Q&A: Motivations for Halakhic Change
Motivations for Halakhic Change
Question
I am reading your book Moves Among the Stationary.
In the list of objections to halakhic change, you present the claim that change carries a Reform odor, a feeling of lack of submission, and so on, and you argue, rightly, that this is not a valid consideration, because truth should be discussed in terms of truth and falsehood, and not in terms of such motives.
But then, in favor of halakhic change, you propose the claim that ossified Jewish law arouses difficult feelings.
What is the difference? In areas of Jewish law that are clear and cannot be changed, is that argument relevant? The discussion about change should be halakhic: the various mechanisms, changes in factual reality, and so on—not the public's attitude toward the matter.
Answer
You are conflating two levels of discussion. The motivation to look for a mechanism can be anything at all. But after the motivation, there must come a halakhic argument that holds water. I explained this very clearly in the book as well (see, for example, the discussion of Yitzhak Gilat's book).
Discussion on Answer
That is, a motivation for change can be anything, unlike a motivation for not changing, which requires a strong justification.
Correction: line 2. “Ossification” instead of “training.”
What is required of someone trying to understand is to read the answer. I’ll repeat it.
You are conflating two levels of discussion: the motivation to make a change can be meta-halakhic, psychological, consequentialist, or something else. But the change itself has to be based on a halakhic argument that holds water.
When I describe the harms of the ossification of Jewish law, I am describing the motivation to look for a mechanism for change. The harm itself is not an argument for change. By contrast, when I reject arguments of the sort that innovation leads to coldness, I am saying that such arguments may be a motivation for conservatism, but under no circumstances are they a halakhic argument that justifies conservatism.
I never thought for a moment that lack of sympathy for Jewish law was a mechanism; obviously that is only a motivation. I just thought you were applying a double standard with motivations: regarding not changing, you claim that this is not an argument, whereas regarding change it is.
By the way, it seems reasonable to me to argue that way.
If that’s what you thought, then you were mistaken, as I explained here twice.
Let me clarify: when you reject motivations for conservatism, do you reject them only on the halakhic plane, and not on the level of motivation?
And on the level of motivations itself, is your claim that lack of sympathy is more serious than coldness?
I’d be glad if you could answer yes or no.
Thank you for your time; I appreciate it.
The argument in favor of ossifying Jewish law says that it leads to coldness; the argument in favor of change says that ossification leads to a lack of sympathy. They're both on the same plane, no?
What am I missing? Or do you want to argue that the motivation for change is not equal to the motivation for not changing, which is legitimate in my view—I’m just trying to understand.