A Look at the Law of Destroying Idolatry in Our Times: The s’passt nisht Principle (Column 447)
Yesterday I was sent a link to a Facebook discussion opened by Haggai Mishgav about the question of destroying idolatry (Avodah Zarah) nowadays. He raises several interesting halakhic points and considerations, especially regarding the application of halakha in our day.
Halakhic Background
Idolatry is one of the three cardinal sins for which we are commanded to give up our lives rather than transgress. As such, the Torah extends the prohibition to its ancillary aspects (abizrayhu of Avodah Zarah). Among other things, we are obligated to destroy the accessories of idolatry, i.e., ritual implements—and certainly the idols themselves or their representations. This is explicit in several places in the Torah, as Maimonides writes in Positive Commandment 185 (and so in the Sefer ha-Chinukh, mitzvah 436):
“The 185th commandment is that we were commanded to destroy idolatry and all its houses by every manner of destruction and ruin—by breaking, burning, tearing down, cutting—each item by the method most appropriate to it; that is, by whatever most strongly and swiftly brings about its destruction. The intent is that we leave them no trace. As it says (Deut. 12:2), ‘You shall surely destroy all the places where the nations … served [their gods],’ and it also says (end of Va’etchanan) ‘Their altars you shall break,’ and again (Deut. 12:3) ‘You shall tear down their altars.’ And because the Talmud states in Sanhedrin 90a, ‘A positive commandment regarding idolatry’—they wondered what positive commandment there is with respect to idolatry; Rav Ḥisda explained: ‘And you shall tear down [their altars].’ And the language of the Sifrei (Re’eh): From where do we know that if one cut down an asherah tree and it regrew—even ten times—he is obligated to cut it down again? Scripture says: ‘You shall surely destroy.’ And it says there: ‘And you shall destroy their name from that place’—in the Land of Israel you are commanded to pursue them, but you are not commanded to pursue them outside the Land.”
These are not all the sources. The Torah already commands this in Exodus 31:11–13 and elsewhere. As is apparent at the end of his words, the obligation of “and you shall tear down” is stronger and more emphatic in the Land of Israel. Details appear in Rambam, Laws of Idolatry, chs. 7–8.
However, halakha recognizes several ways to nullify idolatry, and where nullification is effective the law of destruction does not apply. There are many details in the law of nullification (see Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah §142; Rambam, Avodah Zarah 8:6 and on; and a survey of the principles here). I won’t enter into them here, but simply put, an act is usually required; thought alone does not suffice. There is also a difference between an idol accessory owned by a gentile and one owned by a Jew (the latter is never nullifiable), and acquisition by a Jew can negate the possibility of nullification, and more.
The Question
Mishgav relates about a teenager who found a small idol in an archaeological site and came to ask a rabbi whether he may sell it (the figurine is worth a lot of money). The rabbi answered that the statue must be smashed, pursuant to the law of destroying idolatry. He raised several points that rabbi apparently didn’t consider (it’s not clear how he knows that), and they are certainly worthy of discussion and thought. Before getting to them, I’ll bring a story I heard over thirty years ago on a recording by Rabbi Zilberstein.
A Pilpul in the Laws of Shabbat
Rabbi Zilberstein told that one day Rabbi Disler (Rosh Yeshiva of “Orayta” for ba’alei teshuva—we know each other) came to him with a question. A student from his yeshiva hosted a secular friend for Shabbat. The guest worked in archaeology, and when he arrived on Shabbat he held a gift for his host—a figurine from a dig. The host didn’t flinch and didn’t bat an eye; he grabbed the idol and smashed it on the spot. Afterwards he came to Rabbi Disler to ask whether it was permitted to do this on Shabbat. He took it for granted that he had to smash the idol, and I assume his friend’s astonishment didn’t bother him either (“There is no counsel and no wisdom against the Lord”). All that troubled him was a question in the laws of Shabbat. One could debate at length which prohibition is involved—whether this is destructive or constructive, etc.—but here I’ll bring what Rabbi Zilberstein answered. That’s the punchline of the story.
Rabbi Zilberstein opened with a difficulty that the author of the Avnei Nezer raised regarding a contradiction in the Sefer ha-Chinukh. In mitzvah 425 the Chinukh writes that there is a mitzvah to wage war and kill the Seven Nations in the Land of Israel:
“To kill the Seven Nations who held our land before we conquered it from them—the Canaanite and the Amorite, etc.—and to destroy them wherever we find them, as it says (Deut. 7:2): ‘You shall utterly destroy them,’ and the command is repeated in Shoftim (Deut. 20:17): ‘For you shall utterly destroy them—the Hittite and the Amorite, etc.’
“Among the roots of the commandment: because these Seven Nations began to practice all kinds of idolatry and all the abominations that the Lord despises; therefore, since they are the essence and initial foundation of idolatry, we were commanded to blot them out and destroy them from under heaven—they shall not be remembered or mentioned among the living. And our command to destroy them yields us benefit: that we erase their memory from the world and will not learn from their deeds. And we will also gain moral instruction from this—that we should not turn after idolatry. For in pursuing every member of this evil family to kill him for engaging in idolatry, it will not enter any man’s heart to act as they did in any way.” …
“This commandment applies to men and women, in every place and at all times that we have the power to kill them…”
Here he writes that the mitzvah applies also to women.
By contrast, in mitzvah 604 he deals with the commandment to blot out Amalek:
“We were commanded to erase the seed of Amalek and destroy his memory from the world—male and female, adult and child; regarding this it is said (Deut. 25:19): ‘You shall blot out the remembrance of Amalek,’ and ‘remembrance’ includes everything.”
“This is among the commandments incumbent on the entire community, as our Sages said (Sanhedrin 20b): Three commandments were given to Israel upon entering the Land—to appoint a king, to build the Temple, and to eradicate the seed of Amalek. In truth, the obligation also falls on every individual male Jew to kill and destroy them from the world if he has the power—wherever and whenever—if perchance he finds one of their descendants.”
Here he rules that the commandment is imposed on the public, but practically only the males are obligated to carry it out.[1]
Rabbi Zilberstein reported that the Avnei Nezer raises this contradiction, and when I heard on the cassette his resolution I was sure it was one of the famous inventions of Rabbi Zilberstein—or that he found it in a children’s pilpul book. But no. Later I found it stated explicitly by a holy “High Priest,” namely in Responsa Avnei Nezer, Orach Chayyim §550:
“The Chinukh at the end of Parashat Ki Teitzei (mitzvah 603) writes that women are not commanded regarding the eradication of Amalek—only males, who are men of war [and therefore they are exempt also from the remembrance]. This is astonishing, for regarding the killing of the Seven Nations he writes in mitzvah 425 that it applies to males and females. The Mishneh la-Melekh already hinted at this in his notes.”
Now fasten your seatbelts and hold tight. Note his answer:
“(b) What seems in this matter is as follows: The Chinukh also writes that upon every individual there is an obligation—if one of the seed of Amalek comes into his hand—to kill him. This can occur for a woman as well, as with Sisera and Yael. So why did he write that the commandment is only upon the males, who are men of war? One must say that it is a positive time-bound commandment, for it does not apply on Shabbat, since the obligation to kill Amalek is not more stringent than other capital offenses, which do not override Shabbat. It is understandable that during a time of war Scripture says (Deut. 20) ‘until it is subdued,’ even on Shabbat (Shabbat 19a). But since women are not ‘people of war,’ rather it only applies when an individual happens to come into their hand, it does not override Shabbat. And since Shabbat is not a time for this commandment for women, it is considered that there is no time at all for them regarding it, as is evident from Mishnah Keritot ch. 1 regarding ‘one who miscarries on the night of the eighty-first,’ where Beit Hillel compares it to one who miscarries on the day eighty that fell on Shabbat, and Beit Shammai did not answer except by saying that Shabbat is fit for a public offering; but if it were not fit for any offering, it would be like the night. And do not object that since the time of this commandment for men is during war… We hold (Shabbat 62a) that women are a separate category; and since for women there is no eradicating Amalek at all on Shabbat, it is not considered a time for this commandment at all for them, and thus for them it is time-bound (see Sefer ha-Kaneh regarding circumcision).”
“(c) But regarding killing the Seven Nations—even according to the early authorities in Kiddushin 34a (see there in the Ran and Tosafot R. Akiva Eiger, item 7), who hold that where there is also a negative commandment, women are obligated in the positive one—here too we have the negative commandment ‘You shall not keep alive any soul’ (Deut. 20:16). But even according to what appears from the simple reading of Tosafot in Kiddushin 34a to the contrary—behold, the killing of the Seven Nations is ‘so that they will not teach you to act [after their abominations]’ (Deut. 20:18), and it is akin to killing dangerous creatures. This is considered a labor not needed for its own sake (melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa), regarding which, according to most authorities, one is exempt; and it applies by Torah law even on Shabbat.”
“(d) One might think that since the killing of the Seven Nations applies on Shabbat, that would establish ‘time of the commandment’ also regarding the killing of Amalek—just as the time of a private offering is established because public offerings are fit then. But it is not analogous, for killing Amalek is for the past, to take vengeance upon him, whereas killing the Seven Nations is for the future—‘so that they will not teach you.’ They are not the same category.”
In short, he says that there is a mitzvah also on the individual to kill Amalekites; therefore this is not limited to wartime obligations. Seemingly, that should apply to women as well—but at the same time, it does not override Shabbat (the prohibition of taking a life). Thus, this mitzvah applies only on the six weekdays and not on Shabbat, making it a positive time-bound commandment—and therefore women are exempt. By contrast, regarding the killing of the Seven Nations, the Chinukh explicitly writes (see the citation above) that it is in order that we not be ensnared in their ways. If so, this is a melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa, like killing a snake or dangerous creatures in order that they not harm us (see Shabbat 3a). Hence, killing the Seven Nations is mandated even on Shabbat and is therefore not time-bound,[2] and consequently women are obligated as well.[3] It is unbelievable that a Jew would write this resolution in earnest.
We learn from here that killing the Seven Nations—and apparently also destroying their idols—is done so that we not be ensnared by them. From this Rabbi Zilberstein inferred that the smashing of the idol on Shabbat was a case of melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa, and therefore its prohibition is rabbinic; accordingly, the Torah-level positive commandment of destroying idolatry overrides this rabbinic prohibition.
I must say that this recorded stand-up routine, which I heard while hospitalized, made my day (I’ve always loved pilpulei de-oraita). I owe him thanks for removing one-sixtieth of my ailments, and it seems we can count him the first “medical clown” (see here that this practice began in 1986; that is precisely the year I heard this tape).
Now let us return to Mishgav’s considerations (I recommend reading his post now). I will preface that he presents these reflections not as absolute statements, and he himself writes that one could rule contrary to them. His criticism is of the rabbi who, he claims, didn’t take them into account at all (it’s unclear how he knows; though at least regarding some rabbis it’s quite plausible). In any case, I will discuss them on their merits.
Theft from the Public
Mishgav’s first point is that by law one may not sell the statue (like any archaeological find), irrespective of the prohibition; therefore doing so constitutes theft from the public. If, for the sake of argument, we assume there is a halakhic obligation to smash the statue, then as I understand it his claim is halakhically mistaken.
Even if the statue were merely an object prohibited for benefit, there would be no theft involved (some hold there is no ownership over items prohibited for benefit),[4] and according to other views there may be theft, but certainly no duty of restitution.[5] But all this applies if we were dealing with a regular prohibition of benefit. With idolatry, however, it is not only prohibited to benefit from it; there is a halakhic duty to smash and destroy the idol, and in such a case it is obvious there is no ownership and no theft. Dina de-malkhuta (the law of the land) applies to monetary matters, not to prohibitions; it cannot permit use of items prohibited for benefit or cancel the duty to smash them. Therefore, once I see such a figurine, I am obligated to smash it. And even merely from the standpoint of enforcing mitzvot there is an obligation to destroy the idol, to compel others—who are ignoring their halakhic duty—not to transgress it.
This story reminds me of something that happened to me. A young man studying at the Haredi yeshiva in Yeruham, the son of our friends, used to visit our home. One day he asked to borrow from us a book by Joseph Heller (the author of Catch-22 and the Talmud). While he was in the yeshiva, the spiritual supervisor saw the secular book in his possession—heaven forfend—and confiscated it from him. He felt uncomfortable, but in the end he mustered courage and told me. I told him to inform the supervisor that if he did not return the book I would summon him to a rabbinical court for theft. The young man went to the supervisor, who said he couldn’t find the book (perhaps true, perhaps not). Meanwhile the supervisor argued there was no theft here because reading such books is forbidden and they are like an object prohibited for benefit (the implication being that he destroyed the “prohibited” item, and didn’t merely misplace it). I told him that when I seek his halakhic opinion about what is permitted or forbidden to read, he will be the first to know. In the meantime, I added, I expect full payment for the value of the book; otherwise I will sue him in a rabbinical court. In the end I received payment, and I certainly did not forgive the theft (I assume he also did not repent; in any case I received no request for appeasement or reconciliation).
While this was ongoing I wondered whether in such a situation there truly is a prohibition of theft. According to him it was absolutely forbidden; let’s assume for the sake of discussion that it was an object prohibited for benefit (though even if reading were forbidden, it’s not clear whence he derived a prohibition of benefit). If indeed that is the situation according to him, then at most he “stole” an item prohibited for benefit, and in doing so he even fulfilled the mitzvah of “surely rebuke your fellow” and the duty to coerce compliance with mitzvot. He prevented me from sinning, and if he were permitted to strike me to compel me, then certainly he would be permitted to coerce me monetarily (per Ramban’s well-known logic at the end of Bava Batra: if you coerce him with his body, coerce him with his money). Above I wrote regarding theft involving items prohibited for benefit and argued there is definitely room to permit.
But in a case where there is a dispute whether there is a prohibition of benefit, it is obvious that you have no right to steal from me an item that, according to your opinion, is prohibited for benefit if, according to my view, it is not prohibited—and of course you cannot force me to act in accordance with your position. He (and recall that we are speaking of a spiritual supervisor, which makes the argument much worse) appoints himself judge, decides what is forbidden or permitted, and even coerces me to comply although my position is different. I’m not naive; it’s clear to me that as a Haredi he does not recognize my position as legitimate. The next step is that “heretics” like me might even allow text messaging with 150 justifications—heaven help us.
Returning to our matter: simply put, smashing the figurine does not involve theft.
National Consciousness and Identity
Mishgav’s next claim is that such figurines—and archaeology in general—are important for our national consciousness and identity, and that such a consideration also has a place and weight in the halakhic decision. True, this particular figurine is not really important on the macroscopic level, but the accumulation of data is important; every piece contributes to the overall picture.
Even if it were a cardinal find, I’m not sure that would permit waiving the duty to destroy this figurine (which counts as abizrayhu of idolatry). But to argue based on the marginal contribution of this particular figurine to a general picture that is important for national consciousness and identity seems to me far too remote a consideration to permit abizrayhu of Avodah Zarah.
Public Needs
Mishgav then turns to a discussion of the importance of “public opinion” in halakha. I didn’t fully understand what he meant, or why he presents it as a continuation of the previous point (consciousness and identity). From his examples, it seems he means public needs. He compares this to the permission to relocate graves for public needs. I gather his claim is twofold: (a) We see that public needs permit prohibitions; (b) What determines public needs are the norms accepted by society (therefore we do not limit ourselves to living in small houses to minimize the need to move graves). Perhaps this is what he meant by “public opinion,” namely that if the public considers something important to it in terms of consciousness and identity, that carries halakhic weight (and not necessarily the posek’s personal assessment of what’s important).
Again, it seems difficult to permit a prohibition of abizrayhu of idolatry on the basis of such a consideration—especially
Discussion
I’ll tie up the loose end that was left as an exercise. The upshot is this. The mashgiach is not permitted to destroy the book, since the owner of the book is the adherent of a position and holds his position that it is permitted. And so, nowadays too we are not permitted to destroy figurines (even if for some reason they were not nullified), since those idol worshippers were adherents of a position and held their position that this was the truth. [Except that the right to autonomy helped the owner of the book against the mashgiach only so that he would not violate his property rights by virtue of the obligation to destroy, whereas with idolatrous figurines you argue that the right to autonomy of those idol worshippers removes the obligation of destruction at its root, since today there is no violation of any property right of their worshippers, who are gone, and here the right to autonomy has become exclusive deference to his own position.]
That is, before us is the argument that there is significance to the other person’s stance, one composed of a right to autonomy and deference to his own viewpoint. In the case of the mashgiach, this argument operated within the halakhic system and recognized the rights of one who holds a position within it. And in the case of the figurines, you are applying this argument outside the halakhic system and recognizing the rights of one who holds a position in general. And even though this argument is being applied outside the halakhic system, you continue to grant it a Jewish stamp of approval, something like a transgression for the sake of Heaven. The vision of pluralism and peace.
I understood that this was also the halakhic conclusion at the end of the discussion:
“But here we are dealing with idolatry whose entire category has already become extinct and no longer exists at all in the world. This is a nullification that was effected on the entire form of worship and this religion, unlike ordinary nullification, which is done on a particular item. In such a situation, logic suggests that there is no need for nullification regarding this particular statue, and it is permitted and does not have to be destroyed.”
Maybe I didn’t understand correctly
Indeed. Even so, the archaeological “do not destroy wantonly” was conspicuous by its absence from the ruling.
I’m glad about the discussion, because on the one hand it raises what seems to me a very important and correct point; on the other hand, I think it opens a very wide door to discussion of who is really worthy of and able to make such meta-halakhic “es past nisht” considerations—and from here the הדרך is short to arguing about the very ability and broad shoulders of this or that posek to take such considerations into account (and this reaches everywhere, like the discussion regarding certain rulings of Rabbi Melamed, regarding the conversion framework, and it can reach any ruling that has public significance and resonance).
I don’t think this is about their rights. It is about my duties to respect the other and not harm him. Therefore it doesn’t depend on whether he is still alive and around.
By my definitions, this is not a vision of pluralism but a vision of tolerance.
Except that the practical difference between pluralism and tolerance (in your definitions) is that one can draw a legitimate sphere and an illegitimate sphere. But here you have completely erased any examination of the contents, and everything rests on the seriousness of the position of the one holding the view, since even with the gravest sin between man and God one still treats those who commit it with respect if they hold their position. It follows that in practice this is full-fledged pluralism; only the conceptual infrastructure is different.
First, that is not the difference. It is only a practical implication of the difference. The essential difference is whether I think he is right just like me (= pluralism), or whether I merely respect his mistaken position (= tolerance). Nor have I erased the difference at all. In this case it seems to me that the proper balance is not to damage the figurine. Of course one cannot draw a sharp line and criterion, but that is the meaning of es past nisht. Es past nisht means that it is simply unthinkable to do such a thing, not merely that it is somehow inappropriate.
(By “practical difference” I mean a practical implication of the essential difference.)
If here the balance says not to harm the figurine, then in what way is idolatry within a doctrine treated negatively at all? Here there is a maximum on the axis of error (idolatry) and a minimum on the axis of injury to honor (since its worshippers are gone and only their memory is heard faintly), and yet the balance ruled out harm. It is like Barak saying that of course he accepts both things, Jewish and democratic, but gives “Jewish” the weight of a grain of wheat.
How long will it take until saying that homosexuals should not marry becomes an es past nisht and the halakhah is nullified? Do you think that will happen?
A linguistic note: “es past nisht” simply means “it doesn’t fit.” That is the literal translation. In the sense of—not proper. And it definitely does not mean “it is unthinkable.” So I’m not sure this is the right term for this discussion. “Es past nisht” is a matter of what is accepted, what is proper, and what is not proper. It is a gentle expression, not a harsh one.
I am speaking about a fixed and declared policy of smashing, not about a specific act done by a private individual in his own home. That is a policy that today looks very problematic. The harm is not to the dead ancients, but to respect for humanity’s historical heritage and to a proper attitude toward ideas.
As for the question of the line, I distinguished in my remarks between substantive criticism and hostile criticism, which generally should not be taken into account.
If so, then I was mistaken. I don’t understand Yiddish.
I tried to read and understand the last paragraph about the contradiction to your general approach regarding independent systems, but I did not manage to understand it. Forgive me.
My questions:
A. Ostensibly, if there is room for moral considerations in halakhah, then they are dependent systems.
B. Is the decision intra-halakhic or extra-halakhic? Why is the decision on the side of morality?
In my humble opinion, the claim of “past nisht” goes too far, and from my impression it seems to lack any basis whatsoever in halakhah. In my opinion, the analogy to saving a gentile on Shabbat is not precise. There the considerations and arguments are substantive, and more specific (and they do not seem to me all that sufficient either…). What Noam asked above is only a sign of the matter—that the proposed permission here is actually, to the best of my judgment, devoid of any content (and not merely a “slippery slope” argument). Have we ever seen such a sweeping permission, or anything like it??
However, I would suggest a different argument to permit it (besides the reason of “general nullification,” which also seems to me much more plausible). I would perhaps suggest something like what the Hazon Ish wrote, Yoreh De’ah sec. 2, regarding “they lower but do not raise”—that it no longer achieves its intended purpose, and on the contrary causes the opposite. And since the purpose of our commandment of destruction is akin to (or identical with) the halakhah of “they lower,” perhaps there is room to argue that at least passively one should refrain from destroying it. And furthermore I would say: perhaps in our day, publicizing various idolatries that have already passed and whose memory has vanished from the world is itself an honor to the Kingdom of Heaven, and shows before our eyes the historical procession toward the goal of “on that day…” Perhaps one could say so.
Of course it lacks a basis; that is precisely my claim. And nevertheless people use it, sometimes consciously and sometimes not. Reasons of the sort that it is ineffective, or that it increases the honor of the Kingdom of Heaven, are part of the es past nisht, because beyond the fact that some of those reasons are nonsense (increase of the honor of the Kingdom of Heaven), even if they were not, in halakhah we do not expound the reason of the verse—certainly where the law appears explicitly in the Torah several times—as with destroying idolatry. So it is clear that the attitude toward a secular Jew does not stem from the fact that it is ineffective, but from the fact that it is simply impossible to treat a person that way. Es past nisht.
The same applies to saving a gentile on Shabbat, and also to going to secular courts, which almost everyone allows themselves. These are sweeping permissions that are not examined by the rules of halakhah (even though people try to present them that way), and therefore it is clear to me that they are based on es past nisht.
His honor did not explain at all what the mockery is in the words of the Avnei Nezer.
It is self-evident. First and foremost, there is not the slightest hint of this whole pilpul, even if it were correct, in the words of the Sefer HaChinukh. He writes it as something simple. Second, there is here an expounding of the reason of the verse; third, even if it is correct, the notion that this turns into a positive time-bound commandment is far from clear. And fourth, according to Rabbi Yehuda and the Rambam, who rules like him, a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah is a Torah prohibition.
With God’s help, 1st of Rosh Chodesh Adar I, 5782
It seems to me, in my humble opinion, that idolatry which according to halakhah requires destruction should indeed be destroyed; but since there is concern for “enmity” on the part of various “moderns,” I would recommend destroying the idol privately, for we are sworn not to provoke the nations, and included in this is also “not to provoke the Israelite nation” (as brought in the name of Rabbi Chaim Ozer of Vilna in the introduction to Responsa Bnei Banim by Rabbi Yehuda Henkin). By destroying the idol we are repairing the sin of idolatry on account of which the First Temple was destroyed, and by doing so privately we assist in repairing the blemish that caused the destruction of the Second Temple.
With blessings, Hasdai Betzalel Duvdevani Kirshen-Kvas
At any rate, there is “modern idolatry,” namely the “Spaghetti Monster,” such that saying “es past nisht” nullifies it from the status of “pasta,” and then there is nothing to it anymore.
With blessings, Ke-igul Lakshinger, Yeshivat Itri
It should be noted that in ancient times smashing other people’s idols was much more “past nisht.” After all, the other nations of the world worshipped those idols, and harming them was “an injury to the apple of the eye” of our neighbors. But this is precisely the revolution the Torah sought to create: to bring about a state in which “the idols shall utterly pass away.” Our Creator imposed upon us to be the “standard-bearers” of the monotheistic revolution, and therefore to fight idolatry and its symbols.
With blessings, H.B. of the holy congregation
The story with the mashgiach is nice.
Regarding “fertility figurines,” it should be noted that besides being “accessories of idolatry,” they were designed in a way that would also arouse the “evil inclination for sexual immorality,” and this “idol” is dancing in our time with greater force and greater intensity, and that alone is enough to make it abhorrent.
With blessings, H.B. of the holy congregation
It is a mistake to think that idolatry has been nullified in our world.
See the Damanhur temple in the heart of modern Italy.
One must understand that the root of the matter there is the attribution of “supernatural powers” to matter, under the guise of pretty modern words such as the influence of art on the human soul. It seems that there they would be happy to adopt such an ancient figurine.
Not to mention villages in India where idolatry still takes place in its primitive form, including prayers to statues, offering food to idols, and more.
By the way, in the past I wondered what the place of immersing utensils is nowadays. Until I was exposed to these people…
With God’s help, 1 Adar I 5782
As I saw on Wikipedia in the entry “Catch-22,” the author raises the contradiction that if the soldier submits a request to be exempted as mentally ill, then the very request for exemption indicates sanity.
Along these lines one could also argue against the claim that the idol has already lost its status as idolatry, for the very request for permission to keep the idol—and all the more so with the intention of selling it or researching it—indicates that one attributes value to it due to its archaeological worth, and ostensibly its archaeological worth is precisely in its being an object that served worship. This requires further study.
With blessings, Simcha Fishel HaLevi Plankton
With God’s help, 1st of Rosh Chodesh Adar I, 5782
See Rabbi Yuval Cherlow’s article, “Confiscation of Objects by a Teacher (Position Paper)” (on the Tzohar Ethics website), and the Torah sources cited there in note 2: Responsa Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 6, sec. 284; Rabbi Yehuda Herzl Henkin, “Confiscating Objects from Students,” Tehumin 8, pp. 186–202; Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Ben-Yaakov, “A Teacher’s Responsibility for a Confiscated Object,” Tehumin 19, pp. 51–54; Rabbi Gideon Ben-Moshe, “Confiscation of Objects by a Teacher in the Classroom,” Paamei Yaakov 49, pp. 92–97.
Regarding “damage caused to the object,” Rabbi Cherlow concludes: “When the object is in the teacher’s hands, he is responsible for it and entrusted with guarding it. If the teacher places the object in the place designated for this according to the school’s instructions, the object passes from the teacher’s responsibility to the school’s responsibility. As for the question of the source of the teacher’s authority, and what is included in that authority—this has broad significance also regarding the status of the teacher or school in relation to damage caused to the object.
If there is permission to confiscate—it seems that the parents do not agree that the school or teacher should bear no responsibility at all for the object, and therefore the teacher should be regarded as an unpaid bailee. If these matters are based on distancing a harmful factor—it seems there is no responsibility at all on the teacher, provided there is no deliberate negligence that is unnecessary, since that is not included in removing the harm. If this is a matter of granting force by governmental authority—it is possible that he is even less than a bailee. Nevertheless, it appears that the teacher is liable for damages if he was negligent in the manner of guarding.”
With blessings, Chanokh Henech Feinshmaker-Palti
Regarding a mashgiach in a yeshiva, it seems to me that a student’s entrance into a yeshiva counts as accepting the heads of the yeshiva as his local halakhic authority, and if their halakhic view is that a certain book is a “disqualified book” requiring genizah or destruction, then their student is obligated, for as long as he is in the yeshiva, to adopt this halakhic approach.
Rabbi Michi, if things are really as you say, that the principle of “past nisht” has no halakhic basis whatsoever, and yet we accept it, then haven’t we completely let the reins loose? Everyone will do whatever is upright and moral in his own eyes!?
I ask this not as a provocation, but as a genuine question: is what you are proposing not exactly the platform of “Reform” Judaism?
A good question, and I already hinted in my remarks at the slippery slope and the fears of it. Even so, I will say a few things about it. First, your claim can be understood on two levels: A. This policy itself is incorrect. The slippery slope is an indication of that. B. This itself is acceptable, but there are claims about future concerns. See the discussion of these distinctions in column 429. I will address both claims.
A1. Even if in the end one does not make decisions in this way, it is still important to understand that this is how one ought to act were it not for the slippery slope (see column 429).
A2. In my opinion the fears of slippery slopes are exaggerated. One cannot paralyze a correct consideration because of future fears (see the above column). Clearly, the matter is built on sincere intention and honesty. Whoever wants to turn the world ownerless can always do so, but all of us are supposed to give an account for our actions. And the heart knows whether it is for integrity or crookedness. Adopting such a policy in certain places where it is justified does not mean that the reins have been entirely loosened. Each thing on its own merits.
B1. The step itself is justified under certain circumstances. Hazal themselves spoke of a transgression for the sake of Heaven, of “her ways are ways of pleasantness,” ways of peace, appearance to the eye, punishment not according to the strict law, freezing halakhot (I detailed this in the third book of the trilogy), and the like. And they were not afraid that the reins would be loosened. There are situations that require departing from the halakhah. All these are considerations employed in very specific places. And again, whoever wants to loosen the reins does not need me for that.
B2. The difference between this and Reform is in the scope and nature of the considerations. If every nonsense is es past nisht, then that is Reform. But if one uses this sparingly, in certain necessary circumstances, that is perfectly fine.
In short, one of Reform’s great successes was the fossilization of halakhic Judaism. Out of excessive fear of Reform, we do not allow ourselves to do anything. Again, see my remarks on slippery-slope arguments in that column.
With God’s help, 1st of Rosh Chodesh Adar I, 5782
Perhaps there is room to compare the obligation to eradicate idolatry to the obligation to eradicate leaven, regarding which two reasons are given: (a) lest one not nullify it wholeheartedly; (b) lest one come to eat it.
And similarly one might say regarding idolatry: one possibility is that eradication is meant to internalize in a person’s heart revulsion and abhorrence for the idol, and another possibility is that eradication is meant to prevent people from stumbling into idol worship.
Perhaps there would be a practical difference between these two explanations in the case of idolatry that has already gone out of “fashion,” where the concern that someone will be drawn after it is remote, but the abhorrence and revulsion toward it have not ceased, and there may still be a place to eradicate it in order to express that revulsion.
With blessings, Gabriel Cheftzadi Zweidinimovsky
The specific story of idolatry may perhaps be different from the whole matter of the es past nisht that you are talking about. Among other things because of what you mentioned—that particular idolatry simply passed out of the world long ago. Now the only thing it is is an archaeological item. In everyone’s eyes. There is no one in the world who sees it as idolatry in the sense that we are required to destroy.
And perhaps this connects to Hazal saying that they prayed for mercy and the evil inclination for idolatry was abolished from the world. So a real change was created in a central prohibition of the Torah.
With God’s help, 1 Adar I, 5782
Ostensibly, “idolatry abandoned by its worshippers” applies to nations that forsook their idols. Ostensibly this applies to Greek, Roman, Egyptian, or Arab idols, where the peoples who worshipped them moved to a monotheistic religion and abandoned their idolatrous religion. But with Canaanite statues and the like, we do not find that the Canaanites became monotheists; rather they were assimilated into other idolatrous religions and did not abandon the idols of Canaan, but added them to the pantheon of the nations they joined. Regarding the idols of Canaan and the like, there was never any conscious abandonment of them.
And perhaps there is another rationale for permitting involvement with statues for archaeological research, namely that one may say there is in this a kind of “but you may study in order to understand and to teach,” whereby for this purpose it is permitted to study the abominations of the nations. The permission of “you may study in order to understand and to teach” was explained by the Rishonim as learning how to protect oneself from idolatrous influence or learning in order to know how to judge idol worshippers (see Rabbi Zvi Tal [Teich], “Do Not Learn to Do—but You May Learn in Order to Understand and to Teach,” the Bar-Ilan University weekly sheet, issue 616, Shoftim 5765). But one may say that just as the Rambam learned from the forms of idolatrous worship in the book The Nabatean Agriculture reasons for the commandments of the Torah aimed at negating idolatry, so too archaeological research can teach us identifications of places and interpretations of obscure verses, and there may be in this an aspect of “to understand and to teach.” This requires further study.
With blessings, Eliam Fishel Workheimer
With God’s help, 1 Adar I, 5782
The feeling of “past nisht” regarding smashing idols stems from our being, whether we like it or not, part of the Western world that has inscribed on its banner “live and let live.” As believers, we have no permission to be swept along into a conception of “each person shall live by his faith,” ready to contain heresy, licentiousness, and idolatry.
But nevertheless, since “each era shines according to its character,” one might say that in an age of openness, the struggle against heresy, licentiousness, and idolatry should focus more on explanation and on ways of pleasantness. “Postmodernism” has a negative side of total despair of seeking truth—but it also has a positive side: the breaking of the haughty arrogance of Western man, who is now more prepared to open himself and listen also to outlooks coming from Eastern cultures and from ancient traditions.
And just as Abraham, whose path began with a violent and cynical outburst against idolatry, went on to develop a new path of drawing the distant near through explanation and through ways of pleasantness—so perhaps today there has opened for us a “window of opportunity” for the way of outreach and explanation.
In Abraham’s generations, his influence in this regard was not evident; the inhabitants of the land honored him greatly as a “prince of God,” but “the iniquity of the Amorite” remained in all its severity, and the “fourth generation” after Abraham was commanded to return to the forceful path of a war of destruction against idols and their worshippers.
There was a brief attempt in the days of Solomon, when people came from all over the world to listen to his wisdom. Also in the days of the Second Temple (and afterward until the Bar Kokhba revolt), there was a strong cultural influence of the Jewish people, who were seen by their surroundings as a “nation of philosophers” whose lives revolved around Torah and the synagogue, and their inspiration brought broad influence of monotheism. But the disciples of Judaism—Christianity and Islam—refused to acknowledge the good of the “source” and became corrupted.
Modernity, which brought about the decline of Christianity’s influence and more critical outlooks, can today open itself more and more to the pure source of monotheism, and little by little interest is growing among the nations in returning to the reality of “Noahides” and “the pious of the nations of the world.” In such a situation, there is room to place greater emphasis on “ways of pleasantness.”
Of course, we will not bring idols into our homes, but we can do as Abraham did, who suspected that his guests were “Arabs who bow down to the dust on their feet,” and therefore acted tactfully and gently, proposing that they wash their feet before reclining at the royal feast he had prepared for them. “The left hand pushes away and the right hand draws near.”
With blessings, Ami’oz Yaron Shnitzler
I didn’t read most of the post, but if this helps, Rema (Yoreh De’ah sec. 141):
But the form of a cross that they hang on the neck as a memorial is not called an idol-image and one may derive benefit from it. End quote.
I don’t think that has anything to do with us. There it is discussing something that is not used for idolatry at all. Only its form is like that of idolatry.
With God’s help, 1 Adar, 5782
To the Rema—greetings,
The form of a cross that is hung on the neck as a memorial ostensibly expresses that the wearer belongs to the Christian faith, but since it is not a statue that is worshipped, it is not called an “idol-image” and one may derive benefit from it.
And now one should clarify with the archaeologists whether the “figurines” were really considered statues that were worshipped, or merely amulets that bring blessing and abundance, which perhaps is less severe than a statue of the deity that is actually worshipped (though there is reason to think that an amulet for drawing abundance is more severe than a form hung merely as a memorial and an expression of religious loyalty).
Perhaps we will find a stronghold for ourselves in clarifying this archaeological question 🙂
With blessings, Sh. Tz. L. from the holy congregation of Tze’elim
Regarding what you wrote about the book Catch-22, how does that fit with what you wrote about one who saves himself with his fellow’s property? For there too one can compel the fellow through his property by virtue of the commandment “Do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor,” and take his property in order to save yourself.
I wrote here that if it really were about saving from a transgression, then it would seem to be permitted. But he decided that this is a transgression and now he is imposing that on me. In the next step he will come to my house to steal all the food I have with the Rabbinate kashrut certification.
Beyond that, perhaps he saved the fellow from a transgression, but not me. I have many books like that. Therefore he has no justification to destroy the book, but at most to confiscate it.
So according to this, one may save oneself with another’s property in order to save him from violating “do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor.”
That is, I recall that on the one hand it is forbidden to save yourself with another’s property, and on the other hand according to the line of reasoning you explained here in this column it is permitted, apparently in contradiction to that law.
That is what the Rashba writes in a responsum, and perhaps that really is its plain meaning. I was always puzzled why he writes that because of his duty to save me there is no robbery on my part. Now I think perhaps the plain meaning is as you say. It is an interesting point. You are basically saying that there is robbery, but it is permitted just as one may injure him by virtue of coercion regarding the commandments.
But as for the matter itself, assuming the fellow is not here, he has no duty to save me, and therefore I have no permission to rob him in order to save myself. So basically a person does not save himself with his fellow’s property; at most he saves his fellow from transgression using the fellow’s property. Therefore it is also unlikely that this is the Rashba’s meaning, since he makes no such distinction.
And the case of Zimri requires further study according to this, for Pinchas came to save him from a transgression, and nevertheless one may kill him by the law of a pursuer. Perhaps that is because saving him does not justify killing the sinner. Had he come to harm Zimri’s property, then the law of a pursuer would not apply here.
In the Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah, it is ruled:
“Biblical interest, when it is by way of a loan in a fixed amount, is recoverable through the judges, for they would coerce him and beat him until his soul departs, but the court does not descend to his property…” (161:5).
How does this fit with the Ramban’s reasoning, that instead of coercing him in his person, coerce him through his property?
And another question regarding coercion: can anyone coerce, or only a court? And does this apply to all commandments, or only positive commandments?
Reminder
For some reason I missed this message. Sorry.
It does not fit. See Chiddushei Rabbi Shmuel, Bava Batra sec. 9–10, at great length. In principle, however, this can perhaps be resolved as follows: one may not descend to his property and pay in his stead (for legally he does not really owe me, and no right of mine has been violated here), but one may take collateral from it in order to compel him to pay. And this is coercion through property.
Just now I saw here that Rabbi Sheviv of blessed memory asks exactly your question, and if I am not mistaken answers similarly to me:
https://www.etzion.org.il/he/halakha/studies-halakha/philosophy-halakha/%D7%9B%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%95%D7%AA
For discussion of coercion, see Netivot and Meshovev, Choshen Mishpat sec. 3, at length. They dispute whether one coerces to the point of death, and whether this applies to every person.
There are surveys online. See, for example, these two:
https://daat.ac.il/mishpat-ivri/skirot/311-2.htm
I saw in the link you sent that the authority of coercion is not in the hands of private individuals, and that resolves the difficulties I raised above regarding saving oneself with another’s property. But it is still difficult with what you wrote in the post about the matter of the book and the idol statues, for your whole foundation there rests on the matter of coercion, and we see that this is not within the authority of private individuals.
Would it be correct to say that regarding the command to destroy idolatry, the Torah permitted harming another’s property, but regarding the other cases (a book, for example) there is no such permission?
To Oren—greetings,
Ostensibly, idolatry that is prohibited for benefit is not “property” at all, and therefore it is not “another person’s property.”
With blessings, Yaron Fishel Ordner
I do not think so. As Sh. Tz. L. wrote, idolatry is prohibited for benefit. However, above I noted that perhaps there is a prohibition to steal something prohibited for benefit, only there is no obligation to return it. But property, too, may not be taken except in the form of coercion, according to the Ramban’s reasoning.
But an individual has no authority of coercion.
Hello Rabbi, I thought of an inquiry on the subject that would determine whether there is an obligation to destroy idolatry nowadays.
Side 1: It is due to the presence of an object of idolatry.
Side 2: It is in order that we not be drawn after idolatry.
If 2 is correct, then ostensibly today, when we are not drawn after idolatry, there is no need to break it, no?
I did not understand how in practice the rabbi deals with the explicit verses in the Tanakh that instruct us to destroy idolatry. Is the claim that these passages in the Torah are a scribal error? If so, this is a very radical claim, since this is not a marginal passage but several verses in several places in the Torah. Such a claim also seems unfounded, since we are not dealing here with an extreme moral crime or a narrative that seems fictional; on the contrary, this command fits very well into the general conception of the Tanakh and the Jewish tradition regarding idolatry, so it is a bit strange to claim that precisely this law is not part of the Torah.
By the way, I also do not understand why this command is illogical. Idolatry is the most blatant and clearest act of undermining God’s kingship in the world, and if the whole purpose of creation is God’s honor and kingship (as is explicit in dozens of places in the Tanakh), then it is entirely reasonable that there should be such a commandment to destroy idolatry. It is important that critical thinking not drag us into abolishing every commandment or halakhah that makes us uncomfortable. God is allowed from time to time to demand of us actions that do not suit local political standards.
We do not expound the reason of the verse. And besides, Rabbi Yishmael already said: “I shall read and not incline.”
It seems you need to read the column again.
I don’t think the claim that this is es past nisht holds up. Why is it es past nisht? Apparently because of the right to freedom of religion and intolerance. But those considerations have always existed—if this is es past nisht now, then it was also es past nisht at the time of the giving of the Torah, and nevertheless we were commanded in the Torah to destroy idolatry, so apparently the halakhic consideration overrides that.
Those considerations absolutely did not exist in the past. There was no sensitivity at all to honoring the beliefs of the other. Do you really think you can protest damage to synagogues abroad while at the same time destroying houses of worship of other religions and burning their writings here? And I am really not talking about tactical considerations (whether this will be accepted), but moral ones.
I mean that the moral considerations always existed (even if not in the eyes of human beings, in the eyes of the Giver of the Torah). After all, you advocate objective morality. And if the Holy One, blessed be He, then commanded us to violate morality because the religious consideration overrides it, why should today be any different?
Because morality depends on circumstances. In a world where there is a basic value of honoring the beliefs of the other, morality will say to be careful about that. In a world where that does not exist, morality will be different. And that is not moral relativism at all. It is forbidden to cause another person pain, but the fact of what pains him and to what extent can change over time. Beyond that, morality also depends on reciprocity, and in a world where others do not respect my beliefs, I am not necessarily required to respect theirs.
There is no answer to this question anywhere in the column. The only answer I saw is the one you wrote later—that in the past one did not need to respect others’ beliefs, whereas nowadays one does. But there is no greater haste and recklessness than canceling explicit commandments in the Torah (repeated several times) merely because of a speculative claim that in the past it was probably unnecessary to respect other beliefs. Could God not have written in the Torah that this commandment does not apply when other people respect us?
It seems to me this is the most radical halakhic change I have seen from you. Most of the changes are not even in the category of changes, but only somewhat renewed halakhic interpretation, and the changes regarding gentiles, for example, are reasonable and well-founded. But this change seems to me truly bizarre: abolishing a commandment explicitly stated several times in the Torah on the basis of a general humanistic value (standing against idolatry, which is the gravest prohibition in the Torah) and an unexamined historical guess (was there never in all the thousand years of the Tanakh any group of idol worshippers that respected the beliefs of the people of Israel? There is no necessity to assume so). And all this when we are dealing with the most central topic in the Torah—the war against idolatry. Very strange indeed.
You are insisting for no reason.
A. I find it hard to understand how one can still relate today to archaeological finds as though they are still objects of idolatry. The world has changed and culture has changed, and the halakhah looks ridiculous. From an archaeological standpoint the contribution of one figurine may perhaps be marginal, but if we follow this principle—according to which today people discuss objects of idolatry as if the worship is still continuing today, and not as if this is an object whose role is educational—then it turns out that according to the halakhah we would be destroying each and every figurine, and research would be nullified (of the figurines at least). Isn’t that a shame?