Q&A: Choice and Condemnation
Choice and Condemnation
Question
Hello. I’m a determinist, and as a result of my determinism I reached the conclusion (which seems fairly obvious to me) that it’s impossible to morally condemn anyone, because nobody really chose to sin, etc. (Punishment is only a means to prevent further crime.) I wondered whether a person who believes in free choice could arrive at a similar conclusion. I’m not talking about moral condemnation of the type “he did something that is objectively bad,” etc., but the more emotionally charged kind, like someone who hates Hitler because of what he did. My question is this: does a person who hates Hitler because of what he did, and believes in free choice, necessarily think that if he had arrived at the same “topological balance” (according to your analogy) in which Hitler found himself when he made his crucial decisions, he would have chosen differently from Hitler? Where does such confidence come from? After all, he was never put to such a test. A reasonable (and kind) position for a libertarian, it seems to me, would be to say: “It may be that in his place I would have done the same thing, therefore I do not condemn him (in the emotionally charged sense).” What do you think?
Answer
You’re asking a question that is based on a contradiction: “If I were in his place I would have done the same thing” basically assumes determinism. The essence of libertarianism is that under those very same circumstances even Hitler himself could have acted differently, and all the more so someone else.
Beyond that, your whole discussion is unclear to me. If you are a determinist, you can’t even discuss whether to condemn or not. The concept of condemnation does not exist in your world. At most there is some bad feeling in your gut. Beyond that, the very fact that you reached some conclusion is meaningless, because that conclusion is forced upon you. So what is the point of talking with you at all?
Discussion on Answer
On second thought, I don’t think that in your view a person can choose what to believe anyway. No one chooses his intuitions. So it becomes even less clear where you see any advantage of the chooser over the hypnotized person.
I don’t know whether yes or no. But if I too were to act like him, I too would be wicked. Why should that prevent me from judging Hitler? In my view, someone in such a situation is not supposed to murder millions. If you claim that he was compelled to do so, then once again we’re back to determinism.
Of course you can worry that perhaps you are a wicked person who simply hasn’t yet been revealed as such. I don’t really understand what that has to do with judgment.
If when you speak about condemnation you mean a bad feeling in the gut, then we are not talking about the same thing. Regarding feelings, it would be better to consult a psychologist or take a pill, not start a philosophical discussion.
If the conclusion is forced on you, then you have no indication whatsoever that it is true, because the fact that you think so is only because you are compelled to think it. It may of course be that by chance you are compelled to think the truth, but you have no way of knowing that.
This discussion mixes planes of discourse and confuses concepts (maybe because the system that compels you isn’t especially successful), and I don’t really see any point in it.
It doesn’t seem to me that you understood what I meant, but I’ll let it go (because there really isn’t much point in it). I’ll respond only to the issue at the end.
If the conclusion is forced on me, that means I’m forced to think it is correct, so I have no choice but to think it is correct. But again, I don’t understand how your case is different from mine. Did you choose to have a certain intuition? No? So why do you believe it represents truth?
I didn’t choose an intuition. This is what seems correct to me, and therefore this is what I think. If I am compelled (that is, if my belief that I am not compelled is mistaken), then indeed that doesn’t mean very much. But at least according to my own view, in which I am not compelled, the conclusion is that this is probably the truth (as I see it). But someone who thinks he is compelled to his conclusions cannot, by his own view, know anything at all about the truth.
I don’t understand—what does it mean that you are not compelled? After all, you say that you did not choose what would seem right to you, so if you didn’t choose it, what is that if not compulsion?
“I chose the intuitions” sounds arbitrary. So I wrote that I exercised judgment, and this is what seemed right to me.
See here: <a href="https://mikyab.net/%D7%9E%D7%94%D7%99-%D7%90%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%98%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%92%D7%A0%D7%A6%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%97%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%A9-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%9C-%D7%93/" rel="nofollow">https://mikyab.net/%D7%9E%D7%94%D7%99-%D7%90%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%98%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%92%D7%A0%D7%A6%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%97%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%A9-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%9C-%D7%93/</a>
What I mean is that obviously a person has intuitions that he himself did not decide on, as in the sphere of values (I did not decide that murder is bad and helping others is good). That is imposed on me and forms part of the topographical outline within which I operate. But I do have the ability to criticize those intuitions. On the value plane: to determine what comes from impulse and what comes from values. On the intellectual plane (judgment): whether an intuition is true or not (or: what the truth is in light of the totality of intuitions). The initial feeling can mislead me, and therefore I critique it before I formulate a decision. That is judgment. Sometimes there are considerations in both directions, and I have to decide which one prevails. The system that is imposed on us does not pass directly into the position that is formed; there is another stage of review and judgment, in which I decide whether it is correct or not. That stage is not imposed on me and is not mechanical, exactly as in the sphere of values.
When I say that claim X is true, that itself is a claim. The reviewing system confirms that claim X, which at first glance seems true to me, is indeed true (in my eyes). According to my view, this happens in two stages: I am supposed to become aware of claim X (and that is imposed on me—a mechanical calculation), and then to confirm that it is true (and that is judgment).
That doesn’t mean, of course, that in my view I cannot make a mistake. There may be situations in which in reality X is not true even though I decided that it is. But that statement means that this (X) is my position at the moment (and not merely that this is what I happen to feel at the moment).
I’ll repeat once again: you can of course deny this and claim that the reviewing mechanism is also imposed on me, or ask according to what I decide whether a certain intuition is correct or not. Isn’t that too just part of the calculation (it just happens in two stages)? That is a skeptical question that reflects your determinist position. Maybe you are right, but my claim is that you are not, and therefore at least according to my own view I do have judgment and there is justification for the trust I place in the system.
In any case, here again we’ve returned to the discussion of determinism. If for the sake of our discussion you assume my libertarian position and ask something about it and within it, then in that same discussion you cannot criticize me from a determinist point of view. That is what libertarianism means, whether you accept it or not. You can deny its existence, but you can’t dance at two weddings at once.
If I understood correctly, the reason you think free judgment is needed in order to arrive at truth is so that you know your opinion really came from you. I don’t think that’s right. The very fact that your opinions stem from your intuitions is definitely enough for me, whether there is some stage of choice somewhere or not. I don’t need to invent some deeper source from which my views arise deep, deep from my soul, or something like that.
It seems to me there is a kind of clash here between this argument of yours and intellectual honesty. After all, it seems to any intellectually honest person that you cannot choose what to believe (and that at no point in any argument can you choose what seems reasonable to you, but only apply that knowledge, which was already present in your intuition from time immemorial). Imagine some guy reads Does God Play Dice? and says, “Wow! What a brilliant book! It indeed seems clearer than ever that God exists!” Does it seem reasonable to you that at the end of the book he will decide that nevertheless he chooses not to believe in God (without a good argument)? Would you call him an intellectually honest person?
I don’t think skepticism regarding your view necessarily reflects a determinist position. Here, suppose I held your opinion: even if I believed in free choice, it still doesn’t seem to me that I would believe it enters anywhere in the process of arriving at truth. At every stage of the process you point to what seems to you intuitively most reasonable (assuming you are honest, of course), and you will always point to what from the outset seemed more reasonable to you. In your terminology, you will always point to what eidetic vision shows you. I can’t choose whether to see a tree in front of me or see an elephant, right?
Not in order to make sure that my opinion came from me (what is this “I” anyway?), but in order to make sure that it is true. Even if it came from outside me, if it is true I will adopt it.
Apparently we understand honesty differently. I have a clear sense that I have judgment that determines what is true. As for the example of my book, definitely yes. A person can say that he has no answer to those arguments, but something still seems implausible to him, and continue not to believe. I have met many such people, and some of them were honest in my estimation.
I’m currently writing a post about this issue, and maybe it will become clearer there.
Okay, so for some reason you see importance in that verification being free. From my point of view that is not so, and it seems entirely sufficient to me to believe what seems reasonable to me, even if the conclusion is completely forced on me.
I’m not referring to a case where something seems implausible to him, but to a case where all your arguments seem to him reasonable and correct, and it seems to him very, very reasonable that God exists. In my opinion, if such a person says that nevertheless he does not believe in God, he is probably lying (to himself or to me). But that is exactly what you are asking the determinist to do: my intuitions tell me strongly and clearly that I am forced to believe what I believe, and for some reason you are asking me to give them up, because your conception of the path to truth is different from mine? So it seems that either you are asking me to do the impossible (change my intuitions), or to lie. I’m not convinced.
And I think I’ll try to formulate again what I asked in the first post. If you think you already answered it, you don’t need to answer again; maybe this is more for those reading from the sidelines. I’ll just clarify that I’m writing these things from the point of view of a person who does believe in free choice (even though I don’t).
I think you can agree that the topographical outline of a person who chooses to rape someone, or abuse a cat, or do other monstrous acts, is very different from yours. The temptation faced by someone who goes and rapes is much greater than the temptation you have to rape (correct me if I’m wrong). Now, of course, you too have “mountains” in life that you have to climb, like the mountain of participating in the hakafot, for example, but no one would call you a bad person if you didn’t participate in the hakafot. My point is that even from a libertarian point of view, a conversation like this could take place:
Reuven: Did you hear the news? So-and-so raped and abused eighty girls—what a despicable, horrible, disgusting person!
Shimon: I think he deserves more pity than condemnation. Think about it: how many of the people you know have to deal at all with urges as strong and terrible as he surely had? Have you faced such an urge? Does a person choose the tests that come his way? That so-and-so had bad luck, and a great test came his way, and he failed it just as all of us fail our tests in life… (etc., etc.)
Let me clarify again that both Reuven and Shimon believe in free choice.
The reason I’m bothering with this question, by the way, is that for some reason I find comfort and gentleness in the thought that no person is truly despicable and evil. Maybe that’s just me. It could be that this really is more connected to psychology than to philosophy, as you said, but for some reason labeling a person as “evil” seems to me fairly philosophical. I don’t know.
If the conclusion is forced on you, then it is also forced on you to think that it is reasonable. That is simply a misunderstanding.
I gave various examples of something that seems reasonable and yet I decide not to adopt it. There is no point repeating that again and again.
I’m not asking the determinist for anything. I have no expectations of him and see no point in talking with him (as I wrote to you at the beginning). I didn’t ask you to give up anything; I only claimed that if you are a determinist and nevertheless accept your conclusions, then you are mistaken. One is allowed to be mistaken, and I am not asking you not to be mistaken. I am only stating that you are mistaken. That’s all.
In fact, if you are convinced that the intuitions forced on you are correct (which is, of course, nonsense), then in my view what you really mean to say is only that this conviction itself is the result of your reviewing activity. Otherwise the talk about “being convinced that the conclusions forced on you are correct” is meaningless. They are forced on you, full stop. What is that “conviction,” if not your review activity operating on those intuitions?
Well, I think we’ve exhausted this.
As for your second message, I completely agree to such a conversation within a libertarian framework, and there is not the slightest trace in it of undermining the ability to judge. Those are merely arguments for a lighter punishment (or reduced culpability), and that’s all.
Of course, from your point of view he could have acted differently; I’m not trying to change your mind about that. My point is that you don’t know whether, in a situation where you were put to a test like the one Hitler faced, you would behave differently. In the topography analogy, one could say for example that for Hitler to do the moral thing was like climbing a high mountain. The question is: why are you so sure that if you were in his place you would have had the mental strength to climb that mountain? Let me just sharpen what I meant by condemnation. I’m not talking about condemning an act (act X is bad), but condemning a person (person X is bad). Why condemn him if it isn’t clear to you that in his situation (in the topographical balance in which he found himself, in his test) you would act differently?
Your other questions aren’t really related to the issue (and I’m pretty sure we’ve already talked about them quite a few times), but I’ll answer anyway.
Indeed, that “bad feeling in the gut” is what I call condemnation (in the body of the question I called it hatred toward a person because he is bad). So what if the conclusion is forced on me? Why is the fact that a conclusion was forced on someone relevant to its truth-value? I can force you to believe something true or false, and you can (in your view) choose to believe something true or false, so what advantage does the chooser have?