On syntheticism and postmodernism

Hello, Honorable Rabbi, I read your first book in Quartet, and have now started the second book, but there are some problems for me that are not resolved, and I would be happy if the Rabbi could explain to me, clarify for me, correct my mistakes, etc.
1. In your book, you claimed that an analytic theorem is a theorem that adds nothing about the world but only analyzes what it can analyze, and therefore is empty – "it reveals only what we already know."
Science, as a user of the analytical method, even if I do not make its assumptions, and even if I do not accept its correctness, will create a cell phone through which I can call, or a computer with which I can correspond with you by email. Even if I am a complete skeptic and do not believe in "existence" at all, I will still get the impression that a computer is standing in front of me right now, again, even if it does not seem to exist. Therefore, I will ask – what is its emptiness? If its emptiness is essential (noumena), you are saying nothing, because we do not know the noumena (at least according to the Turtle, because we all know the world only synthetically) but only the phenomenon of things, that is, only their appearance in reality. In fact, the emptiness of content, according to the implication, is the synthetic because we cannot talk about it and understand it. The synthetic only allows us to say that we cannot know everything. It is a symbol of a lack of awareness, which is in a certain sense empty.
2. I agree with your claim that every encounter with reality is synthetic first. And if so, the use of analytics is not pure because it starts with synthetics. But this claim about the negation of the analytic does not mean anything. When the analytic necessarily appears after a synthetic encounter – then this is the definition of the analytic, that is, the analytic is not an encounter with reality in an immediate way, but rather it necessarily has a synthetic medium. When you negate the “pure” analytic – you negate something that does not exist in the first place.
3. In your book, you claimed that postmodernism appears alongside the empty analytical, but I don't understand. The postmodern's authority to derive its truth stems from the understanding that all of our knowledge of reality is necessarily synthetic, and we are unable to know the truth, and therefore I believe in what I choose. In other words, the synthetic is the sacred here, and it is what allows content in the life of the postmodern person. A person with postmodern thinking could also choose the Jewish narrative and live according to it only because of the synthetic knowledge.
4. You also claimed that postmodernism does not allow for active education to a certain extent, but in my opinion, it is difficult to make such a claim on such a general concept. After all, a person's openness depends on the truth he believes in. If I choose to believe in the Jewish narrative, I can, on the one hand, understand that everyone has their own narrative, and therefore I cannot educate or prevent anyone from doing anything that stems from their narrative, or if I choose to stick to my narrative, because it is the sole truth (for me), I will judge reality from my narrative, and measure the qualities of the people around me according to my standard, and perhaps even seek to influence them from my narrative. The possibility of influencing depends on the degree of a person's belief in his narrative, and the mere fact that he chooses one narrative or another ties him to the postmodern method or thinking.