Bringing down bastards and saving a Gentile on Shabbat

1. There is a common fallacy of confusing the opinion of the law with the opinions of certain jurists. The jurists are the pattern of the landscape of their homeland, and therefore the law should not be judged by the words of this or that jurist. Just as I would not judge secularism by things written a hundred years ago (about the status of women and homosexuality, etc.). There are dimensions in the law that are the culture of certain people and not the law itself. Incidentally, this is also the reason why one should be careful not to judge Islam by the behavior of certain people (blood libel, for example, is an Arab culture and not Islam). Beyond that, I'm surprised to hear such criticism from a secular woman who belongs to a society that mostly advocates the right to abort (=murder) unborn babies without any reason at all. So why should she complain about the halacha that greatly restricts this permission (=permission to murder), much more than is accepted around her. Think about the situation of a society that obliges its members to help with all their money those in need, but they say they won't do it for bastards (they are only allowed to help up to five times) but do for those with Down syndrome. Is there room for complaints against them? After all, the entire standard in question is a much higher standard than is accepted here. So why should we complain? 2. In the background of the matter, it should be noted that at least some opinions (Rash Ben Menasya in Tractate Yoma) Halacha does not permit the desecration of Shabbat even for a Jew, but only because he will keep many Shabbats. If so, from the perspective of Halacha, the value of life is not higher than the value of Shabbat, even in relation to a Jew. Now, whoever wants to criticize Halacha should criticize it on this principle (an irrelevant criticism because from its perspective there is no value at all in keeping Shabbat). But assuming you accepted this – the result of distinguishing between a Gentile and a Jew is obvious, because a Jew will keep many Shabbats and a Gentile will not. In addition, the Gentiles that the Sages spoke of had an extremely low human level (murderers, adulterers, idolaters, sacrifice their children to Molech, and worshipers of Peor). This is the only reason why halakhic discrimination against them was created (see BK 37). Looking at Gentiles through what we see today is an anachronism. Indeed, the Meiri writes that today one must desecrate Shabbat in Torah work in order to save a Gentile, and even I, the younger one, argued for this in my article in the Akademo on 'Enlightened' idolatry , and Rabbi Kook also wrote that the law was similar to his. —————————————————————————————— Asks: Rabbi Michi Shalom, Thanks for the response. I enjoyed the comments. Regarding 2, I will just note that the Mayari does not explicitly write that one must break the Sabbath to save a Gentile in the works of the Torah… We conclude from his words that there are Gentiles who deserve to be saved (sometimes there is a difference between explicit writing and inference from the words in terms of the validity of the words). I have read your article before 🙂 In any case, even in our time there are rabbis who seize all permission to save Gentiles on Shabbat solely for reasons of hostility. See for example here: http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4229407,00.html We do not learn from the articles, but if you look, for example, at the HaZo'a Shabbat 3, page 67, there Rabbi Ovadia rules that saving a Gentile is only out of enmity. And in the notes he wrote a very long reply, which, to the best of my recollection, contains no discussion of any fundamental change in the perception of the Gentile at this time. It is all a technical engagement with enmity, a work that does not need a body, two that he has, the Torah and the Rabbis. Rabbi Ovadia is a contemporary posk (incidentally, judging on perceptions of 100 years ago)… and it is very difficult to say that his views and perceptions are far from the mainstream in the literature of haskaz in the last 100 years. In my opinion, most Haredim would not have a dilemma at all about saving a Gentile, in the absence of enmity. They would not care not to save him. On another note, do you have copies of "True and Unstable" for sale? What is the price? Best regards, —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: He writes this explicitly in the Dumas Pacha, that the rule that one is not saved is only among the Gentiles of the past who were not bound by the manners of the nations. It is clear to me that almost no poskim today trusts the Meiri, and even I, the little one, if I did not believe as he did, perhaps I would not have relied on him as a source. But it seems to me to be correct in my understanding, and I only found solace in the words of the Meiri. Although I believe that if a real question arises, and there is no way out of hostility and peaceful means – I believe that there will be quite a few poskim who will say this also in terms of halakhic law. Today it is convenient to rely on technical solutions so as not to be considered Reform. True and unstable, like all news books, is only sold in stores. I am not allowed to sell. All the best, Michi —————————————————————————————— Eliyahu Abramson: Rabbi Shalom,

Your words remind me of the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer Berkowitz, who was one of my favorite thinkers of the 20th century, as he strove to discover the founding values ​​of Halacha.
And yet the question is how do we separate that "knowledge of law" (the substance) from the knowledge of the jurists who are the instrument for its discovery (the form)?
We say that the motives of the posak are irrelevant as long as he justifies his opinion in the categories of halakhic language, but doesn't the halakhic language change because of such rulings? Regarding the gentile, it seems that I've only heard clear and direct things from you, but other posaks usually accept almost technical considerations such as enmity and ways of peace. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Hello Eliyahu.
I did not come to disparage the rabbis. I merely emphasized that we should not talk about the "halakha" but about one interpretation or another for it. The various interpretations, all of which have their due place, are human products resulting from environmental influence.
The decision of the judge does not depend on his motivations but on the justifications he gives, but at the same time he does not obligate me if I have a different interpretation and other justifications.
The poskim's preference for technical considerations stems, in my opinion, mainly from the fear of being perceived as reformists (a wrong and distorted consideration in my opinion, but I think it accurately describes their way of thinking). I want to believe (and I do believe) that in a real case (on a deserted island, when there is no fear of hostility, etc.) many of them would permit for the same reason as the Meiri. And even if not – then I do not agree with them. Therefore, as far as I am concerned, the halakha says something different. Their opinion is theirs, and its respect is in its place, but it is not "the halakha."
I haven't checked to see if there are other poskim who say these things directly, but it's clear to me that even if there are, they are few and far between. The reasons are as above. In any case, if this is the truth, in my opinion, it doesn't really matter to me how many poskim say this. —————————————————————————————— Eliyahu Abramson: Rabbi Shalom,
God forbid, I didn't think you were disparaging the judges, but rather how one decides whether a particular judge is right or wrong. I understand from you that ultimately it's a matter of discretion and not formal "rules of jurisprudence."
From the above, I recognize that your motivation (blessed, it must be said) is moral, or at least an attempt to calm the tension between Halacha and morality where possible. thanks —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: What does it mean to decide? With reason. And are there no disagreements in halakhic law? How do you decide every halakhic dispute?
What I wrote is that if Posk A says X and Posk B says Y, I don't understand how you can come to Posk A and criticize the halakha for saying Y? That's absurd. You can criticize Posk B's interpretation but not the halakha.
Regarding the decision, as mentioned, you should use your own judgment or choose a rabbi according to your understanding.
My motivation is moral, but it seems to me that even in my case, things should not be judged by motivations but by the reasons. In my opinion, this is the obvious and correct interpretation regardless of my motivations. I mentioned the issue of BK 37 and the words of the Maimonides in Pihamash about returning a loss to a Gentile, which is attributed to the behavior of Gentiles. Hence, if in reality the behavior is different, the approach must be changed.
In conclusion, in my understanding, anyone who does not do this is not only immoral, he is also halachically wrong and committing a religious offense. And I distinguish between the two (see column 15 on the website). —————————————————————————————— Tuvia: Maybe a more precise reference to Meiri is possible? I couldn't find a reference to Pom Rihta.

Here: http://ph.yhb.org.il/plus/01-27-03-04 The methods of the meklim are presented (and the meiri is not mentioned) —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: I brought it up in Chapter 5 of my article on the enlightened Zechariah, which I referred to in my remarks. It also appears in Rabbi Gershoni's article, which I referred to in note 28 there.
This is the article .