Q&A: Punishment in Jewish Law
Punishment in Jewish Law
Question
Dear Rabbi Michael, hello!
In one of your lectures you spoke about two types of authority, substantive and formal, and according to what you said a person cannot be obligated to accept formal authority. And if we are speaking about substantive authority, then he has in any case already been convinced. My question is therefore: how is it possible to punish a Sabbath desecrator by stoning and the like, seeing that if he does not believe in God, or in the Sabbath, and so on, what meaning is there to punishing him? (As is well known, Moses Mendelssohn indeed opposed punishments based on religion and belief.) Perhaps one could say that the Sabbath, and in general all the laws in the Torah that are religious and are not directed toward another person directly, nevertheless involve an offense judged as a criminal offense (and not a religious one, because as stated religion and beliefs and opinions are not something that can be coerced), just like someone who stole or murdered and the like; so too, one who desecrates the Sabbath endangers society socially and spiritually and the “public peace” of Israel. And the same applies to the rebellious elder, who is basically rebelling against the ruling of the Sanhedrin and thereby endangering the Torah and the proper social foundation (as, if I recall correctly, Maimonides wrote in the Guide for the Perplexed).
I would appreciate it if you could clarify your words for me.
And your answer will greatly honor me, Nehorai
Answer
Indeed, one cannot punish in such a case. Coercion in matters of belief is coercion in every respect. The punishment given to Sabbath desecrators applies only to those who did so because of their impulse, but they know that one may not desecrate the Sabbath. Someone who thinks there is no such prohibition will not be punished. And the responsum of the Radbaz is well known, that coercion in matters of belief is like coercion in every respect, and this is obvious.
By the way, I do not see a difference between religious prohibitions and moral prohibitions toward another person. A person who does not know that the act is forbidden is not punished. Of course, protection against harm is relevant even in such a case, but not a punitive sanction.
“Is not My word like fire,” the humble one from Baghdad
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