Methods of decision in Halacha

The posak himself may want there to be a consensus in order to rule in this way, and this depends on his opinion and assessment. Therefore, he is also supposed to decide who, in his opinion, will be counted in this consensus. But for the layman, this has no meaning. Once there is a posak who has decided this way, if that posak is your rabbi, you can act according to his method. If not, then it is like this voice and that voice (evil).
And regarding the posak's own options, in my new article: On Sabra, Their Meaning and Halakhic Status , I showed that the hasbra is binding by the very fact that it is a sabra, and there is no need for an authorized institution to correct or determine it. And in the end I brought it up that the layman is also like that (although he takes the risk that his opinion is nonsense and then he will be sued for it under the laws of heaven because it is reckless to act according to your opinion when you are not the most wise).
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Asks:
Regarding "from this voice and from that voice," to the best of my memory, Rashi interprets this only in voices that contradict each other (say, inserting Shabbat according to the times of the R's and removing it according to the regular time).
Do you think someone who is not a bar-hi (a layperson) should only follow one rabbi?
And is it permissible for someone who is not a barrister to act according to his own opinion?
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Rabbi:
1 I don't remember such a Rashi. In Gemara Eruvin 6b it really doesn't mean that, and on page 7a it is explained that when they make from the materials of both, it is only when they contradict each other. It does not speak there about the voices of both. It is also quite clear from the explanation that it is not connected to contradictory voices. With contradictory voices, the problem is that they act in a contradictory manner. This is a logical problem and not a problem of evil. But when you take voices from every wise person even without contradiction, then there is a search for voices here instead of a search for truth.
2. It is most desirable for someone who is not a bar to act as one rabbi. But even if he acts as several rabbis according to their accessibility, it still seems that if he does so because he is seeking the voice of all (and not because of accessibility considerations) he is the one the above Gemara is talking about.
3. As a general rule, the question is not defined. Someone who acts according to his own opinion will not be prosecuted for this per se, but rather for the offense he committed (if he did). If he acted correctly, and why would you think he would be prosecuted because he did so according to his own opinion? Only if he acted incorrectly can the question arise whether he has a defense that it was his opinion and therefore he is a rapist.
To this he says that it is permissible and desirable for everyone to act according to his own understanding. However, part of his understanding is supposed to be that if he does not understand the field of halakhah, he should not follow what seems to him to be vague, but rather stick to those who do understand. This is not a halakhic instruction, but rather common sense and responsibility. This should be his own true understanding. And if he did not do this, then he acted according to a distorted understanding. Of course, if he truly and sincerely believed in this and was not simply negligent or lazy, then it seems that he is still a rabbi. But a reasonable person should understand (from his understanding) that this is not the right path.
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Asker (another):
This Rashi appears in Tractate Rosh Hashanah, page 14b:
From the voices of Beit Shammai 25 – Eruvin explains it in one dispute, that there is a place where the words of Beit Shammai are taken to be lenient, and there is a place where the words of Beit Hillel are taken to be lenient, such as: How much is missing in the sderah that will not make it impure in the tabernacle? Beit Shammai say: two links, and Beit Hillel say: one link, and similarly for the turban, the words of Beit Shammai were found to be lenient in the turban and say until two links are missing, and Beit Hillel are stricter about it and lenient in the matter of impurity, to say that since one link is missing, it does not make it impure. And whoever holds on to the voices of Beit Shammai and the voices of Beit Hillel – is wicked, since their words contradict each other in order to be lenient, and whoever holds on to the substance of both – is a fool walking in the dark, who does not know how to discern who to trust, but in two disputes that made one lenient and the other – there is neither wickedness nor foolishness here, as Baha’i and Baha’i and Beit Hillel argue.
Sagi
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Rabbi:
Pay attention to Rashi's reasoning: Because he believes in this, God Almighty, and in this, God Almighty. When a person believes in this and that, it is clear that he is not wicked. The question is what happens when a person chooses opinions only because they are sound. Here I said that it seems to me that the explanation is that the wicked one is in question. When there is a logical contradiction, this is not wickedness but an error or lack of coherence and a violation of the halacha. A person who does this has violated the halacha in question (like links in impurity) and not the instruction not to do this or that from the sound of the voice.
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Asks:
Regarding 1, I found an opinion in the Talmud Commentaries in the Responsa Project: Torat Chaim Tractate Eruvin Page 7 Page 1 From David in Teri Duchti to the grave He walks in the darkness who does not see the meaning of a word and from David in Teri Duchti to the grave He is wicked, for his words contradict each other in order to make it easier, but here, do not be wicked or foolish, who is he? Do not be wicked or foolish, MMM, or a virtuous person, except for the sake of Torah, he will follow the stricter one and the lenient one will follow the lenient one. Even without this opinion, when you perceive the voice of two different sages, it is not always because of wickedness or a desire to make it easier. Sometimes, simply in two different issues, the words of the lenient sage are more acceptable. Regarding 2: From a practical point of view, it is very difficult to turn to a rabbi in every halakhic matter, and it is more convenient to use rules such as the question of the rabbis for the grave (meaning the question of the lenient one), the question of the Torah for the grave, Halacha is a rule of thumb, a rabbi does not say anything, following the custom, a higher power is better, etc. (while trying to maintain fairness and intellectual honesty, without leaning towards the extreme or the extreme). Are these rules intended only for people who are "the most knowledgeable", or perhaps for laypeople as well? Regarding 3: I agree that it is irresponsible to follow what I think is correct, but if there is a halachic opinion of a well-known and accepted rabbi, which also seems logical to me ("reasoned with it"), where is the irresponsibility in adopting that ruling (even if he is not my rabbi)?
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Rabbi:
1. You answered yourself here. When he believes like this one here and like that one there, and there is no evil in the insult, of course (see my answer now written below here). On the other hand, when there is no contradiction between the voices, it is still not right, as I wrote.
2. When it is possible to clarify, it is accepted in halakhic law not to follow the laws of spikot. But it must be discussed whether a question from a sage has a law of clarification (since the holders of both opinions were also talaq). Therefore, I agree that it is possible to follow the laws of spikot here, but not according to the voice of one or the other. These rules are not intended for poskim, but on the contrary, only for those who are not poskim. The poskim are supposed to decide for themselves (unfortunately, a large number of them are not aware of this).
3. This is a reasonable move, although when your opinion is not well-founded (you are not a "bar hik") then any consideration of it seems problematic to me. Of course, when you do not have a rabbi, you can rely on it because you need to make a decision somehow. So your opinion is a reasonable tool to do so. But when your rabbi has an opinion, you must accept his opinion. In such a place, your opinion (as someone who is not a "bar hik") has no weight (I am not sure that this is a halachic determination, but that is how it should be for the rabbi).
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Asks:
You wrote regarding 2 that "it is possible to follow the laws of doubt here," while regarding 3 you wrote that it is possible to choose an accepted halachic opinion in accordance with my opinion, but there seems to be a bit of a contradiction here. That is, is it permissible to decide between the halachic opinions of several poskim in accordance with my opinion, or must one follow the laws of doubt (for someone who is not a bar, of course)?
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Rabbi:
I will summarize my opinion.
This is a halachic question about which you have several halachic opinions from accepted rabbis.
1. If you are a bar, it is best to decide between them and act according to your understanding.
2. If you are not a barrister, follow your master.
3. If you don't have a rabbi, make one for yourself.
4. If there is none or it is not accessible, follow your own opinion as long as it is consistent with one of the opinions of an accepted rabbi.
5. If you don't have your own opinion/reasoning – follow the laws of sufficient reason (if you know what the laws of sufficient reason say in such a situation).
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Shua:
I never understood, and I still don't understand, why it is forbidden to take this voice and that voice where there is no contradiction (and when one is not afraid of an unknown contradiction that hides beneath the surface). Whether it is permissible to trust a rabbi because he is close to the truth or whether this is how the Torah permitted us, what fundamental reason could there be to prevent one from devouring voices to one's heart's content? The claim that this does not indicate a search for truth is ostensibly only based on the assumption that what is sought is forbidden. And that one who chooses a rabbi must identify with 'his truth' in the depths of his humble soul?
If the laws are independent, then it is also impossible to rely on the assumption that an expert rabbi is aiming for the truth, for example, in a respectable 65% of cases, and when one shuffles between rabbis, then one may reach a lower percentage of hits on target. (If I take myself as a weak example, during the relevant period I acted as the lenient opinion in the interpretation of 'from my voice this and from my voice that', which was a crutch for a large treasury of voices.)
Except that I'm not really clear about the general status of literary statements like 'evil,' 'like a dog,' 'he should never have been born,' and others.
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Rabbi:
Hello.
Simply choosing votes without your own position is a search for an easy life and not a search for halakhic truth. On the other hand, materialistic this and that is a stricter way to fulfill the obligation of all methods. Therefore, it is better. And it is best, of course, to act as you yourself understand (provided that you are the most righteous). If not – then choose a rabbi and follow him.
This is not the desired assumption because seeking truth and legitimate conduct are not the same thing. Even if this were legitimate conduct because you are acting according to the instructions of a rabbi, it is still clear that there is no striving for halachic truth here.
If you play target shooting, that in itself is not a search for truth. Random shooting for truth is also not a search for truth (it is about the search, not the discovery).
The general status of such statements is that of general statements. What is not clear here? This is not a halakhic statement but a meta-halakhic one.
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Shua:
(Hopefully a question repeating the answer will appear below the answer)
I'm afraid I haven't understood what the problem is yet. Finding the truth is the same whether you choose one rabbi or a collection of votes (when there is no dependency), and the process of seeking the truth does not exist even in choosing one rabbi. Even if the most searching rabbi is superior*, how is the one who chooses one rabbi better than the one who chooses seventy, other than the implicit revelation that he is seeking an easy life when there is no conflict with the Creator's command (or other values) – which is probably what everyone does and I don't see any problem with that. Why is it possible to choose a rabbi and not have to unite the severe ones in order to fulfill the obligation of all the methods, and is there a problem in choosing a lenient rabbi?
Ostensibly, the search for truth is one thing and obedience to all the rules of Halacha is another.
* [I will ask separately about the familiar-yet-strange idea of ​​acting autonomously as one understands oneself, provided that one is most righteous, and about its connection to the concept of halakhic truth and the mechanism of retribution. This has bothered me ever since I read the articles on 'these and those' and the difference between halakhic law and Hebrew law].
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Rabbi:
The poor helper helped, and indeed the answer appears below the thread. Let them give thanks to the Lord for His mercy and His wonders to mankind.
Because seeking an easy life is not seeking the truth. This is a foreign consideration. Choosing one rabbi means handing over the decision to a person who knows. It's like creating the reverse Responsa project: Give me a desirable answer and I'll find you the posk who says it.
When you are a bar hakim you seek the truth to the best of your understanding. This is best, because autonomy is a value (and not just the truth). When you are not a bar hakim you choose a rabbi to decide for you or to guide you in making a decision. But when you choose a desirable answer you are just doing what is convenient.
You assume that choosing a rabbi is an algorithm for minimizing errors, and therefore you claim that it is also possible to draw a rabbi. I have two things to say about this:
A. It is possible to draw a rabbi, but choosing a rabbi based on votes is not the same thing, even on a statistical level (meaning, contrary to your assumption, you will be less likely to get the truth that way). I think you will be more wrong, because the choice is biased by a partisan consideration (the desire to make things easier).
on. Choosing a rabbi is not necessarily an algorithm for minimizing damage. It is a method of handing over the decision-making for you to someone else (he is like a messenger who fulfills the autonomous duty for you). Not because of the assumption that this is the best way to minimize damage.
And after all, I will add what I wrote to you in the previous message. It says that this and that Makoli are wicked, and it does not say that they are halakhic transgressors, meaning that they are more wrong in relation to halakhic truth. Striving to be lenient instead of striving to do what is required of you is a state of mind that does not indicate a commitment to the will of God, and therefore there is wickedness in it. But this does not mean that you have violated a halakhic prohibition in the laws of Shabbat or Nida if you acted in this way. This is a law of nature and not of whim.
As for the expression regarding the unification of the severities, there is a mistake in it. I did not write that severities must be united. What I wrote is that it is possible to unite the severities (as opposed to cutting the severities, which is evil). Uniting the severities is a legitimate way of finding out for someone who does not know the truth. It is possible to choose sometimes the severities and sometimes the severities and not to unite the severities, and this is also a legitimate way. But to always choose the severities is not legitimate, and so on.

Regarding what you wrote at the end, was that a question but rather a promise of a question to come?
[I will ask separately about the familiar-yet-strange idea of ​​acting autonomously as one understands oneself, provided that one is most righteous, and about its connection to the concept of halakhic truth and the mechanism of retribution. This has bothered me ever since I read the articles on 'these and those' and the difference between halakhic law and Hebrew law.]
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Shua:
Thank you. This salvation for Israel would not have been possible without the blessing of Rotel, which I poured on the grave of Rashbi Birae and Siludin.
If you can explain what the difference is at a statistical level. After all, the side consideration is only between the laws that can be chosen and, according to the assumption, there is no dependence between them. (And indeed, I assumed that the reasons for choosing a rabbi from the complex should not be stronger than the lottery, and that handing over the law to the rabbi is an algorithm for minimizing errors).
The pointed formulation 'as a kind of messenger to fulfill an autonomous duty' overwhelms the problematic nature of it, but once it surfaced, it refused to sink. What 'mitzvah in its body' is more than the autonomous duty, and what remains here of autonomy (in democratic elections, by contrast, the election has more dimensions of autonomy because there it is really, in aspiration, a reverse project). Is it possible to explain the permission to sometimes choose a kola (by choosing a rabbi who also has votes) without the idea of ​​a mission? In a way that choosing a rabbi is merely a convenient conceptual shortcut for choosing his set of laws (and if members are added to the set, then it is always possible to switch to another rabbi, meaning that the choice is always about the present).
As for Bar-Hakki, it was (or should have been) a wish to myself that I would have the opportunity to ask later, after I re-examine what already exists.
Splitting votes is of course permitted, presumably with the intention of unification.
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Rabbi:
Once the sample is biased, there is a difference in the statistical result. You are not choosing randomly, but from a certain trend.
You appoint him as a messenger to act for you. Your choice is the rabbi's choice. And in any case, his choices are considered your choices. When there is a mitzvah that cannot be fulfilled in itself, a messenger is useful for it as well (not to mention that the very division regarding mitzvahs that are in themselves are not agreed upon).
In any case, the conclusion is that the debate is about whether the only goal is to minimize errors.
I mention the additional explanation I proposed (evil, not criminal) which concerns the creator, not the object.
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Shua:
This is indeed the conclusion, but I think I'm left with the assumption that the only goal is to minimize errors (because I'm currently assigning a round single-digit weight to the value of autonomy per se).
There is only one detail that I do not understand regarding the statistical difference under the assumption that errors are minimized (and as far as I am concerned, if it does exist, then the fate of the possibility of choosing by majority vote is sealed) and I would appreciate clarification. Perhaps the assumptions of our model are not appropriate, and clarification would help me avoid guessing. The assumptions that I make (at least the ones that are obvious to me) are that the laws are independent and that the axis of truth/falsehood is perpendicular to the axis of kola/humra. From these assumptions I also conclude that the reason there is no rabbi who rules over the large collection of votes is only because Rabbi Akiva's students have died and not enough rabbis have reached teaching. In any case, I fail to see the effect of the bias. Instead of locking the door behind which the car is, I always choose the right one; it seems completely fair to me.
Right now I am discussing the truth of the halakhic position, and not the execution of the act. So in this aspect there is no advantage to the stricter. In terms of execution, it is clear that there is a preference for the stricter (which comes out of all the methods, as you wrote in the first answer), and if that is the only issue that is relevant to the discussion, then I understand. But I assume that the position is decisive and from it the ruling on the act hangs, meaning that it is permissible to choose between equivalent positions without regard to their consequences (a bit like the presumption of kashrut for witnesses that allows them to testify about lives).
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Rabbi:
Hello Shua.
First, I would like to point out that the moment you stick with this conclusion and it leads you to difficulty, you must draw conclusions, right? You can of course disagree with the Gemara, but its determination that this and that are evil led us to the conclusion that the goal is not to minimize errors and KM. This is similar to someone who says, "My conclusion is that there is a circular value to keeping Shabbat," and now "Why does the Torah command keeping Shabbat?"
You assume that there is no dependence between the parameters (slightly-slightly and right-wrong). This can be debated, but let me go with you for the sake of clarity.
It should be remembered that the halakhic conclusion can vary from person to person and from situation to situation, and if you always choose the easy side, you risk tipping the scales. You yourself are inclined to choose what is convenient instead of what seems right to you. My point is that your choice of the halakhic option, even if you are not a rabbi, is not a completely random lottery.
Take the following situation as an example. In your given situation, two halachic options arise, X and Y. If you were to decide in a way that was independent of your convenience, you would choose X (or in a plural that says to do X), because that is what you think is the right thing to do, but Y is more convenient for you and therefore you choose it.
Now note that the original choice is not a random lottery, but rather your small attempt to get to the halakhic truth. Since you are not a TA (assuming here), your choice will be 60% correct (and not 90% like a clear TA). And you will still be a little closer to the truth than a random lottery that brings you to the truth by 50%. In contrast, choices based on convenience will only bring you to the truth by 50% (assuming that there is no dependence between the parameters).
Note that the value of autonomy enters the picture I described, because when you choose an option not based on convenience, you are exercising discretion (and not making a random lottery, as you assume). On the other hand, from my perspective, this and that is a decision without your discretion, but rather a kind of lottery. Of course, those who believe that there is a circular value to autonomous discretion will not accept this – and here I can only return you to the essence of my words.
I didn't understand the comment at the end where you distinguish between a theoretical discussion and a practical decision. I decide X and that's what I do. If X fulfills the obligation of all opinions, then it is clear that I have covered the halakhic truth. What do I care whether it is the decision stage or the implementation stage?

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Shua:

Thanks again.
If I am forced to draw conclusions (whatever the halakhic opinion is), of course I will draw them on my own initiative. But I will switch to a paradigm that seems significantly more reasonable to me (a priori, and also a posteriori from a memory of the conclusions that have occurred to me in the past, according to my opinion, without a memory of the reasons) only when the evidence is forcefully thrust upon my astonished face. With the Gemara, I think it is possible to get by (even if narrowly) as the one who interpreted it (and brought up above in the main body of the discussion) that these are contradictory voices, and the evil is trivial. As far as I am concerned, the discussion right now is about the plausibility of the claim in itself that it is possible to gather voices, or: about the plausibility of the interpretation that these are also voices that are not contradictory.

Regarding the flow of the Tigris, its waters are sharp and light.
On the last one first – if my position of the commander really had a weight of 60%, then the emphasis on it does not stem at all from the autonomous value but from minimizing errors. Here (in autonomy) we are dealing with a commander who is standing against my friend and he is also armed (as a rule) with 60% and I prefer my 60 over his 60 when the autonomy is rising in my throat. In any case, I prefer (in the hope that the preference is possible and will be accepted, without the island of Gavra resembling some strange spring) to avoid assuming the value of autonomy when examining the statistical chance of minimizing damage that was placed as an alternative option in your second answer, that is, to search.
And first – the options are (as stated in your second answer above) to draw one rabbi in a sweeping manner or to choose votes. I still see that this sweeping draw did not detract from the draw for the partial vote (because the laws are independent), and that the draw for the partial vote did not detract from choosing what is convenient. I return to what I wrote above, that it follows from the assumptions that the fact that there is no rabbi who rules exactly on the collection of votes is completely coincidental (not enough rabbis were born), and therefore I will set up a hologram of such a rabbi and choose him as if he had drawn by lot and sanctified his hands and feet. The option of relying on my understanding to get closer to the truth is not at all on the table when drawing a rabbi (which is possible as stated). I am afraid that I have missed something here despite the detailed scriptures, and I will not continue to press on further if you wave your hand again.

I draw the distinction between a theoretical discussion and a practical decision. It seems that nothing will fall on that, so I will not bother trying to defend it.

By the way, I was reminded of the answer in Ya'vi'-Omer (and it will be found written in part 7, part 1, section 1) that discusses whether it is permissible for a person to appoint a judge because he is his relative even when the other is older than him. And he quotes there B'H (section 8) who wrote, "And I understand from the words of the Rambam that anyone who is a learned scholar who is knowledgeable in the laws, even though there is someone older than him in the city, and he appointed him to this because he is his relative, does not commit an unwholesome act, and this is how it is practiced in all places, even though it is not in the teachings of the Hasidim." [And it is possible that he is indeed wicked in nature, as you explained]. And he also brought the Torah of Life in Sanhedrin (which seems to follow somewhat his method in the Eruvin cited above in the main discussion, and should be easily rejected) who wrote, "God who comes for silver or gold, it seems, namely, specifically without a gamir, and he is not appointed except for his wealth alone, but if he is gamir except as here, who is a gamir of a few shares and they appoint that because of his wealth as well, even if he is a gamir, he is a good servant, as Dekayil went after the beautiful D, MMM does not pass without doing with me, God of money, this is a judge who appointed him because of his wealth alone, but as here, a gamir does not pass."

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Rabbi:

There is still a lot to be said on the statistical level (when you choose a virtual rabbi who collects all the votes, you did not choose a rabbi according to an objective criterion, but rather ad hoc, and again there is a chance that you will not score 60%. Even if on average every rabbi scores 60%. Beyond that, you assume that the opinion that collects all the votes will indeed appear among all students of the Rabbinate, and I wonder who revealed to you this Raz that assumes what is wanted. Maybe this is not an option?!). But I think we have exhausted ourselves, and everyone will draw their own conclusions.
I completely agree with the argument about the appointment (even without the comment about the man). But that is only if it is not the appointer himself who determines that the appointee is worthy, but rather that this is known objectively.

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Pine:

Continuing your discussion, I wanted to ask about the matter of choosing a rabbi. I remember that in one of your classes you said that there are cases in which a person is considered a “bar hik,” and in certain situations that bar hik will sometimes rule contrary to the gedolei hador on a certain halakhic issue. I remember you said that that bar hik is aware that the gedolei hador is probably closer to halakhic truth than he is, and he still has to go with his own truth (because of the value of autonomy). Now the question arises regarding instruction to others. If that bar hik understands that the gedolei hador is closer to halakhic truth than he is, shouldn’t that bar hik instruct others in accordance with the rulings of the gedolei hador and not according to his own rulings? After all, when he instructs others, there are no considerations of the value of autonomy here anyway, and the only value that stands here is the value of halakhic truth.

A similar question can be asked from another perspective. When a person who is not a barr is debating a halakhic issue, is he permitted to follow his rabbi even in cases where his rabbi rules against the opinion of the majority of the great men of the generation? After all, it is clear that the halakhic truth is closer to the opinion of the majority of the great men of the generation than to the opinion of his rabbi, and his rabbi also understands this, but his rabbi goes in accordance with his opinion due to considerations of autonomy, which does not exist for that person who is debating.

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Rabbi:
When a person is asked a question, he must always express his own position. On the other hand, he must also present the position of the other jurists. In my view, a jurist does not decide at all, but only presents the various options and their "prices." It is the questioner who must decide between them and carry out what he has decided. I elaborate on this in my book on Halacha (as part of the theological trilogy).
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Pine:

It seems that you are presenting a new idea here that even a person who is not a bar hachi can receive a halakhic ruling given the "prices" (where the rabbi only reveals the prices). In this view, after the "prices" are revealed, the ordinary person also becomes a "bar hachi" and then the value of autonomy returns to play a role.

And yet, the common man does not always feel capable of making the right decision, and he prefers to rely on the ruling of a great rabbi. First, the question arises whether in such a situation it is better for the common man to take a risk and make the decision himself (due to considerations of autonomy) or whether in certain cases it is better for him to rely on the ruling of a great rabbi?
For the sake of continuing the discussion, let's assume that the answer to the last question is that there are cases in which it is better to rely on a great rabbi. In these cases, would it be permissible for a layperson to rely on his rabbi, even in cases where his rabbi disagrees with rabbis much greater than him? Or shall we say that because considerations of autonomy are not at issue here anyway, he should adopt the ruling of the greatest rabbis on the issue.

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Rabbi:

The halachic decision of what to do in practice is always left to the individual himself. The posk only decides on the options and their prices. He does not become a barrister because his decision does not require one. All the halachic knowledge and skill is contributed by the posk. Now the individual must decide what prices he is willing/willing to pay, how acute it is for him, etc.
For example, a person comes to ask whether he is permitted to postpone the mitzvah of "Pur" (family planning). The rabbi is not supposed to answer him yes or no, but rather to outline the full map of the various options and opinions, as well as his own opinion. He must tell him what is in terms of Torah law (the active cancellation of "Pur"); and what is in terms of Shabbat Yatzra (the deserts of Kabbalah and interpretation), and in which situations the poskim indicate the possibility of postponing these obligations. Now the questioner must weigh how difficult it is for him and for his wife, and decide how heavy the price is (only they can do this), and in light of this decide whether to do it or not. The rabbi is not supposed to "give him a permit." This is nonsense, because there is no such thing as giving a permit. Even if the rabbi gives him a permit, he does not have a permit if it is forbidden, and even if he does not give him a permit, it is permissible if there is no prohibition. The rabbi is a halakhic expert who is supposed to outline the options and their costs, and not give permits.
If the person feels that he is not qualified to make this decision, it should be explained to him that he is indeed qualified to make this decision. On the contrary, the posek is not qualified to make the decision for him (and because the posek knows how difficult it is for them, what their financial situation is, how distressing their missing needs are, what the implications will be for the peace of the home, and so on and so forth). In no way is it right to give in to the evasion of responsibility of those who always want the rabbi to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them.
In simple questions, the process can be shortened and the arbiter will decide for them, but in significant questions, I do not recommend doing so, and I even think it is forbidden and wrong.

You can ask whether that person can trust his rabbi against those greater than him if he decided to hand over the decision to his rabbi and if his rabbi made a mistake and took it upon himself? I think so, and his rabbi should take this into account. The question is, when his rabbi instructs him, does he have to express his own position? In my opinion, yes. In essence, he stands in the place of the questioner as his representative, and now the duty of autonomy applies to him.

Incidentally, the questioner's decision to rely on a rabbi is itself a decision that he makes himself.

I discuss these things in more detail in my book on Halacha (in the trilogy currently being written).

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Shua:
And all we have to do is wait (impatiently) for the trilogy to be released on the BBC.

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Pine:
I remembered a point I wanted to make in the context of shlichut in matters of autonomy. You wrote about the rabbi who rules that "he is a kind of emissary who fulfills the autonomous duty for you." But in any case, even if you choose to adopt the ruling of another rabbi, then that other rabbi will be your emissary in matters of the value of autonomy. It follows that shlichut in the value of autonomy has no meaning for a person who does not rule for himself, right?
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Rabbi:
There is value in this because choosing a rabbi is your autonomous choice. From here on out, it is the rabbi who analyzes the situation for you and presents you with the options (but you are the one who decides what to do in practice, and again your autonomy comes into play). Therefore, you need to responsibly choose someone who truly seems appropriate to you and who expresses your values ​​and way of thinking. Choosing a rabbi is not arbitrary (a lottery).