Q&A: Temporary Emergency Ruling in Our Times
Temporary Emergency Ruling in Our Times
Question
Hello,
I came across an article in Akdamot that discussed halakhic ruling among the Conservatives. I saw there that they discussed their two famous leniencies permitting travel by car on the Sabbath and the marriage of a priest to a divorcée—rulings that I had always seen as baseless. But apparently they noted that these laws were permitted as a “temporary emergency ruling,” a mechanism that, as far as I remember, can in fact be used nowadays by a local religious court, and I was confused—very confused.
Does it follow, then, that even their most extreme rulings have a halakhic basis? After all, if so, one could uproot anything in the Torah.
Thank you.
Answer
Hello Yehuda.
I should begin by saying that I’m surprised that Jewish law disappoints you. Would you prefer everything to be as you thought from the outset? Do you observe Jewish law, or your own wishes? If this is the halakhic truth, then it is not disappointing. This is the Jewish law, and that is what is binding. And if this is not the Jewish law—then there is nothing to be disappointed about.
As for the matter itself: most Conservative rulings do have a significant halakhic basis (unlike the Reform, who are not a halakhic movement). There are a few people there—very few—who really know how to learn, and they usually write the responsa or at least review them.
True, they usually go a bit farther than what is accepted among the Orthodox, but as far as I know this is generally done within the framework of Jewish law (mainly by returning to earlier sources and opinions that were rejected). Sometimes, in my opinion, they are actually right and the Orthodox are merely being conservative. In other cases, genuinely problematic changes were made. Life is more complex than what they taught you in cheder—metaphorically speaking.
As for uprooting something as a temporary emergency ruling, I think it is accepted that only the Sanhedrin can do this. But there is room to discuss cases where the times require it (as the medieval authorities write, that when the times require it they uproot something from the Torah even through positive action, for example the permission to kill an informer who hands over another’s money, and that the leading religious court of the generation may impose corporal punishments and the like). In any case, it is very likely that this is not something available to a local religious court.
Discussion on Answer
1. Definitely. I am not aware of any limitation on the ability to interpret through the thirteen hermeneutic principles. On the contrary, Maimonides writes several times as something obvious that a religious court issuing a halakhic ruling does so also through the thirteen principles. Of course, such an interpretation does not bind the public, but only the one making the interpretation. The public is bound only by the Sanhedrin because of the commandment “do not deviate.”
And even regarding the individual himself, he may indeed interpret—but of course only if he knows how to do so. Nowadays no one really knows how to use the methods of interpretation. I have been working on this myself for several years, trying to reconstruct the matter.
2. Absolutely yes. After the Talmud, no one has absolute authority. The words of the medieval authorities carry weight, and it is proper to take that into account. See Rosh on Sanhedrin, chapter 4, section 6, and in my article here:
Thank you! It’s not a matter of disappointment but of surprise, since until now I had understood it differently.
A few more questions, if I may:
1. Nowadays, is it permitted to derive verses in ways that the Sages did not derive through the thirteen hermeneutic principles?
2. Suppose that in a certain Talmudic passage all the medieval authorities interpreted it in a certain way—are we allowed today to disagree with them and interpret it differently?