Between Halacha and Morality: Noah's son was killed for less than the value of a penny, and no one makes war on a person in the world until they call him to peace.

Dear Rabbi Michi, greetings.
 
Following your column on between Halacha and morality. And then the column on addressing Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu's words regarding the deaths in the disaster in Turkey.
 
An example came to mind of an issue in which there is a gap between halakha and morality. And it seems that the poskim themselves may also relate to the issue itself in this way.
 
It is a well-known rule in the laws of the Noahide people that Noahide people are killed for a one-time offense against any of the commandments in principle. If a Noahide person steals, he is subject to death. And if he kills, he is subject to death. And if he commits one of the forbidden sexual sins, he is subject to death. And so is a person who worships idols, he is subject to death. And if you look at those same judges who sentence every Noahide person to death for a minor one-time offense, you are called upon to act differently in practice, not only from the perspective of peace. I will give some examples that occurred to me:
 
A. Maimonides is very strict in the Noahide laws. He states that for each of the offenses committed intentionally, he is liable. And it does not matter whether he knew about the prohibition in the offense or not. But only whether he intended to commit that specific offense or not. For example, if he came to his friend's wife but thought that she was his wife. Or if he killed a person by mistake. But if he did not know the prohibition – he was killed in 27.
A. B. On the other hand, Maimonides states in the Laws of Kings and Wars that war is not waged against a person in the world or a city until they call for peace. And if the residents of the kingdom and city reconcile with the government of Israel, they are accepted as righteous Noahides.
There is apparently a contradiction here. After all, a son of Noah was killed for less than the equivalent of a penny according to the first section. And a city or kingdom that does not belong to a resident gentile or to the Righteous Among the Nations, but rather to the majority of the Gentiles. In which it is known that everyone has transgressed one of the 7 commandments of the sons of Noah at least once in their lives. So then they are not killed?
Is this a classic case of compromise between the theoretical law that expresses the principled law and the practical law that expresses what is needed in order to achieve the world's correction, for example? (It is true that both of these are theoretical laws in principle, but it seems that one of them expresses the written theoretical ideal and the other the theoretical ideal that must be acted upon). And so in law, there is no raising or lowering. The Maimonides states that it is forbidden to heal a Gentile who is a non-Jew or to save him from death. But on the other hand, it is forbidden to kill him. This is despite the fact that it is known that he is violating the 7 commandments of the sons of Noah (of course, both laws are theoretical again, since today even non-Jews will be saved from death, but I am referring to the division that I already asked about in the previous section).
2. I also remembered education and found an amazing gap. On the one hand, it is also very strict in the laws of the Noahide people. As I understand it, a Noahide is a nickname for a person who lives with or near the people of Israel and violates the 7 commandments. Education says that in principle, except for a woman, any Noahide or Israelite may sentence a Noahide to death. And that in principle, they must die for each of the offenses.
But in his commentary on the commandment to love the stranger, he writes that although it is practiced in practice only by righteous people, it is appropriate to extend the same measure to every person who lives next to us and has nowhere to go. And here too, there is a contradiction between the halakhic ideal that requires such a person to reasonably assume death (since during the period of education, any such stranger is probably also considered a commoner who violates one of the 7 commandments) and the moral ideal that says that in practice one should act toward him with mercy, and even though this is not an explicit contradiction (because it is possible that this is a principled measure that is practiced as long as we see that he does not actually violate the 7 commandments of the Noahide). I certainly find a principled contradiction here.
3. And so with Amalek and the law of accepting immigrants. There is a dispute as to whether it is permissible to accept an Amalekite as a resident immigrant or a legitimate immigrant, so that the obligation to kill him would be extinguished. And I ask: Why is it not a pishta not to accept the law that the son of Noah was killed for less than the value of a penny? And if we have dealt with the Amalekite, all the more so. On the other hand, most of the jurists are reconciled with an Amalek insofar as he accepted the law of a resident immigrant or a legitimate immigrant. And he is not killed afterwards (and if not with an Amalek, then certainly with the law of an Ammonite or Egyptian immigrant there is a gap between these two guidelines).
I am not entering here into the question of the attitude of the Jewish people towards other nations. I am merely asking whether this is something that can be brought up as an example of what is presented as the gap between Halacha (theoretical, religious, written law) and morality (not to act in this way in practice for reasons of correcting a person in accepting the commandments or sanctifying God, or preventing the breeding of enmity between Israel and the nations).
 
thanks