A Halakhic State: Torah and Politics (Column 669)
In the religious world it is commonly thought that the Torah has its own message and system regarding the governance of a state and society. As part of this, many aspire to establish a “halakhic state,” while others greatly fear it (“Iran is here”). In a debate held a few months ago between me and Yaron Yadan (which ultimately wasn’t uploaded due to poor audio), I was asked for my opinion on the matter, and to my interlocutors’ surprise it turned out that my vision on this issue is quite similar to Yadan’s. I wished to devote a column to clarifying these questions, which these days hover over us with no small intensity (despite the preoccupation with the war and its implications, and perhaps precisely because of them—namely, because of the “messianism” with which parts of the current coalition are charged, in my view quite unjustly)[1].
Two meanings of the term “halakhic state”
The discussion of a halakhic state should be divided into two distinct planes: 1) What is the utopia, on the assumption that all the people of Israel are committed to Torah and mitzvot? How would a state be run in such a situation? 2) What would I do if I were elected today to be prime minister and had control of the Knesset, but the demographic composition of the country were as it is now (a secular–traditional majority)? These are, of course, two different questions, including with respect to the threat they pose to the secular citizen (who, in the first case, in fact does not exist).
Question 2: A halakhic state in the current reality
Question 2 is relatively simple. I would not change anything essential. Of course there would be some changes, as you would expect from any new officeholder who implements his views. But this would not happen because of halakha or Torah. It would happen because I personally disagree with certain aspects that have existed until now. My considerations would be moral—values of freedom and liberal democracy—which, in my view, are today realized in a distorted way. In short, to my best judgment this would not be a halakhic state but rather a liberal-democratic state in the style of Michi Avraham.
One may wonder how a mitzvah-observant person is prepared to tolerate transgressions and not enforce observance of halakha upon the Jewish public when it is within his power. Is this a tenable stance from a halakhic-Torah perspective? My claim is that in the current situation it is not proper to impose the values of halakha on the general public. Coercion is ineffective for several reasons. First, it breeds hatred rather than bringing people closer. Second, acts performed under coercion are devoid of religious value. Coercion can be applied only when it comes to someone who is committed to halakhic values and deviates from them (due to his inclination or various interests). Coercion upon someone who does not believe (in God, or at least in the giving of the Torah) is pointless and valueless.
Moreover, when we use the state’s institutions to impose our values on others, it corrupts both the state and the Torah. It creates corrupt and squalid mechanisms such as the Chief Rabbinate and the Haredi parties, which enjoy the forceful backing of state institutions and use them for their own purposes at the public’s expense. Separation is first and foremost a religious interest, long before concern for the suffering secularists (this happens to them and to us because of them. They are the majority here, and therefore the power given to the religiously corrupt is given by them).
Beyond that, there is a more substantive point. I live in normative duality (see, for example, Columns 15 and 80, and on a more theoretical plane, Columns 541, 621, and more), meaning that I am committed to the values of the Torah and halakha and in parallel also to moral values (which, in my view, are liberal and democratic, generally speaking). Neither cancels the other, even though at times there are conflicts between them. Therefore, even if I were given the power, it would still not be right for me to impose halakhic values alone. Liberal-democratic values would be an inseparable part of the picture even in such a case, and therefore there would be no place for religious coercion. According to the liberal-democratic model, a state is not supposed to impose religious values on its citizens, even if most of them are committed to halakha.
By the way, I think that on this point I do not differ in my outlook from most of the religious and Haredi public, although others may recoil from saying this to themselves (when they speak outwardly there is, of course, no problem), since it seems to them inconsistent and not in keeping with their commitment to halakha. In my estimation, most of them intuitively espouse this dual commitment, even if they do not explicitly define it to themselves.
Question 1: A halakhic state in an utopian reality
My claim regarding an utopian halakhic state is more far-reaching. I contend that even there you would not find many differences compared to a democratic state today. The question of coercion would likely change, but not in an essential way. If there is a person who commits transgressions, the laws of coercion and punishment may return, but only because it is clear to him that these are transgressions and that they oblige him. One who does not believe in any of this is coerced by circumstances and exempt. In the utopian situation, by the premise, most people are not such, and therefore it is an esoteric question. That is, the change is mainly a question of proportions—regarding how many people coercion and punishment are justified—but the principled policy remains the same.
As for the state’s mode of conduct itself, one might expect the Torah to guide and direct it (as noted, this is what raises fears on the secular side and the desired utopian model on the religious side). But as I will argue now, even this is anything but simple. For that purpose, I must preface several points, all of which I have discussed in the past. I will therefore mostly summarize here and refer to the relevant sources. Our concern here is the broad picture.
The preliminaries
The first preface is that the Torah is divided into two categories (see, for example, Column 541): halakha and morality.
The second preface is that halakha is particularistic, i.e., it obligates only Jews, whereas morality by its very nature is universal. There is no Jewish morality and some other morality. The Torah is indeed the source of morality’s validity, but it is not the source of its contents (I do not learn them from the verses but from my conscience). Of course there can be moral disagreements, between people or different groups. But these disagreements are not related to Judaism and the Torah. If there are two reasonable moral positions, both will appear within the beit midrash as different interpretations of the Torah. In such a case we can discuss whether there is only one that is true (monism), or whether there can be disagreements in which there are several possible correct answers (pluralism). To me it is clear that pluralism cannot be sweeping—i.e., for all disagreements. But I do not rule out the possibility of disagreements in which both views are morally correct.
The third preface is that neither of these two categories has absolute priority. When there is a clash between a moral value and halakha, decisions must be made according to the circumstances and the principles involved (as in a moral dilemma).
The fourth preface is that even within the halakhic world itself, particularly in the legal part (Choshen Mishpat), there are two parts (see the article here and Column 219): the “pure halakha,” founded on a commandment in the Torah (in verses or parashot or derashot), and various extensions added over the generations. Some extensions were created by the Sanhedrin as enactments or interpretations, and some were created over the generations by various commentators and by customs that arose in different places. Thus, for example, in Choshen Mishpat you will find various laws that were created by customs and decisors over the generations on the basis of common sense and morality rather than pure interpretive considerations. These parts do not have full halakhic force, since they are common-sense solutions not created by an authorized institution (the Sanhedrin or the Talmud), and therefore any sage in any generation can act differently with respect to them. Laws of this sort were also created in the Talmud, and these are ostensibly binding. But still, it is unlikely that there would be an essential difference between them and foreign legal systems, since their source is not at Sinai but in reasonable considerations of common sense and justice.
Implications
When a state is created that conducts itself according to halakha, there is no doubt that it will have a supreme authoritative institution (a Sanhedrin). Without this we could not truly run a state. The halakhic system as we know it today is not suited to managing a modern state and society (exemption for damage caused indirectly, the requirement of two valid witnesses and forewarning before any punishment, the absence of punishment for a robber, the lack of orderly attention to new economic and social institutions, and much more), and it will be necessary to adapt halakha to our current situation. This sounds very daunting to many, since we were educated on the eternity of halakha. But this is a mistake. What is eternal in halakha are the foundational principles that appear in the Torah, but all the additions do not belong to the eternal part; they belong to a transient part that comes to address arising problems and needs. Even the application of the principles in the Torah can change according to circumstances (see in detail the series of Columns 475–480 on Modern Orthodoxy). Even rabbinic laws, which certainly belong to the binding halakha, actually belong to this transient part (see Columns 582–583). The inability to change them stems only from questions of authority that are supposed to disappear in the utopian situation when authoritative halakhic institutions return.
When that utopian state wishes to shape its modes of conduct and its lawbook, it will have to find legal solutions for all the topics I described and many others. The rigid halakhic framework is fairly limited, and in the legal part of halakha it is truly thin. With respect to everything beyond that, these solutions will be found mainly by considerations of common sense rather than from the Torah. It is reasonable to assume that these solutions will not be very different from what exists today, which is also based on common sense and considerations of fairness and legal effectiveness. In an era in which the Torah does not function as a full, binding system, various proposals and approaches can arise in the beit midrash, and not all of them need to meet practical tests. Internal coherence of the picture suffices. But when it comes to implementation in the field, this requires adaptation to common sense and legal effectiveness (see Columns 84, 219, 356, 641, and more).
The conclusion is that the rules of morality will look quite similar to what exists today (and if there are changes, it is because of moral disagreement and not because of the Torah), and most of the legal part will also look quite similar. One can adopt here the Ran’s model in Derashah 11, but this picture is self-evident to any sensible person even without it. Moreover, in my estimation even coercion would be applied in such a halakhic state only with respect to someone who willfully transgresses and recognizes his obligation to halakha. Therefore, even here there would not be overly dramatic change. Even regarding Shabbat observance and halakhic constraints on the conduct of state institutions, see Columns 529–530.
In short, there is no doubt there would be some changes, but in my estimation they would be fairly minor. Bottom line, even in an utopian halakhic state that is indeed supposed to be run on the tracks of halakha, I do not anticipate all that many things that should frighten those who fear a halakhic state.
What is happening today?
At the end of my podcast with Rogel Alpher, he asked me for my opinion about the awakening of religiosity in Israel today, and to his surprise I said that I really do not like the matter. I presented two reasons there: 1) Many of the “awakened” are not truly committed. This is part of New-Age spirituality that overlays our tradition and religious sentiments. It gives religiosity and Judaism a bad name and presents them as a mystical movement that is part of the New Age. Judaism is nothing but a solution to the distress and feelings of emptiness of secular people. And when they sober up and realize this is not the case, either they leave or they invent a new Judaism for themselves and identify it with various strange ideas. 2) The current political conduct of the religious public is, in my eyes, very harmful and brings about a terrible desecration of God’s name. The stronger support our dreadful religious establishment receives (the religious parties, the Chief Rabbinate and its institutions, and the like), the more dismal our situation. Those who try to use the state to advance religious ideas and values bring only damage, corruption, hatred, and desecration of God’s name. The democratic values according to which such coercion is problematic dovetail nicely here with the religious view that sees desecration of God’s name as harmful and coercion upon a non-believer as an unjustified act.
Therefore I can fully understand the fear of a halakhic state, but my claim is that it is unjustified. Moreover, I also think that labeling Smotrich and others as “messianists” is groundless. This labeling does not pertain to questions of religion and state but to their political-security conduct. In those spheres they indeed expect the coming of the Messiah and redemption, and indeed believe in God, but their practical steps in these areas are usually derived from realistic ideological conceptions rather than mystical messianic delusions. In light of their problematic conduct, it is very easy to classify them as messianists and to point to a halakhic state and declare that “Iran is here,” but there is no real basis for this. The troubles they cause are not related to their messianism. Even in religion-and-state relations, in my estimation they do not have a genuine aspiration to establish a halakhic state in the threatening sense. As far as I know them, this is not mere lip-service apology, but a real conception regarding Question 2 (a halakhic state today, when most of the population is not committed to halakha). Regarding Question 1, they likely see the situation differently than I do (regarding coercion and the imposition of halakhic values via the state), but to the best of my understanding they will be surprised. When this situation arises, it will dictate changes as I have described here. The law will remain quite similar, as will the general modes of conduct. Halakha is very practical, and with respect to the utopian state we are all, at present, denizens of theoretical batei midrash. When this happens in practice, and when halakha is given the authority and power, it will also reveal the responsibility required. I am quite certain that the religious leadership will then understand the constraints and act accordingly. Their autistic conduct today stems from the fact that they have no authority and therefore no responsibility. As noted, in the beit midrash one can say anything.
I will conclude with two remarks intended to demonstrate the (ir)relevance of the Torah and halakha to current issues: the hostage deal and rejoicing at an enemy’s elimination.
A. The hostage deal
A few months ago I saw a column by Rabbi Stav on Ynet regarding the hostage deal, and I thought it bore various connections to this column’s topic. First, try to think what a “halakhic state” would do with respect to this question. Many of the accusations against the government and its religious components (mainly the religious-Zionist camp) deal with its attitude to the hostage deal. They are accused of messianism and bizarre religious conceptions and of ignoring morality. Truly all the fears I have described here in one handful. It seems obvious to people that in a halakhic state (utopian, but also in our days) the attitude toward the hostage deal would necessarily look like it appears in today’s coalition: rejection out of hand. For that reason I thought that precisely on this charged issue it would be appropriate to illustrate my claims.
In Column 607 I already noted that halakhic considerations cannot really guide us with respect to hostage deals like these. Each side quotes the citations it prefers: supporters of the deal keep reminding us that the redemption of captives is the most important mitzvah in the Torah, and its opponents quote the rule not to redeem captives for more than their value. Neither of these quotations teaches us anything— not even by the faintest hint—regarding what to do in our case, but people love quotations. They feel that the desires of their heart are much better grounded if they buttress them with such or such a citation, usually chosen in a completely tendentious fashion and wrenched from context. It is clear to everyone that the circumstances dictate the policy in such cases and not this or that interpretation of halakha. If it becomes clear what is right to do in our case, that is what will be done—whether later they will offer interpretations that reconcile it with halakha (more or less convincingly) or not.
As I showed there, the theology that people try to enlist for the matter will also not bring us to a single, unequivocal solution. If so, neither messianism nor a “halakhic” state dictates policy in such a case. These are strategic, security-political considerations, and by their very nature they are universal. Accusing opponents of the deal of being driven by messianism and/or by fundamentalist subordination to halakha has no logical or factual basis. This is a debate about the price it is right or not right to pay in such a situation— that and nothing more (I have already written more than once that this argument is conducted among ourselves. Hamas has never offered a deal nor expressed willingness to a deal. The main thing is that we enjoy quoting and arguing about hypothetical deals that never came to be).
Rabbi Stav in his column ostensibly argues something similar, and in that sense he certainly strengthens the view I have presented here. His claim is that this is a strategic decision and not a halakhic one, and therefore it should be handed over to those entrusted with such decisions, namely the experts. The first clause is of interest to us here, while the latter clause (handing it to experts) is not. But to complete the picture I will add that I do not agree with the latter clause.
My critique of that latter clause is described systematically in this article. In brief: I do not agree with Rabbi Stav’s claim about handing the matter over to experts. I very much doubt whether there really are experts in security and policy in the same sense as in medicine or physics. These topics are extremely complex and vary according to circumstances, and as Ben-Gurion said, experts are experts in what was, not in what will be. Moreover, every decision and position in these areas is saturated with values, and it is very difficult to separate them from the professional questions (regarding which one can perhaps speak of expertise). Therefore, the positions voiced by security and policy “experts” on such matters are agenda-driven, and we have already seen the expertise tested by events, and the learned opinions of all the experts in the studios saying one thing and its opposite, always predicting the past quite well but struggling a bit more with the future. Again: tell me who the “expert” is and I will tell you what his opinion will be.
Moreover, as I explained there, there is room for a Torah/halakhic decision when there is disagreement among the experts, and that does have authority for a court or a Sanhedrin. In this too I disagree with Rabbi Stav. However, today we do not have institutions with such authority, and so this is a hypothetical caveat.
In the end, I agree with Rabbi Stav that this is not a halakhic question, and therefore rabbis’ opinions do not have much added value regarding it. The question is entrusted to the security establishment and the statesmen, not because they are experts but because they have the public mandate to make such decisions. Of course, one may express an opinion either way, and this is true for rabbis as well (“let not the priestess be as an innkeeper”).
This was a remark about the (ir)relevance of halakha and Torah to practical contemporary decisions—those that ostensibly have direct halakhic references. I will now bring another remark about the significance (more precisely, the lack of significance) of halakha and Torah with respect to value-laden aspects of current affairs.
B. “Do not rejoice when your enemy falls”
Following the blessed elimination of Hassan Nasrallah “of blessed memory,” there were those who handed out baklava or celebrated the matter in various ways, and there were also quite a few who criticized them and claimed that this is immoral and of course also “not Jewish” (at times like these everyone suddenly remembers their Judaism; cf. “Redemption of captives is the most important mitzvah in the Torah”). I am not telling you anything new when I say that one can quote in such a context “Do not rejoice when your enemy falls,” and the midrash “My handiwork are drowning in the sea and you sing a song,” and “May sins cease, not sinners”—how could we not?! And of course one can quote against this “When the wicked perish there is song,” and continue with more erudite quotes. For my part, I was very happy about the elimination of that scoundrel “of blessed memory” (though unfortunately I am not among the lovers of baklava), and those sanctimonious rebukes aroused in me profound nausea.
So what do we do with the quotations? Well, there are thousands of pretexts to this side and to that, and I am sure they are readily available online to any seeker. As readers of this site, I hope you are not deluding yourselves: no one really formulates a moral stance in the light of such sources and quotations that contradict each other and do not say much. Tell me who the speaker is and I will tell you his conclusion on this matter, and what he will quote—just as happens in almost all other value-laden issues. And still, so as not to leave the page blank, I will say that I personally greatly enjoyed precisely the “answer” of R. Douglas Murray, may he be granted long life—the one and only—who offered a fascinating resolution of this grave contradiction, in this clip (see 10:40–11:20 there, and your heart will rejoice). For those who struggle, here is the passage translated:
So who said, “Torah among the nations—do not believe”? To teach you that sometimes in one healthy non-Jewish homosexual there is more Torah and common sense (and also charm) than in thousands of sanctimonious Jews.
Discussion
I’m checking whether it’s possible.
Do you think that nowadays a rabbinical court cannot compel a secular person to give a get, because the Rambam’s statement that “it is his evil inclination that has overpowered him, and once he is beaten until his inclination is weakened and he says ‘I am willing,’ he has divorced of his own will” does not apply?
What is a woman supposed to do if her husband has gone secular?
Correct. I wrote this here in the past. There is no solution for a secular refuser. She is essentially an agunah.
The solution is of course a prenuptial agreement and a condition in the kiddushin.
I’m sure volunteers could also be found for manual transcription (or proofreading an automatic transcript). Upload the recording (for the glory of the State of Israel), and there can be a shared file where whoever wants can transcribe it. I, for one, am already volunteering to transcribe at least half an hour of the conversation.
You wrote two things:
1. According to the liberal-democratic model, a state is not supposed to impose religious values on its citizens, even if most of them are committed to halakhah.
2. If there is a person who commits transgressions, it is possible that the laws of coercion and punishment would return, but only because it is clear to him that these are transgressions and that they obligate him.
A. These things seem contradictory. If a citizen is a believer, is the state permitted/required to force him to observe the commandments?
B. I didn’t understand how the liberal-democratic model can negate the need and the possibility of enforcing the commandments. After all, coercing commandment observance is explicit halakhah, and in a case where obedience to morality means nullifying halakhah (not just in a specific scenario), then halakhah takes precedence. Is this what you called “it doesn’t fit”?
A. I don’t see a contradiction here. A democratic state can enforce agreed-upon values even if they are religious. So long as this is an agreed-upon framework.
B. Indeed, that doesn’t fit. Beyond that there are additional reasons: actions done under coercion have no religious value. The laws of coercion were written in a different reality, one in which freedom was not a central value. Coercion is not useful, since it makes halakhah hated by the public, and in such a case it is mistaken to coerce. Beyond that, morality too is God’s will, and when there is a conflict between halakhah and morality, halakhah does not always prevail. Therefore one can say that for moral reasons I will not coerce even if that is what halakhah says. Halakhah is not necessarily the bottom line (in my lectures on halakhah and morality I made an exception for laws that are explicit in the Torah and whose clash with morality is inherent and not accidental. But this is not the place).
As I have written more than once, hypothetical discussions about an unfamiliar reality are fairly pointless. Decisions about such a reality can be made after we experience it and understand the significance of things in that reality. When there is a state in which an overwhelming majority of the residents are committed to halakhah, I assume we will understand what is right to do. The discussion here is from our point of view today, of course.
On this kind of matter the Rashba wrote (Responsa, part 3, siman 393):
“If you insist on establishing everything strictly according to the laws fixed in the Torah, the world will be destroyed, as our Sages said: Jerusalem was destroyed only because they based their rulings strictly on Torah law.”
You mentioned that you didn’t upload the conversation with Yaron Yadan because of poor recording quality.
By the way, there are programs, including AI programs, that can improve the quality a lot.
And little old me understands a bit about computers, so I don’t mind doing it, even for free, if you want.
I agree with you. I wrote here that I’m willing to work on it even for free, as someone who deals with building and promoting websites and things like that.
And I’m also willing to volunteer to transcribe it and even translate it into English.
Thanks.
As for an inherent clash versus an accidental one, that’s what I meant when I wrote that the meaning here is the nullification of the halakhah of coercing commandment observance—entirely, and not just in a specific scenario. If in the optimal system of government this halakhah is void, then apparently we have not obeyed God’s will. But I agree with you that this is all completely theoretical.
A. Don’t you think there is a problem with the state today committing biblical prohibitions? For example, public transportation on Shabbat, and more.
B. In an ideal halakhic state, would the Sanhedrin and the court system be two separate bodies?
C. More generally, how would the concept of a Sanhedrin work? How do you think people would be chosen for it, for example? Or is this a utopian vision and the solutions are not ours…
I agree, except for the claim that we have not obeyed God’s will. I wrote here that my remarks are aimed mainly at laws that are explicit in Scripture. Coercion is an interpretation of the Sages. Beyond that, morality too is God’s will, not only halakhah.
A. What does “there is no problem” mean? Of course there is a halakhic prohibition, but sometimes morality or “it doesn’t fit” arguments override halakhah. Beyond that, the state does not commit prohibitions. The one who commits them is the Jew who desecrates Shabbat. The state at most does not coerce him to refrain from doing so. Search here on the site for discussions of “it doesn’t fit” arguments.
B. Questions like these are hypothetical, and only when we experience the situation will we be able to form a solid position on them. As things stand now, I would say yes. As the Ran writes in Derashah 11 about the king’s law and Torah law.
C. Indeed, utopian. The Rishonim already disagreed about this (the Rambam, regarding the renewal of ordination, argues that it depends on the agreement of the sages of the Land of Israel; others hold that it will come from above). I think that when a situation arises in which a person or body receives the endorsement of the entire public, we will recognize it, and that will be the semikhah.
The rabbi speaks to elites, and I live on the ground. When I hear stories about doctors being called for life-saving house calls on Shabbat in Haredi neighborhoods and hesitating whether to drive because their car tires might be slashed, or when I encounter attempts to push women out of the public sphere by violence in the name of modesty, I understand that the Haredi street is not there. From its perspective, every drive on Shabbat is desecration of Shabbat. Every female presence in the public sphere is promiscuity, and so on. Do you think that if it had the power it would refrain from religious coercion in the name of abstract principles? I don’t think so.
I’m really not talking about elites. First, coercion exists on both sides, and one side drags the other along. It escalates. Second, I argued that when a state arises in which halakhah has authority, there will also be responsibility. That of course says nothing about the current situation. On the contrary, today both the religious public and its political and rabbinic leaders are fossilized fools with whom there is nothing to work. But so long as that remains the situation, the situation I am talking about will not arise. With authority comes responsibility and pragmatism. There are countless examples of this (just for example: the permission to participate in government once the Haredim realized they could not serve in it without responsibility; women serving on religious councils; Torah study for women; and more). Principles of “be killed rather than transgress” dissipate like smoke when circumstances change. Therefore I am not very impressed by the situation that prevails today. I do not like it, and it truly horrifies me. But it has no bearing on forecasts. It will dissipate like smoke when circumstances change. And if it does not dissipate, then the circumstances simply will not change. In my estimation there will not be a situation in which halakhah has the authority to run things here, and all these characteristics will remain in place.
And is it possible?
I join Ariel’s request: “The people want to see the debate.”
Regarding forcibly imposing religion on people who are in principle observant of Torah and mitzvot, your words seem to show some openness to that. But should a state impose on a citizen his own principles even when his actions harm none of the other citizens? A state is ostensibly an institution that helps its members function better together than they would alone; it is not meant to realize citizens’ desires for themselves through state power. Even if people want such coercion, is it still right to use public power in order to make an individual uphold his own principles toward himself? If citizens wanted fines for adultery between married spouses, would it be right to use the power of the state for that, when whoever chooses to marry through that track (let us say there are several tracks) takes the fine upon himself? Ostensibly that is not the state’s role. Likewise on the plane of religious coercion there is no benefit in this for the members of the state, and there is no point in forcing a person to uphold his own principles; he should deal with them himself.
You are ignoring the elephant in the middle of the room: the traditional interpretation of the prohibition of “you shall not stray after.” According to the traditional interpretation, there is an obligation to prevent free thought and critical discussion. Responsibility and pragmatism are on the technical level. On the essential level there is no responsibility or pragmatism among the Haredim. In a halakhic state in the Haredi version there will be no place for universities, for freedom of opinion, for critical literature including yours and probably Rav Kook’s as well. At most they’ll leave engineering institutes. A free university and free research will be prohibited. Cultural works too will be censored across the board. I knew schools with excellent children’s libraries that were completely destroyed as a result of Haredi influence. It won’t stop there. You yourself saw this with your child in the Haredi yeshiva. Why would what happened on the micro level not happen on the macro level?
Last week you wrote:
“Everyone now understands Biden’s enigmatic yet plainly jubilant remark from yesterday that he is even more aware than all of us think of the danger of war in the north. It is surely clear that the Americans should be the first to be happy that we are dealing a mortal blow to the ‘axis of evil’ (their term, as is well known), without any cost to them except for backing that is mainly passive. Their conduct on the ground also shows that Israel absolutely did not twist their arm and act against their position (if they really didn’t want it, not a single tank here would move. All the munitions are from them, and so is the international umbrella), but is acting together with them.”
And now Amit Segal reports that Biden cursed and swore at Bibi over the killing of Fuad Shukr, so I hope you will infer from this that next time you should speak with less confidence. In other words, here Israel is taking a super dramatic step without first receiving America’s consent, or even more, entirely against what would be America’s expected view. That is a frontal contradiction to what you wrote. And I also conclude that perhaps in this particular respect (not, God forbid, in every respect) at this time we are better off with a leader with backbone like him and not spineless people who rush to hand over maritime territory because of diplomatic pressure (and yes, he too in the past buckled under diplomatic pressure, but apparently eight years of Obama toughened him up).
It’s possible, and it was even done quickly by the two friends here, Ariel and Ushi. Thanks to them. It will be uploaded to the site soon.
As I wrote, if an overwhelming majority of the citizens sees halakhah as a public goal, that turns it into a social need. In such a situation there is room for a position that justifies a certain degree of coercion. But as I wrote, a position on this can be formulated only when we experience it ourselves and understand the meaning of the situation. As for the other drawbacks of coercion, I certainly agree and have written that as well. A position regarding coercion must take those into account too.
I completely agree with the description of the Haredim. What is new about that? My argument was not about them, but about a future situation that will arise. But I added that when the Haredim are the only ones here (if everyone is Haredi, Heaven forbid), they will engage in high-tech and academia and the army and libraries. Otherwise they will disappear.
I find it a bit hard to cope with reading-comprehension difficulties. I can only recommend to you your own recommendation to me: a bit less decisiveness and a bit more thought and attention to what you read. I did not say that we never acted against the U.S. We certainly have, more than once. I said something about what happened specifically here, and I had indications for that (the immediate reversal of the American position). And I’m not even talking about your absolute confidence in journalistic reports about what goes on with Biden in the Oval Office.
I am sure that if you try, you can improve on this. Best of luck going forward.
Just to note that the video cuts off and the ending is missing. And it ends בדיוק at the point when Yaron asked about your remarks, and you had not yet answered him. Could you “pay the debt” here (or elsewhere, or point to a relevant post)?
It didn’t cut off. His battery ran out and we stopped. Maybe there will be a continuation sometime in the future.
Which question are you referring to?
A halakhic state is a shell; the question is who fills it. A “halakhic state” according to Religious Zionism is one thing; the Haredi version (which to some extent finds expression in Haredi communities and towns) is something else: lack of transparency because of the laws of lashon hara, nepotism, irrational faith in sages bordering on “Daas Torah,” and more.
Hello Rabbi Michael,
Isn’t the fact that the state (in this area) has given the mandate to the rabbinical court a solution for a secular recalcitrant husband?
After all, he wants to be part of the state (if I remember correctly, I think you once wrote something similar).
In the days of the Sages, did actions done under coercion have religious value?
According to this principle, it is never right to coerce religious acts.
I don’t understand. So what if he wants to be part of the state? So inwardly he really wants to divorce her? Very forced. I don’t recall ever writing anything like that.
Absolutely. In their time people believed and were committed to halakhah, and that is the law of “we coerce him until he says ‘I am willing,’” which has been explained here on the site several times.
Rabbi, isn’t your time too precious for this…?!
Everything you wrote here also exists today in a state that is not a halakhic state. It changes according to interest.
Nu, so. I don’t understand why this is my reading problem if both I and you are talking about the specific case of heating up the front with Hezbollah, and you respond to me saying you didn’t mean U.S. relations, say, since the days of Truman. Where in my words could it be understood that I meant “never” rather than this specific case? I ask in wonder.
You wrote, “Their conduct on the ground also shows that Israel absolutely did not twist their arm and act against their position” about this specific case, and now it turns out that in this specific case (assuming the report is correct, of course) Israel did go against their position and twisted their arm. I have no other definition for eliminating Hezbollah’s number 2 without informing them in advance / asking permission in advance than that Israel twisted their arm and acted against their position. So where exactly is my reading-comprehension problem??
As for the second remark about the reliability of the report—if I have to choose between a report by the exposer of the Watergate affair and “my heart tells me” of the honorable rabbi—my heart tells me it knows where to place the bets.
No wonder you don’t understand. You still haven’t read. There is no point in continuing.
Just leaving this here from this morning:
“The Wall Street Journal reports:
After Israel eliminated Nasrallah, Gallant called to update Defense Secretary Austin, who told him: ‘Sorry, what did you say?’—in light of the fact that the administration had not been informed in advance.
Austin asked Gallant whether Israel was prepared to be ‘alone’ regarding its self-defense, given the administration’s lack of prior notification about significant operations.”
And against that—
“Their conduct on the ground also shows that Israel absolutely did not twist their arm and act against their position.”
Quite amusing indeed.
He doesn’t want to divorce her, but he does want to be a law-abiding citizen.
It seems to me that a Torah-observant person whom they coerce also does not want to divorce his wife; rather, he wants to be a Jew who fulfills the words of the Torah.
Today this exists as a deviation from proper conduct, when everyone—at least in the general and knitted-kippah sectors—admits that it is a deviation. Nobody legitimizes corruption affairs because “it is forbidden to speak lashon hara and sages must be honored.” In a Haredi halakhic state this deviation could become the norm.
Take, for example, the area of sex offenses. In a halakhic state, no one will publish investigations against the next incarnation of Chaim Walder and Yehuda Meshi-Zahav, no one will complain against them to the police (and even if someone does complain, he will be ostracized by his community, or the police will bury the case).
A Torah-observant person wants to divorce her because he understands that this is what is right. A law-abiding person may perhaps comply and perhaps be afraid, but not because in his opinion this is what is right.
Fools have a well-known advantage. They greatly enjoy their foolishness and dig themselves ever deeper into it. Accomplished fools are distinguished by the fact that they do not understand that they are fools. And regarding this it was said: “Avi chastised you with whips…”
For those who don’t understand the foolishness here, how do you actually reconcile this report with your understanding that we were coordinated with the U.S. in the move to eliminate Nasrallah?
Economically, I agree that the Haredim, as a phenomenon of economic leftism based on the welfare state, have limits like all welfare states. But politically, if the Haredim rise to power and have the ability to establish a Haredi halakhic state according to their interpretation of halakhah, then the consequences I presented—dismantling the universities, censorship, and religious coercion—will appear very quickly. People also did not believe that the Muslim Haredim would get where they got to, but both in the Shiite case with Khomeini and in the Sunni case they proved that those were mere illusions, despite the heavy economic and political price they paid. The Jewish Haredim too will prove that pragmatic considerations are only secondary for them, and in fact they are already proving this in matters of economy and security.
That is not correct, because the problem today is that the Haredim have no trust in any external government, and in particular not in a Zionist government. In the communities of Europe, when the community had authority to punish, they definitely did hand offenders over to the community leaders.
An exercise for the intelligent reader: help bewildered Michi find where he wrote that any elimination was coordinated. Now find two times where the matter was already explained here properly (reading comprehension—I already said that, didn’t I?).
And regarding this our Sages said in their holy spirit: one does not deal with fools.
I thought I was the only idiot, but apparently there are several others, which reminds me of the story about the man whose wife calls him to say there’s someone driving the wrong way, and he tells her he sees lots of them.
“It is surely clear that the Americans should be the first to be happy that we are dealing a mortal blow to the ‘axis of evil’ (their term, as is well known), without any cost to them except for backing that is mainly passive.”
Even just regarding this, I could only conclude that the Americans ought to be jubilant over the removal from the list of a man with a bounty of millions of dollars on his head—Hezbollah’s number 2, whose hands are drenched in the blood of many Americans—and lo and behold, Biden’s reaction is a juicy curse at Bibi. So maybe not everything is belly-born speculation in the manner of Hazal.
I understand from his holy words that you are trying to back away from what you said because you spoke about the specific step, but what can one do when regarding that specific step it turns out that Biden issued a soothing public statement while in closed forums he was boiling over at Bibi. So now it turns out that Israel did twist their arm and acted against their position. And again, a respected journalist with one of the most distinguished résumés in the world of journalism is more trustworthy to me than speculation of the “anan sahadi” type, all the more so when people point out your mistakes—in keeping with the saying, “If from your own mouth, then according to your own valuation.”
Test
Rabbi Michi was talking about the elimination of Nasrallah, and you are talking about the elimination of Shukr, which was two months earlier and was the first elimination. And in general, what the Americans are afraid of is a mess, not an Israeli victory or a Hezbollah defeat.
I saw no point in continuing this bizarre discussion in which my interlocutor repeats the same nonsense over and over and thinks it’s a new argument. I have said more than once that talking to walls is not among my hobbies lately.
So I will only note to Daniel: I absolutely was not talking here about the elimination of Nasrallah, nor about any elimination at all.
Doesn’t the rabbi think that promoting Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip, as some of the religious MKs and ministers are doing, stems mainly from a messianic outlook that ignores realistic reality?
Absolutely not. Their motivation really is settlement of the land. But this is a commandment, or a religious and national outlook, not a messianic consideration. You turn it into something messianic if you claim that this is an unrealistic aspiration that will cost us dearly and they ignore that (I have posts here on messianism; you should look there). But note that according to them this is not true. On the contrary, they argue that giving up the settlements cost us dearly, and returning there will improve our security. Both because of IDF control of the area, and because it shows the Palestinians that they pay a price for their conduct and lose territory, and perhaps that will deter them in the future (because the loss of life they suffer does not really work on them).
You can argue with this, but it is not messianism; it is a dispute between outlooks. People enjoy making life easy for themselves and labeling anyone who thinks differently from them as “messianic,” thereby exempting themselves from substantive discussion.
From my perspective, the lack of realism is not expressed in whatever price we may or may not pay as a result of Jewish settlement in Gaza, but in the near-zero feasibility of such a move, mainly in light of external constraints. Therefore, although one can indeed theoretically discuss each of the arguments in favor of settlement in Gaza (which do not necessarily overlap with the arguments against uprooting settlements), one cannot ignore the infeasibility of such a move, a matter which, from what I have seen, receives no response at all from supporters of settlement.
By the way, in post 584 you yourself argued against Smotrich that he acts according to a messianic outlook, so what is different here?
I really disagree. There is definitely feasibility, just as there is feasibility for declaring a death zone or a buffer zone at the expense of the Strip, which many want to do. The world will be angry and protest, and we will move on. People said about the war too (including me) that it was not feasible. Meanwhile it continues. Taking territory away from the Strip is a very sensible step in these circumstances, whether for settlements or simply to leave it empty. Exactly like settlement in territory conquered in war—except that here it is even a somewhat smaller problem, since we did not conquer it from a state.
Even if you disagree, in my opinion treating someone who thinks this way as messianic is unnecessary and demagogic labeling.
Indeed, there are messianic components in their conduct. But it is not true that every step we do not agree with is messianic. Specifically regarding renewed settlement in Gaza, I do not think messianism can be attributed, as above.
I did not claim that their every step stems from messianism, and therefore I did not address the claims against them regarding the hostages, where I do not think this is necessarily messianism (though in my view this is not a binary matter; yet regarding that issue it does seem that they have weighty arguments). But regarding the feasibility of Jewish settlement in Gaza—when it is not even defined as part of the war’s objectives, when the prime minister himself has said several times that he opposes it, not to mention the world—personally this seems irrational to me, to hold conferences on the subject and present within them concrete plans for Jewish settlement. Therefore, in this case the balance inclines me to attribute messianic motives to this conduct, or at least motives that are mainly messianic.
Are the ideas of equality and peace not messianic?
So what if it is not defined? In their opinion it should be defined that way. Moreover, if it were defined, then it would not be messianism? Is it impossible for a messianic government to set messianic war goals? You are contradicting yourself. And if the prime minister does not think so, am I forbidden to disagree with him? I simply cannot understand the connection between your words.
I assume that among other things he means that if Bibi does not define this as a war aim, when he has a lot to gain from it with his base, that is an indication that it is not feasible on the geopolitical level.
Again, everything I wrote relates to the feasibility of the move, and therefore the fact that the government did not see fit to include it among the war aims, together with the prime minister’s opposition (in addition to the overwhelming opposition of the entire world, all our friends), all tilt the balance toward the infeasibility of such a move.
There is a problem for the secular public,
but also for the religious public (less so for the Haredi) in understanding that a “halakhic state” is a secular concept. Even the concept “religious” is a secular concept. From the standpoint of truth there is only sacred and profane, or redemption and exile (of the people of Israel or the Shekhinah, etc.), and that is all. If we were engaged in sociological modeling then it would make sense, if anything, to speak of a “Torah state” rather than a “halakhic state,” since it represents something more than a collection of rituals; but even that—inasmuch as it deals with shaping the face of human society, which is false by its very nature—is a secular concept. Secularity is external and deals with the sociology of empty people, whereas holiness concerns unity or singularity. Holiness wants to take all the things in the world and turn them into something singular, or more precisely to find the unity that lies behind multiplicity and division.
Therefore holiness (and also truth) hates sociology and abhors it. As with the very concept “religious,” which is a secular concept from the standpoint of truth, there is a problem in that people do not understand that the acts of the commandments (with the appropriate intention, which is of course the main thing) are supposed to achieve a goal that everyone is eventually meant to see, and then they will cease to be rituals. For example, if as in the past we all went out to war and the Holy One, blessed be He, came with us with storm clouds and preemptive artillery bombardment of lightning on the enemy camp, or stones from heaven exactly on the enemies’ heads, and zero dead and wounded in the war, along with much spoil—regularly—and then suddenly He stopped doing so because He is no longer among us, because someone sinned, then I do not think anyone would have any problem—in order to purge evil from our midst—with executing someone who for some reason decided to live among us, but despite that desecrated Shabbat in front of two witnesses and after prior warning. The whole purpose of coercing the commandments is precisely so that God may dwell among us, and God’s dwelling among us is something operative that one sees with one’s eyes. That is what matters, not modeling a halakhic state. In any case, the true goal of spiritual people who observe Torah and mitzvot is redemption and not the empty-content sociology of a “halakhic state.” Redemption from the prison that is the meaningless reality around us, which is realized in every phrase of the form: “the state of (fill in the blank).” Sociology is the embodiment of the meaninglessness of our existence, and any person with spirit ought to abhor it. Only people who are empty shells (you can call them “demons”) like to engage in it (jurists, people in the humanities, media people, etc.).
And on this no one is allowed to disagree, and whoever disagrees is messianic? Blessed is He who has shared of His wisdom with those who fear Him—who are not flesh and blood but God, who does not err.
See my reply above. Mere insistence.
And let us say amen.
I only hope you are saying amen to something you understand. Like the laws governing saying amen to blessings.
You claimed that there is nothing to fear from Smotrich acting with a messianic policy, and I disagree.
Smotrich runs the economy by the method of “with God’s help,” as he himself said. If only it were just a figure of speech. The man is throwing away our money at the expense of our children’s economic future and hanging everything on the idea that in the future the Messiah will come and throw us banknotes from the air; otherwise there is no logic whatsoever to his “policy” (does failing to advance a state budget count as policy? Or is he simply too busy in the security cabinet), and he does not listen to Treasury officials, to all the economists, to the governor of the Bank of Israel, and of course he waves them all away. Fine—if the result were that he was right. But of course all the “leftist” credit-rating agencies listened less to Mr. Economy Smotrich’s “arguments” and lowered the rating to rock bottom.
So after the facts above (seasoned with my own descriptions), do you still think Smotrich is not acting out of a messianic policy?
What about religious/Haredi communities? In them, is it justified for the public to impose religious norms?
Because that is what happens in practice in religious/Haredi communities: there is coercion (regarding Shabbat observance in the public sphere, modesty, wearing army uniforms, and I assume there are other examples I have not had the privilege of hearing about…).
Not religious norms, but there is room to enforce reasonable norms. Just as a person would not walk naked in the street. And don’t ask me what counts as reasonable. I have no general answer. For example, there was the protest of the parliamentary aides in the Knesset over not being allowed in wearing tank tops and shorts. In my view that is entirely reasonable.
[Just to note from this post – https://mikyab.net/posts/797/%5D
I had not even remembered it. Many thanks.
Is it permissible to impose halakhah in a religious community or religious neighborhood? Because in practice today religious communities and Haredi neighborhoods impose Shabbat observance in the public sphere (and there are other examples of coercion, especially in Haredi neighborhoods). Is that acceptable from your perspective?
I think there is room for that in a reasonable and sensible measure. For example, to close roads to traffic on Shabbat if there is an alternative route. It is hard to set sharp criteria.
One may wonder how an observant person can be willing to accept transgressions and not enforce halakhic observance on the Jewish public, when it is in his power. Is this a position that is acceptable from a halakhic-Torah standpoint? My claim is that in the current situation it is not right to impose the values of halakhah on the public as a whole. Coercion is not useful for several reasons. First, it creates hatred and does not bring people closer. Second, acts done under coercion are devoid of religious value. Coercion can be applied only when dealing with a person who is committed to the values of halakhah and deviates from them (because of his inclination or because of various interests). Coercion toward a person who does not believe (in the Holy One, blessed be He, or at least in the giving of the Torah) is pointless and valueless.
I would be glad if you could bring me halakhic Jewish sources that hold this way (or even point me to a post).
This has to be assessed. Halakhically and morally there is room for coercion of a believer who is slacking off. But in a democratic state there is no room for this because of democratic values. I see no need for sources. Why do I need a verse when reason suffices?! I can gather sayings such as not saying something that will not be heard, boundaries on “you shall surely rebuke,” etc. But that is unnecessary, since the discussion is not there.
In the context of institutional halakhic coercion, I think it is worth mentioning the Sanhedrin’s decision to leave the Chamber of Hewn Stone as soon as they saw that capital punishment no longer interested anyone and that if they had to implement the law they would have to open a slaughterhouse. What I understand from this is that Hazal themselves understood that punishment and coercion are relevant only when the people want the legal system, and if not—there is no point.
I’m shocked that there was a debate with Yaron Yadan and we won’t get to see it.
In what framework did this interview take place? Did you just throw it in the trash, or is someone working on publishing it?
There are all kinds of solutions for poor audio quality, like adding a transcript using automatic tools or even uploading the conversation as text only.
I would be very happy to listen to/read such a conversation even with poor audio quality. (Happy to help with that if needed.)