Public and individual fasting in our time
Hello Rabbi Michael,
I recently had the opportunity to study the laws of fasting in Rambam. A few questions in this context:
Maimonides writes:
- "It is a positive commandment from the Torah to shout and sound the trumpets for every calamity that comes upon the people" – is this also practiced today? And if not, why is it invalid?
- "Just as a community suffers for its troubles, so does an individual suffer for his own" – is this also the case today? And if not, why is it invalid?
- Let's assume hypothetically that the mitzvah were still in practice today. From the spirit of Maimonides' words, it seems that the reason for the mitzvah of fasting is so that they know that the trouble has come because of bad deeds, and another reason for fasting is that by virtue of fasting they will be saved from evil. In a providential view like yours, would it be possible to say that the reason for the mitzvah is null and void? And if so, would this justify the abrogation of the mitzvah (in practical terms)?
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0 Answers
1. The early scholars have already dealt with this. The Ramban, Ta'anit 15:1, cites two reasons: 1. There are no adjacent rabbis, and therefore there is no ta'anit material from the Torah when there are no adjacent rabbis. 2. There is no president (governmental authority. The public is not the public). And so it is in Ritva Ta'anit 12:2 and Pesachim 44:2. And so it is in Rabbah 83:11 Ta'anit 1554. And see also Ritva 6:13 Taqah 63. Indeed, there is some standing for the ruling of the sages of our time. See Here are the details .
2. Regarding the modern-day Tekia, see some explanations in the Mishnav, 6. Tekia SA.
Regarding individual fasting, in principle it is practiced today. See Details here .
3. It can be said that the meaning of the mitzvah is null, but even when the meaning is null, there is a problem with changing laws established in the Bible when we do not have the Bible (except in a situation where there is harm and several other possibilities that were hinted at in the column on legumes). The same applies to requests and confessions in prayers in general. I think that one can simply take advantage of these opportunities to connect with God (without building on salvations).
By the way, Rabbi Kook writes in several places that changes that seem technical (no death penalties, no Amalekites, etc.) have a fundamental reason (usually unknown even to the sages who correct and interpret) behind them. And perhaps today fasting is not practiced for a technical reason, but behind this there is a fundamental reason that is irrelevant today.
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Asks:
- According to this, why do the sages of this generation not usually decree fasts during times of war or rocket fire on the country?
- I happened to know Lithuanian ultra-Orthodox people whose children sometimes had severe and serious illnesses (which supposedly required fasting) and I don't remember them taking on a fast (maybe they didn't tell me). Does this mean they canceled a Torah act?
- To the best of my knowledge, this halacha was not established in a court of law, but rather is a halacha from the Torah. And the rule "if the reason is nullified, the regulation is not nullified" does not apply to the halacha from the Torah. In the case of prayer 18, which was established by the Sages, there is no possibility of nullification, but in the halacha from the Torah, why is it not nullified (instead of nullifying the reason)?
- Because they know that this is not the right path for the public today. As soon as it comes to halakhic policy and not halakhic law, it must be examined according to its usefulness. But in difficult situations they did try to correct or decree (there is also a question of authority: who will decree and correct).
- The question is what is a bad situation in which one must fast. I don't know if there is a halachic definition for this. I didn't check whether the "kashem" in Rambam is intended to expand the law from the Torah. It seems to me from the book that he does not intend to say that he did something from the Torah.
- In the Torah, the Halacha did not require a reason to read, which is equivalent to the annulment of a regulation that annuls its reason. Again, there is also a problem of authority, since something that is allowed by one minyan requires another minyan to be permitted. Although in the Torah, the annulling minyan does not need to be greater than the one that is allowed, it still has to be a Sanhedrin.
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