On Rulings for Women and the Laws of Stains (Rorschach) (Column 446)
Yesterday (Tuesday) I was sent an amusing clip of an American comedienne who apparently participates daily in a Daf Yomi lesson and afterward posts remarks about the daf on TikTok. Despite the coarse and rough language, I thought there were a few points here that are definitely worth pondering.
The course of the sugya
The Gemara in Mo’ed Katan 9b brings a dispute among the Amoraim regarding women’s cosmetics on Chol HaMo’ed:
“And a woman may make her adornments.” The Sages taught: These are women’s adornments—she applies kohl (to her eyes), arranges/parts her hair, and passes rouge over her face; and some say: she passes rouge over the lower part of her face.
The wife of Rav Ḥisda was adorning herself before her daughter-in-law. Rav Huna bar Ḥinena was sitting before Rav Ḥisda and said: They taught this only with regard to a young woman, but not an old woman. He said to him: By God, even your mother, and even your grandmother, and even if she is standing on her grave—for people say: A woman of sixty is like a girl of six; at the sound of the tambourine she runs.”
Rav Ḥisda’s wife was already older (she had a daughter-in-law married to his son), and the Amoraim disagree whether the permission to wear makeup was said only regarding young women and not for someone like her (Rav Huna bar Ḥinena), or whether it was also permitted for older women (Rav Ḥisda). The halacha follows Rav Ḥisda, that the permission applies also to older women. His rationale is that makeup matters to sixty-year-olds just as to six-year-olds; the parable is that sixty-year-old girls run to a banquet and rejoice at the sound of the tambourine just like six-year-old girls. Incidentally, the Pri Megadim writes that the permission applies even to an elderly single woman (who need not beautify herself before a husband) and even if she has no intention of remarrying. He takes this leniency all the way.
Now I suggest you listen to the fascinating description of the sugya by that same Miriam, in her colorful (and coarse) language. She naturally scolds Rav Huna bar Ḥinena for trying to tell her and her friends whether to wear makeup and whether makeup matters to them or not. In short, she is in Rav Ḥisda’s camp (and even proud of him and his positions).
The critique of male rulings
Here we have an example of a very common critique in recent years: that halacha was formulated and fixed by men, including the laws that pertain to women. The claim is that men do not understand the female mind—what matters to a woman and what doesn’t—and therefore cannot rule on such matters.
As a rule, I oppose such statements. I indeed object to excluding women from halachic decision-making altogether (see the end of the previous column), but I don’t see any special problem with male rulings in these areas. Of course one can raise arguments and discuss each ruling and each decisor, but as a sweeping claim that excludes men from these domains—this I do not accept (as distinct from the claim against them for having excluded women, which is of course entirely true). But these things apply to most halachic rulings regarding women, since such rulings and the debates around them do not depend on “female feelings” or on understanding “female nature.” Sometimes something is forbidden to women because it is forbidden, and even if their feelings about it are difficult, there is still a prohibition. In such a case, the above critique has no place, and there is no principled problem with the fact that the decision was made by men.
Back to the sugya in Mo’ed Katan
But the case in this sugya is different. Here the discussion revolves precisely around the question of what women prefer. The prohibition or permission to do this on Chol HaMo’ed depends on how important it is to a woman. Rav Huna bar Ḥinena, who determines that for older women this is not important, forbids it to them. Rav Ḥisda swears that it matters to all of them and therefore permits it (Miriam describes this as a scolding of Rav Huna; I’m not sure about that). As we saw, the Pri Megadim takes this all the way, apparently assuming that this could be important for any woman in any situation.
One must understand that with this kind of question, it is not enough for some woman to give the decisor a verbal description. Even if she explains that this is very important to her and to women in general, he may think that perhaps it matters only to her, or that what she regards as important is not truly so important (she just feels like it—so let her cope). He does not know the feeling that a woman has about such things, and a verbal description of the feelings does not necessarily reflect them accurately; therefore it is very hard to rule on the basis of a verbal description without experiencing the underlying experience.
I have often brought the example of Mary’s Room. Mary is a genius physicist specializing in optics. She knows the theory and applications forwards and backwards and has nothing more to learn in the field. The equations are as clear to her as the paths of Nehardea, and the behavior of all wavelengths in every situation is as plain as a garment. Yet all her life Mary has lived and worked in a black-and-white room. The books she read, the experiments she conducted, and her entire research and activity were in a black-and-white world. Imagine the moment she steps out of the room and meets a poppy flower. She is told that its color is red (she has never seen red). Did she learn something new? Clearly yes. Red was known to her as an electromagnetic wave of a certain wavelength, and she knew everything about its behavior in the world. But she had never seen the color red, and had no idea what it is, what it looks like, or how it affects the psyche. While still in the room, one could perhaps try to describe it to her and the feelings it arouses (though that is of course very difficult), yet none of that would bring her to understand what red is. This is an excellent parable for the difference between experiencing women’s feelings about something and hearing verbal descriptions of those feelings.
Now I will argue that if Mary had to decide the halachic question of whether a woman may wear clothing that is red (see here), she would have no tools to discuss it. The unmediated experience is a necessary basis for such decisions. This is also a good example of the distinction I made above between two kinds of rulings. If the prohibition of red stems from “the ways of the gentiles,” then direct familiarity with the color itself, with its effect on the wearer and her surroundings, with the feelings of women if they are permitted or forbidden to wear red—all of these are unimportant. So long as it is “the ways of the gentiles,” it is forbidden (today this is no longer unique to gentiles, and therefore according to some decisors it is permitted. But that too has nothing to do with direct familiarity with the experiences I described). However, if red is forbidden because it is immodest or because of the feelings it arouses in men or in women, then it is very important that the decisor have direct familiarity with those feelings, and verbal descriptions will not necessarily suffice. One who has never seen red cannot truly rule on this question.
In my article on halachic rulings during the Holocaust, I addressed this claim more broadly. I spoke there about a decisor who rules on questions connected to an environment unfamiliar to him, where the prevailing atmosphere is critical to the halachic decision. An example is monetary law in the ghetto; to determine its parameters (and whether it applies at all there), there is a huge advantage to someone who directly experienced the ghetto reality. I said that in such circumstances the distant decisor must not step in and decide. At most he can advise and guide, but the decision must be made by a rabbi who is directly immersed in the relevant reality.
This touches some of the questions that arise regarding women’s prayer quorums and egalitarian minyanim, for example. Elder Haredi decisors who do not understand the mindset of a young liberal community cannot rule on such questions. The reality in question is unfamiliar to them, and they have no idea what any ruling means. Again, I am not speaking of black-and-white questions (there are very few of those in the context of a synagogue), but of questions for which familiarity and experience are very important. Another example I gave is a ruling about listening to a woman singing at a performance. A Haredi or Hardal decisor who has never heard a woman sing and does not know the contemporary attitude toward music, performances, and singers (including men) cannot determine that the matter is forbidden. Such a decisor is unaware that people go to a concert by a female singer because they enjoy her singing, not with the goal of arousing improper thoughts and stimuli. He simply does not know that experience, and in my view, in many cases even if you tell him that this is the feeling he will scoff and explain that these are the wiles of the yetzer, while the deep motivation is the sexual impulse. All this simply because a verbal explanation cannot convey the feeling and the experience itself. Of course, here too, if a decisor believes that the prohibition of listening to a woman’s singing is essential and fixed—i.e., not subject to change and not dependent on questions of thoughts or the listeners’ aims—then he can of course forbid even without understanding.
And we have not even entered the rulings about mobile phones and computers and the internet, which are in many cases issued by decisors who have no clue what these things are and what they mean. At best they feed on verbal descriptions, but those cannot convey the reality itself. In the past I wrote here about a minyan on Zoom, and said that for one who has experienced the virtual reality, it is very easy to accept my sevara (see in column 350 and the references there), according to which a minyan can be held on Zoom, even if some of the people are in Australia and others in South America, or in Israel. The synagogue and the shared space in which all are gathered is the “site” on the internet (the Zoom room or page). One can of course argue with my reasoning, but try explaining this claim to a decisor who has never participated in a Zoom meeting and does not know or understand what the internet is. You can indeed transmit to him verbal descriptions of the experience and the reality, but those cannot bring him to a full understanding of them. Therefore he is not qualified to accept this reasoning or to refute it. He is not the person to ask such a question (though one can certainly consult and receive guidance).
Back to the dispute between Miriam and Rav Huna bar Ḥinena
Returning to halachic rulings for women, my contention is that specifically regarding this sugya, Miriam is right in her critique of Rav Huna bar Ḥinena. Since the matter depends on women’s feelings about makeup and its meaning for them, a man has no tools to understand it directly. I know of myself that this whole business looks bizarre to me. Smearing oneself with various colors on various parts of the body—for me that perhaps suits Native Americans heading to battle or avant-garde artists. Walking on stiletto heels as thin as a pin and as tall as the Eiffel Tower is a kind of extreme sport, and it is really unclear to me why anyone would do such unhelpful exercise for hours in places utterly unsuited for it. I once thought all this was done to impress men (not that I understood whom that impresses and why), but then it was explained to me that in many cases it has nothing to do with men at all but with a woman’s inner feelings about herself. If I tell you that this put my mind at ease, I would be lying. In short, to me a woman is a riddle. But precisely for that reason I do not see how I, dwelling safely on Mars, can rule on makeup and heels for the strange creatures inhabiting Venus.
So much for the critique by our Miriam, which may sound coarse and rough, yet has a considerable measure of justice—but that does not exempt us from thinking about it and discovering that perhaps there is something to it. In closing I cannot avoid pointing out another point that emerges from this sugya.
How do our sages relate to a woman?
The Talmud’s and halacha’s treatment of women is a hackneyed topic laden with emotion—and again, to a considerable extent justifiably so. A group of men fashions halacha by themselves, excludes women, and then presents them as inferior and peculiar human beings whose weight should not be given much consideration. In this context I always recall Maimonides at the beginning of Chapter 10 of the Laws of Repentance. When he speaks about the importance of serving God for its own sake, he first describes service for the sake of reward, and says:
“A person should not say: I will perform the commandments of the Torah and engage in its wisdom so that I will receive all the blessings written therein, or so that I will merit the life of the World to Come; and I will separate from the transgressions that the Torah warned against so that I will be saved from the curses written in the Torah, or so that I will not be cut off from the life of the World to Come. It is not fitting to serve God in this manner; one who serves in this way serves out of fear, and this is not the level of the prophets nor the level of the sages. They do not serve God in this way, but only the common folk, women, and minors, whom one trains to serve out of fear until their knowledge increases and they serve out of love.”
Every time I learned this Rambam with women it was a rather awkward experience. The common folk, women, and minors are mentioned in one breath, and he writes that all these underdeveloped creatures must be educated until their knowledge increases (how exactly will women’s knowledge increase if they are forbidden to study and add knowledge?! Let the Rambam answer. And perhaps “one trains them” refers only to the minors mentioned at the end of the list…).
I am sure we will now hear about the “extra understanding” given to women, and “honor her more than himself,” and the like. Please spare me all that. What I do accept is that once, women were indeed underdeveloped beings (everyone’s fault), and thank God this has changed in our day. “The decline of the generations,” did we say already?…
A Rorschach blot
Even in the sugya in Mo’ed Katan cited above, women are portrayed as creatures who dash off to any joy and feast at the sound of the tambourine and cannot be stopped. Sixty-year-olds like six-year-olds (is it any wonder? From age six they’re supposedly not meant to study anything anymore). Ḥayuta Deutsch wrote to me that she chooses to read this Gemara as praise of women—that they are possessed of vitality and joy of life and do not lose it with age (and she drew my attention in this context to the song by the late Yoram Taharlev, “Women Dancing”). Well, happy is the believer. To me it looks more like treating women as overgrown children who act by conditioned reflexes. Indeed, the Baal HaTurim (Numbers 30:14) wrote that this proves that if a woman vowed not to listen to instrumental music, such a vow is considered a matter of “self-affliction,” and her husband can annul her vow. So too ruled the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 234:62 (and in the Beit Yosef ad loc. he brings a source for this from our sugya). Simply put, this does not derive from her “joy of life,” but from a perspective that the woman is like a child not trained in postponing gratification and therefore cannot restrain herself from going to feasts and celebrations. Better to permit her, so she not stumble in the prohibitions of vows.
In any case, this is another example of what I have argued many times regarding aggadah and Scripture: they can be interpreted any way one wishes, and the cravings of the heart play a large role in interpreting the aggadot, and in the end one does not truly learn anything from them. Everyone uses them to buttress what he thinks anyway, and therefore I see no point in studying them. In the second book of my trilogy I dealt with this and also explained the differences from interpreting halacha (where, of course, inclinations of the heart also have weight and there are many interpretive possibilities). I described those genres as a Rorschach blot that everyone interprets according to his heart’s desires and inclinations. A few weeks ago I saw in Rabbi Elai Ofan’s book, Torah of the Soul (definitely recommended), which deals entirely with psychological interpretation of the Torah, that at the end he devotes a chapter to the Torah as a Rorschach blot. In my view, that chapter is a shot the author fires into his book’s foot, for once one understands that this is indeed the Torah’s nature, what is the point of studying it? Go through the entire book and you will see that you will learn nothing from the Torah. At most you will see in it the ideas and occurrences that psychology describes. It always fits, of course, since we look at the Torah through those lenses. As stated, in my view, aggadah too is a Rorschach blot.
Discussion
For the sake of precision and the record – I definitely took into account both possible readings, the disparaging one and the other one, and chose the option that seemed to me not only more congenial but also more fitting to the content of the argument in the sugya there.
Rav Huna bar Chinnana was sitting before Rav Chisda, and he sat and said: "They taught this only regarding a young woman, but an old woman — no [she may not adorn herself]."
He said to him: "By God! Even your mother, and even your mother's mother, and even if she is standing over her grave."
As people say: "A woman of sixty is like a girl of six — she runs at the sound of the tambourine."
The argument is about what people say; the Gemara here (the anonymous stratum of the Gemara, and perhaps Rav Chisda himself) cites what is accepted in the world (a kind of presumption): women at every age, even when elderly, run to the sound of the drum. And I definitely saw here the double meaning: a. contempt for that supposedly frivolous light-mindedness; b. respect for the power of the body, life, and joy that exist at every age. Option b, in my humble opinion, fits Rav Chisda's words better. So this is not just a Rorschach blot that I interpreted for my own pleasure, but also a reading of the sugya itself. But fine.
I will never understand your disqualification of the world of aggadah because of the Rorschach aspect. There is truth there even if it is not halakhic or factual or unequivocal truth. Even if it is double or triple, two- or three-layered. It is laid there, and whoever wishes to take it may take it.
Chayota – greetings,
Evidence for the respectful interpretation in Rav Chisda's words is that there in Bava Batra he disagrees with the one who said, "Happy is he whose children are males…," and holds: "On the contrary, to me daughters are preferable."
With blessings, Chasdai Bezalel Duvdevani Kirshen-Kwass
Thank you!
With God's help, Friday eve of Parashat "According to the rule for daughters, so shall he do for her," 5782
It may be that Rav Huna bar Chinnana's distinction between a young woman and an old woman stems from his view that the reason permitting a woman to make her adornments is the reason given in the Jerusalem Talmud for this mishnah: "because of the neglect of procreation." According to this, the permission applies only to a woman fit to bear children; she was permitted to make her adornments so that she not become unattractive to her husband and thereby cause him to refrain from procreation.
By contrast, Rav Chisda holds that the reason for the permission in the mishnah is to fulfill the woman's own need to look beautiful, and this need exists even in an elderly woman who is no longer fit to bear children, and therefore even an old woman may apply cosmetics on the festival.
And perhaps the sages of the Land of Israel follow their own view, for they would praise a bride entering the bridal canopy: "No eye paint, no rouge, no braiding, and yet full of grace." Since in their view true beauty is not that which requires external cultivation, but rather the grace that radiates from a woman's inner being, they therefore held that the need for beautification on the festival is not an independent matter, but only an instrument for increasing procreation because of the weakness of the man who is drawn after external beauty.
And in an earlier period in the Land of Israel, it seems there were differences of approach in this among the daughters themselves: some called upon the young men to set their eyes on beauty, "for a woman exists only for a woman's adornments." By contrast, the more distinguished among them would say: "Do not set your eyes on beauty. Set your eyes on family, for a woman exists only for children."
With blessings, Chasdai Bezalel Duvdevani Kirshen-Kwass
An interesting and thought-provoking post. By the way, in my opinion there is certainly great value in study that exposes what already exists. Revealing what exists can be no less a novelty than discovering something that did not exist. Even what ostensibly exists can develop and become clarified from different angles and aspects that were previously entirely unknown. Your example of the physicist living in a black-and-white world is exactly an example of such a thing.
And if you argue that this is really something entirely new and not a new aspect of existing knowledge, then certainly a Rorschach blot too allows a renewed perspective and experience regarding "known" things.
No. But they should be involved.
An interesting book that brings psychological ideas and information into the Torah portions. Rabbi Elai Ofran is generally a wise person whose writings are worth reading.
Did Mari really live in Nehardea?
No. In Sura. That is Rav Mari in the Talmud. And about this it was said: where is Yentl hinted at in the Torah?
And in fact, the TikTok woman's claim that there are things rabbis supposedly do not understand in matters concerning women – is beside the point, because as with any matter in which a halakhic decisor requires an assessment of the mindset of a certain sector, he will ask those who understand that specific field.
One may assume that Rav Chisda and Rav Huna bar Chinnana consulted women they knew about the question. Perhaps the difference stemmed from the difference in the ages of their wives. Rav Huna bar Chinnana's wife, who was presumably young like him, thought that elderly women are not particular about matters of grooming. Whereas Rav Chisda's wife, who was already old, could make him aware of the fact that elderly women too are interested in grooming.
And it may be that there was a difference between the women of the large towns such as "Rav Chisda's place," where there was a social atmosphere that required even elderly women to dress up for "social events," while in Sikhra, Rav Huna bar Chinnana's village, the atmosphere was simpler, and only young women took an interest in cultivating beauty in order to please their husbands, while "social trends" interested them less.
And for that reason it may be said that in matters of modesty, a woman's clothing and conduct – only men who are sexually attracted to women can truly know what is more attractive and what is less. I saw (on Wikipedia, under "red color") that men are more attracted to women dressed in red, while women did not show increased attraction to men wearing red.
By the way, in the Maharik's words about the prohibition of wearing red clothing, he is not speaking specifically about women. Red clothing in his time symbolized members of the upper classes, rich people and nobles, or senior clergy. To this day the cardinals of the Vatican wear red garments. Likewise, senior members of the House of Lords (see under "Speech from the Throne") appear in red ceremonial dress. The color red expresses extroversion and passion, both romantic passion and forcefulness, according to design and fashion experts.
It is therefore true that rabbis need to consult experts in the fields they discuss, but the expertise is generally not along a "men-women" axis, but rather in each field on its own terms.
With blessings, Afo"r
The contrast between a villager and a townsman can also explain the dispute between Rava and Rav Huna bar Chinnana regarding minced fish flesh containing scales. In Rav Huna bar Chinnana's simple village they were not accustomed to mixing several kinds of fish together, so it could be assumed that the scales testified that the whole package was fish. By contrast, in the modern city of Mechoza they also produced diverse "salads," and therefore Rava ruled that there were several kinds of fish in the package.
In line 4
…and therefore Rava ruled that one must be concerned that the package contains several kinds of fish.
In general, claims of this kind – that "rabbis do not know reality" – recall the story of a wagon driver transporting merchandise whose wagon got stuck in the snow, the wheel broke, and the goods were damaged. They came for a Torah judgment, and the rabbi obligated the wagon driver to bear the loss. The driver asked: "Why did you obligate me?" The rabbi answered: "According to the Torah." The driver retorted: "But the Torah was given in Sivan, in the spring. How can one obligate on its basis on a snowy, freezing winter day?" :)(
With blessings, Feyvish Lipa Sosnovitsky-Dehari, owner of the old platform
This is not serious. The whole concept of understanding a person is to get into his head and see how he sees the world. That is what is called empathy. Whoever claims this is impossible is revealing autism in himself. The Sages knew how to listen much better than we do to other human beings (that is part of what led them to possess divine inspiration). And here you have a case where someone assumed something about women, and when his wife told him something, he took it to heart, thought about it, and understood what it was about. The proof is that he changed his mind. But he presumably did not just immediately yield to her because she said it. One can understand something even without direct experience. When you understand, it ultimately becomes a kind of direct experience. That is the essence of understanding. Understanding is seeing. It is experience. If a decisor listens carefully to explanations of what Zoom is, asks questions, and takes interest (even if in the end he had no possibility of any direct experience whatsoever; that would have to be under compulsion, because someone who wants to understand will want to see with his own eyes), in the end he will be able to understand enough to rule.
Indeed, the situation of women's singing is different, because truly a Haredi person cannot understand a liberal person who was raised and born into such a world, because the Haredi conservative Eastern mentality itself is childish in relation to the modern liberal Western mentality (which itself is also childish in relation to the truth; it is adolescent, not mature). That really will be impossible to understand, because a child truly cannot understand an adolescent or an adult. But Zoom, and women's love of jewelry and clothes (which today I understand very well – not because I share with them that ridiculous love, but because on that subject I saw the world through their eyes, and then automatically it also seems less ridiculous; that is, there is some logic to it, it achieves some goal), and also a get – even old Haredi men can understand, if they simply devote the time and thought to it, and that's all. When there is no time and energy, then certainly one leaves the ruling in the hands of those who are in the situation. But every situation can ultimately be understood (experienced). That, after all, is the scientific faith. In short, in these cases one can acquire through the "physics" a sense for seeing the "color red." The analogy of the physicist and black-and-white is incorrect when it comes to understanding human beings or social situations, except for understanding more developed human beings, whom one understands when one becomes as developed as they are (and that itself is the acquisition of the sense of sight). And about such cases they say, "When you understand, you will grow up" (understanding produces the growth, not vice versa).
This whole story smells like flattery toward women. And faintheartedness. If the Sages saw them as infantile, then they probably really were such. We do not say about children that we do not understand them and they see the world differently from us, and therefore they are not really children and deserve equal rights, etc. We say that they are children because they have childish behavior, period (and that is why they do not get the right to vote for the Knesset). That is something objective. Women in the past truly lacked understanding enough to be put in the same category as children and ignoramuses – at least in comparison with the Sages themselves. What is embarrassing about that? The rabbi is the embarrassing one (if he is worried that women will be hurt, then he should not study this passage with them). I too today identify many infantile behaviors in various groups from various sectors, and if what my eyes see passes my test of criticism, then those groups are infantile, period. Not that I say this to someone from that group's face (there is no logic in needlessly hurting people, unless he is patient enough to listen to my explanations of why his group's behavior is childish…). The Arabs, for example, have a childish culture, and that explains a great deal of their behavior, which to us seems totally irrational. Why they love wars so much and are unwilling to invest in themselves, etc. Therefore I also do not think they can be citizens (as a closed group) in any modern state whatever. And if women too appeared that way in my eyes, I would say it plainly, without eye paint or rouge. Not to them, of course. Enough with the justifications and apologies and embarrassments. If that is the reality, then that is the reality.
In short, men can calmly rule for women.
Rav Mari bar Rachel may have been in Sura, but Samuel, his mother's father, sat in Nehardea.
With blessings, Mari Dor
In the last paragraph, line 1
The contrast between a villager and a townsman, can…
How can a rabbi rule on abortions? As the matrons say: get out of my womb.
A similar phenomenon exists regarding games on Shabbat. There are decisors who say that a game implement is muktzeh on Shabbat. And what is the explanation for that? After all, it has a use – to play with it, as on any other day. Rather, in their eyes the importance of play is not serious enough to count as a use. And seemingly this is unreasonable, for gaming and entertainment industries are seen to generate hundreds of billions and drive industry forward (bandwidth, image quality, graphic processing speed, and the like), and very serious people are involved in them, and there is a whole body of knowledge there. And what is wrong with pure enjoyment? Rather, apparently those decisors do not go by how people feel about how desirable something is in their eyes, but by a principled definition of what counts as something worthwhile. So too the dispute between the amoraim can be explained in a way more distant from reality. You interpreted that Rav Huna bar Chinnana had not internalized reality, and then Rav Chisda came and revealed it to him. But one could interpret that he knew the reality, only he held that the use of adornment is not considered a worthy and fitting use for a woman, such that on its basis one permits activity on Chol HaMoed. And Rav Chisda told him that since she desires the adornment, we follow the person and not an external objective judgment.
I always thought that "because they turn words of Torah into idle chatter" was said only about the distant past, when education and learning were the preserve of men alone, until I watched that video, and it turns out that the statement applies also to certain modern TikTok personalities.
With God's help, 26 Shevat 5782
To T"G – greetings,
In the "Expansions to Peninei Halakha" on the topic "Are toys considered muktzeh according to the Sephardim?", he brought, among other things, the words of Shevut Yitzhak in the name of Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, that one should distinguish between the toys of former times, which children made in a simple way and which "came as they went," and the toys of our day, which are substantial, factory-made, and meant to last. See there.
With blessings, S. Filman
And on the other hand, one may say that to be excluded from the category of "muktzeh," it is not enough that something be important; it also requires the status of a "vessel" (kli) (a concept that also exists in the laws of ritual purity), and a toy is not a "vessel" in that sense. As the Rosh discusses in his responsum to Rabbi Chaim Or Zaru'a (sec. 82) regarding songbirds, that they should be considered muktzeh because they do not have the status of a "vessel" (see the article by Rabbi Ariel Elkobi, "Muktzeh in Pets," on the Asif website).
With blessings, S. Filman
To me the sugya very much recalled Rabban Gamliel's leniencies for himself on account of his being delicate. I wonder whether there was an amora who was not delicate and who sought to be lenient for the delicate.
Indeed, hats off to Rav Chisda's aesthetic wife, and to Rav Chisda for understanding her heart so well.
And by the way, let us not forget that sometimes a woman's need to look aesthetic and attractive is nourished דווקא by her husband's character, and by his need to look at an aesthetic and attractive woman. There are men who see nothing, and there are men who see everything. (As the song says: "My son has eyes that see everything," from the song – "Bni, Bni, Yeled Ra").
And as they say, a beautiful woman, a beautiful home… all the more so on a festival!
*Correction: on Chol HaMoed.
Why not? Did you read the column? It seems not.
It seems that in matters of abortion only the fetus can rule. Especially since it knows the entire Torah 🙂
With blessings, Amos Beten
"How exactly will women's understanding increase if they are forbidden to study and increase understanding?! The answer lies with Maimonides. Or perhaps 'we educate them' refers only to the minors mentioned at the end of the list…" I saw in the commentaries that they proved from here to permit sex-reassignment surgery
What does one do in a case where both sides have claims that stem from life experiences the other side cannot experience?
For example, a woman's right to wear whatever she wants, with the claim that if there is a man whom this arouses – let him deal with it. Has a woman experienced such a struggle?
With God's help, Friday eve of Parashat "These are the ordinances that you shall set before them," 5782
To Moshe – greetings,
Indeed, Maimonides outlined the path of education suitable for everyone, saying (end of chapter 4 of Hil. Yesodei HaTorah):
"And the matters of these four chapters [Yesodei HaTorah, chapters 1-4, in which Maimonides presented his view in theology, metaphysics, and cosmology – S.Tz.] concerning these five commandments [belief in God and His unity, love of Him and fear of Him – S.Tz.] are what the early sages call Pardes… And I say that one should not stroll in Pardes except one whose belly is filled with bread and meat. And this 'bread and meat' is knowing the explanation of what is forbidden and permitted and the like among the other commandments.
And although the sages called these matters a 'small thing'… nevertheless they are fit to be given precedence, for they settle a person's mind first. Moreover, they are the great good that the Holy One, blessed be He, bestowed for the ordering of this world, in order to inherit the life of the world to come, and it is possible for everyone to know them – great and small, broad-hearted and narrow-hearted."
That is to say:
According to Maimonides, "knowing what is forbidden and permitted in the commandments of the Torah" is the basic study, which settles a person's mind and brings him to inherit the life of the world to come. And it is suitable for every person, "great and small, man and woman, broad-hearted and narrow-hearted" – e-v-e-r-y-o-n-e is invited to study the book Mishneh Torah.
With blessings, Yaron Fishel Ordner
And in light of the above, we must say that the sages' command that a person should not teach his daughter the Oral Torah for fear that she will turn words of Torah into idle chatter – applies specifically to "his daughter," where we do not yet know whether "her mind is directed toward learning," that is: whether she has the patience to concentrate on study (as in the words of the Perishah, YD 246, and the Yad Peshutah on Maimonides). Or else the "Oral Torah" that one should refrain from teaching her is the depth of analysis in Talmudic sugyot, where the concern about error is much greater (R. Yosef Kapach's explanations on Maimonides). But laws formulated clearly, as Maimonides did – it is a great mitzvah that adults and minors, men and women, study them.
Prof. Aviad Hacohen showed in an article that every place where Maimonides used the phrase "the sages commanded," he is referring not to a prohibition but to good advice; and it seems to me that after all, "frivolity" is not a prohibition, but something for which a woman who studied does not receive "reward for a commandment." Maimonides explicitly says that "she has reward, but not like the reward of a man"; but from the father who teaches her, the sages removed the reward of the commandment, and it is only like teaching her "fine literature." In this way the sages sought to prevent ambitious parents from pushing daughters into Torah study in which they are not truly interested.
Rabbi Nachum Eliezer Rabinovitch (in Yad Peshutah on Maimonides) brought Maimonides' words in one of his responsa, that most Torah students in his time do not study deeply, and therefore they err and distort the correct understanding of the words of Torah. That is to say, even for men there exists the concern of "turning words of Torah into idle chatter"; except that for men, whom the Torah obligated to study, we must enter into the risk. But for women, whom the Torah did not obligate to study, we must be extra careful lest the gain of the "beautification of the commandment" come out in loss and corruption.
With blessings, Yfao"r
It should further be noted that the expression "if his mind is properly directed" appears in Maimonides' laws of prayer as a condition for permission to stand and pray. Thus we learn that when Maimonides says that "most women do not have their minds properly directed toward learning," his meaning is "that they cannot concentrate on study." And indeed, even in our time, when there are diapers and washing machines and "prepared loaves and woolen garments" ready on supermarket shelves, it is nevertheless very difficult to run a household and simultaneously care for a crowd of screaming, shrieking children – all the more so in ancient times.
Thank you for an interesting post!
You referred in the post to women's singing today. I'll ask more generally: are the laws of modesty determined solely by the definition, "whatever arouses men should be covered and concealed"?
Absolutely not. Modesty is a value in itself and not a means of preventing arousal. There is indeed quite a bit of talk about modesty as a means, but in my opinion they are mistaken (that is not the foundation of modesty). There is, of course, a correlation. Arousal can be an indication that there is a lack of modesty here, but that is not the essence. There is an article by my friend Nadav Sznarb, who argued that the whole connection to arousal is unfounded and baseless. I think he is basically right, although he exaggerated a bit with the thesis of disconnection:
https://bmj.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/29.2.Snerb_.pdf
But of course, the prohibition of a woman's singing voice is not connected to modesty. There it really is about arousing men. One indication is that a woman's singing voice is not prohibited when there are no men in the area, but dressing immodestly is prohibited in any place and situation.
The argument from Mary's room is not serious. If, as you say, nobody is allowed to rule for anyone else, since no decisor has my specific life experiences. And why divide specifically by sector?
Rather, the decisor's role is, as far as his understanding reaches, to enter into the lived reality of those for whom he is ruling; and if he does not do so, he is negligent in his role. And I see no reason not to assume that the amoraim indeed did this. And inevitably, his grasp will always be limited; and whatever he fails to grasp, from that point onward the public will say its piece, since it too has a part in the stages through which a ruling is accepted, in the sense of a decree that the public cannot abide, and so on.
My claim is that when the situation is very remote, so that it is difficult to enter into the other's lived experience, then one may not rule. That is not the case between any two human beings whatsoever. Taking things to an extreme and proving things from there is a well-known demagogic trick, but somewhat childish.
By the way, independently of this argument, I really do think that nobody is allowed to rule for another person. The decisor's role is to advise, not to rule. I discussed this at length in the third book of the trilogy.
And regarding a decree that the public cannot abide, that has not the slightest connection to our discussion. My claim applies even to Torah laws, regarding which that rule was not said.
The need to read again and again texts from which nothing new can be learned is apparently necessary and important in order to internalize what is already known. Why is this important? It is not clear. But it is a fact that people return again and again to their stories, striving to understand them, refine them, arrange them according to various scales. It seems fair to say that what is known is terribly important to them, and they want to fix it in place. It is clear that there is a psychological need here, but it also creates clarity and distinctions that serve as a substrate for generating new insights. You too, from post to post, return again and again to things you have written, and it seems that this is not only for the sake of the readers. Why do you do that?
If I am right, then expressing the same idea in different stories/midrashim/witticisms is pictorially richer and perhaps more effective for internalizing and fixing what is already known, than repeating the same idea in almost the same words. Isn't that so?
Maybe. The problem is that there is no message in those texts. You extract from them whatever you want. You could do that just as well with Tzippopo or the Upanishads. In my opinion, what makes people return to those texts is the belief/feeling that there is something there that teaches us. That is the meaning of the attachment and the repeated return to them, not because of what is learned from them (because nothing is learned from them).
I wrote in the second book that I have no problem at all with repetition, even without novelty. That too is a kind of study. But that is not what is happening here. Those texts are Rorschach blots.
The sweeping rejection of every reduction claim is also a trick. In this case I think this is not a reductio ad absurdum. The difference between any decisor and my world is not all that far from the difference between him and a woman's world.
I brought up the decree that the public cannot abide as a standard example of the fact that halakhic rulings also depend on their acceptance by the public. This principle is true regarding Torah law as well. The public (in a proper state, at least) is supposed to "feel" when the decisor is disconnected from the lived experience of those for whom he is ruling, and not to accept the ruling.
It may be said that in other matters, indeed, there would be room to ask women and ordinary people what they say. But since the laws of Chol HaMoed were entrusted by Scripture to the sages to clarify what is called a loss and the like, the ruling therefore needs to be based on the sages' judgment and not on that of the ordinary public. Consider: does everyone agree that women's cosmetics are a necessary thing? One might say that there is no greater falsehood than this, and that beauty ought to be just as she is, without eye paint and rouge.
An example of this is in the Gemara in Berakhot, where they discuss from where we know that a woman's hair is nakedness, and the Gemara brings from Song of Songs that your hair is lovely. Seemingly, do we need a verse for this? Go out and see what people do, what brings erotic thoughts to a man. Rather, certainly without the verse one could have said that the erotic thoughts are not really from the hair, but that the one who has such thoughts is so steeped in lust that everything brings him to such thoughts. Therefore Scripture comes and teaches that according to the Torah, with which the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world, hair does bring erotic thoughts to a man. And if so here too, one could not ask women what they say, for after all one could say that it is not really a necessary thing, but only that they have already become accustomed to it. Possibly.
Even if something was entrusted to the sages, they are not supposed to invent it out of their own minds. If it is a matter of assessing reality, they first of all have to examine reality and only then decide. The question is not who is the factor authorized to decide, but how the decision should be made. Therefore, when discussing what is important to a woman, even if they are the ones who need to decide about it, they need to ask women and then decide.
Relying on verses in order to learn simple things is a common phenomenon in the Gemara and among the Rishonim, and nothing can be learned from it. It is merely an asmachta (an illustration, in foreign jargon). A verse from Song of Songs is not a halakhic source, but at most a gilui milta. Tosafot writes that there are many stars in the sky because the verse says, "Lift up your eyes to the heavens and see…" and it is obvious that they did not learn this from the verse. This is an old point.
With God's help, ערב ראש חודש אדר א', 5782
A law that strengthens the status of the woman was taught to us by Rav Huna bar Chinnana (Ketubot 61a): Rav Huna said (and some versions have: Rav Pappa): Rav Huna bar Chinnana asked us: If she says to nurse and he says not to nurse – we listen to her, for it is her suffering. If he says to nurse and she says not to nurse, what is the law? Wherever it is not her custom – we listen to her. If it is her custom and not his custom, what is the law? Do we follow him or do we follow her? And we resolved it from this: "She rises with him and does not descend with him."
That is to say: A woman's right to refuse to nurse exists both if it is the custom of the women of her family, who did not see nursing as an honorable act, and if it is the custom of his family. Even if in her family women did nurse, the woman is entitled both to the "privileges" of the women of her family and to the "privileges" of the women of his family. (And likewise, if she wishes, she is entitled to nurse even against the family custom, because her suffering overrides the family's "respectability.")
Certainly there is room to ask ordinary people and women. But the "ruling" needs to come from the judgment of sages after all the considerations. If there were women in the category of "sages" at that time, they too could have ruled.
PS: I am not from Israel (unfortunately), and therefore it is difficult for me to express myself so much in the Holy Tongue. My apologies.
If so, there is no disagreement between us.
Aside from that, there are topics in which it is not appropriate at all to rule for another person (when the distance from his experience is great and the experience is important for the ruling).
It is worth noting that there is a famous halakha that was established in the period of the amoraim by the "daughters of Israel," who were stringent with themselves to sit seven clean days even for a mustard-seed-sized drop of blood.
It seems that the stringency regarding legumes on Passover also spread from France to all the lands of Ashkenaz, and partially even among Sephardic Jews and the Jews of North Africa, following the practice of women to sort rice and legumes three times out of concern for mixed-in grains (a practice mentioned by the Ritva). It seems that instead of sorting three times, the women preferred to remove rice and legumes from the menu for the week. The discovery of America, which brought potatoes to Europe, also helped remove legumes from the menu.
With blessings, Ze'eira from among the colleagues
Does the honorable rabbi skip over the blessing "who has not made me a woman"? If he does not skip it because that is how halakha rules, then what is the point of cooling hot pots in endless posts?
My honor most certainly does not skip it, nor do I. If you ask some question, I can try to address it. If this is just a declaration, then here, you have received the platform.
Does the rabbi mean that the answer will sound like nonsense and not legitimate if there is indeed a declaration in it?
https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%94%D7%A1%D7%92%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%94
By chance I came across this strange word whose existence I had not known. And I was reminded of this post…
To Rav Huna and Rav Chisda, with love!
In my eyes, the very existence of the discussion on this matter, and the very decision to insert this dialogue into the text, even if perhaps Rav Huna innocently missed something, testifies to great sensitivity on the part of the Sages toward women. Not at all to condescension.
Regarding the joy of life of women – Mrs. Chayota Deutsch is clearly right.
(With a name like Chayota – how could she be wrong?)
But our Rabbi Michi, from Michi's room, cannot see that – but he explained very well
why in fact he cannot express an opinion.
With God's help, Friday eve of Parashat "Upon Aaron's Heart," 5782
And along with the importance of recognizing the subjective feeling of the person who is commanded to observe the ruling – there is also importance in descending to the depth of the mind of the Giver of the Torah in order to understand His precise purpose and intention, especially in matters where one must "understand one thing from another," which depend to a large degree on the reasoning of the heart.
Therefore there is a vital need that one who comes to interpret the will of the Torah be a person who is identified with the will of the Torah in every fiber of his soul. One who has devoted decades of his life to delving into Torah, and is "at home" in all the recesses and expanses of Torah, and has made his ear like a funnel to absorb the depth of the wisdom of Torah – he is the one who has a better chance that his understanding reflects in an optimal way the will of the Torah.
With the blessing of a good Shabbat, Eliam Fishel Workheimer
Hello Rabbi. In your opinion, should only women determine the laws of modesty for women?
B. What is special about the book Torah of the Soul that you recommended?
Thank you in advance.