Interpretive freedom depending on changing realities

First, one must distinguish between two types of laws from the Torah: 1. Laws that the Sadducees acknowledge, that is, laws that are written in the Torah commentary. 2. Laws that arise from commentary or midrash on the verses of the Torah. Almost all the laws that we have are of type 2. Why is this distinction important? Because interpretations of type 2 are man-made, and as such they are certainly informed by norms and reality that existed at the time of those who interpreted them in this way. Note that these are laws from the Torah, but they are man-made. Therefore, regarding such things, there is certainly room to change the law at a later time, and this does not harm the eternity of the Torah. For example, in Tractate Shabbat 37b, there is an ancient law that a woman should not wear blue or black hair during her period of separation. Until a Rabbi came along and claimed that you were defending her husband, and demanded a different verse and changed the law (permitted a woman to wear blue and black hair). Regarding type 1 laws, it is more difficult, but the Sages have taken quite a few verses out of their meaning (an eye for an eye, etc.) for various reasons. The verses can be understood as an example that applies according to place and time. The Torah speaks of requiring damages when an ox goesres another ox. And what about when a car hits a dog or a rooster? It is clear to us that this will also be required. why? Because an ox is an example. Thus there are suggestions for a different application of sevenths and interest in our day, because the reality is so different that the idea of ​​the Torah must be applied differently and the original prohibition is only an example of the correct application. Regarding the question "This Torah will not be replaced," see my article published in Akademi on the enlightened rabbinic tradition . All the best, Michi —————————————————————————————— Asks: Hello, Your Honor!
I understand what the rabbi is saying about interpretations that base norms on Torah verses, but the problems I raised stem from the Torah itself!
For example, regarding sanctification, this is explicit in the Torah itself – "If a man takes a wife" (Deuteronomy 24:1), as is the case with the matter of inheritance, where sons precede – "And if he has no son, then his inheritance shall pass to his house" (Deuteronomy 27).
What is the Rabbi's response regarding situations of the first type that the Rabbi described, which supposedly contradict a person's view of the world?
I would also appreciate answers about these specific examples, I think it would clarify the matter for me.
Thank you very much and Happy Shabbat! —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: The verse that a man should take a wife does not mean that the husband must sanctify her. It can certainly be said that the Torah spoke in the present tense (this was the way the husband sanctifies the wife). Only the Sages determined that there is a halachic requirement that the husband take the wife and not the other way around. Regarding inheritance, there too it can be said that the Torah speaks of a situation where the daughter is supported by her husband and therefore does not inherit, which is not like our situation today. It can also be interpreted that when he has no son, the inheritance is transferred to the daughter, but this does not mean that when there is a son, only he is the heir. And it is also possible that this only concerns an estate in the land and not inheritance. It is also possible to demand and he has no son – that is, a situation where the son is not a preferred heir (also due to social norms). This is certainly no more far-reaching than an eye for an eye in wealth or the demands on the law of a rebellious and disobedient son, which make the affair merely theoretical. This requires an understanding and an entry into the workings of the methods of the sermon. But these are just possibilities and examples of course. I certainly don't think that in every situation the interpretation of the Torah should be adapted to our present situation. Only in a situation where I assess that it is truly not the will of the Torah. Of course, in many cases it is difficult to determine this with interpretive tools. —————————————————————————————— Asker (another): Rabbi, when you say this is an example of the correct application, please explain, correct application of what? How can one point to this something and isolate it? Jonathan Levin —————————————————————————————— Rabbi:
I'm not sure I fully understood the question, but I'll try to illustrate. There is a prohibition in the Gemara that says "You shall not gather together" – you shall not form associations of associations. The Gemara explains that it is forbidden to build two synagogues in one city and not to divide into communities in that city. According to most opinions, this is a Torah prohibition. And yet, for a very long time now, we have not observed this, in direct violation of the Gemara's law. The poskim twist and turn and explain that it depends on circumstances, etc., etc., which is really unconvincing. It is clear that they are speaking after the situation already exists and there is no way to change it, and the explanations don't really hold water.
In my opinion, what underlies this change is a realistic change. Once the concept of community coincided with a geographical concept, a city or a village. People were born and died in the same place as their ancestors, and therefore the geographical community was static. But nowadays, because of the global village and the mobility of people in it, the "community" today is not geographical (=city) but by origin (=tribe). That is why the concept of custom in relation to the tribe and origin in place in relation to the place also developed, as in its original meaning. The original halakha speaks mainly about local customs (although one can tinker with ancestral customs, but that is a personal and not communal matter, and so on). Therefore, it is possible today to establish two synagogues in different versions for two denominations in the same city, contrary to the Torah law of the Gemara, because these are two "cities" in their virtual definition, and in any case there is no prohibition here that you should not congregate. This is an example of a change in Torah halakha that is agreed upon by everyone, and at its core is a conceptual concept that most of them may not consciously adopt, but in my opinion this is what underlies this halakhic determination and conduct (even if not consciously).
This means that the term "city" used in halakha is an example and not a substance. Today it is interpreted differently. Thus the "bull" in pecuniary damages is an example of capital damages (its intention is to harm and is modified), and so on. This is an interpretation that treats the Bible as giving examples and not as determining rigid laws. And the application changes with times and places.
They also did the same regarding the concept of "book", which they allowed to be saved from the fire, and according to Medina DaGmaara, it is only about actual Torah scrolls (although here it is a rabbinical law), and so did the Rosh regarding the obligation to write a Sat, which can also be fulfilled in the Tosheba and Pentateuch books (and here it is already a Torah law).
This can be done with the concept of "woman" and "slave" and "shmitta" and so on. It is really difficult to determine a clear criterion here where the limit is, and it is dangerous of course because it can go very far with it (beware of reform!). But as our sages said: life is not a guava (ibid., ibid.). It is not always possible to define something clearly, and yet this does not mean that it is forbidden to rely on undefined concepts (as Mohar Rabbi Robert Pirsig says in his book of worship, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, in the mouth of his hero Phaedrus. He treats the concept of "quality" in a similar way, and so on). —————————————————————————————— Pine: If a certain rabbi were to arise and decide that some unknown law is no longer relevant today because reality has changed (say, he decides that today's women are not the "women" that the Sages said do not inherit an estate, and since women today are more like the "people" of the Sages, they do inherit equally), would it be possible to act according to his ruling? Or would we need a broad consensus for such a change? If not, why is there a need for consensus at all? And who would be counted within this consensus? (Maybe even conservatives?). —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: The posak himself may want there to be a consensus in order to rule in this way, and this depends on his opinion and assessment. Therefore, he is also supposed to decide who, in his opinion, will be counted in this consensus. But for the layman, this has no meaning. Once there is a posak who has decided this way, if that posak is your rabbi, you can act according to his method. If not, then it is like listening to this and listening to that (evil).
And regarding the options of the Posk himself, in the new article I sent you to upload to the website (by the way, I don't see it there) that deals with interpretation and its halakhic status, I showed that interpretation is binding by the very fact that it is interpretation, and there is no need for an authorized institution to correct or determine it. And in the end, I brought it up that the layman is also like that (although he takes the risk that his interpretation is nonsense and then he will be sued for it under the laws of heaven because it is reckless to act according to your interpretation when you are not the most knowledgeable). —————————————————————————————— Isaac: Couldn't there be laws that were given because that was the situation then (and indeed, this was the just division in that situation), but from the moment it was given it became a binding norm (and this expresses more sharply the fact that we observe it because of the commandment and not justice in itself)…
Just as many orders may have been issued as part of the war in Gaza (according to Maimonides, meat in milk), but even when they are irrelevant, this is a binding norm…
Although the discussion is still relevant regarding the issue of 'the will of the Torah' and 'bypassing the Halacha'… It is possible to sign all kinds of bills so that the laws of inheritance are not relevant (or to only enforce them for a small amount)… In the case of the Kiddushin, to correct the transfer of something from the man to the woman after the Kiddushin ceremony… or to correct the bastards for the man's infidelities…
If we understand that the law is tied to the reality of the time, this is the will of the Torah, and if not, this is a conspiracy against the will of the Torah…