Q&A: Changes in Jewish Law
Changes in Jewish Law
Question
Hello Rabbi,
You explained that the difference between Reform and Orthodox is the point that there is a need to find a valid mechanism for changing Jewish law, and that motivation alone is not enough.
But it isn’t clear to me how your approach (Orthodox in this context) accepts Fastnich’s claims (for example regarding gentile courts), even though you didn’t explain what the halakhic mechanism is that could permit such a thing, and were satisfied only with the fact that here the motivation is tremendously strong, and therefore we would accept a change in Jewish law?
Answer
Fastnich is activated only where the problem is acute. There is precedent for this in a transgression for the sake of Heaven, where too one permits violating Jewish law in an extreme situation. Among the Reform, this is a standing policy.
Discussion on Answer
A transgression for the sake of Heaven is not a halakhic principle but a pre-halakhic or meta-halakhic one. Jewish law does not instruct one to violate itself. See my articles on a transgression for the sake of Heaven here on the site. You don’t need a precedent, just as the Sages did this without precedent. Perhaps Jael, the wife of Heber the Kenite, is a precedent.
A small hypothetical pilpul question…
In a case where there had been no precedent of a transgression for the sake of Heaven, in your opinion could one still use Fastnich’s argument?
That is, is the starting point that in the end there is still commitment to Jewish law, or is there some other mechanism (commitment to morality that clashes with commitment to Jewish law, for example)?
*Another possibility is that even if historically there had been no such precedent, it could still be inferred by reasoning that the principle of a transgression for the sake of Heaven is itself a halakhic principle..