Q&A: The Hostage Deal
The Hostage Deal
Question
Hello Rabbi Michi,
Only recently did I see the posts you wrote in which you expressed your position regarding the hostage deal, and I was saddened to discover that you oppose hostage deals, including those that have already taken place.
I read the arguments, and since a calming pill or a psychologist will not remove the sadness (even if it is only an emotion), I would like to present to you a number of arguments in favor of the deal and an attempt to address some of your arguments.
1. It is a basic premise that there is no room whatsoever to compare the hostages from October 7 to anyone who was kidnapped or taken captive in the past.
The hostages are in Hamas tunnels solely because of the disgraceful failure of the state (whether military leadership or government) to fulfill its most basic duty toward its citizens: safeguarding their personal security in general, and that of the communities near Gaza in particular.
This failure is in effect a blatant violation of the most fundamental condition in the contract between the state and its citizens, and therefore it bears the duty—one that can even be described as sacred—to do everything to specifically fulfill this violated contract.
This could and should have been done only by making the return of the hostages the first goal the government set for the war.
2. You yourself state that there is no reasonable way to define the goal of the war as returning the hostages while at the same time setting a parallel goal of destroying Hamas.
Since returning the hostages is a moral, ethical, and contractual duty, as a correction of the criminal negligence (in my view even rising to the level of a crime) that brought October 7 upon us in general and the kidnapping of the hostages in particular, then this goal should be the dominant one even if it harms or limits the goal of destroying Hamas.
3. The war is therefore meant to destroy Hamas, but only insofar as it also brings about the return of the hostages, and to the extent that the goal of destruction harms or might harm the hostages, the state must adjust its actions against Hamas so as not to undermine the return of the hostages.
4. In all of the above I have not included the emotional component: compassion, mutual responsibility, preventing suffering, the duty toward the families whose suffering is indescribable, and to which we as human beings and as Jews are committed.
5. Your claim that the considerations and discourse regarding hostage deals reflect a psychosis of emotionalism and are devoid of logic, reason, and substantive arguments that should not be allowed to influence the achievement of the state’s goal, which is destroying Hamas, is factually incorrect in the case of this war—even if I were to agree with your basic assumption that worthy leadership must know how to sacrifice the individual for the sake of the state’s higher goals.
In our case, under the leadership of the prime minister and his associates (and I remember the grades you once gave this government), this basic assumption has no basis or relevance.
A. They are responsible for defining the plainly contradictory war aims, and this did not happen due to lack of thought—quite the opposite.
B. The certain and immediate danger of the hostages being killed or otherwise dying outweighs the future danger that may perhaps occur due to the release of a large number of terrorists and the failure to completely destroy Hamas, especially when it is already militarily very weakened.
During Operation Entebbe, several of the greatest Torah sages convened and ruled that the kidnappers’ demand should be accepted and that the number of terrorists they demanded should be released from prison in order to free the hostages.
Rabbi Ovadia Yosef ruled: “According to the law, it appears that we truly must be more and more concerned about the immediate danger to the hundred Jewish hostages, as the flame of the sword is brandished over their heads by the cruel terrorist hijackers threatening to execute them… whereas the future danger that may occur from releasing the forty imprisoned terrorists is not currently at issue in an immediate way, but rather in the long term and only after some time.”
This reasoning applies to our case as well, both regarding the release of imprisoned terrorists and regarding withdrawal from Gaza.
There is no basis for the presumption of being able to foresee with certainty the disaster that will occur because of the two concessions above, nor any advantage over the view that we will be able to deal with the price, and this requires maximum caution when human life and suffering are at stake.
C. Moreover, the issue of stopping the war was clarified by security officials as solvable, since we can at any time find a pretext to enter Gaza again even if we committed not to do so.
The same applies to the released terrorists, with whom the security forces will in all likelihood be able to deal if the problem perhaps arises, and perhaps it will not, and in any case we do not know when.
Netanyahu himself just proved that although he signed the three-stage agreement, once he decided that he was not going to fulfill the commitment to begin stage two of the agreement, with all that this entails, he allowed himself to violate the agreement he signed and claim that he wants to extend stage one.
He can act the same way even if he withdraws from the Strip and declares an end to the war: the hostages will be returned, and he will find a reason to violate the agreement and enter Gaza.
D. Do you trust the judgment of the government and its leader that the price of withdrawing from the Philadelphi Corridor, declaring the end of the war, and releasing imprisoned terrorists does not justify freeing the hostages?
This is the same government that just withdrew from the Netzarim Corridor for the hostages released in the first phase, when in May the prime minister declared emphatically that withdrawing from the Netzarim Corridor was a national security disaster, and because of this he torpedoed a deal and brought about the deaths of at least six hostages and several more soldiers.
This is the same government, and the same leader, who signed the three-stage deal identical to the agreement proposed in May and even agreed to withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor, but when stage one ended he changed his mind and no longer wants to leave that corridor.
E. Can you confidently accept and rely on Netanyahu’s judgment that we should return to fighting, with all that entails, when to this day he has presented no “day after” plan, and when such a decision will certainly lead to the killing of at least some of the hostages, and perhaps for some of them will end like the Ron Arad case, and prolong their suffering with every passing hour?
F. Can you state as emphatically as you wrote that there is no place for a deal even if the hostages are killed, when I am sure that you too harbor doubts as to whether the prime minister’s conduct throughout the fighting has involved political and personal considerations and a strong desire to preserve the government intact.
If you do have doubts, and in light of Netanyahu’s many decisions during the war that speak for themselves and that common sense cannot deny, then there is certainly doubt here, and in such a balance it is absolutely forbidden to sacrifice human lives.
6. I dare to cast doubt on your certainty that you are unwilling to be a party to a discourse in which feelings of mercy, compassion, concern for others, and the like are given a place—perhaps even a large one—components that in your view belong in the psychologist’s room. And I would allow myself to add that these components together create mutual responsibility, which is already fully within the realm of intellect, rationality, and very sound reasoning.
I have more arguments in reserve, including substantial opposition to your distinction between right and left, between secular and religious, regarding the components underlying the decisions or ideology of the two groups—and even support for the opposite distinction—but space is short.
In conclusion, I stand astonished and truly do not understand how you, Rabbi Michi, and all the many who joined the opposition to the deal do not give weight—even if only a few grams tipping toward doubt as to the correctness of your opposition—when we are dealing with matters of life and death.
Is it not proper to be a bit more humble and not presume to decide so emphatically the fate of our brothers and sisters, the fate of entire families, and the ending of ongoing suffering every hour that we do not act to return them?
Do you really have all the information in all its aspects to know what will happen in the future, and on the basis of what you know to determine fates with such one-sided certainty, to the point of voting for Ben Gvir?
As far as I am concerned, abandoning the hostages will lie as an eternal disgrace upon each of us as individuals and upon us as a state, and will severely harm our resilience as a people and as a state.
I hope we will pass the tests before us with the help of common sense and wisdom, and as human beings and as Jews, also with the proper measure of emotion.
Answer
Hello.
Thank you for the detailed letter. I’ll try to address it point by point.
Let me begin by saying that of course I very much want all the hostages to return. Who doesn’t?! I also agree that there was a horrifying abandonment here and an awful blunder by all of us (the whole society, not just the army or the government—including the hostages themselves). And finally, I strongly oppose the emotional discourse being conducted on this issue, because emotionalism leads to superficiality and to the wrong course of action. In this matter, because of the emotional charge, emotion is more harmful than usual.
Now I’ll try to respond to the arguments.
1. I agree with most of the premises but not with the conclusion. It is definitely correct to compare the hostages to other cases. There was indeed abandonment and a blunder here, but such blunders have led to many casualties from terrorism and in wars. Others will tell you that the disengagement was a blunder that brought all of this upon us (in my view that is not entirely correct, but it just illustrates for you the meaning of claims like yours). In our case, the blunder was made by the government and the army. By contrast, the price we will pay for such a deal will fall on all of us and for a very long time. Therefore the comparisons to whoever made a blunder and should pay the price for it are mistaken. Although, as I wrote, there was also a blunder by society as a whole, that includes the hostages themselves. We all failed, and to this day are still failing, in our improper attitude toward threats from the Palestinians (including the push for a deal at any price. Surrender to terror is a continuation of that same blunder).
Therefore I do not agree with the conclusion that returning the hostages should have been the first mission. Absolutely not. A state does not set itself central goals to bring back 100 people. That is unnecessary emotionalism that leads to mistaken conclusions. A state has broader goals of its own, and although it sounds cruel, a state cannot operate otherwise. We also send soldiers to die, and sometimes that is over territorial and economic interests and not over saving lives (this is the Talmudic passage about “stretch out your hands against the battalion”—an optional war). Defending our territory and our ability to live here takes far greater precedence than returning the hostages, because these are broad interests that concern our very existence.
For example, we do not direct our entire budget to the healthcare system, but also allocate money to education and culture and more—even though human life is above all. The considerations of a state are different from those of a private individual. So too here.
2. I answered that. Just note that the same claim applies against the supporters of the deal, who explain to us that we will make a deal, return the hostages, and then destroy Hamas. That is throwing sand in people’s eyes. Both sides are lying to us in claiming that both goals can be achieved. They cannot. By the way, in my estimation it is impossible to achieve the return of all the hostages even if we make that the sole goal. Hamas will not give up all its cards.
3. Same as above.
4. In my opinion, you did include it. Putting the return of the hostages at the top of the mission list is a result of emotion, because logic rejects that completely.
5.
A. Same as above.
B. I have written more than once that the future danger from releasing terrorists is, in my view, not a consideration. If that were the issue, I would support releasing all the terrorists in exchange for the hostages. A certain present danger overrides a possible future one. I don’t need Rabbi Ovadia for that. To me it is completely obvious.
The claim that Hamas is weakened is a continuation of the same mistake I described. The concern is not that it will conquer the State of Israel, and it never was such a concern. Therefore its weakness is irrelevant. It is a terror organization, not an army. In my view nothing has changed in terms of the danger from Hamas as a result of this war.
C. I don’t buy this argument. Hamas is not stupid, and it will not give in without serious guarantees. Hamas too saw what Netanyahu just did now (by the way, Netanyahu acted here exactly as you recommended: he signed an agreement to get as many hostages as possible, and then violated it. And here immediately afterward you criticize him for that).
D. Unfortunately, I don’t trust anyone. Not the government, not those who oppose it, and not the security establishment. I’ve lost trust in all of them.
E. I don’t see a “day after” plan from anyone. Therefore the only possible plan right now is to keep slaughtering them and not stop for decades. We’ve had our fill of multinational forces and the Palestinian Authority (which was already in Gaza). I don’t buy this argument.
F. Unfortunately political considerations are involved on all sides; that’s part of the game. And I trust no one. I form my position not because I do or don’t trust someone, but because in my opinion that is what is right.
By the way, the desire to preserve the government intact is not an argument for criticism. It is an entirely legitimate consideration, since the government’s integrity is threatened because of the substantive dispute over the hostages and the war. Why is it a criticism that a government makes decisions by agreement among its components? Isn’t that the point of a coalition? Have not all governments until today exempted the Haredim from military service and core studies in order to preserve the integrity of their coalitions? If Bibi did what he himself wanted without taking others into account, they would criticize him for being a dictator acting outside procedure. It’s all positioning.
6. Unfortunately, I too am a human being. No one is perfect. But one ought not involve emotion in decisions like these.
I would draw your attention to the fact that from your perspective all the arguments lead in the same direction. Doesn’t that strike you as odd? I definitely think the decision is complex and there are considerations both ways (for example, the danger from releasing the terrorists truly is not a consideration in my view either, even though I oppose the deal. For example, I do indeed harshly criticize Bibi and the government and yet here I support them), but in my opinion the relative weight of the considerations leads to opposition to the deal, and Bibi and his coalition are pure black without exception. It seems that everything leads you in the same direction. In my view that is an indicator of emotionalism. Though a person does not always feel what is happening within himself (and of course that is also true of me).
That brings me to your conclusion. I give not a gram of weight? Of course I do. On the contrary, I give it great weight, but there are counter-considerations as well. By contrast, in arguments that all lead in the same direction, there is not a gram of weight given to the opposite side. I raise such criticism of one-sidedness and dogmatism דווקא against the supporters of the deal.
As for humility, I’m not sure I possess that virtue. But why am I accused of lacking humility and you are not? Why is it permitted for you to hold your position emphatically without giving a gram of weight to the other side, and that is wonderfully humble, while I, who acknowledge that there are considerations both ways but form a position against the deal, am the one who is emphatic and not humble? Is such a reversal of the sides not a product of emotionalism?
Discussion on Answer
I think I could not have hoped for a better outcome from the discussion. If we remain in disagreement while each side understands that there are considerations on the other side, that in itself is a very deep repair of today’s fracture. In my view that fracture is much deeper than the content of the disputes themselves. Both sides entrench themselves in their bubble, convinced that the other side is evil or stupid.
I wondered whether my claim about emotionalism among supporters of the deal also indicates such a failure. I really don’t think so, because I agree that there are weighty considerations in favor of the deal. The claim about emotionalism does not stem from my thinking that all your arguments are absurd, but from the fact that they all lead in the same direction. I definitely think there are arguments in favor of the deal. By the way, stage one already surprised me. We gained hostages and insisted on not ending the war. It turns out, to my delight, that we too know how to violate agreements. If they go back to fighting and continue to insist, I will admit that I was wrong in opposing the deal. Carrying out stage one and returning to war was worth it.
Regarding your claim that the consideration of releasing terrorists is a future threat, as opposed to the threat to the hostages which is immediate:
In my view you did not address a much more important point here: psychologically, how the enemy perceives a country willing to pay “any price,” or an excessive price, for its hostages. As I understand it, everyone who does not like us sees this and understands that the most worthwhile thing is to kidnap, because if you kidnapped someone, you are then in the strongest possible position no matter how weak you are.
And if in the past we had taken a firm and very painful position for us—of not releasing at an excessive price—the enemy would have had much less motivation to kidnap, and today perhaps we would have had fewer hostages, or alternatively they would have been released at a lower price.
Hello Rabbi,
Thank you for the quick and detailed response.
We will probably remain in disagreement on this issue.
As for your remarks regarding my lack of humility and certainty against the background of my criticism of the lack of humility and certainty in the camp opposing the deal, I accept and agree with what you said, and immediately add even a full kilogram to the opinion of the other side, and intellectually understand your reasons and respect them, though I disagree with them.
It may be that I am guilty of emotionalism, but in my view my position on this issue is in reasonable balance with the arguments of intellect and logic, and from my perspective justifies a struggle to return the hostages.
Hoping for good news.