On False Consciousness Arguments (Column 203)

With God’s help

About two weeks ago I again participated in an international roundtable conference on civic consensus (see Column 116 on last year’s conference). Among other things, the question of gender separation in universities and in academic institutions generally came up for discussion (including those defined as Haredi). The Council for Higher Education adopted a policy of temporary compromise (until Haredim are integrated into academia), but, as is well known, there are quite a few academics who strongly oppose this, including separation in Haredi colleges. They raise various strange arguments (most of them unfounded, though not all), within whose framework our liberal and tolerant-pluralistic cousins energetically impose their opinion on a minority that emphatically declares that it does not want this and that it contradicts its values.

At that session of the conference, two academics spoke, both law professors, on opposite sides of the divide in this controversy. One defended the Haredim’s right to conduct themselves in accordance with their values and understanding, at least in institutions that are not publicly funded. By contrast, another speaker defended the position favoring a sweeping prohibition on such separation. In other words, by virtue of her declared liberalism, she supports coercing others to act in accordance with her own way. (The issue here is not how the universities should look, which incidentally are not necessarily secular institutions either, but how Haredi institutions or special programs for them within universities should look.)

The “liberal” argument

In explaining her remarks, she argued that the Haredim are not cut from one cloth, and that there are different voices among them, some of which, even if they do not appear in the public arena in a clear and explicit way, themselves oppose such separation. Beyond that, she argued that a systemic adoption of the declared Haredi position that supports gender separation would lead to the imposition of that view on society as a whole (as happened with segregated buses, which at first were opposed even within Haredi society and today are considered a reasonable and perhaps even binding position). She brought proof for her claims from the United States, where, she said, many Haredim study in mixed academic institutions, and from this she inferred that mixed study is not impossible from their point of view.

In my response I told her that her remarks were outrageous on the ethical plane and inadmissible on the logical plane. Ethically, she explains to people what they themselves think, contrary to what they themselves declare, and then decides for them what is desirable for them. And logically, the proof from American universities is unfounded. If there are only mixed universities, it may be that some Haredim are prepared to study there because they have no other option. Does that necessarily mean that separation is not important to them? True, this proves that separation is not a matter of Let him be killed rather than transgress. (one must die rather than transgress), but that is not the issue. It is obvious that gender separation is a basic Haredi value, and anyone who disputes this does not know what he is talking about (or alternatively is deceiving himself and others).

I assume (by virtue of the principle of charity) that underlying her remarks is the premise that separation is bad even for the Haredim themselves, and therefore in her view this would have to be a matter of Let him be killed rather than transgress. in order to allow it to them. Again, this expresses a patronizing attitude, as she decides what is good for them. Incidentally, the speaker who supported separation said that even if on the level of private individuals there is room for tolerant and pluralistic positions (he relied on the distinction I made last year, according to which tolerance has a radius or boundary; see the above-mentioned Column 116), on the public plane pluralism must prevail, allowing each person to act as he wishes and according to his values. Society, and certainly one group within it (even if it is a majority), cannot impose its positions on the minority.

In my response I also suggested that she conduct a thought experiment. Suppose that the Council for Higher Education (=CHE) were controlled by conservative Haredim, and they were to tell her and her friends that in fact the secular people who demand mixed study do not really want it. Deep in their hearts they want gender-segregated study, and what they declare is only the result of pressure (and you must admit that there is certainly enormous secular and feminist pressure in that direction). In addition, I asked her what she would say about proof that I would bring from Haredistan, where there are only segregated universities and, lo and behold, the secular also study there, meaning that from their standpoint this is not a red line. Therefore the Haredi CHE would decide that we must not allow the establishment of mixed universities, even if it is a university intended for secular students or a special track for them within the public universities. I asked her what she would say about such an argument, both logically and ethically. For some reason, I received no answer. She merely explained that she had been misunderstood (she really loves Haredim very much and opposes coercion), and to clarify she simply repeated exactly the same things. It seemed to me that almost everyone sitting around the table understood that these were wicked words of nonsense (perhaps not deliberately; it seems she truly thinks this is the dictate of morality). So either everyone suffers from poor listening comprehension, or despite our limited grasp we nevertheless managed to understand the depth of the matter.

Arguments of “false consciousness”

Among other things, she argued that the fact that Haredi spokespeople outwardly declare that they want separation is the result of the exertion of social power, or even of internalizing the dominant approach without truly identifying with it. People internalize the approach that Haredi life requires gender separation in study and convince themselves of it, even though that is not necessarily true. This is the creation of “false consciousness” (see below).

She resorted to the example of the segregated “mehadrin bus.” There, indeed, the approach took root that it is proper to separate men and women on buses, something that once did not even occur to people, even in the Haredi world (I can testify to this myself. At that time I lived in Bnei Brak, and everyone there joked about the bored activists who took upon themselves the mission of separating the buses). In her view, this is an example of one position taking over all the others, and especially of the fact that institutional adoption (by Egged) of that position helped its takeover and entrenchment within the Haredi world as well. Today, people who once would have opposed this conception have internalized it and themselves hold it.

Although I think the example is fairly correct, the claim itself seems very strange to me. What she proposes is also a similar mechanism, only this time in the “right” direction (in her eyes). For according to her proposal, since she claims that there are Haredim who accept mixed study and others who do not, the academic establishment will force all Haredim to do so, and thus will assist this approach in taking over Haredi society as a whole. In this way one can create and impose ideological uniformity in the opposite direction. From her point of view, this is of course a blessed process, and a consciousness that is not false at all, since it is done in the “right” direction. After all, this is how everyone arrives at pure liberal truth. Only the takeover of a non-liberal position is false consciousness (for otherwise how are we to explain the public’s adopting a position that is so dark and so wrong?!).

Haredi women and other “disempowered” groups

Another example. It is widely held that Haredi women are discriminated against in their society. They are given a marginal and secondary status, and opportunities for advancement are closed off to them. They cannot study Torah, hold positions of authority and influence, or participate in various social activities. But if you ask Haredi women, it seems to me that in many cases you will receive the answer that they themselves believe this and think that this is how it ought to be. If a husband wants to leave the kollel and go to work, in many cases he will encounter firm opposition from his good wife. My impression is that in many cases the truly devout people who sustain the Haredi world are precisely the women. In the face of this phenomenon, liberals raise claims about false consciousness. The claim is that because women do not study Torah and do not really know what is obligatory and what is not, what the source of each social or halakhic custom is and what its force is (and how and whether it can be changed), they live with the feeling that the principles of Haredi life descended from Sinai. This is what Moses our teacher received directly from the Holy One, blessed be He. Therefore, in fact, they have no choice but to endorse the Haredi social norms. A false consciousness has been created in them, within which they themselves internalize the positions that discriminate against them, and they are honestly and sincerely convinced of them. When you ask them, they themselves will support these positions with enthusiasm and devotion.

Such arguments arise with regard to quite a few vulnerable populations (among other things, that is why they are called “disempowered” and not weak. One of the mechanisms of this “disempowerment” is the creation of false consciousness). Thus, for example, a woman who works in prostitution or offers herself for surrogacy in exchange for payment, or a person who donates organs for money, is really doing something that he himself does not want to do. We know better than he does what he himself really wants, were it not for the false consciousness planted in him. This is a justification for refusing to heed his wishes and for forbidding him to do what he himself wants.

Note that the argument from distress is not relevant here. If women work in prostitution or are willing to serve as surrogates because of their distress, that is not an argument for preventing them from doing so. On the contrary, this is the path they chose in order to solve their distress (to earn money). Many people choose a profession they do not like and that even harms them, because of distress. The need for money is usually the reason one goes out to work. Such arguments seem like a violation of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. Once I heard the crime reporter Buki Naeh say that among women who work in prostitution there are quite a few who have other livelihood options but prefer to earn better money in this way (for example, students who do this in their spare time). He claimed that many of them choose it themselves because of the accessibility and the good pay. There are of course others who are forced into it, but I am speaking about a principled example and am not dealing with the phenomenon of prostitution as a whole. If you say this to women’s organizations and other liberals, you will immediately get hit over the head, because they know better than all of us what is good for us ourselves. Again, these are false-consciousness arguments.

False consciousness and liberalism

False-consciousness arguments were very common in Marxist thought (see here). The Marxists held that the proletariat lived in a consciousness that had been internalized from the ruling and privileged classes (the owners of capital). But this terminology is very reminiscent of, and not by chance, the postmodern discourse that today is used with respect to every weak group (or, in their language, “disempowered”).[1]

At first glance, false-consciousness arguments contradict liberalism. A liberal is supposed to allow a person to act according to his own understanding and to oppose coercion. He is supposed to revolt against the condescension and paternalism of a person or society who know better and explain to others what they themselves think. Thus, when the Chief Rabbinate explains to all of us that in fact it is better for us to marry according to the law of Moses and Israel and that every Jew wants in the depths of his heart to keep all the commandments, even though quite a few say that they do not want this, everyone protests: do not tell me what I myself prefer. Likewise, when I tell people who define themselves as atheists that deep inside they have faith in God, they call me paternalistic. Even when I tell my opponent in an argument that he is mistaken, there is usually an automatic reservation about this “condescension” (what, do you have all the truth?!). True, if you think X, then logic says that your opponent, who thinks not-X, is mistaken (in your opinion). But no, telling him that he is mistaken is condescension and out of place. Well, logic does not really play much of a role when we are in the liberal sphere.

In any event, it is not at all surprising to discover that false-consciousness arguments are used quite a bit, and perhaps primarily, by liberals – that is, precisely by those who oppose coercing people to act against their conscience, who do not hold firm positions or a single truth, and who certainly strongly oppose paternalism. The explanation for this is utterly simple. They certainly do hold positions, and in an astonishingly firm way; they are just unwilling to admit it (see Column 116). In their view, only the other person is supposed not to hold positions, and pluralism and liberalism are merely tools (often cynical ones) in polemic and nothing more. How will those liberals justify actions that impose their values on non-liberal groups? Very simply: they will explain to the members of those groups that in fact, deep in their hearts, they too are “closet liberals.” True, you do not dare say this openly, they will say, but that is only because of pressures. Sometimes you do not even say it to yourselves, because the “disempowerers” have internalized within you (=the “disempowered”) the false conceptions (Stockholm syndrome). You live in false consciousness, and therefore the liberal will save you from yourselves (and from the “disempowerers”) by imposing on you and on them your true conceptions. You are simply not aware of them, and only he is aware of them. Thus you will be liberated from falsehood and discover the liberal light that has always resided within you.

Are false-consciousness arguments necessarily wrong?

Despite everything said so far, I myself am not in principle opposed to arguments of “false consciousness.” In my opinion, in quite a few cases they do contain something real. For example, in the context of Haredi women, I too tend to think that not infrequently this is indeed the case. The fact that in many cases it is precisely the women, whose status in Haredi society is more marginal, who are the more “religious” and more devoted to Haredi life seems to me to indicate that this is the result of ignorance (women, especially Haredi women, do not study Torah). Ignorance is the way to weaken them (not necessarily intentionally) and to implant in them a false consciousness as if they themselves believed with full force in the Haredi conceptions on which they were raised. From the standpoint of such a woman, deviation from the Haredi way of life is deviation from the Torah given to Moses. From her perspective, 40-denier stockings and the fact that a woman does not receive an aliyah to the Torah are laws given to Moses at Sinai, and therefore of course she would sacrifice herself for them.

If so, I certainly accept the possibility of such a phenomenon, and I have no principled objection to diagnosing groups or people as living in false consciousness (see, for example, Columns 191 and 194, and also 199 on unconscious beliefs). But I object to using such arguments as a basis for imposing my opinion on another. Whenever I have power and I am facing someone else who thinks, acts, and expresses a position different from mine (especially if I am a liberal who does not impose his opinion), I can tell him that in fact deep inside he believes my own position and that his declared consciousness is false, and behold, I have a wonderful justification for coercing him to act “as he himself truly believes” (and contrary to what he explicitly claims).

To sum up, in my opinion there is room for false-consciousness arguments under two limitations: 1. that this be done in reasonable measure and when there is a logical and/or empirical basis that explains the formation of this consciousness and shows that it is false. 2. when one does not use this as a basis for imposing one’s own opinion on others. If a person declares that he believes in X, I may perhaps tell him that deep inside he actually believes in Y (like me) and that he lives in false consciousness, at least if I have good reasons for that. But there is no justification whatsoever for deriving from such an argument that I may coerce him to act according to conception Y. An argument of false consciousness is a kind of speculation, which may be true and may not, but every person and group are sovereign to formulate a position and act according to the best of their understanding, even if in my view that “best” is not really their understanding (and even if I am right about it). In the next column I will bring examples of false-consciousness arguments with which I completely agree.

This is the main thrust of my criticism of that speaker who opposed gender separation. Beyond the question whether she is right that this is indeed a case of false consciousness (I am willing to accept that, at least regarding part of the Haredi public and in some cases), I am not willing to accept the use of false-consciousness arguments in order to impose my own position on the other, and that is exactly what she and her friends are trying to do.

The boundaries of tolerance

In my article on the price of tolerance I pointed out that if a person or group has not formed an opinion seriously and has not bothered to invest thought in it, study the issue, and examine the different alternatives, I am not willing to give them credit and let them benefit from my tolerance. For example, I wrote there that I would not sign the “Kinneret Covenant,” because in my opinion it amounts to a license for superficial and lazy ignorance. I am not willing to recognize a Jewish identity or a position regarding Judaism that was not formed seriously. It does not deserve a tolerant attitude.

This is the place to sharpen that my intention there was not to say that on that basis I support coercing such people and groups. Absolutely not. What I argued was that I am not willing to sign with them a covenant of mutual respect. I explained there that I respect every position, however far it may be from the truth (in my opinion), so long as it was formed seriously and through examination of the arguments and alternatives. But a position that is held merely for various reasons, without more, is not worthy of respect. And still it is important to say that even in such situations I do not support coercing my opinions on other people.

Note that this is an argument that is somewhat similar to false-consciousness arguments, since I am in effect telling them that if they had examined things better they might have changed their opinion, and therefore in my view it is not clear that this is indeed their position, and so I see no need to respect it. But precisely because of this, I am not willing to regard such an argument as sufficient justification for coercion. To make the claim – yes; to coerce on its basis – absolutely not. A person has the right to hold whatever opinion he sees fit, and by the same token I have the right to tell him that he is mistaken and that I do not respect his opinion. Not only do I not agree with it; I also do not respect it and am not willing to assume that it is indeed a genuine position of his. But I do respect his right to hold that shaky opinion, that is, in my view there is no justification for coercing him to act contrary to it.

Caveat: those lacking judgment

It seems to me that there is another important caveat to what I have written so far. We do not give much credit to the positions of people who lack judgment. For example, we do impose positions and forms of behavior on minors (children vis-a-vis their parents, or students vis-a-vis their teachers) or on the mentally incompetent (involuntary hospitalization, limitations on the right to vote, entering into transactions and legal status, and the like). The reason for this is that in our assessment the formation of their positions is not serious. They cannot decide what they themselves think or what their own interest is. In such cases we will even permit ourselves to coerce them to act in accordance with our own positions. Indeed, this is not a simple claim, for how can one determine when a person is serious and when he is not merely disagreeing with me but truly incapable of forming a position? And yet in reality there is no avoiding a decision even about such situations.[2] What I have said so far applies to adults who possess judgment and form positions of their own, and, as stated above, with respect to them there is no justification for coercion, even if they do so in a negligent way that is not worthy of respect.

He is compelled until he says, “I consent.” in a get

Surprisingly, there is in Jewish law a clear example of the use of a false-consciousness claim, and there it appears as a basis for imposing a position on one who declares that he is not interested in it or does not believe in it. Moreover, this concerns precisely a person of sound mind, not a minor and not a mentally incompetent person. I refer, of course, to coercion of a man who refuses to give his wife a get (a Jewish bill of divorce), that is, to the law of He is compelled until he says, “I consent.” (we coerce him until he says, “I consent”).

At the end of Column 199 I explained Maimonides’ understanding of this law, and in the terms we have seen here one can say that this is a claim of false consciousness. Deep in his heart, that recalcitrant husband wants to observe Jewish law and its commands, and what he persists in is due to something like false consciousness. True, here we are not dealing with external coercion, but with obstinacy arising from his own inner psychological motives (for example, anger at his wife). Maimonides argues that these motives cause him to convince himself of something that he himself neither wants nor believes. In that column I explained similarly some mental illnesses as well (those that are curable), by way of Rabbi Nachman of Breslov’s story of the turkey.

This is an example of a false-consciousness argument by virtue of which we coerce an adult into behavior that does not accord with his declarations. We tell him that he wants to divorce even though he himself cries out and declares that he does not want to (until we force him to say with his lips that he does). The explanation given there is that deep inside this is indeed what he wants. Very Marxist. That is, a false-consciousness argument serves here as a basis for coercion, in direct contradiction to what I wrote above. It should be noted that the comparison to a mentally incompetent person (in the story of the turkey) points to the same paternalism. Instead of seeing him as someone with a different opinion, we classify him as a sort of mentally incompetent person (temporarily, in one respect) living in false consciousness, a kind of mental illness, and that justifies our relating to him as lacking judgment, whom, as we saw above, it is permissible to coerce. How does this fit with my claim here that such arguments should not be used as a basis for coercion?

But there is a very important aspect here that we have ignored. In the story of the get there is also an injured party, the woman whose get is being withheld. Where the bearer of false consciousness harms others (me or someone else), there is justification to coerce him. Beyond that, in such cases the coercion is not based on a claim of false consciousness. In such cases there is justification for coercion irrespective of false consciousness, because of the very harm done to another. The false-consciousness argument is not needed in order to justify the coercion, but only so that, from the standpoint of Jewish law, the get will not be considered a coerced get. Thus, in the case of coercing a get, the coercion is justified for other reasons (the harm to the woman), and false consciousness is required only so that it will not be a coerced get. Here we need false consciousness for the validity of the get, not in order to justify the coercion. In such a case we need only examine whether the argument is indeed correct, and, as stated above, I accept the possibility of false consciousness. I simply do not accept coercion by virtue of such an argument.

Moreover, as I explained in the above-mentioned column, to the best of my judgment in this case the false-consciousness argument regarding the recalcitrant husband is indeed correct and well founded. If so, in this case both of my conditions for using false-consciousness arguments are met: 1. I adopt this argument because it has reasonable justification. 2. I do not coerce by virtue of it (but rather for the sake of protecting the woman).

He is compelled until he says, “I consent.” in offerings

An interesting question, and apparently a different one, concerns coercion until he says “I consent.” in the laws of offerings (Rosh Hashanah 6a and parallels). The Talmud brings that very same principle with regard to someone who does not want to bring a sin-offering for a transgression. There too the principle of He is compelled until he says, “I consent.”, which, as stated, is a false-consciousness argument, is used as a basis for coercion. At first glance, there is no injured party there (as there is the woman in the case of the get), and in light of the explanation I proposed here there should seemingly be no justification for coercion. Therefore the case of coercion in offerings seems to flatly contradict my claim that such arguments should not be used as a basis for coercion.

But this too is a mistake. There as well, the coercion is not based on false-consciousness arguments. I do not coerce him because he really wants to. I coerce him because he needs to bring an offering and refuses to do so. The purpose of the coercion and its justification is the desire to save the person from the punishment that awaits him and to bring him atonement. The false-consciousness argument (according to which deep inside he really wants to bring the offering) is required only so that the offering will be valid and accepted (he consents), because an offering must come with the consent of its owner. Therefore the situation here is indeed similar to the situation of coercion regarding a get as described above. False consciousness does not serve here as a justification for coercion, but as the basis by virtue of which the coercion is halakhically effective.

In conclusion, it is important to understand that if the liberals were arguing that mixed-gender study should be imposed out of concern for harm to themselves (because the Haredim would want separation even in institutions where secular people study), I would have had no problem with their defending themselves, even if that included coercion. But then there would have been no need at all for false-consciousness arguments. In such a case the coercion is justified in itself, and there is no need to resort to such arguments. This is defensive liberalism. But in the discussions I described about gender separation in academia, these arguments serve as a justification for imposing mixed-gender study on the Haredim in their own institutions (and not in order to defend against them). That, as stated, is plainly unacceptable in my eyes.

[1] On the connection between Marxism and postmodernism, see from Column 178 onward and in my interview here.

[2] It is customary in such cases to resort to psychiatric or psychological expert opinions. Personally, I am very doubtful whether those people in fact have the tools to make such a decision.