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Doubts

שו"תDoubts
שאל לפני 5 שנים

Hello, Your Honor. I recently studied Tractate Horiot and came to far-reaching conclusions from it that completely changed my halachic perception on the one hand, but in my opinion may increase tolerance toward different opinions among the Jewish people, and I would like to hear the rabbi's opinion on the matter.
As the Rabbi surely knows, the tractate deals with the duty of obedience and the degree of responsibility of the one who obeys the Sanhedrin, if they are wrong. According to the rulings of Maimonides and Rabbi Hananel on the matter (I have not seen anyone disagree) who rule according to the opinion of the Sages, it follows that in order to be exempt from a sin offering, several conditions must be met simultaneously, including, among other things, that the Sanhedrin be a Sanhedrin of 71 contiguous members, that the majority of the public follow the erroneous instruction, that there be no one there who told them that they were wrong, etc. If I obeyed the court when at least one of the conditions was not met, I am obligated to make a sin offering according to the offense I committed.
From here I learned a few things, more or less:
A. Of course, if my rabbi is wrong and I obey him, this does not absolve me in the next world (the rabbi's power will not be greater than the power of the Sanhedrin)
B. Even if I follow the majority of the first, etc., it does not exempt me in the next world if the minority is the righteous (as above, especially since they did not sit in one seat, so even after many, there is no room for bias here)
C. Since there is no necessary connection between the commandment "do not deviate" and exemption from sin (am I not obligated to sin even if I obeyed the Sanhedrin as a kosher law if the majority of the public did not follow them), even if someone says that there is something wrong with me and that I should not deviate from the Torah, this does not exempt me from anything. In any case, when I know that he is wrong, I am allowed not to listen to him, and in general, it seems that I am allowed to be harsh towards him myself without making it public in order to avoid sin.
D. Even Jewish custom/acceptance does not exempt me from sinning if it is a mistake, because the nearby Sanhedrin are the sole representative of the Jewish people with almost unlimited authority, and yet they do not exempt me. (The fact that the majority of the public is exempt from sinning is only under the command of the Sanhedrin. If the majority of the public simply made a mistake, the public's ignorance is not a sin, and each person brings sinning, "an act depends on the public and its ruling depends on the court").
the. Even the doubt of the jurists (even if we accept that there is a doubt of the spicah from one name that is not a sicah, even if we accept that there is a doubt of the spicah in the sicah of the sicah in the sicah of the sicah) does not cause the conclusion to be a sin if it is an error. That the power of doubt is not greater than the power of a certain law in the Sanhedrin that is not dismissed.

So on the one hand, it turns out that it is very, very worthwhile to be strict in the Torah even against most of the poskim/speka spiqa, etc. if there is a reasonable concern, in order to avoid serious offenses. (And it is also said: Who said that a sin indicates a tribulation in heaven towards a person? So see Hilchot Shegagot 5:56 of the Rambam, and Shaar HaGmul of the Rambam. And what about the victory of my sons? This is apparently only talking about a situation in which one is not supposed to decide by means that are beyond human reason, which is not relevant to a mere Torah dispute and especially a dispute over the interpretation of the Babylonian Talmud. And what about these and those words of the living God? See the Maharal, Rashi and Ramban on the website).

On the other hand, I believe that adopting such an approach may increase pluralism in the religious world. In a certain sense, it is precisely the excessive authority that society (and the rabbis themselves) attribute to the rabbis that leads to personal attacks on a rabbi who, in the opinion of other rabbis, "changes the halacha" or is harmful or "does not obey the great men of the generation," etc. If we adopt such an approach, it becomes a simple question of fear of God. Anyone who wants to listen to a rabbi with questionable voices, for example, is welcome to do so, he simply risks serious offenses. There is no need to attack rabbis personally, etc. Everyone will decide who to go to and whom to trust in all that concerns his own afterlife, and just as everyone manages to choose the doctor who suits him the most, in whom he trusts the most, as long as he does not bring him to death – so everyone will choose the rabbi (who is the doctor of souls, as Maimonides says) that he is sure will lead him to as many commandments and as few offenses as possible.

What is the Rabbi's response to the above? Does the rabbi agree? Does the Rabbi believe that most of the Poskim today conduct their rulings while taking into account what is stated here?

Thank you very much.


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0 Answers
מיכי צוות ענה לפני 5 שנים
A. Indeed, I wrote here in the past that a rabbi's ruling does not exempt you. But it must be remembered that there we are talking about the sages who acted in accordance with the instructions of the Jewish Council (meaning that there are other sages in the community besides the Sanhedrin). When you listen to your rabbi if you are not a religious leader, you can be considered coerced. In other words, there is no substantive exemption here, but there is still a possibility of coercion. B. You burst into an open door. I argue that not only are you not dead, but you are not allowed to follow the majority of the first. You have to follow your own opinion. If you don't have a position, there is the law of sufficiency (and there it may be permissible to follow the majority of the first). C. In my opinion, the Mera Datra has no authority regarding private questions, and certainly does not apply to him as "not to be disobedient." His authority is from below, not from above (by ordination). D. A custom is also a foundation only if you yourself do not have a position. And certainly there is no deviation, nor is there any fundamental exemption from sin. But it is still possible to have an exemption from rape. E. The doubt of a sifika is different, because when there is a prohibition of a sin that you committed from the doubt, you are liable for dependent guilt. And in the doubt of a sifika, there is no dependent guilt (according to the opinion of the Farach. I remember a disagreement on this). If you do not have your own position, there is certainly reason (even an obligation) to be strict in the Torah. This is true both without regard to the obligation to sin and in offenses for which you do not sin. And consider a matter from the law of something that has a permissible purpose (until you eat it with a prohibition, eat it with a permit). You burst into an open door. I have written about these questions in several places, and in particular about the duty of autonomy in halakhic rulings, about tolerance and pluralism, and more.

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