Q&A: Disagreeing with the Talmud Stringently
Disagreeing with the Talmud Stringently
Question
A Torah scholar who holds that something is prohibited at the Torah level even though the Talmud permits it—whether there was a dispute about it that was decided leniently, for example if he holds that rice is a grain species with respect to leaven on Passover, or whether according to everyone it is permitted, for example if he holds that one who slaughters on the Sabbath renders the slaughter invalid—is he obligated to conduct himself according to his own view, when he is actually disagreeing with the Talmud itself on the law and not on matters of factual reality?
Answer
It is very unlikely that there is any obligation. Once the Jewish law has been decided, that is the Jewish law. Is there nevertheless some value in being stringent? Possibly yes, but only as a stringency. There is also a possibility that it would be forbidden: “You deserved to be held liable by your own conduct, because you inclined toward the words of Beit Shammai.”
Discussion on Answer
If public acceptance determines the Jewish law, then it is the same thing. The assumption is that public acceptance is binding as an interpretation of the Torah, like the Sanhedrin. Still, there is room to distinguish it from the Sanhedrin, because here perhaps there is more reason to be stringent in accordance with my own view.
That is the Jewish law because there is formal authority by virtue of public acceptance; how can such acceptance exempt that Torah scholar from an obligation according to his own view?