Question

Regarding your conceptual analysis of leniency and stringency, I made a suggestion and a few comments a few days ago.
I made a serious mistake in the proof from Maimonides; there he is talking about the prohibition against reciting a blessing, not about being lenient in cases of doubt regarding blessings.
But my question from Tosafot in Kiddushin still seems to stand: why, if we find a case where the ruling is stringent, is it not considered a leniency? After all, it simply opened up more options.
My suggestion makes the whole discussion unnecessary, and no, it is not similar to yours, because removing a halakhic norm is not required in order to add options; even if it replaces another option, as long as what he did was set the Jewish law aside and turn the situation into one devoid of halakhic significance, that is a leniency.