Tassel and blue thread today

Not just in our day. Every day and in every generation, a thread of blue must be placed. This is a positive positive commandment (and not an existential one, as some confuse in light of the teaching of offerings, "blue does not hinder white") from the Torah. The question is whether the identification of the new blue is correct. Here I tend to think so, and at least we have not left out the doubt. Sfiqa da'Oriyata lehumra (although some have doubted about positive commandments, and so on). In my opinion, this is even above and beyond the reasonable. —————————————————————————————— Asker (another): Further to this question, as far as I understand, the blue thread is part of the mitzvah of tzitzit. And it is known that the mitzvah of tzitzit is an existential mitzvah. In other words, do you mean that every day one must wrap oneself in a tzitzit with a blue thread? And if not, have you nullified the act? Additionally, I wanted to ask, why should we even observe the mitzvah of tzitzit in our day? And also, do you think there is a prohibition on wrapping yourself in a tzitzit without a blue thread (only white threads). —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: The mitzvah of tzitzit is not existential. Although there are some akhronim who express themselves this way, they are mistaken or confuse concepts. An existential mitzvah is a mitzvah that can be fulfilled but not canceled. But the mitzvah of tzitzit can also be canceled: if you wear a garment of four fringes without tzitzit, you have canceled the act of tzitzit. Therefore, the mitzvah of tzitzit is a conditional positive act (upon the existence of circumstances), and not an existential act. It is true that one can not wear a garment with four wings and not wear tzitzit and not be guilty of anything. But to the same extent, one can not eat to satiety and get rid of the blessing of food. Does this mean that the blessing of food is existential? Of course not. When I said that blue is a positive deed, I meant it in the same sense as the mitzvah of tzitzit. When I wear a garment of four fringes, it is obligatory to wear a tzitzit with white and blue, and if I did not do either of them, I nullified the deed. If I did not wear a garment of four fringes at all, of course I did not nullify this deed. Although the Gemara states that in the Idna Dritcha, failure to wear such a garment is punished in order to evade the obligation to wear a tzitzit, the Torah already wrote that this does not belong in a place where it is not customary to wear such a garment at all (in which case the failure to wear it is not to evade the mitzvah, but simply because it is not the accepted garment). I didn't understand the question about observing the mitzvah of tzitzit in our day. Why shouldn't we clean it? Indeed, there is a doubt about the prohibition of canceling a deed (because of the doubt that it is the correct tekhel). It may be better to go without a tzitzit garment at all. When we go with only white, we will purify the mitzvah of white and it is doubtful whether we will cancel the tekhel. The question is whether it is better to fulfill a mitzvah while doubting the cancellation of another positive mitzvah, or whether it is better not to do both, neither to fulfill nor to transgress. And perhaps this is a mitzvah that comes with a transgression, and then you have no mitzvah at all. —————————————————————————————— Asks: Regarding tzitzit nowadays, I meant that nowadays we don't usually wear 4-paneled clothes anyway, so why would we bother and wear 4-paneled clothes with tzitzit? After all, there are many conditional positive mitzvot in the Torah that we don't bother to observe (for example, Petar Hamor). And we already wrap ourselves in a tallit gedol during the morning prayer, so we already observe the mitzvot of tzitzit on a daily basis, so why should we continue to observe it at all hours of the day? —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: You really don't need to. It's a custom of the past. Of course, the one who does it benefits from a positive commandment, but the one who doesn't do it hasn't committed anything. As I explained, the Idna Dritcha argument doesn't hold water in this context either. —————————————————————————————— Asker (another): You wrote that there is no halakhic method that exempts from wearing azure, but it is explicitly written that white does not inhibit azure, and azure does not follow white, 16 when there is doubt whether it is truly azure. horizon —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: This is a common mistake. The fact that the blue does not inhibit the white does not mean that the blue is voluntary. Neither do the hand tefillin inhibit the head tefillin (in the same mishnah in the offerings). Are the head tefillin also not obligatory? When two things do not inhibit each other, this means that if you did not do one, you still fulfilled the obligation of the other. But the first in itself can be a complete obligation. Therefore
When you cast a tzitzit of only white, you nullified the act of a blue-green color, but it did not delay the white that existed. If there is doubt as to whether it is a blue-green color, the normal laws of spikot apply.
See details in my articles Here . —————————————————————————————— Asks: But that is exactly the point. Since the blue does not hinder the white, and there is doubt about the correctness of the blue, there is no obligation here and that is precisely why this halacha exists. After all, it is impossible to obligate a person with a mitzvah that he cannot fulfill, and according to the laws of doubt, he is not obligated at all because as soon as there is doubt about a mitzvah, there is no obligation to fulfill it. The parable/example from tefillin is a distortion of the matter because we have no doubt about what tefillin are or whether the head separates the hand, etc. The correct example/parable is to ask whether there is an obligation to put on tefillin of the rabbinate. And the Gra's answer is also acceptable here. 16 When there is more than one method of the blue, and unlike tefillin, it is impossible to fulfill all the possibilities. horizon —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Hello Ofek.
I explained things, and I will come back again.
First, we must examine the situation when there is definitely azure. In such a situation, the fact that the azure does not inhibit the white certainly does not mean that the azure is voluntary. Agreed? That is why I brought the "distorted" example of tefillin. I would be happy if you could explain to the poor in mind like me what is distorted here (apart from the interpretation you gave to my words).
So when there is doubt about a blue sky, it must be performed with the same certainty as any other mitzvah. It has nothing to do with the question of delaying the white. This is a doubt about a regular positive mitzvah. Whatever you say about a positive doubt (and I mentioned that the latter differed on this, but according to the vast majority of them, one should also be strict about a positive doubt) you should say here as well.
The existence of several methods for Techelet is also irrelevant. The connections and bindings, even if they are incorrect, do not hinder almost any method. So what is the point of this, Landon Didan?
The example of Rashi's tefillin is not relevant here, since you could equally well ask about Rashi's tefillin. But what? It is clear that the accepted custom does not consider this a doubt, but rather that there is a ruling by Rashi, and the question is only whether to be stricter by Rashi. This is not a question in ordinary spikot laws. —————————————————————————————— Asks: Thanks for the additional explanation, but you didn't bring anything new that I didn't understand from the previous points. First, as is known, doubt from the Torah is a serious matter. There is doubt that it is a tzeitze, and the moment a person wears a tzeitze with a tzeitze that is doubtful, he enters the law of doubt that cancels certainty through the existence of doubt, or in other words, wearing a tzeitze that is not tzeitze causes the certain to be canceled by the existence of doubt. Therefore, in this case and others like it, doubt should not be maintained at the expense of certainty, and as mentioned, since there is no proof that it is a tzeitze, it should not be worn and the reason is clear. Regarding what you wrote regarding tefillin, "that the accepted custom does not consider it a doubt, but rather there is a ruling as a Rashi, and the question is only whether to tighten as a Rashi…" This is completely incorrect. There are many poskim, from the Arizal to Rabbi Ovadia zt"l, who state that it is not a doubt, but an obligation. So as you wrote, there is no ordinary doubt in this, but not in the way you intended, and again, it is not an acceptable metaphor. horizon —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: I didn't understand what you said. Even if the Tekhel is not real, it did not cancel the commandment of tzitzit. And regarding tefillin, I disagree. But as I commented on your statement, I could also ask about Rashi's tefillin.
One way or another, this entire discussion has absolutely nothing to do with the question of the delay, and that's what I was talking about.