Dina Damalkota Dina and the relationship to the courts

Hello. Blessings and thanks. Unfortunately, this is too long. I quickly skimmed the table of contents (and a little bit about the chapter on 'rule of law') and I have a few quick comments: 0. In my opinion, power over land is only a sign and not a reason. If today the government does not have control over the land, this does not mean that the Rashba does not have Dina Demalkuta either. What's more, to a large extent it has control over the land (can expropriate, monitors land transactions, holds vacant land in the Israel Lands Administration). What's more, today land is not the main means of production, as it was in the past. This entire criterion is problematic nowadays. 1. I think there is no point in relying on the methods of the Rishonim, if the assumption is that public consent is the basis for Dina Demalchuta. One simply needs to see what the public consented to or did not agree to. This is a question of fact and does not depend on the opinions of the Rishonim. 2. Your hasty conclusion that when power is handed over to the judicial system, there is no monarchy is completely absurd in my opinion. The judicial system is part of the governmental establishment, and the public, by virtue of being part of the state, agrees with the three branches of government. In other words, it is the monarchy that gives power to the judicial system. The internal struggles between the branches are part of that multi-armed government, and it is clear that all of them together constitute monarchy. I must say that this seems like a very biased conclusion, especially since it is written with such vehemence that it is inversely proportional to the degree of logic it contains. 3. In my opinion, there is a meta-halachic problem in the lack of recognition of the judicial authorities, and this can be seen in the Haredi society, which is completely dysfunctional because of this. Private police forces have been established there, courts are run in an unsystematic and improper manner, and certainly do not act according to Torah law (after all, they discuss a compromise, which at best is close to the law). And my friend Nadav Shnarb has already written that it is absurd to demand that people not go to courts that do not discuss according to Torah law when the Supreme Court itself insists on not discussing Torah law. He cites a case in which they issued a letter of refusal against a judge who insisted on wanting Torah law. Right now I am writing a column in which I explain my approach regarding the courts of law today as courts. It will be published in the coming days. And again, I apologize for writing without reading, because what the heart desires, time suppresses. I hope my comments didn't miss too much because of that. Good luck and all the best,