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Jurisprudence

שו"תJurisprudence
שאל לפני 4 שנים

Shai Wesner, in his book on the law of debt, argues that a legal-financial obligation is not a rule of conduct (which imposes on the recipient a certain duty of conduct) but rather a rule of definition (which defines a state of affairs in the world in which a certain person owes a debt to an unknown person). For example, if a minor steals, he has a legal debt, but since he is a minor, it is understood that this is a realistic state of affairs, but this does not impose on him a duty of conduct to return the theft since he is a minor.
(It follows that according to him, there is a difference in essence and content between monetary rules and religious rules: the former are rules of definition and the latter are rules of conduct)
 
Whereas you wrote, in the article Between My Territory and the Territory of Others, in the paragraph Duties versus Rights, that the Rabbi "is not satisfied with this and continues to claim that legal theory … also contains a prohibitional dimension: there is a legal prohibition on stealing."
 
Do you still disagree with Wesner? What is the basis of the disagreement between his interpretation and yours at the moment?


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מיכי צוות ענה לפני 4 שנים
I didn't understand where you saw a disagreement here. What happens is a definition I call reality (halot). This reality has normative implications and these are the legal rules that are derived from it. The woman has the halot of a man's wife, and this is a realistic situation, and therefore different laws that are derived from it apply to her. By the way, I met with him before and we both thought we were saying similar things.  

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