Libet-style experiments on choosing, which would show certain predictive ability, would not prove that there is no choice?

I explained in my book that they would not. Both because you would never get a certain result in an experiment, and also because my choices now are the result of choices I made in the past. Even if they can now predict in advance what I will do in the dilemma before me, that can still be the result of a choice of some value that I made in the past. At this point I am acting “deterministically” in accordance with the value that I freely chose in the past.

I was asking about a hypothetical situation in which they do manage to get a certain result in an experiment. In such a situation, to argue that it is true that in all the times we performed the experiment there was no choice, but in the past there was a choice that shaped the brain so that it would deterministically choose that value again, sounds to me like a strained explanation. In such a situation determinism sounds more plausible.

Not to me. But plausibility is something one can argue about.