Impressions and Insights from the "Forum for Civil Agreement" Conference (Column 116)
With God's help
At the beginning of the week I took part in an international roundtable organized by the Forum for Civil Agreement. This is a forum that brings together people from every shade of the country's civic spectrum: Haredim and secular people, left and right, Arabs and Jews, Mizrahim and Ashkenazim, women and men, and, if possible, all the combinations as well (true, I have not yet found there a secular Ashkenazi Arab Haredi woman of the male sex, but future developments should not be ruled out out of hand). Participants included guests from abroad, academics, politicians, and various speakers belonging to different population groups. There was simultaneous interpretation from Hebrew to English and back, so everyone could speak freely in his or her own language (including yours truly in his halting English).
In general, it was very interesting for me. As part of the conference I had the chance to meet and speak with various people I do not usually encounter, and I was impressed by the openness, broad-mindedness, and good will of almost all of them. At times I was surprised by the views and directions that came up there, and this stirred some optimism in me regarding the possibility of making progress toward solving the problems. I confess without embarrassment that I have no experience with peace conferences and "dialogue between-_" events (fill in the blank: religious-ethnic-sectoral-gender-national, etc.). There are people who make their living from such conferences around the globe (the jet-set circle of peace activists), and although my impression was that the participants there do not belong to that jet set, the conference nonetheless gave me some understanding of the secret charm of such meetings, of the optimism that drives them, and also of the optimism they generate (the late Shimon Peres's "New Middle East").
But already during the conference, and even more so afterward, I came to the conclusion that this optimism is probably a bit exaggerated, perhaps even illusory. I realized that, for my own part, although I do not belittle this aspiration and activity (would that they succeed), I am fairly pessimistic about their importance and about the potential they contain, and I felt I was beginning to understand why it is entirely possible that this is a kind of illusion. In what follows I will try to explain one significant aspect that contributes to this pessimism. The penny dropped for me on this point at the conference itself, and perhaps awareness of it will improve the chances of success of this undertaking, which I value greatly. Inshallah.
The first session: conceptual clarification
I was invited to open the first session, based on the understanding of the forum's chair that without conceptual clarification and sharpening, the discussion is doomed to failure. He had read an article of mine and thought that the conceptual distinction I drew there was essential for clarifying the discussion and thereby also for making it successful. He therefore decided to send the article to the participants even before the conference, and even gave me the honor of opening the first session, which was devoted entirely to my remarks. A respectable opportunity indeed, one that gives even a pessimist like me some room for hope, and perhaps even influence.
The session dealt with the relevant conceptual framework (openness, tolerance, and pluralism, and the relations among them), and following my remarks a lively discussion arose (though I must say, a rather predictable one; I already have some experience with these topics). In the discussion it again became clear to me that even people for whom this is a professional field (including academics) are not really coherent and sharp in their definitions of these concepts. They are locked into ideological templates that protect their worldviews, and it is very hard to shake them loose. There were people offended by automatic identifications I had not made at all (the empty wagon, secularism = pluralism, and the like), and I found it quite difficult to make the point clear. People who certainly seemed intelligent literally repeated my own words, but did so in a tone of criticism and puzzlement (that is, they had not grasped the crux of the matter). I think that in the end, after we gathered the various responses and I addressed them again, I managed to sharpen the points further, and the message nevertheless got through.
I will not go here into detail about the relation between tolerance and pluralism, because that is not my subject here (you can read about it in the above-mentioned article). But in light of the marathon discussion we have just finished here on the site regarding the definition of poetry (Columns 104–113), it is worth noting that at the conference criticisms were raised of my conceptual analysis that were strikingly similar to the criticisms you can see of my proposed definition of poetry in those columns. People there kept arguing that reality is complex and subjective (it includes emotion, not only reason and cold deliberation; there are also questions of identity, etc., etc.), and some even flung at me the charge that I was really just performing detached intellectual exercises that had nothing to do with reality. They argued that a tolerant person and a pluralist of the sort I describe do not exist in our reality. Of course there were also those who insisted on terminological questions ("It is simply not true that pluralism is this and not that," and the like), even though I had prefaced my remarks by stressing that I have no interest in semantics and dictionary meanings (for all I care, what I call pluralism you can call Yekum Purkan; the main thing is that we understand that this is a different concept from what I call tolerance). Incidentally, among those making such claims were academics in these fields (the "baloney studies"), who fell into the very same methodological mistakes I pointed out in the discussion of poetry.
As in the above series of columns, I tried to explain to my colleagues that without attempting to define theoretical concepts that indeed do not appear in their pure form in our recalcitrant and complex reality (but only in impure dosages—metamorphoses), it is impossible to understand reality in all its complexity, and of course impossible to make progress in dealing with it. The concepts of tolerance and pluralism (just like the concepts of poetry and prose in the above series), as I define them, indeed do not appear in their pure form in reality. I know no person who is a pure tolerantist, and certainly no pure pluralist according to my definitions, and yet without defining and understanding the pure concepts and the differences between them, it is very difficult to deal with the flesh-and-blood human beings we actually encounter. The resemblance between what happened there and what happened here in the discussion on poetry was truly illuminating for me. Needless to say, this strengthened my view regarding the need to define abstract theoretical concepts as a basis for understanding real reality, and regarding the fact that researchers in these fields fail again and again by trying to characterize the complex reality directly instead of attempting to rise to abstractions as is done in the natural sciences. Indeed, there is no pure tolerantist and no pure pluralist, but almost every person or approach I can think of falls somewhere between the two, in varying proportions and for varying motives. Because of the conceptual vagueness and the complexity of the subject and the phenomena, people become confused and do not know how to define even their own position, let alone diagnose the approach facing them. Once again I saw that discourse cannot really be conducted, and certainly cannot advance, without theory and abstract conceptual analysis. I was again convinced that this is not only a matter of temperament (to your surprise, I am a theoretician by temperament—you never would have imagined it), but that these analyses are of the first practical importance.
As I also mentioned in the discussion of poetry, game theory is accused of similar things. There too there is an attempt to describe human activity through detached and supremely rational intellectual exercises, and of course it usually fails. Contrary to what the researchers who work in it try to persuade us, game theory works in almost no field and no context (aside from a few basic insights that do not require the complex mathematics in which they engage). But with game theory too, it is a mistake to despair and flee into the provinces of mathematical and intellectual amusement, or to accuse the mathematicians of engaging in games (though there is, of course, something to that). Game theory assumes that the way to deal with complex reality is to build an abstract conceptual framework, which indeed cannot be applied straightforwardly to a reality that contains many other aspects, some of which are not rational considerations, and yet it provides insights that illuminate reality and help us understand it properly. Within the theoretical framework one can discuss reality and propose corrected models, and even incorporate into them non-rational human elements.[1] One can at least discern directions and understand trends, even if one cannot apply the mathematical theory literally in order to obtain results. Not only game theory, but modern science as a whole teaches us that without these abstractions we remain in a fog. The way to make progress in dealing with reality is to flee from it into abstract worlds and concepts, and only then return to deal with it.[2]
The second session: what is liberalism
In the next session, one of the participants, for whom this is an academic field of expertise, gave a short lecture on what liberalism is and what post-liberalism is. She began with the common and familiar definition that liberalism gives priority to the individual over the collective. She then added that liberalism is not as empty and transparent as it appears, for it too has boundaries. The liberal does not deny the right, and perhaps even the duty, of a person to care for his children before all the other children in the world, for his family before all other human beings, and for the citizens of his own state before the citizens of all other states in the world. In other words, the liberal too recognizes separating boundaries between populations and does not necessarily see them as a basis for discrimination. But in his eyes there are certain boundaries that are by definition harmful and lead to discrimination, such as gender, religion, and the like. His own boundaries, of course, are not of that sort.[3] From there she moved on to argue in favor of post-liberalism, which recognizes liberalism as one opinion among others (and not as the empty framework of discourse, as its proponents tend to think), and is aware that it too has boundaries worth defending and capable of generating discrimination, like any other position (though perhaps fewer of them, although even of that I am not sure). One of the scholars in the field added there that post-liberalism is basically willing to exchange the rights of the individual for collective rights (such as a people's right to self-determination), and to recognize those too as rights that should be advanced and defended within the liberal framework.
In the discussion that developed afterward, I told her that in my opinion she was mistaken in her basic definition. A collective contains a great many individuals (without entering into the question whether there is something more in it)[4], and it seems unreasonable to me to prefer one individual over a thousand other individuals. That is an absurd conception. I suspect liberals of many things, but not necessarily of stupidity. Because of the Principle of Charity (which instructs us to interpret our opponents' views in the way most favorable to them), I think a more correct definition of liberalism would be: an approach that prefers rights to values (in their positive sense). When I speak here of values, I do not mean values such as not harming others, or even helping others, since these are values grounded in interests and needs, which brings us back to preferring one person's needs and rights over those of others. I mean positive values—that is, values whose purpose is not merely to improve people's simple material condition. I mean religious values and perhaps national ones (though in my view nationalism is a need, not a value). From here stems the liberal's opposition to boundaries other than his own. In the liberal's eyes, such values are overridden by the rights (needs) of the individual. The struggle, then, is not between the individual and the collective but between rights (or negative values) and positive values.
But now the expansion to post-liberalism becomes empty. In effect, post-liberalism turns religion and nationhood from (positive) values into needs and rights, and is therefore willing to defend and recognize them as well.[5] But if one recognizes a group's national or religious rights as rights worthy of protection, then one has drained liberalism of its content. The distinction between values and needs/rights is erased and becomes empty semantics. As is typical of "post-" processes in general, post-liberals take a concept with a distinct philosophical and ideological meaning and turn it into an empty term. Such an expansion is an empty framework that preserves the concepts while draining them of content (and not merely updating or modifying them).[6]
It is worth noticing that in light of my remarks, the characterization of liberalism as empty of values—a characterization the average liberal is deeply offended by when he hears it ("an empty wagon")—becomes almost tautological. According to my proposal, this is liberalism's very definition: a war against values in the name of rights.[7] From here, again, one can see that the move to post-liberalism, which is presented as an expansion and updating of the liberal conception, is not really such a thing. Post-liberalism is essentially trying to erase the essence of liberalism and introduce (positive) values into liberal discourse, only it does so under the guise of collective rights. It will now admittedly not recognize the importance of nationhood or the truth and validity of religion, but it will recognize nationhood and religion as protectable needs of various groups. After this conceptual laundering, these are no longer values but needs, and so the new liberal is willing to fight for them and to recognize those who demand them (even at the expense of the individual rights of others) without pangs of conscience. Despite the abundance of lectures, essays, and scholars explaining to us why this is still liberalism, I, in my smallness, see in this mainly semantics intended to cover over the recognition (sad, at least from their perspective) of the emptiness and lack of meaning of the good old liberalism. Now we are all on the same platform: each person fights for the particular values of his own identity group. Liberalism is not the framework of the discourse, as they tended to think, but at most one participant in it. But this of course raises the question: so what will be the framework of the discourse? Once the liberal framework has been emptied out, we must find a new framework within which we can speak, argue, and make decisions. More on that below.
Pluralism and tolerance[8]
Where does the disappointment with liberalism come from? Simply from the fact that it does not work. In its beginnings there was great hope that it would bring the messianic age. As a transparent framework of discourse, empty of intrinsic values, it would overcome fundamentalism and extremism and leave them in the private courtyard of those who espouse them. Religion is entirely legitimate, but it is a person's private affair. He of course has the right to believe in it, so long as it is done in his private home and so long as only liberal discourse rules in the public sphere. The difficulty that shattered this hope arose when our liberal repeatedly encountered people unwilling to place their views and values in the private domain. Resurgent nationalism, no less than renewed religiosity, is a bitter disappointment for the liberal—not because of its very existence, but because it refuses to enter and remain in the private realm. It turns out that people who believe in something are not willing to give it up, or even to give up fighting for it in the public arena. They caused the liberal to understand that he too is a party to the argument, and not merely a thin, objective, agreed-upon framework of discourse.
Thus was born the disappointment that gave rise to post-liberalism. The question is whether the son can do the work where the father failed. If indeed there is room even within a liberal framework for collective rights (a laundered name for values in the positive sense above), how is the public sphere to be conducted? Their very being collective prevents their being consigned to the private domain. If so, liberalism is dead. So how is a discourse between the groups to be conducted, one that will make it possible to run life and disputes together? Because we have understood that the liberal framework is no longer really an option, this triggers new thinking and all the new discourse within which people try to define post-liberalism, or a federal society (built out of some federation of cultural cantons). This was the spirit that emerged from the remarks of almost all the speakers at the conference, each in his own shade, and as I understood it, the aim of the entire conference was precisely to formulate as coherent a post-liberal and federal doctrine as possible. The great question is how one can move forward within a post-liberal framework. What will be the shared framework within which the discourse is conducted?
Back to pluralism
In my remarks I stressed that pluralism is the most harmful framework imaginable for managing such a society. Pluralism largely parallels the original liberalism. It is a vacuum of values that recognizes a multiplicity of truths. Within a pluralist framework of thought, I accept you because you are right just as I am (the liberal can say instead: because it is not my business whether you are right or not; that belongs to your private domain). This is precisely why liberal-pluralist discourse is always stuck, which frustrates its participants greatly. It always gets stuck in the same way: you, the liberal, encounter a person or group that is not liberal and not pluralist—so what do you do? Fine, you simply persuade them to become pluralists. But those annoying stubborn people are not persuaded. So what do you do then? Either you hold roundtable panels with other frustrated pluralists like yourself, and there you all complain together about the situation while eating burekas and/or sushi. Alternatively, you update liberalism and adopt post-liberalism—but then again the discourse gets stuck, because there is no shared and agreed framework even for the public sphere.
I insisted and argued that pluralism is the problem, not the solution. The only way to make progress in a post-liberal situation is on the basis of tolerance, not on the basis of pluralism. In order to live together, the monist (as distinct from the pluralist, he recognizes one truth and regards the rest as mistaken) does not need to be persuaded that the other is right and that there is no truth. It is enough for him to accept the value of tolerance—that is, to be willing to contain the other even if, by his lights, the other is mistaken. Does this sound trivial? To me it does. But it turns out that to others it really does not.
The reactions to my remarks, not for the first time, were mixed. Quite a few were angry at the condescension and lack of pluralism (monism assumes that I am right and others are wrong. Who am I? Do I have a monopoly on the truth? A bit wearying, but that is what always comes up in discourse of this kind). Others argued that tolerance as I present it cannot move us forward, because the other is still wrong in my eyes. And I kept arguing that these very claims are what keep them stuck time and again. The fact is that they are looking for a way to conduct themselves vis-à-vis monists, and it is precisely their clinging to pluralism and to old-style liberalism that keeps the discourse stuck. If they continue trying to persuade the world to become pluralist, then the dilemmas of "defensive democracy" (when does the liberal stop taking his non-liberal colleagues into account?) will continue forever, as will the frustration with the benighted people with whom no progress can be made, and the endless complaining about what to do. When you meet pluralists like yourself around a round table (which is usually what happens), the agreement is truly marvelous. The heart warms at the sight of peace and pastoral harmony among all the colors of the spectrum (all of whom, of course, belong to the same color, and differ from one another mainly in dress: hijab, shtreimel, or shorts). But when you go out into the field, or when you trouble yourself to bring to the table a few "benighted ones" who in this case are also honest (see below), all the agreements evaporate on the spot, and the frustrations return.
My claim was that this is what happens when discourse is conducted on the basis of barren pluralism, because of the following dilemma: among pluralists this discourse is unnecessary, and when you speak with groups or people who are not pluralist, this discourse is stuck. Therefore I argued that if one could persuade monists that even if they are right and others are wrong there is still room for a tolerant attitude toward the other (who is mistaken), only thus can progress be made. My remarks were directed against two errors that are two sides of the same coin: not every accommodation of the other is pluralist, and monism does not always have to be non-accommodating. In other words, there is a tolerant accommodation that is not pluralist (see in my above-mentioned article the differences between them; this is not just semantics), and this is an option—the only one—open also to monists.
The meaning of the tolerant option
Several Haredi rabbis took part in the meeting (some of them very well known), and one of them, who has been working for many years to find a social solution for the Haredim in Israeli reality, recounted that he has been working in theory and in practice to build a cantonal model for Israeli society. Thus the Haredim would be recognized as a distinct society (here he joins the post-liberalism I described above), and general society would not try to impose norms on them from outside.[9]
Around the table, after he spoke, someone turned to him and asked: in his canton model, would there be no demands to close supermarkets on the Sabbath in the secular cantons? He answered quite innocently that when this model is adopted, he assumes and hopes that there will be enough secular people for whom the Sabbath is important and they will take care of it themselves. By no means could they extract from him any concession regarding the Sabbath as he understands it even in the other cantons—that is, a straight answer to the question of what would happen if there were not enough such secular people. In the course of his remarks he also said more than once, again quite innocently, that he is working to persuade the Haredim to accept the canton model as the right solution for a situation in which "our hand is not strong enough." In addition, he repeatedly objected to my remarks about the value of tolerance. He said that for a Jew committed to Jewish law, tolerance is at most a means (for shared living), not a value.
I must say that the feeling around the table was: "Here, at last we have met an enlightened and cooperative Haredi. At last there is someone to talk to. So who said the situation is hopeless?!" But his remarks jolted me, mainly because I felt that the people around the table did not understand the terminology and the subtext. I told them that translating his words into everyday Hebrew would yield the following: "our hand is not strong enough" = as long as we do not have the power to beat into you what it is your duty to do, we are willing to seclude ourselves so that you will not bother us, while at the same time demanding the full measure of our rights, and perhaps, in muted tones, also not entirely imposing on you what you "should" do according to Jewish law. In other words, we are using liberalism or post-liberalism as a solution for an interim period, so long as we do not have the power to impose on you the correct path (the monist one). Suddenly I realized that in colloquial Arabic he was basically speaking about "hudna". But then I realized something else as well: perhaps the other partners in this post-liberal discourse are also speaking about hudna and not about genuine tolerance.
I told him that I was speaking about a different model. Genuine tolerance means that even if our hand is strong enough, and even if we have the ability and opportunity to impose the correct path (in our eyes) on our fellow citizens (= the entire citizenry of the state), we will not do so. I am prepared to recognize the right and duty of every person and every society to conduct its life as it understands it. I argued that there is room for such a value-conception within the framework of Jewish law—that is, to see tolerance as a value and not merely as a cynical means of attaining interim goals (= hudna). I explained that tolerance as a value is based on a conception of respecting the other's autonomy, that is, respecting his right and duty to make his decisions by himself according to his best understanding, even if he reaches conclusions that, in my eyes, are utterly different and utterly mistaken (I am a monist, as you will recall). I claim that there is room for such a conception within Jewish law—that is, that the value of tolerance does not come from outside, nor as an interim arrangement (hudna), but as an essential value. This, of course, within certain limits. In my article I define "the price of tolerance," meaning that a person or group is entitled to a tolerant attitude if they have done their best to examine their path and have reached a conclusion. If this has indeed happened, and they have reached a conclusion different from mine, then I must respect their decision and their path (this is essentially a situation of compulsion in matters of opinion. On the one hand, I do not recognize that he too is right, and on the other hand I am not proceeding this way merely as a punitive argument. It is respect for his autonomy). But if they have not done this, I have no obligation to respect their path and opinion. One who demands tolerance and wishes to play with me on the same field must bear the requisite price (see my above-mentioned article).[10]
The rabbis around the table were incensed, and one of them began hurling quotations at me. I said that I did not intend to enter into a dispute about sources in a forum where some do not speak Hebrew and others are strangers to halakhic literature. My claim is on the principled plane: if I were to enter a closed room with Rabbis So-and-so and So-and-so and persuade them that even if they sincerely believe in every Jew's obligation to Jewish law, there is still room for their adopting a tolerant conception toward others who think differently, that is the only way to move forward. This is the only way in which a liberal or pluralist can reach a reasonable status quo with a monist. The focus of the discourse shifts from the encounter between the groups to an intra-group discussion. Instead of looking for a shared framework of discourse, each group is sent to do its homework and see whether it is willing or able to adopt tolerance as a value alongside its monistic beliefs. This sounds utopian, and there is serious doubt whether it can succeed, but it is clear to me that the other paths certainly are not an option.
Success by this route depends on the monist becoming convinced that his position and belief allow him to be tolerant (that is, that the value of tolerance does not contradict his beliefs and does not require him to surrender them). My claim was not that in this way we necessarily succeed, but that once one understands the difference between tolerance and pluralism, the way opens to examine this possibility. Given the accepted identification between accommodation and pluralism, the monist feels that the liberals are demanding that he give up his beliefs (even only with respect to others who do not share them: to grant secular people legitimacy to desecrate the Sabbath). But if one understands the distinction between tolerance and pluralism and adopts a discourse of tolerance, he may accept it, because he can remain within his monistic outlook and still arrive at a reasonable status quo with others. As stated, this will not necessarily work, for not every monist is tolerant. But my claim was that this is the only way to move forward with monists. Moreover, I do not think that the way there is to persuade the monist to adopt the value of tolerance. In many cases it is enough merely to expose him to this option (to be tolerant and not pluralist), and it is possible that he will find that it is feasible from his point of view.
Is the discourse reflective and trustworthy?
Now I return to the pessimism I described above. Part of the sense of progress in such meetings stems from less-than-straight discourse on the part of the non-liberal elements. Listeners unfamiliar with the discourse become convinced that there is someone here with whom to speak. Ostensibly, their monist interlocutors are expressing positions of willingness to cooperate and arrive at shared life. They simply miss expressions like "our hand is not strong enough." Sometimes this is not a matter of misunderstanding but of failing to listen to what is uncomfortable for us to hear. It seems to me that in many cases this is also the situation in dialogue with the Palestinians. Peace activists (most of whom are pluralists and/or liberals) come to the conclusion that there is someone to talk to, at least on the pragmatic plane, when their interlocutors are in fact speaking about hudna and not about genuine tolerance. Their interlocutors may speak of interim solutions under duress ("our hand is not strong enough"), and they hear sincere calls for peace. Again, sometimes this is a failure to understand the language, and sometimes it is selective and tendentious listening. That comes from the listeners. And what about the speakers?
This phenomenon is no less complex. Sometimes speakers from the non-liberal side are aware of this difference and do it cynically and intentionally. They utter slogans of peace and coexistence when in fact they mean hudna. But in other cases the atmosphere in these meetings genuinely leads the speakers to express pluralist positions and to feel a sincere desire to arrive at coexistence. The feeling of fraternity, acquaintance, and encounter with the other creates an unexpected kind of willingness. But in my opinion this usually does not reflect their deep and genuine desire, the one that would find expression on the ground in everyday life, when they are not sitting around a round table with peace activists from all sides. In such cases the speakers present their positions in softened form, not always aware of this process themselves. The atmosphere influences them and prevents even them from understanding the difference between hudna and genuine tolerance. Beyond that, even if the speakers themselves truly believe this (the peace conferences and round tables actually did something to them), the society they represent is not there. When they return to their territorial waters, you will hear none of this. The extremist forces will lead them again and again, and their voice will be swallowed up (if they even try to raise it). Either way, this is not an authentic expression of the society in whose name they speak.
This is my feeling regarding Haredi speakers in meetings of these kinds, and certainly in media interviews. There you can hear extravagant tolerance and pluralism of "live and let live"—especially the "let live" part—which arouse a great deal of hope and trust in their interlocutors. But in fact, in many cases these statements have no real backing. These are demands whose purpose is to enable us to exhaust our rights, achieve the maximum gains, and suffer the minimum disturbance, and all this only as an interim solution. This is basically mostly "let live." The "live" is only for the meantime.
Thus you can hear Haredim at such conferences or in media interviews speaking of entering the workforce and military service as a value, of their great appreciation for secular people, for the State of Israel, and for its founders. They demand respect for their outlook without wishing to interfere with others (Torah study is no less important a value, and therefore they are unwilling to enlist). The radio interviewer and those sitting around the round table positively melt with pleasure, but I, as one who knows the people involved, know that in most cases there is no sincerity there—and even if there is sincerity, it represents nothing. In most of Haredi society, military service is a taboo, and the basic fear is of corruption and conversion to Zionism, heaven forbid, not because Torah study is the ultimate shield (which is why frameworks like the Haredi Nahal and Shahar are beginning to succeed more, because they offer a Haredi hothouse within the army). I know full well that even someone who does not study is told not to enlist and will suffer greatly if he does enlist (in the past this was sweeping and absolute; today there is already some welcome erosion). But none of this surfaces in public discourse. The listener who does not know the reality from within may be impressed by the speakers on behalf of the Haredim/Arabs and conclude that the situation is wonderful and there is a real desire for genuine cooperation. These seem to be good and intelligent people with a great deal of good will, and thus all of us feel a desire to take this wonderful group, which is in genuine distress, into account, and to allow them to integrate into society on equal terms—to recognize them as a canton in our post-liberal society.
When I hear a radio interview with a Haredi politician or journalist, but also with an ordinary Haredi, I am reminded of the famous joke about Nixon: when do we have a clear indication that Nixon is lying? Answer: when he moves his lips. The same was once said about Ariel Sharon, and that is my feeling in every interview on Haredi matters, whether with their official spokespeople or with people speaking on their own behalf. A Haredi who is interviewed in the media or converses around a round table always feels himself to be an ambassador and spokesman, and therefore will generally not allow himself to expose his true positions. In most cases I do not believe a single word that comes out of his mouth. As someone who knows the reality, I also know that he is lying or misleading the listeners, sometimes deliberately and sometimes innocently. But from this I also learn that in other cases, which I do not know from the inside, this is probably the situation as well.
Here is a similar example from another context that arose from my experiences at the conference. At lunch I sat with a well-known Jew who has devoted his life to peace activism. He told me something that astonished me: a vast majority of the Palestinians today want a peace agreement. He repeated and emphasized that this was a large majority among the Muslim Brotherhood and large sectors of Hamas as well, and not only among the people of the "Authority." They are merely frustrated because of Israel's repeated violations of the Oslo Accords. I asked him why they launched the 1948 war instead of accepting the partition proposal, and he said that was then. Today the situation is different. I asked why they shoot and carry out terror attacks, and he answered that it is because of frustration. He insisted very strongly on returning again and again to the claim that the fact is that all these people have a sincere and genuine desire for peace. This, he said, is the result of personal experience and of surveys—in other words, supposedly we are dealing with facts.
Precisely because I believed him that this is indeed what he thinks (he is a sober-minded man, a former Knesset member and minister), I thought to myself one of two things: either I am living in a movie or he is living in a movie. After a while, these remarks connected in my mind to the discourse that had taken place at the conference itself, as I described above. I thought to myself that it is entirely possible that he is hearing the same tunes that we at the table heard from the Haredi side, and in fact from all sides. They speak to him about hudna, and he hears the dove of peace. They speak about "our hand is not strong enough," and he hears tolerance and pluralism. One often hears in the media complaints about the difference between what Palestinian leaders say in English and what they say in Arabic. But I think that in many cases even what they say in English, at least if one listens carefully, contains the relevant information. After all, around the table that rabbi said that "our hand is not strong enough," only the listeners did not notice, did not understand, or did not want to understand.
It is important to understand that even when one conducts surveys, so that ostensibly the answers are anonymous—and all the more so when these are ordinary citizens and not manipulations by some spokesman or politician—the picture one receives is not necessarily reliable. People think to themselves: truly, why shouldn't there be peace?! Who doesn't want peace?! But when you translate this into details, what they really mean is peace without a price. Peace in which the Jews are in the sea, or the secular return in repentance (or go down into the pit and do not come back up). When you come to translate this abstract desire for peace into practical reality, you discover that it vanishes. Thus they can tell us that "factually" most Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood people are seekers of peace, and most Palestinian citizens of Israel are loyal citizens who only want good and equal lives. As I said, I tend to think that all this is indeed true at the level of consciousness. But to the same extent I tend to think that this is a misleading picture, and I would not rely on it in any way. When it has to find expression in the real and concrete field, not much of it will remain. In other words, I would not want to be a citizen in a Palestinian state even if the nice and intelligent speakers who were sitting around the table were to run it. On the ground, when "their hand really is strong enough," I have little confidence that this will actually work. It seems to me that Ben-Gurion once said that he yearned for the realization of the prophets' vision of And the wolf shall dwell with the lamb ("the wolf shall dwell with the lamb"), only one must make sure that even then we are the wolf.
Will you say that I am a man of little faith? Perhaps. Perhaps I really am simply stuck in the current picture of the world and refuse to digest change and adopt a long-term vision? After all, our sages have already said Where there is no vision, the people cast off restraint ("without vision the people come undone") (somewhere, somewhere). Pessimistic and faithless people like me will not bring us the longed-for peace (I do not say this cynically. It is a genuine question). At best—perhaps…
A concluding reflection
In closing, the time has come to face the mirror. What about my own remarks? Those sitting around the table who heard me speak about the value of tolerance within the Jewish-halakhic-Orthodox conception probably believed me, and perhaps even began to develop hopes that there was someone to talk to. Is that justified? Was I too not speaking there on my own behalf in a way that was actually misleading them, just like the other speakers I described? To the best of my knowledge, in religious society as a whole there are indeed echoes of such conceptions, but it is equally clear to me that they represent almost no one in the leading religious and rabbinic leadership. That leadership is usually bound to the accepted categories of coercing observance of the commandments and of absolute truth in faith and halakhic obligation. Tolerance, as distinct from "hudna," is beyond it and farther on (though I do think there has been some change, and that certain tolerant conceptions are emerging, even if not among those wearing frock coats and white beards). In this sense, the Haredi speakers around the table (who refused to see tolerance as a value within a religious-halakhic framework) were actually more reliable ambassadors than I was, and described the situation more accurately. So in fact my remarks too were misleading. I too was an inauthentic ambassador speaking out of a feeling of comfort with my fellow participants around the round table.
And yet, it seems to me that this is true only on the practical plane—that is, if one wishes to see my remarks as an authentic expression of an existing halakhic current of thought. But unlike the speakers I described above, I did not claim that this is in fact the prevalent way of thinking. What I claimed is that if we succeed in creating such a situation (which does not yet exist, and it is doubtful whether it will ever exist), this is the only option for moving forward. Beyond that, I can testify that this is truly accurate with respect to my own intentions. I spoke sincerely, and I genuinely think this way. Moreover, I truly think that there is such a legitimate religious option. Therefore I believe that even if the reins and the power were in my hands, I would not coerce others to observe commandments (perhaps I would coerce them to examine the matter seriously; see "the price of tolerance" in my above-mentioned article).[11] On the other hand, it is clear that this conception is not shared by others in the rabbinic and religious establishment, and therefore anyone who draws practical conclusions from my remarks does so at his own risk. There is something misleading even in my own words. I can only conclude with the optimistic saying of Rabbi Chaim Levin, of blessed memory: "Despair has become more comfortable."
[1] I have more than once mentioned in the past the utility function in game theory, which can take subjective, psychological, and emotional utilities into account, and not only money and power, as is customary.
[2] See an interesting discussion of this (in my opinion) in my article on ukimtot.
[3] This is of course a tautology, or begging the question, since every boundary involves discriminations, and the distinction between "legitimate" discriminations and illegitimate ones smuggles the desired conclusion in behind it. In this sense, the liberal is no different from anyone else who holds a position.
[4] My good friend Nadav Shnerb likes from time to time to remind me of the immortal saying of a great man known to both of us: The public is not a collection of individuals. It is a collection of beasts. Forgive the bluntness, but it reflects frustration with the quality of public discourse, whose spirit hovers over the pages of this entire site.
[5] In this sense, communism, for example, is not a value. Its aim is to improve the condition of all individuals (admittedly, on the way it tramples a few of them. Well, that is the grease on the wheels of the revolution).
[6] One must understand that post-liberals see themselves as liberalism's own flesh and blood, unlike post-Zionists in relation to Zionism (though there too there are quite a few such people). These are the same people and the same groups, whose outlooks have undergone a metamorphic change of form and an adaptation and updating in light of new insights. By contrast, as I understand it, this is simply a covert abandonment of liberalism while preserving the terminology (as explained above).
[7] I will not go here into the wondrous process by which rights turn into values, and liberals become bold fighters, sometimes downright violent, on behalf of those values—at the expense of the rights of those who dare to espouse values.
[8] As stated, my remarks at the conference were based on this article, because of which I was invited to speak there. It was also sent in advance to those attending the conference.
[9] In a preliminary conversation with him I told him that so long as he does not descend to the details, his model is rather devoid of practical value. I argued that it would collapse on the details. Military service is not coercion but participation in the needs of the collective, and therefore the problem will not be solved by cantonization. Entering the labor market is also a public matter, since their canton will need extensive economic support. He argued that within a cantonal framework, entry into the labor market would be received graciously. I thought this phenomenon would threaten Haredi identity even if it were recognized as an autonomous society (moreover, the Haredim's own fear of entering the labor market would not diminish, since it entails a loss of economic control over people). But that is not my main concern here.
[10] Incidentally, here I distinguished between the Haredi-secular dispute and the Palestinian-Jewish dispute. In the first, the goal is to create one society that operates as a federal body. The demand is that I recognize their Judaism, and not merely forgive them and live alongside them. By contrast, in the Israeli-Palestinian context the goal is not to create a society with a shared value foundation but to live side by side without killing one another. Here the dispute is not about values, and therefore there is no need to pay the "price of tolerance."
[11] By the same token, I also think that even if I had the power to solve the Palestinian problem and win the war definitively, I would prefer compromise (if it were possible). That is, for me the willingness to compromise (tolerance) is not merely an interim solution until I succeed in winning, neither in the internal Jewish arena nor in the external one.
Discussion
A nice and interesting article. What I missed was a discussion of an approach like Rav Kook’s, which Avinoam Rosenak calls “metaphysical pluralism”– that is, a multiplicity of truths arising from recognition that there are merits in one’s opponent that do not exist in the camp to which you belong, and which you do not intend to abandon. For example: support for the pioneers’ love of the land, even though Rav Kook never intended to become a pioneer himself. Is such a system impossible in our world today? (Leaving aside the question of how such a position should navigate the arena of political struggle.)
This is the first time I’ve found any point in a discussion of politics.
It seems to me that this is thanks to the clarity of the concepts around which it revolves.
That is a correct point, and I even made it there in the discussion. They asked me what I propose adopting in order to move forward, and I said the question is meaningless. I do not adopt pluralism or tolerance as means to some goal. If I am a pluralist, then that is what I am, and if not, then not. And the same applies to tolerance. My claim is only that it is worthwhile for all of us to examine whether I or my group are committed to the value of tolerance, because it has consequential value. He or they will not adopt it because of the result, but that is a motivation to examine carefully whether such a value exists and whether it is consistent with their outlook. Before the conceptual clarification, people would not think to look for such a thing. They perceive consideration for the other as contradicting my belief in my values.
Beyond that, my claim is that pluralism cannot do the job, while tolerance—if it exists—can. So it is worth looking for tolerance, but pluralism is of no help and there is no point in looking for it in particular.
I don’t see any special approach here. By my definitions this is not pluralism but tolerance. The fact that the pioneers were devoted to love of the land leads me to appreciate them and feel gratitude toward them, but that has nothing whatsoever to do with my relation to their values. If I accept their values (such as settling the land), then I agree not because that is something positive about them, but because that is what I think; and if I do not agree with that value, then despite the positive aspects they have, I can at most be tolerant. In my view these definitions are part of the same vagueness that characterizes academic discussion in these areas.
A comment on the criticism in the article against the lack of honesty of Haredi speakers.
As someone from that sector, I feel there is a certain unfairness in presenting this criticism as aimed specifically at Haredim (although the article did mention that Arab speakers also “suffer” from a similar lack of honesty).
In my humble opinion, the real problem, if anything, lies דווקא on the supposedly liberal side. Unfortunately, the degree of “tolerance” that liberal pluralists show toward genuinely “benighted” views is nil. This leaves the miserable speaker with no choice. He cannot really express his views freely and hope to conduct a fair discussion. Usually the conversation will immediately turn into a mutual exchange of insults, and thus the speaker will achieve the opposite result. And the reverse is also true: try entering the inside of a Haredi yeshiva and putting one of the principles of faith on the table for discussion – they will call you a heretic, and that will be the end of the discussion (I have no doubt you have already had similar experiences).
In short, the problem of concealing one’s true position is a principled problem that arises whenever the value gap between the sides is large, and the discussion is taking place on one side’s home turf and is intended for the ears of the home audience. In such a case, because of human nature, there are only two possibilities for the guest side: A. To be honest and turn the discourse into childish squabbling. B. To conceal his true position and thereby achieve interim goals that matter to him – such as reducing hatred or clarifying certain points in his position that, in his opinion, will not irritate the other side. The fact that Arab speakers conduct themselves similarly strengthens my theory.
Forgive me, Rabbi: it is true that one can reconcile a pluralistic attitude toward deniers of Judaism (for example: the commandment to stone Sabbath desecrators was said only about one who sins deliberately, and a denier is under compulsion; or: an atheist’s transgression is not a transgression, and therefore there is no need to force him to close his store on Shabbat), but the big problem is with secular believers (or even “light” religious people). What justification can be given for not intervening in their lives and closing their stores? If you say this, it turns out that you have nullified the Torah’s laws of capital punishment by the court, and coercion by the court.
How does the rabbi manage to find a place in Judaism for such an approach? According to your method, it would be impossible to punish even a Haredi who desecrated Shabbat (true, he believes, but we must give him “autonomy”).
The rabbi faces serious problems on the way to justifying such autonomy. Therefore, it is דווקא the rabbis who objected who seem rational to me, and your approach seems incoherent.
With God’s help, 16 Shevat 5778
Without espousing ideologies of tolerance or pluralism, neither religious Judaism nor Haredi Judaism is interested in forcing a secular individual to observe Torah and mitzvot. It is simply impossible. Careful observance of the 613 commandments can exist only out of firm faith in God and His Torah.
As for “we compel him until he says, ‘I want to’,” Rambam explained that the person being compelled in principle wants to observe God’s commandments, but his evil inclination is holding him back, and the external coercion restores him to himself. But when a person has no basic recognition of the Torah – what good will coercion do him?
Therefore the proper way is to draw people close to faith with love and pleasant ways, through correct explanation of the foundations of faith and the commandments of the Torah, and through knowledge of the Torah and understanding it they will come to faith and acceptance of the yoke of the kingdom of Heaven. This is the path charted, with various differences, by Rav Kook, the Hazon Ish, the Sephardic sages, and the Lubavitcher Rebbe, and it has indeed brought hundreds of thousands closer to faith and to lives of Torah and mitzvot.
What there was a demand for, and what also won the agreement of the secular public, was that matters of state and its services be conducted with observance of Shabbat and kashrut; that matters of marriage, divorce, and conversion be conducted according to halakhah, so that we do not become two peoples unable to marry one another because of concerns over lineage disqualifications; and that Shabbat be the weekly day of rest for the economy, something that also has social value for the worker and his family. While maintaining these limitations, secular, traditional, religious, and Haredi people can all preserve their own character and way of life. Each sector is entitled to live its life as it wishes and educate its children according to its own path.
The problem is the secular anxiety that is aroused because of the continual strengthening of the believing public, and the weakening of the secular public, both because of a lower birthrate and because of the weakening of the values of secular Zionism, with some of its children turning left and abandoning nationalism, and some turning right and drawing closer to religion and tradition. Some secular people fear that they will become a minority in the state, and the worry and frustration lead to thoughts of “Come, let us deal wisely with him, lest he multiply.” Yet it seems that even when the religious and Haredi public become the majority – they will remain faithful to the guidance of the great Torah sages of all circles, to act by drawing people close through pleasant ways, ways that have proven their effectiveness in bringing Israel closer to their Father in Heaven..
Regards, S. Tz. Levinger
You are not distinguishing between two levels of discussion. You are dealing with the question whether the Haredim should be blamed for the lack of honesty, while I am talking about the very phenomenon that the discourse is not honest. If we agree on the facts that the discourse is not honest, we can now discuss who is to blame for it. I agree that such dishonesty characterizes minority groups, and still I get the impression that the Haredim stand out in this. I would expect honesty even from a minority group, and if the public will not accept your position, then it won’t. I do not see any permission to lie because of that. If that is what you believe in – stand behind it.
Where did I say that one should let a person desecrate Shabbat? On the contrary, I wrote that this is only if we are dealing with someone who truly believes in it (who has paid the “price of tolerance”).
S. Tz. L.,
1. What you describe is a kind of tolerance.
2. The rabbis who were present there did not think as you do.
3. As for “we compel him,” you have hit on my broader view. I too already wrote in the past (in “Humanity Is Like Grass” and elsewhere) that it makes no sense to compel an atheist until he says “I want to.” The get would be a coerced get, and the woman would remain fully a married woman. I even brought for this the parable of the turkey prince from R. Nachman of Bratslav, but this is not the place to elaborate.
You are always against the religious factions that vote against public transportation and the like. I take it that if it were not for the 10 percent of atheists in the nation, you would enthusiastically support voting against opening supermarkets, public transportation, and so on?
Shmuel, how did you manage to pack so many errors and misrepresentations into two sentences? Truly an impressive achievement.
I would be happy if the rabbi would explain and not simply dismiss the remarks. Are you not upset with the religious parties (Haredi parties, in your terminology) that force the secular public not to open stores (for religious, not social, reasons), or not to use public transportation?? Yes or no.
Shmuel, what won’t one do to make you happy?!
I am not always against the religious factions. Even a stopped clock tells the correct time twice a day. I am against their very existence and their ideology (coercion). As for public transportation, it is not simple, just as the supermarkets issue is not simple, both in terms of concern for the religious person who needs to find work and concern for workers getting to rest on the day of rest with their families (the social issue).
If there were no secular people who wanted shops open, then why open them? What nonsense is this? In such a case everyone agrees there is no need for religious parties. They are intended mainly for coercion (and sometimes concern for the sector). In general, I am against coercion, and when there is no coercion (or when the coercion is justified, when the entire public is religious or understands that it should be religious), then obviously halakhah should be observed. That is a tautology that has nothing to do with inferences and conclusions.
What is the connection between the two parts of your message? What is this unsupported complaint that appears here? And why is the conclusion you drew below connected to the opening claim (as noted, it is a banal tautology)? Fine, I will not spell out further errors and misrepresentations here.
I hope that now you will not challenge me with further far-reaching conclusions such as 2+3=5. And I further ask that you not put me in a difficult position and ask me the piercing question, which I will not bother answering: whether in my opinion 2+3=5, yes or no?!!!
And I wonder where you read all that into my words. My words are very simple, and you are ignoring them. Assuming there is no social problem involved in opening supermarkets on Shabbat, would you force secular people not to open stores because it is a desecration of Shabbat (we are talking about secular believers)? Why beat around the bush instead of answering the simple question exactly?
You are too pessimistic. Liberalism has defeated, by knockout, every approach that stood in its way, and it is still continuing to do so. Even in Israel, the Haredim are a small minority group that is incapable of offering the majority what liberalism offers it.
I very much appreciate the rabbi’s work, and I even tried to write an article in his spirit, but I still would not fear for the majority. In fact, the processes the Haredim are undergoing express a similar understanding, and it is no accident that the Haredim are split between the zealous HaPeleg and the more compromising United Torah Judaism.
One can think about a move that would change Israeli society in a way that would allow the Haredim to integrate better, but one cannot give up liberalism. In the world, liberalism rules. If it encounters difficulties, they are internal – despair, loneliness, choosing not to bring children into the world. All these harm different societies to the point of future risk of extinction. Here Judaism offers hope against the spreading despair. Time will tell what the quality of this hope is.
With God’s help, 16 Shevat 5778
To R. M. A. – greetings,
Since coercing a get according to halakhah is done in situations where continuation of the marriage is plainly unbearable – then in such situations morality too requires that the man release his wife, and from the moral commitment embedded in every human being, even the unbeliever will say, “I want to.” This requires further study.
Regards, S. Tz. Levinger
“Where there is no vision, the people cast off restraint” is written in Proverbs 29:18. I’m noting this because you tend to use “ibid.” for invented quotations.
With God’s help, 16 Shevat 5777
Liberalism is gaining strength in Israel in terms of its influence on the government of the state. By contrast, the power of Judaism is rising among the public. If in the 1950s and 1960s there was a crisis of great abandonment of religion, when people imagined that the flourishing of secular Zionism made the “outdated” tradition unnecessary, and everyone was captivated by the charm of the proud secular sabra, “fair of hair and handsome of appearance” – then since the Six-Day War a process of steadily increasing religious and traditional strength among the Israeli public has begun.
This process was intensified by the crisis of the Yom Kippur War, which greatly cracked the pride of the “successful, all-powerful Zionist.” Some responded by leaving the country, and some began to think about returning to Judaism, and a large baal-teshuvah movement grew then. The exposure of the government’s failures led to a crack in the public’s naive trust in the hegemony of the Labor movement, and the political upheaval of 1977 signaled a rise in the strength of the right, which was more connected to tradition.
In the 1970s there also began an awakening among Jews from Eastern communities, and part of this awakening included a return to tradition, a process that grew stronger in the mid-1980s with the founding of Shas and its educational system, which to a large extent brought about a “restoration of the crown to its former glory” among Jews from Eastern communities, proud of their magnificent Torah tradition.
A great Torah awakening also took place in Religious Zionism, fulfilling Rav Neria’s vision, “We will establish yeshivot everywhere,” and the land is filled with Torah through a host of yeshiva high schools, hesder yeshivot, advanced yeshivot, ulpanot, colleges, and women’s study institutes. Their male and female graduates, integrating into all areas of action—security and economics, science, technology and medicine, law, education, and culture – show that it is possible to live full modern practical lives in the light of Torah.
At the same time, the strength of Haredi Judaism has also grown. From a few hundred yeshiva students in Ben-Gurion’s day, there are today tens of thousands increasing Torah in quantity and quality. In the area of bringing the distant close to Torah, Haredi activity in all its forms surpasses that of Religious Zionism. And the high natural growth rate increases the proportion of Haredim, while on the other hand it necessitates going out and opening up to the general world, entering the worlds of economy, education, and the army, for the larger a public grows – the less able it is to remain secluded.
If in the 1950s secular people could dismiss the small number of “pious” people and see them as an “endangered species” – today secular people fear “religionization” because of the multiplication of the religious and Haredi publics and the growth of their public influence.
The democratic regime and the freedom inherent in it are an excellent tool by which different Torah currents can develop and exert influence. An atmosphere of freedom encourages wondering and searching: what is the taste and meaning, and where is life going? Everyone wonders and searches—secular, traditional, religious, and Haredi. A life of constant pursuit of success and material pleasure, and a life of habit and “commandments learned by rote,” cannot satisfy a person’s soul, the “king’s daughter,” and he seeks faith and values to which he can aspire and strive..
In short: freedom is a tool that enables a person to seek worthy content to fill it with – and when people seek, they find!
I answered everything and ignored nothing. With this I am ending this bizarre discussion.
S. Tz. L., a very interesting reasoning that had not occurred to me. And still it requires further study. I will think about it.
With God’s help, 15 Shevat 5778
As for the attempt itself to reach “civic agreement,” the thing is not possible. When there is a sharp disagreement, there are usually strong arguments for each approach. There are indeed apparent disputes, but there are quite a few real, existential points of disagreement that cannot be solved easily.
When facing a disagreement, one must define whether there are points of agreement, and understand what the factors of disagreement are. When each side understands what troubles it and what troubles its counterpart, agreement will generally not be reached. On the contrary, each side will emerge strengthened in its view, that although it now understands its counterpart’s considerations deeply, it also understands better why its own considerations and arguments are more correct.
Mutual agreement will not grow from a real discussion, but mutual understanding is itself an achievement. When I understand that the other person’s opinion is not merely stupidity and dishonesty – I can at least relate to him with appreciation and understanding, and reach practical arrangements that reduce the points of friction and make it possible to live together and cooperate on what we agree upon, without blurring the disagreement itself.
The more mutual understanding increases – the more hostility and contempt between the disputants will diminish. The argument will focus with full force on the points of disagreement, but will allow cooperation on matters where there is agreement.
Regards, S. Tz. Levinger
With God’s help, 17 Shevat 5778
To R. M. A. – greetings,
Granted, according to Kant telling the truth is a supreme value, and even if a murderer asks, “Is so-and-so in the house?” one must answer him truthfully, even though it will lead to murder. By contrast, halakhah permits deviating from the truth for the sake of peace, which is also one of the things on which the world stands, together with justice and truth.
Conversation between people is not meant so that each one may “let out all his spirit” and express his feelings. To express feelings, one can write poems for the drawer, without pouring out our wrath on someone who will not understand what we want from him. Dialogue between human beings is meant so that “each may hear the language of his fellow,” and they may arrive at mutual understandings, understandings that will make shared life possible; therefore – not everything in our hearts should be said to the other. One must be careful not to burn the bridges.
Regards, S. Tz. Levinger
It seems to me that there is nevertheless a difference between this and “plain” tolerance. In the tolerant approach presented in the post, tolerance stems from a kind of resignation – I am 100% right (of course, until proven otherwise), but there is no point in forcing the truth on others, because it is important that each person be autonomous. In the view attributed here to Rav Kook (without entering into the question whether he really thought this), tolerance stems from the fact that even the path I choose is a kind of lesser evil. True, I chose the path that seems most correct to me, but I recognize that in my choice I had to give up certain elements in order to emphasize others. Others choose to act differently, and in my opinion their choice is ultimately mistaken (therefore I am tolerant and not a pluralist) – but I recognize that they gain certain correct things that I lose, and therefore my decision is not as sharp as in the first kind of tolerance. The difference between the two kinds of tolerance lies in the degree of attentiveness I give to my counterpart’s opinions. In the first type, he is mistaken, and until I am persuaded otherwise I have nothing to seek from him. In the second type, I am in a constant effort to reduce my losses and gain as much as possible from what I lack and my counterpart has.
Regarding what was said by rabbis at that same gathering, I do not know exactly what was said, and therefore I cannot respond in detail. But in general, it seems to me that the proper way to present the values of the Torah should not involve “changing” them; on the contrary, one should explain the matters in all their complexity. When the listener understands the Torah’s broad system of considerations in all its complexity—a complexity expressed in the different approaches stated by the sages of the generations – he can understand the matters, even if he will not agree with the “bottom line.”
Of course, in a public discussion, in which most listeners have neither the openness nor the patience to listen and understand a complex Torah outlook – this is no simple task. It requires the ability to summarize and simplify complex matters, and care not to lose the audience’s attention, and much heavenly assistance so that the words will be both true and accepted.
Regards, S. Tz. Levinger
This comment is a continuation of my comment “And what about ‘ways of peace’?” below. Regards, S. Tz. L.
In my article I address this argument and show that it is not different. Suppose that act X has value-advantage A and value-disadvantage B. Reuven claims that it is right to do X because of advantage A, and Shimon thinks one should not do X because it has disadvantage B. They do not disagree that A is important and B is prohibited; the question is which prevails (the balancing). In this debate there is only one truth, and if the other thinks differently from me, he is mistaken. But still? I will treat him with tolerance because nevertheless his mistake is legitimate.
See Gittin 6a: “he found a fly or he found a hair,” where the dispute is resolved in a way that both were right (he found both a fly and a hair), and nevertheless there is a dispute.
See also in this article:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%94%D7%90%D7%9D-%D7%94%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%94-%D7%94%D7%99%D7%90-%D7%A4%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%98%D7%99%D7%AA/
Indeed.
S. Tz. L., you are talking about the way to reach agreement, whereas there they discussed the way to live together.
S. Tz. L., I really do not agree:
0. First, when I am the one being deceived, should I too accept it because halakhically one may deviate from the truth for the sake of peace? A man dances before the bride and tells her that she is beautiful and gracious. Now she hears from someone else that the dancing young man is lying (he himself thinks she is ugly and wicked). Do you think she is supposed to say to herself: fine, but he lied for the sake of peaceful ways, as Hazal instructed? There is a difference between justifying the liar and demanding that the other person accept that lie.
1. In my opinion, in discourse about beliefs and opinions, one should not speak about deviating from the truth for the sake of peace. That was said about relations between a person and his fellow.
2. Certainly not when the discourse is public, and all the more so nowadays when it is bound to be exposed.
3. And all the more so when the purpose of the discourse is to clarify the disagreement and see how to live together, while you are in fact concealing the problem and preventing its solution. While behaving in a pleasant and peace-seeking way, from your point of view this discourse is actually part of the war. This is truly “Palestinian” policy.
4. About such people it was said: “He does not read Scripture.”
5. This reminds me of the argument that took place between us when they wrote “Discourse, O Returnees.” I argued that it is forbidden to lie to a person in order to bring him back in repentance, and others argued that it is permitted and proper. See post 21 on holy lies: https://mikyab.net/%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%A9%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%A7%D7%93%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%98%D7%95%D7%A8-21/
With God’s help, Friday eve, “And also all this people shall come to their place in peace,” 5778
To R. M. A. – greetings,
When Beit Hillel praised the bride as beautiful and gracious, they were not lying; rather, they were exposing the full truth. For even if outwardly ugliness is prominent, in every person there is a “good point” of grace and kindness that a deeper gaze discerns. There is here a “change” relative to the superficial external gaze that sees the prominent flaws, and the change in perspective brings one to see the depth of truth and to expose the inner good in the other. And exposing the point of truth and good in both sides paves the way for true peace, which comes not because of interests but out of mutual understanding and appreciation, without blurring the points of disagreement.. .
This was also the method of Beit Hillel in their disputes with Beit Shammai. As the Hatam Sofer explained, the fact that they would “state the words of Shammai before their own” was not merely a matter of politeness. When Beit Hillel first presented the arguments of their disputants, they thereby showed that they understood deeply “the other side of the coin,” and nevertheless they reached a different conclusion, and thus Beit Hillel succeeded in persuading the many of their correctness.
And Mrs. Bat-Galim Shaer well defined that “groundless love” is “love of their grace”—seeing the point of good even in one with whom one has sharp disagreements.
Regards, S. Tz. Levinger
Even Aaron the Priest, who would go to the two quarreling parties and tell each that the other regretted the quarrel, did not lie, but rather exposed the truth hidden in the depths of their hearts. For a quarrel usually takes place between people close to one another who want to live together in peace, except that each thinks the other should make the first move toward reconciliation. When each one understands that his “opponent” regrets the miserable state of the quarrel just as he does, and empathy returns between them – the path to resolving the dispute becomes easy.
A summary of the Hatam Sofer’s words (which I mentioned in paragraph 2) about Beit Hillel, who stated Beit Shammai’s words before their own, thereby showing that they deeply understood the argument of those who disagreed with them – I brought in my comment “A war waged by means of a book—love is at its end: a little about the culture of dispute in Judaism,” on Leon Wieseltier’s article, “A Polemical Jew,” on the “Shabbat Supplement – Makor Rishon” site.
Regards, S. Tz. Levinger
S. Tz. L., I too know these interpretations, and they tire me quite a bit. Clearly this is not what Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai meant. But beyond that, it is of course irrelevant to the discussion. I described a very clear situation: Reuven praised the bride as beautiful and gracious, and afterward it becomes clear to the bride that he lied and in fact she is ugly and wicked in his eyes (he had not heard of the interpretations you brought to the Gemara). What should she do? Be happy and accept his lie and say to herself that he was only fulfilling the statement of Hazal? My claim was that there is a difference between Reuven’s being permitted to lie to Shimon and Shimon’s relation to that “permitted” lie.
A good and interesting article, thank you. It helped me sort out the questions that go through my head every time I encounter a discussion like this, or pluralism voiced by people who do not really subscribe to the method (and also by people who do).
One point that bothers me: how does genuine commitment to the Torah and its values actually fit with ‘live and let live’?
(I would very much like to believe that it is possible, but from honest reflection so far I have not found a way to combine the two.)
It’s not “live and let live,” and it’s not specifically connected to Torah. Every truth a person arrives at entails commitment to it. The belief is that if some person arrived at conclusions different from mine after proper intellectual effort (exposure to all the arguments and discussion of them), and especially if he arrived at conclusions rather than forcing them onto the facts (in my estimation, that really is the case), then one should respect his autonomy according to his understanding of reality. And that is itself a truth. In other words, that is the right thing to do. That is probably what the rabbi would say. I would say more than that (and it seems to me that perhaps the rabbi also wrote this somewhere): such a reality is an indication that I still do not grasp the whole truth, but only a certain aspect of it (great as it may be), and part of it is visible only from that person’s angle. Consequently, it makes no sense to fight over something that is not the whole truth. Rather, one must allow that aspect of the truth, as reflected in that person’s eyes, to find expression. Usually one can know that we are dealing with a genuine reaching of conclusions if there is a large group of people who hold this view.
So you are claiming that the members of Beit Hillel would praise the bride to her face, while thinking and saying the opposite behind her back? The truth is that there was already one Jew who thought like you, that Hillel’s pleasantness was external and that if they found the opportune moment to annoy him, the inner evil would burst out and be revealed; but it did not work for him, and he lost four hundred zuz in his failed attempt.
This is the truth: every man and woman has the areas in which they excel, and every opinion has a “spark of truth”; and when one knows how to identify the point of good and truth in a person and in his opinion, one can conduct an effective argument with him while trying to give a fitting response to his claims. Therefore Beit Hillel stated Beit Shammai’s words first and showed that they deeply understood their disputants’ arguments. In this way they persuaded the many of their correctness, as the Hatam Sofer said.
The assertion that even in the ugliest woman one can find a beautiful side is a full legal ruling in the laws of vows, decided in halakhah by Rabbi Ishmael, who ruled that a woman who had ugly blemishes from head to toe, and whose very name was ugly, “Lichluchit,” nevertheless had something beautiful in her—that her name suited her nicely—and thus the husband’s vow, in which he demanded that she show him something beautiful in her, was fulfilled. And Rabbi Ishmael also ruled there that the daughters of Israel are beautiful, but poverty makes them ugly. When one knows how to peel away the ugliness that has accumulated – the inner beauty is revealed in all its splendor.
Shabbat shalom, S. Tz. Levinger
By the way, “gracious” in the words of Beit Hillel is not the opposite of “wicked.” “Gracious” means “one who bears grace and kindness in the eyes of those who see her.” We will talk more in the afternoon when I come to bother you in the middle of your Shabbat preparations with urgent questions about the heads of the Babylonians and the feet of the Tarmodians and the like 🙂
The story of Lichluchit, who is considered beautiful because her name suits her, is about Rabbi Ishmael son of Rabbi Yosei (a colleague of Rabbi Judah the Prince), in Nedarim 66b, and earlier on 66a are the words of Rabbi Ishmael (a colleague of Rabbi Akiva) that the daughters of Israel are beautiful, but poverty makes them ugly.
And there is a difference between their approaches. According to Rabbi Ishmael, beauty is reckoned by its future revelation, whereas Rabbi Ishmael son of Rabbi Yosei sees the aspect of beauty even in ugliness that cannot be repaired!
Regards, S. Tz. Levinger
Eilon – thank you for your response, but I think you are falling a bit into the trap of pluralism yourself – “Consequently, it makes no sense to fight over something that is not true” – if it were not true in my eyes, I would see no point in fighting over it; QED.
And I definitely do not agree with you regarding the number of people who hold an opinion as an indication of its correctness – a billion Chinese can certainly be wrong.
In any case, what I meant more was the *halakhic* ability to come out with a statement of live and let live.
There is no trap here at all. Reality is complex. The fight is a function of the importance of the issue and the strength of the other side’s arguments (how much I understand how the other reached his conclusion even though he is mistaken. This is an error in judgment—how much the arguments in one direction outweigh the arguments in the other direction—not a secondary matter). And I will indeed fight for my opinion if it is clear to me that the other person is shallow and did not invest thought in the matter. Because then there is no truth in him at all. Not even error. There is nothing. Because there is such a thing as good errors that conceal within them some truth that is absent from the one who is right, and it is part of a higher, more general truth that contains both my truth and the truth he has. The practical upshot, of course, is for fighting for justice and on simple matters (such as the fight against the Nazis, against slavery, against the Palestinians, etc. It is not so with the general secular world reality today, which stems from the hiding of God’s face and in which every person today is liable to err).
As for the number of people, of course that was only in a rough sense. Since, again, what matters is arriving at a conclusion with seriousness, I am speaking of many people who invested thought and arrived at the same conclusion—not just a random billion Chinese. And the truth is that even the error of a billion Chinese cannot be just a random mistake.
As for the halakhic ability, that is already a deep topic, and the explanation would be a whole column in itself (and the rabbi wrote an article here on the site about it), but in a nutshell I will say that this entire discussion, mine and the rabbi’s, belongs to derekh eretz that preceded the Torah (and on the other hand to the meaning of existence that the Torah serves). So if my arguments are true, they obligate everyone, including believers in Torah, whoever they may be. If the Torah is true and tolerance is also true and there is a contradiction, then there is a contradiction between two truths and there is no need to panic. One of two things must be the case: either we are mistaken in our assessment of reality, or what we think the Torah says is not really what it says, or both. And in practice, so long as the third line (and text) that will decide between the two lines and texts has not yet arrived (and there is supposed to be one), one decides in each case what to do: whether to go according to the apparent surface meaning of the Torah or according to reality, and there is no algorithm for what to do. The assumption is that the exceptional cases that go against the Torah will be a minority of cases, but even that is not necessarily so. The right action is always prior to the Torah (and also always comes after it. And usually the action dictated by what we take to be the Torah will be the right action).
Miri,
In the conventional conception, this is not really “live and let live” in the usual sense, but someone who believes in a different path is not punished for his transgressions because he is coerced. In that sense, one lets him live. But for me it is not only an argument about punishment but respect for a person’s decision about his path, so long as it was made seriously and after examination (as I explained in the article I linked to—that he has paid the “price of tolerance”).
The point is that coercion in opinions is coercion in every sense. The obligation to compel observance of the commandments applies only to one who believes and sins because of his urge. With regard to such a person, there is no possibility of acting according to “live and let live.”
S. Tz. L.,
Again, I am apparently wasting my words. Who was talking about Hillel? I drew for you a fictional situation of a man dancing before the bride and what he thinks. That’s all.
The sugya in Nedarim is irrelevant here. It says nothing about people’s opinions and how they see brides.
Well then, thank you 🙂
In my opinion there is an error of identification here:
the “progressives” are not “post-liberals” but “neo-Marxists” who aspire to destroy modern, free society—which they hate because it is necessarily unequal—by strengthening trends that are destructive to society. Some of them intentionally, and most of them useful idiots…
Perhaps one more point should be illuminated. After all, it is clear that even in the time of Hazal no one forced his “values” on others. If there was a dispute on a certain halakhic issue, clearly each person acted according to his own opinion, even though the other held that he was committing an outright prohibition. That is, if one does not want a communist world (and there is no hint in halakhah of striving for such a world), one must respect the autonomy of the other. There is a certain boundary at which a person goes outside the legitimate boundaries, and then one may coerce him, as for example the prohibition of prostitution, which is illegal by law and where individual rights are not respected, or preventing suicide, etc. In other words, in extreme cases individual rights are not respected.
In the world of Hazal, where there were no diverse ideologies and Jewish society was overall homogeneous in accepting the fundamentals of Judaism, at most there were people who cast off the yoke. In such a world, where the person even in his own eyes “knows his Master and intends to rebel against Him,” coercion is far more reasonable than today. Besides that, the person also perceived himself much less as an individual than today, and as part of the public he was bound to public norms. (For example, the killing of enemy civilians, which once was completely legitimate, is today an absolute crime; much of this is connected to the above differences in outlook.) Therefore, one who does not want to return to ancient norms—such as killing enemy civilians—should not latch onto one specific ancient norm (coercion) merely because it was “ruled as halakhah.”
A fascinating column. It’s nice to hear that the rabbi is involved in conferences like these and brings common sense into people. A comment regarding the Haredim: there is no Haredi hothouse in the army (and probably won’t be any time soon). I did basic training in a Haredi company considered the most Haredi in the army (far more than the Netzah battalion, etc.), and it was interesting to see that precisely the minority who do keep halakhah consisted of religious people who simply wanted to serve in a religious environment, while the Haredim in the company (mostly those who had dropped out of Haredi frameworks) were far from that.
Thanks. I know well the phenomenon you are talking about, but it seems to me that it is indeed a Haredi hothouse. What the soldiers do is because of who they are (after all, whoever gets there is usually already not Haredi, and perhaps not even religious), not because of the influence of the military environment. From the army’s perspective, there is a Haredi hothouse there that enables a Haredi way of life.
With God’s help, 20 Shevat 5778
On the face of it, “live and let live” is the foundation of Judaism, as Hillel said: “What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow.” The difference between the “live and let live” of Western culture and “Love your fellow as yourself, I am the Lord” in the Torah is that with them everything begins with the “discourse of rights”: my right to live as I wish without your disturbing me, and therefore they make a “deal”: I will not disturb you and you will not disturb me. Peace is built on shared interests, not on brotherhood.
By contrast, the care that the Torah demands regarding another’s honor stems from the consciousness that “Beloved is man, for he was created in the image” and “Beloved are Israel, for they are called children of the Omnipresent.” Our obligation toward the other stems from our brotherhood and from the duty of mutual responsibility. It is this that obligates us to help our brother, whether when he falls into material trouble, and likewise obligates us to save him from spiritual failure. The Torah commandment “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind” also includes the prohibition of causing him to sin.
The way to save a person from sin depends on his situation. If he is aware that the matter is forbidden, rebuke in pleasant ways is preferable, though sometimes there is no escaping the exercise of authority, which in the end he too will acknowledge saved him from failing in sin. By contrast, when the person is not aware of the prohibition, and all the more so is not at all aware of the binding force of the Torah – here the duty of mutual responsibility is to bring him to awareness and recognition of the truth of the Torah, and that can be done only with love and patience, through explanation in pleasant ways and by personal example, so that “they accepted His kingship willingly.”
Therefore today there is no point at all in forcing a private individual to observe commandments. The demands are at the public level: that the state, as a Jewish state, which claims a historical right in the Land of Israel, and whose citizens to a significant extent, if not a majority, are believers and keep tradition fully or partially – should conduct itself in its actions as a Jewish state. That its institutions should observe Shabbat and kashrut and the like, and likewise that Shabbat should continue to be the weekly day of rest for the economy, for every economic branch that opens for activity on Shabbat pushes out Jews who do not wish to work on Shabbat—whether these are small business owners who cannot withstand economic competition with businesses that desecrate Shabbat, or workers who are forced to work on Shabbat against their will for fear they will be fired or not hired..
Setting “rules of the game” for public and economic activity entails no coercion at all of the individual to conduct himself as he wishes in his private life, and precisely this freedom brings about growing public interest and increasing closeness to the heritage of Judaism.
Regards, S. Tz. Levinger
Perhaps there is a third possibility.
Not recognition of the other’s right not to be religious, but deep recognition that in the current world this is the prevailing discourse, and therefore one has no choice but to conduct oneself accordingly.
Even if we assume that inwardly there will be an aspiration for change, on the face of it the circumstances for change will never be realized (unlike, for example, a Palestinian hudna), and therefore there is nothing to fear. The advantage is obvious. It is much easier to swallow.
I don’t see any difference at all. Are you talking about a hudna that will never change? Fine by me.
1. The current situation in democratic (“enlightened”) countries is that tolerance does not apply to values about which there is a broad consensus. For example, polygamy is prohibited by law, as is animal cruelty, and so on.
Should someone who sees tolerance as a value – as you present it here – also be tolerant toward such values?
Is there any value that even you would not tolerate? (Of course, all on condition that the person who thinks differently from me studied the issue and made his decision according to his judgment.)
2. As you present the value of tolerance, it seems to me almost empty. After all, every person will say that someone who thinks differently from him either did not study the issue well or lacks intellectual integrity.
The Haredim who participated in the meeting would certainly say that every person of integrity must acknowledge the revelation at Sinai and the Torah, etc., except that all secular people have biases, and an evil inclination, and also eat non-kosher food that dulls their minds, etc. etc., so perhaps you are right in principle, but such a view does not advance the discussion.
At the end of the day, you too say (in the linked article) that you would not sign the Kinneret Covenant. Bottom line, you are like the Haredim you argued with, despite coming from a different principle.
3. If I understood correctly (from the comments, not from the column), struggle over matters of religion and state is religious coercion in your opinion. So long as the struggle is over life in the public sphere and not over what the individual does in his home, how is this different from any other struggle over a state’s path—for example, the struggle between right and left?
When the left—for example—signs a peace agreement and evacuates settlements, it destroys people’s homes, but this is not defined as coercion because it is a struggle over the path of the entire state. Likewise, a religious person who works to prevent public transportation on Shabbat, or to require marriage according to halakhah, is acting for the sake of the character of a religious state. Why is this coercion?
It seems to me that you did not understand what I wrote. The points are spelled out in more detail here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%94-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A1%D7%95%D7%91%D7%9C%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%AA/
As for 3, in both cases we are dealing with coercion, and coercion is not a dirty word. Sometimes it is justified and sometimes it is not. You should read the link above.
I actually read both columns patiently.
Which columns? I referred you to an article.
Fine, an article then.. In any case I read it carefully.
So if you read it, I do not understand what you are writing. Everything was explained there in great detail.
1. I wrote explicitly that there is a radius of tolerance, and each person sets it for himself. That is, there are things regarding which I will not be tolerant.
2. I wrote that I would not be tolerant (would not sign the covenant) toward someone who does not examine seriously. What does that have to do with our discussion?
3. Indeed. But that depends on the radius of tolerance, and as stated each person sets it for himself. Beyond that, in the question of religious coercion the issue is not only tolerance but also the value and the harm of coercion. The examples from evacuating settlements are beside the point for several reasons; here are three, for example: 1. Whether settlements are evacuated or not exacts prices from the public at large (which must fight, defend, and so on), and therefore leaving the settlements in place is also coercion upon the rest of the public. Thus every decision involves coercion, and therefore one of the paths must be chosen. 2. There we are dealing with coercion for the sake of a consequential value, not coercion over a form of behavior. Even if someone comes
to murder, I will coerce him not to murder (and likewise not to commit suicide). But religious coercion is usually over a behavioral value without regard to the result (and therefore in my opinion it has no value). 3. Religious coercion is paternalism, since it is done for the sake of the other person who does not want it (so that he will do the right thing). Evacuating settlements is done for my own sake (self-defense, not coercing the other person to do the right thing).
And by the way, the left never signed any peace agreements.
1. My impression of the State of Israel is that it is not tolerant toward values about which there is a broad consensus; there just are not many such values. (I gave the example of polygamy or animal cruelty, where there is broad consensus that these are negative things and therefore they are prohibited by law.)
Does the degree of support a certain value has constitute a factor in the question whether to be tolerant toward it or not?
Or in other words, if a very large majority (say 95%) were religious, would that be a reason to be less tolerant toward secular people?
And are you as tolerant toward polygamy as you are toward desecration of Shabbat?
2. This is relevant because in the end you and the Haredim you argued with arrive at the same result. You too are not willing to be tolerant toward the secular public, and neither are they. So the principles differ, but the result is the same.
3. Regarding the harm of coercion, I agree with you. I am asking why this is defined as intolerance.
Regarding the example of evacuating settlements:
A. I know that the left has never signed a peace agreement; it was an example for the sake of discussion.
B. As to the matter itself:
I am not saying there is value in religious coercion. I am discussing whether religious people who want to coerce have a moral right to do so.
I agree that there is no value at all in performing a commandment under coercion, but the religious people who want coercion do not do it so that a secular person will perform a commandment – they do not care what he does in his home – they want the state and its institutions (the Ministry of Transportation, marriage, the Chief Rabbinate, kashrut, etc.) to take on the character of a religious state. Therefore, from their point of view, coercion has consequential value, and it does not come for the sake of the secular person but for the sake of the religious person struggling over the character of his state.
The question is whether in your opinion there is moral justification for such coercion.
1. These are generalizations, and it is hard to argue about them. How tolerant one should be, and what counts as intolerance. Are we talking about the state or society? Are we talking about tolerance, pluralism, or considerations of interest (I won’t coerce so that they won’t coerce me). Does the existence of a law mean there is no tolerance? That depends on the sanction and how much it is enforced. In short, there is no point in this debate.
There is a problem in diagnosing tolerance, because in practice it looks very much like pluralism and like self-interested considerations. It is a matter of impression. Theoretically, a person could accept that his neighbor stands on one leg and call himself tolerant because that is the only value that bothers him and nevertheless he is willing to tolerate it. I also have no way of knowing whether that is true (see previous paragraph).
2. Not true. For that is precisely what I explained: that I am willing to be tolerant, but I condition this on their seriously considering my position and studying it. This is not true of the Haredim. True, one can always claim dishonestly that the other person did not really consider it, but that is true of every human or social phenomenon. One can always cheat. Bottom line, from my perspective they do not need to arrive at the correct answer, only to consider it seriously according to their own method.
3. Indeed. But that depends on the diagnostic radius, and as stated every person sets it for himself.
In my opinion, everyone has a moral right to coerce so long as it meets the criteria I set out. And the heart knows whether it is for honesty or crookedness.
In short, you keep taking me back to the realm of diagnostics (the bottom-line determination of who around us is tolerant and who is not), but my article is not about that. It is about defining the concepts and giving a person tools to think about himself and others. Diagnostics is a matter of impression, and it cannot be determined objectively (see my remarks above). In my article I defined the concepts, and each person will interpret reality and himself as he understands. Whoever thinks Haredim are tolerant – good for him. I think not, but I see no point in arguing, because in a formalistic way one can justify anything. Even Hitler (forgive the Godwin’s law reference) or bin Laden can be defined as tolerant in this way.
Diagnostics does not interest me, and I certainly am not claiming that Haredim are tolerant; I am only bringing examples in order to sharpen the discussion.
What bothered me in your words is that you define concepts—and also infer from them to social questions—but ignore an important datum, namely—using your terminology—the radius of tolerance.
At the end of the day, every person is tolerant toward certain values and intolerant toward other values. The whole difference depends on the radius of tolerance, so what is the point of discussing the definitions of concepts if they have no effect on the radius?
(Perhaps there is a point for the sake of formality, but here you are applying it to social problems.)
They do affect the radius. When a person is aware of the map I drew, he may change his outlook. And it is not true that every person is tolerant toward other values. Many of them behave in a way that appears tolerant, but as I described above that is not tolerance. I do not think I ignored the question of the radius of tolerance anywhere.
And besides, in my view even a theoretical discussion has value.
I read this very carefully—thank you very much!
(This is an initial response – I reserve the right to respond again, with your permission.)
Throughout the discussion you present tolerance as the only “solution,” and as “the only way to move forward.”
But in my opinion, even if tolerance is the only solution and the only option, etc., that still doesn’t make it valuable; at most it makes it pragmatically effective.
I got the impression that the arguments you raise here in favor of tolerance are arguments that at most support the position of that Haredi rabbi—meaning, they support tolerance as a practical tool, not tolerance as a value.
And one comment regarding the central argument for tolerance as a value (the argument from autonomy – which you spell out mainly in the article you linked to):
It seems to me that this argument is not enough to turn someone who is not a pluralist into a genuine tolerant person. The reason is simple. Even someone who respects the value of another person’s autonomy usually agrees that this autonomy has limits, and that it gives way before higher values such as the public good. He would not, in the name of autonomy, allow harm to the public as a whole, for example. A true fanatic generally thinks that the other person’s actions harm the public as a whole, and since in such a case he will not respect autonomy – his tolerance will disappear de facto. So what will remain of the tolerance you propose? Not much, in my estimation, and certainly not enough to found an exemplary liberal society on it, one in which everyone has complete freedom in the private sphere. As I understand it, that is possible only at the price of giving up absolute values.