On Accommodation and Coercion (Column 137)
With God's help
Today (Tuesday) I heard on the news about the Ministry of Education's directive to schools to hold school fairs or sports days that are gender-separated. School principals protested and announced that they would not be willing to comply with this directive. Later I read an article by Hila Kubo on WALLA, in which she explains that this is religious coercion under the guise of a request for accommodation. The headline says that not every request to accommodate the religious is justified. As noted, in her view this case is coercion in disguise.
I have no clear position regarding separating children in the lower grades of school, but that is not my subject here. The Ministry of Education's directive did not necessarily support this policy, but rather justified it by the need to accommodate the policy that already exists in a considerable portion of religious schools. Therefore I will discuss it here on that plane and not on the substantive plane.
Kubo's argument
I read Kubo's article because the headline intrigued me. The question of when a request for accommodation is justified, and when it is not right, or at least not obligatory, to accommodate such a request, is not a simple one. Beyond Kubo's claim itself, which seems reasonable to me, that there are situations in which there is no obligation and perhaps it is not even proper to accommodate, she presented a criterion in her remarks: one should not accommodate when what is involved is coercion under the guise of a request for accommodation.
Fine, but how do we know that this is indeed the case here? What is the criterion for requests for accommodation that are credible and authentic, as opposed to those that try to coerce us under the guise of accommodation? That I did not find in her remarks. The rest of her article is devoted to the claim that the education system and the religious public have undergone major radicalization compared to the past (when her parents, and even she herself, were educated in the schools and youth movements), and it seems that she sees this as the justification for her claim.
An initial critique
As a matter of fact, this is of course true, and I myself can attest to it. By saying 'as a matter of fact,' I mean that I am saying this regardless of the judgment whether this is 'radicalization,' an expression with negative connotations, or rather greater stringency, consistency, and fear of Heaven. But even if this is factually correct, and even if it is correct to call it 'radicalization' (in the negative sense), I still wonder what this argument has to do with her conclusion. Why is this fact at all relevant to our discussion?
Even if this is an unreasonable and mistaken radicalization, it is still factually clear that many institutions really do conduct themselves this way and believe in it. In her eyes they are presumably all foolish and irrational, and indeed they have invented for themselves a new religion in place of halakhic Judaism, since the customs of the 1950s and 1960s of our parents (and really also of people of my generation in our childhood) were handed down to us directly at the revelation at Mount Sinai. The fact that, in her view, that revelation probably never took place at all (it is implied by her words that she is not among those committed to Jewish law) does not really undermine her professional authority to determine what does and does not accord with what was given there.
But even if all this is true, and even if it is a severe, foolish, and dangerous radicalization, how can one infer from this that this is coercion under the guise of a request for accommodation? Does she think those requesting it are not sincere? They themselves certainly believe that this is proper, otherwise they themselves would not act this way. So why does their request seem to her to be a coercive attempt in disguise? Why is the criterion for the authenticity of the request for accommodation connected to the question whether this is a new development or whether it has always been practiced?
If a request came from the Ministry of Education to wear jalabiyas (robes) because that was the practice in Babylonia fifteen hundred years ago, would that be old enough for us to accommodate it? Alternatively, if the policy of gender separation really had also been practiced twenty or thirty years ago, then would this be a request for accommodation and not an attempt at coercion? Why? In another thirty years (assuming this 'invalid' and 'extreme' custom survives), would Hila Kubo agree to such a request from the Ministry of Education? Would that then already count as an authentic request for accommodation?
It is important to understand that there is a difference between the claim that this is a mistaken policy, and after all even if it were ancient it still would not be correct in her eyes, since she is not committed to Jewish law or to religious outlooks, and the claim that it should not be accepted because it is coercion in disguise. Why is a mistaken and irrational but ancient policy a legitimate request for accommodation, whereas a mistaken and irrational request that developed only now is an attempt at coercion in disguise? This is beyond me.
And yet, a remark on the substantive plane
Beyond that, I truly do not understand what school principals have against such a request even on the substantive plane. Let us say that they see no value or rationale in it, but do they regard it as a problematic practice, morally and ethically improper? Why? If they were asked to hold seminar days for students whose family names begin with letters up to Yod, and in another group to place those whose names begin with Kaf and onward because that is how the Baha'i (or the Muslims or the Druze) behave, would they oppose that too? [By the way, I assume and believe that if the request for gender separation had come from Muslims, most school principals in Tel Aviv would joyfully rush to fulfill their wishes and accommodate them]
As long as there is no discrimination here but only separation, I do not see why one should not accommodate a community for whom this matters.[1] Is it preferable to separate the religious from the secular in order not to separate girls from boys for a few hours once a year? Again, if such separation contradicted some value, there would be room to understand the claim. Someone who wants me to give up my values in order to accommodate him is making an unreasonable request (and perhaps in certain cases I would accept the claim that in fact he is using the request for accommodation in order to coerce me. Of course this is unrelated to how long he has practiced this custom). But what secular value is being relinquished here? Mixing boys and girls has, through no fault of its own, turned from one legitimate educational method into a banner of values, a red line from which there can be no retreat, and that I do not really manage to understand.
Widening the scope
Regarding women singing in the army and at various state ceremonies, I can perhaps understand the claim. If we do not allow women to sing, this closes the door on a singing career for women. They will not be invited to sing at events because the men will not be able to listen to them. Even here, however, in my opinion this is not sufficient grounds to force soldiers to go in and listen to a woman singing against their values. But there at least I understand the secular motivation for behaving immorally and trying to obligate and coerce soldiers to act in a way that contradicts their values, with no operational need whatsoever. As stated, in my view this is wrong, because no one is obliged to give up his values merely in order to enable someone else to choose a career in which he is interested (and therefore I personally would refuse solely because of the principle, although I do listen to women singing and do not think there is any prohibition here, at least in a considerable portion of the cases).
Regarding separate academic study, where a similar discussion also arose (mainly at the Hebrew University), arguments were also raised there that were ostensibly substantive, but in my view were not really convincing. I think there is no justification whatsoever for prohibiting, or even for failing to provide, separate academic programs for whoever wants them. The same applies to separate dancing at a student party at the law faculty of that university. All the religious students wanted was for those interested to be allowed to dance on opposite sides of a partition, while everyone else would dance as they wished. Even this minor and elementary request was met there with weighty 'value-based' arguments, and of course not at all convincing ones. In my view it was simply malicious and foolish (although the ringleader there, Prof. David Enoch, is an intellectual idol in many people's eyes).
The issue of women's service in the army also has similar elements, although there I can understand the logic of those who support it. On the one hand, there is no sense in integrating women into most combat roles for many reasons (some of which are not presented to the public out of fear that, heaven forbid, a substantive and real discussion might arise in place of the self-righteous bluster and holy wrath against the religious). On the other hand, I can understand that in present-day Israel, full army service is a gateway to the advancement of women in various business and governmental spheres. Therefore here there are arguments I can understand in favor of liberal stubbornness, if not for the sake of the army then at least for the sake of the women's careers and future.
A surprising conclusion (or not?…)
From the discussion of these examples a rather surprising conclusion emerges. Those who claim that one should not accede to the request for accommodation because it conceals an attempt at coercion do so in the name of value-based arguments. But if I am right, then those arguments are nothing but a fig leaf behind which an attempt at coercion (against the religious) is hidden, and so in fact they are guilty of the very fault they condemn. They present their position as though some value were at stake here (whereas they have no such value, nor has one developed in recent years, although they claim that it has)[2], while in fact their intention is to impose their way of life and conduct on the public as a whole. Hila Kubo claims that the religious request for accommodation is covert coercion under the guise of a value-based claim, whereas the truth is that her refusal to accommodate is itself the coercion under a value-based guise.
A side note: the economic consideration
On second thought, I suddenly realized that this is an economic consideration. A few months ago we were informed that in New York State 31 different genders had been defined, and a law was enacted forbidding discrimination against them and treating them contrary to their wishes. A person defines himself and enters whatever restroom (00) he wants (and everyone else, if it bothers them, can go to hell. Who cares about straight men who do not want lesbian women in their restroom?!).[3] Enlightened London is following New York's lead and now the announcement on the Underground will no longer be the constraining 'Ladies and gentlemen' but the enlightened 'Hello everyone' (why not 'hello to all-f./all-m./all-nb./…' with 31 different forms?).
Now think about enlightened Tel Aviv, which as is well known tries to follow New York's lead (combined with San Francisco. Very soon a municipal law recognizing 10,483 genders will come up there for a vote. The opposition advocates a fully continuous spectrum of genders, so that each one will receive a real identification number between 0 and 1)[4]. If there is gender separation there, education is expected to become individual. Instead of one class there will be 31 classes (some of them empty and most with one student). So is it any wonder that it is specifically the school principals in Tel Aviv who are leading the struggle? Bennett does not understand that they are simply sacrificing themselves to save him and all of us from an economic catastrophe.
1] Yes, I am familiar with the American tendency to be shocked by arguments of separate but equal (following the well-known court ruling regarding racial segregation between blacks and whites). What can I do? I still was not persuaded.
[2] The only secular value I see here is opposition to everything the religious propose or request.
[3] See, for example, the fascinating list here and a critique here.
[4] I hope and believe that this will suffice, at least so long as there are not genders for grains of sand and the stars of heaven, in which case we will move on to the next infinite cardinal number. A riddle for readers: is this aleph2?
Discussion
I think Kovo identifies this correctly and is right in her claim, even if she does not know how to explain herself.
My sense is that the hard core of today’s religiosity is driven more by conservative reactionary motives, and less by faith and a sincere desire to do the “word of God.” The proof of this is the insistence on fighting over issues like “family values” (where does that appear in the Talmud or in the Torah???), while “regular” halakhic issues do not receive such holy enthusiasm. Surprisingly, there is an almost 100% overlap between the issues religious Jews fight over and the issues conservative Christians in the U.S. fight over—and this proves that what is involved is opposition to liberalism, rooted in conservative instincts.
So clearly the trends here are important. Hila Kovo sees a process that will not stop at one such isolated event or another, but rather an intense desire to turn the wheel back to the Middle Ages. A more refined version of the tendencies of organizations like ISIS, which want to subdue liberal societies by force and intimidation. These are not secular paranoias. When various rabbis phrase things in openly militant terms against liberalism, we have no choice but to believe them.
There is one thing I didn’t understand: who exactly is “hurt” by the regulation?
And furthermore, in the (semi-communist in my view) establishment of public education, the Ministry of Education determines everything anyway. It decides the content, which is the essence of education, and there is no greater coercion than that. This is also reflected in the public’s complaints: these people grumble about unnecessary Jewish studies and “religionization,” and those people grumble about civics studies with extremely liberal content.
Ami
Apparently you also don’t know how to explain yourself…
Even if we accept that they are conservative reactionaries and don’t care about God, how does that change the discussion? After all, that is exactly the claim in the column: that they are separating because that is their ideology. You can argue that one should fight them and coerce them (because if we don’t, one day they will kill us like ISIS), and therefore not accede to their request, and that is exactly what the column claims is Hila Kovo’s real opinion—but the problem is that they hide this inside an argument about consideration and anti-coercion.
I understand the secular people. Part of the secular belief system is the “right to normality,” that is, the desire for a normal life (in their view) or a natural way of life (in their approach). Ordinary life (in their view) between men and women is a clear representation of this belief. In addition, if it would offend someone, and he held it as a value that one must not see cars, you, who would drive all year round, every day of the week, would not agree to listen to him.
“The question of when we are dealing with a justified request for consideration and when it is not right—or at least there is no obligation—to take such a request into account, is not a simple question. Beyond Kovo’s very determination, which seems reasonable to me, that there are situations in which there is no obligation and perhaps it is also not appropriate to take it into account”
A sports happening—is that not education toward Western culture, even if there is gender separation? A person does not live by dodgeball/class/classics/skipping ropes alone. Why shouldn’t they leave the four cubits of the schools, like the old Zionists, in order to study the Bible in an inspiring place, even if it is called the national park?
And therefore the secularists try to impose this on the religious. After all, in practice this is what the religious do.
As for the matter itself, there are considerations in both directions, but I do not see this as something very problematic, certainly not when it is done for a few hours on one day a year (among the secular).
Beyond that, future concerns are something else, which was not raised in the article. In this case, I doubt how realistic they are and whether they do not themselves constitute a justification for coercion.
I didn’t understand the first question.
As for your second remark, one can think of a framework within which a discussion is conducted about its contents. That is so even if the very existence of the framework as such is not acceptable to you.
What does that have to do with this? Is it forbidden to have a happening? At most you can ask that they also go out for Bible studies (is there such a thing? see previous posts) in inspiring places (like Auschwitz, for example).
Just a comment regarding the painful fact you mentioned in the last sentence. I don’t have children, so maybe I’m not up to date, but prayer in the lower grades really does not get into the fine distinctions between the Eastern rites and the Ashkenazic rite. Though around third or fourth grade, it suddenly clicked for us about Ashkenazim/Mizrahim because we noticed that some walked with their tzitzit out and some tucked in.
Children in fifth and sixth grades need neither spontaneous events like a children’s-games happening, which may suit kindergarten children, nor weighty journeys to Poland, which may suit high-school students, but rather proper foundations of reading and writing, with an emphasis on Bible study.
The reason is of course what you wrote in note 2.
There is also a genuine economic issue—there are bodies and foundations that voluntarily fund organizations whose goal is to create a public atmosphere of automatic opposition to such requests for consideration.
How would the discussion help, and how is it even decided? After all, it is enough that one person is dissatisfied in order to determine that there is coercion here, no?
After all, if you were to prove to Ms. Kovo that most parents support separation one day a year, would that change anything?
When a wise person like you is wrong and insists on his mistake, it is so irritating.
Would you agree to separation between Ethiopians and whites, or between Ashkenazim and Sephardim, if someone told you that this was a matter fundamental to his faith and dearer to him than life?
I don’t understand what is still so hard for you to grasp after you came out against preventing separation at the Hebrew University.
An institution is allowed to preserve its character and tradition, and the method of getting a foot in the door (first let’s make a small partition for the poor religious girls who want to dance, and later we’ll arrange a completely separate event and demand modest dress) used by the yeshivish and other sectors is already well known.
By the way, I myself am a benighted religious guy, but I don’t want anyone to take my feelings into account.
I’m sorry that I irritate you, but you are talking nonsense. A university is a state institution. It is not a yeshiva. Therefore it must be run according to rules accepted by the general public, solely on professional considerations. There is no justification for imposing the values of this group or that one, even if it is the majority (and by the way, in my opinion it was not the majority there), on the student body, when the matter is unrelated to the professional consideration.
Even a benighted religious guy does not have to talk nonsense…
Unfortunately I didn’t understand at all what you answered me—maybe because I didn’t write clearly before…
I’ll try to clarify:
If they held at the university an event separated between blacks and whites or between Jews and gentiles because some Ku Klux Klansmen asked that their feelings and beliefs be taken into account, would you accept that? (Especially in light of your criticism of Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef.)
Is an institution allowed to refuse a minority’s request to make changes to the nature of its social events?
Does a small concession not lead to further demands for concessions?
I answered that a state institution is not allowed to preserve its character. More than that, it is not allowed to have an ideological or value-based character. The institution is the sum total of all its students, and the only consideration is the professional consideration. What is unclear here?
Therefore the institution may not refuse such requests from minorities. The comparison you are making between the KKK and religious people is not only outrageous but downright stupid. First, because, as I explained in the post, mixing between the sexes is not a secular value but a legitimate way of life (in the eyes of most of the public). Therefore there is no obstacle whatsoever to taking the minority’s feelings into account. Especially when the minority does not want separation of the entire event, but only to enable it to conduct itself separately. The same goes for separate academic studies.
Second (another side of the same coin), this is not an immoral minority but a minority with different norms.
And third, it should be remembered that the request comes from both the religious women and the religious men, and therefore the paternalism that worries about the religious women more than they themselves do is disgraceful. And in this you will understand the trivial difference between KKK demands and this case. There, the blacks do not join the KKK’s request to separate the event.
These really are ridiculous comparisons.
First—like several people here have already written, this is not a way of life but a value.
Second—if we agree that it is a value, then that makes the demand immoral (according to the secular value system).
Third—the difference you wrote is irrelevant. The secular value here (at least that is the value in my eyes) is educating toward normality, not concern for the religious women. And with the KKK the value is non-discrimination (by the way, I think I would oppose separating blacks from whites even if the blacks agreed to it).
And a question for you—if the religious at the university asked that every woman be marked with a special sign to warn the righteous men, would you agree to that?
The rabbi sins in what he preaches against: the desire to defend your original position overcomes the desire for truth.
Bar-Ilan has no religious character?! Why should Hebrew University not have a secular character?
If secular people came to events at Machon Lev and made genuine demands of conscience, would you accept that?
It is permitted and obligatory to set limits to the “consideration” demanded by religious people and other minorities, because there is no end to it.
These things are obvious to anyone with understanding, and it is embarrassing that they require explanation.
I assume they (I do not. Modesty is of course a different consideration) would compare it to separation of blacks. Clearly this goes beyond technical separation, and I would have found it hard to participate in it. There is a statement here.
It is also embarrassing for me to repeat simple things again and again and to respond to absurd comparisons. So if we are both embarrassed, this is the point to stop. All the best.
Separation always has a price. Either wasted resources, or inequality.
I’ll illustrate from the topic itself:
Suppose sports studies/classes were separated (in my opinion this already exists, but never mind), and let us say that in sports class there is a choice among several possible activities. For example, floor exercise or soccer.
One can expect that what would happen is that the boys would play soccer and the girls would do floor exercise. This need not happen because of a top-down decision by the teacher (though that too is plausible), but simply because presumably that is what most girls/boys would want.
Now let us say that out of a class of 15 boys and 15 girls, there are four girls who want to play soccer and five boys who want to do floor exercise.
If the activities were mixed, there could be a group of 10 boys and 4 girls who would play soccer, and a group of 11 girls and 5 boys who would do floor exercise.
But if there is separation, then either the 4 girls and 5 boys will do an activity they are not interested in (floor exercise and soccer respectively)—that is, there is an option blocked to them because of their gender,
or you bring additional teachers and more students from somewhere (because fine, you can do floor exercise in a group of five, but to play soccer you need more than 4 people)—a waste of resources.
I myself think that because of the physical differences between girls and boys, it may very well be preferable to separate sports classes, but clearly there is a price.
All the more so in academic studies.
I really do not agree. First, you are talking about separation in the regular curriculum, and I was talking about a single day of a general gathering. Beyond that, even when there is no separation, in sports class they still do something that is not convenient for some of the group. Why is the male-female axis specifically the important axis? On the contrary, precisely there there will usually be a better fit between the preferences. But as I said, all this is mere hairsplitting.
As for academic studies, your words are a riddle to me. There too, do they choose what to teach according to taste?
Sorry, you are right regarding the specific case above, but I think my example is correct regarding separation in general.
Of course they will always do something that is not convenient for everyone (in this case—what if someone actually prefers baseball?) The point is that separation for any non-substantive reason whatsoever (even if they divided into two groups by alphabetical order) reduces everyone’s range of choice.
Clearly, in a case where there is no separation, it is possible to allow two groups and everyone can choose which of the two he prefers to belong to, whereas when there is separation, he will have to go to the activity intended for his sex even if there is another option he would prefer.
And in very rough schematic terms, given the same resources:
No separation—each student has 2 options.
Separation—each student has 1 option.
As for academic studies:
There are fields in which there is a male/female majority. (Mathematics—gender studies, for example.)
If universities were separated,
it would be necessary to open departments for very few students (a waste of resources, since the same lecturer can teach both the male and female students simultaneously)
And still, the women’s universities would have weaker mathematics departments, by virtue of the smaller number of women entering the field, and likewise the men’s universities in the field of gender studies (well, not such a great loss. But in biology too, for example, women are the majority in the bachelor’s degree)
Likewise, certain departments might not open at all.
And again, schematically:
No separation—everyone can enroll in the best department that exists in the field that interests them (if they are good enough to be admitted)
Separation—if you want to go to a department in which most of the people interested are of the opposite sex, you will be forced to go to a weaker department (even if you personally might be the brightest mind in the field)
or perhaps you will not be able to go to that department at all (I don’t see a university opening an occupational therapy track for men, for example).
The claim that integration between the sexes in education is not a liberal-secular value reflects either utter contempt for secular values or ignorance. The struggle to integrate girls into general education is more than 150 years old in the Western world. This is not a ‘legitimate educational approach’; it is a value, educational and social, of the first order. Defending it is not driven by hatred of religious people (even if the awakening here may stem at least in part from opposition to “religionization” as it is perceived among the secular public), but from defense of a fairly basic principle in the liberal worldview (the one that sees women and men as equal parts, even if different, in society; aspires to build a cooperative society that recognizes the value of the contribution of all its members; and opposes defining women as something different that must be hidden because of the danger they pose to men’s peace of mind).
On the other hand, it is not clear what religious or social value is invoked in whose name children are separated in religious education. In the name of what principle or sacred value is the separation carried out? Not that I dispute people’s right to educate in their own way even without a good reason, but just for my own education: what value is there in separation in fifth grade? What coherent and logical worldview does it serve to such an extent that the separation cannot be suspended for a few hours without causing mortal harm to the overall system?
It is certainly legitimate to say that the dispute is about values. It is indeed about values. And not covertly. Explicitly. Kovo’s question as you defined it is really the wrong question. I do not much care whether there is an intention to coerce or whether this is a demand with authentic justification. What I do care about, by contrast, is whether in the name of acceding to the demand I have to give up a substantive principle.
Gender integration is a substantive principle in education. It is also such, by the way, for many who sit on the benches of the state-religious school system. And we too see with pain and growing opposition the coercion of alien values on the education we seek to give our children. From our perspective, suspending that integration is more like a demand that, in the name of joint activity, children from the state-religious system be required to eat in the non-kosher cafeteria of a hosting secular school. It is completely clear to me why teachers and principals of religious schools would choose not to acquiesce in such a demand.
By the same token, it is not proper for principals of integrated schools (including the religious ones among them) to give up a substantive educational principle in the name of integration. That is not integration. It is shoving aside the values we seek to impart. You cannot educate toward integration while signaling to children that this is a value that can be suspended and replaced in the name of ‘consideration.’ That cheapens the value into insignificance. Insofar as schools choose to insist on the need for separation, it is proper and just that schools that do not subscribe to it refuse to participate in an activity that requires it. Not because of ‘coercion.’ Because it is an educational ironclad asset over which there is no room for compromise. If those who separate cannot suspend the separation for a few hours, then it will not be possible to meet. Because this is not a request for consideration. It is a demand for a value concession.
Not an attempt to coerce the other side. An unwillingness to compromise on an essential point. If you believe that those who advocate separation, too, are incapable of being considerate because of the great importance of gender separation in fifth grade, then we have reached a dead end that will no longer allow joint meetings.
And no, it is not because the sides are coercing one another. It is because integration between the sexes is an important value in education and in society (the career of one less female singer troubles me less than the need to accept the outlook that reduces the essence of my existence to the danger of some man’s evil inclination as a legitimate worldview that should be given a place in the world). It is one I am not willing to compromise on. Insofar as those who separate are also unwilling to compromise, they are forcing separation between us both (because with no apology I admit that their value is, in my eyes, delusional, mistaken, and dangerous, and I have no intention of signaling anything else to my children).
These are rather weak arguments. Anyone can weigh whether the importance of separation is worth a bit of extra money to him. There is always some price that is paid, and here the price seems to me truly marginal.
One could also complain about sorting students by psychometric tests or matriculation exams. What is the fault of someone who did not study? These are generalizations that have a price, but they are made in order to simplify and ease life.
This is really not contempt, but a simple and clear distinction.
I know this world and its values very well, and I disagree with you. The long struggle for joint education stemmed from the desire to equalize the level and the opportunities given to girls/women. In the past, separation was intended for discrimination and for closing possibilities בפני women. But once equal yet separate possibilities are allowed (separate but equal—sbe), there is not a shred of value here apart from the desire to oppose the religious. I know that liberal brainwashing has managed to drive the world mad, but what can I do—I am not willing to submit to it and believe it. By the way, the ruling of the American Supreme Court regarding sbe also stemmed from the fact that the separation came to conceal discrimination. Once there is no discrimination here, there is no reason whatsoever not to separate. As stated, I certainly understand a society that does not want separation because it sees no point in it, and it is even a bit irritating. But there is no value here.
As an aside, I will note that there is a very clear asymmetry between a religious person (like me) and the average secular person. I know his world and its values very well, and in fact I share the overwhelming majority of them. By contrast, he does not know my values and certainly does not share them. Therefore I can criticize him far more than he can criticize me.
True, that is annoying and may sound patronizing (not justly, because it is not patronizing), but that is reality as I understand it.
Perhaps I’ll add one more point. Turning mingling into a value stems not only from the desire to oppose the religious, but also from feelings of inferiority. Religious people have lots of values that are very important to them, and the average secular person is very embarrassed that he does not have them (more accurately: he does, but far fewer). So he creates them out of thin air.
I agree with Noga. In the eyes of the secular person, and even the liberal religious person, non-separation is very much a value.
We live in a mixed society and are interested in educating our children for healthy and normal lives in such a society. See, for example, education in the kibbutzim, the booklet “A Modest Mixed Society Ab Initio” of Ne’emanei Torah Va’Avodah. See Ne’emanei Torah Va’Avodah’s struggle against separation in state-religious education. This aspiration to such normality is indeed perceived as a value. To say that this stems only from a desire to fill the empty wagon is, in my eyes, a misunderstanding.
I’m sorry, normality is not a value but a need. I could understand opposition to a demand to live completely separately even if that is not a value (because it is a significant need and there is no reason to give it up for the sake of others). But to oppose separation for a few hours is mere stubbornness. Such separation will not harm normality in any way when we are speaking of groups that live completely mixed.
And by the way, contrary to what you wrote, you actually do not agree with Noga. The 150-year struggle she spoke about was not for normality but for equality (which truly is a value and not merely a need). The world has lived in mixed settings for hundreds of years, and there was no separation between women and men there that had to be struggled against. The struggle there was against inequality. At the Hebrew University too, it was not a struggle for normality but coercion against the religious. Not permitting a group that wishes it to dance separately is not a struggle for a value, but plain wickedness stemming from feelings of inferiority (because of a value vacuum) and from a desire to coerce others.
Our rabbi, I wanted to keep quiet but I can’t manage it.
I have no value vacuum, no feelings of inferiority, and no wickedness, and nevertheless I oppose the girls’ demands at the university and demands for consideration of minorities in general.
By the way, I am stricter than you on issues of separation and distancing, so the matter is not halakhic.
You are simply babbling on this subject.
Sad…
I suggest that next time you try harder. Maybe you’ll succeed.
I agree with most of what you say, but in my view there is value to not separating when the separation is gender-based. If the separation were by the first letter of one’s name, everyone would understand that it was just a technical matter and there would be no problem. When the separation is on religious gender grounds, there is a statement here. As someone who opposes separations, I oppose them not only because they cause technical difficulties and unnecessary expenses, but mainly on a substantive level—in my opinion, it corrupts children’s souls, truly so! A child should not begin to think about why he was separated from the girls in his class and what he was supposedly meant to be thinking if they had not been separated. It reminds me of the painful fact that only in the religious community do children in first grade know how to say that they are Ashkenazi or Mizrahi (third generation in Israel and beyond), and that is thanks to the built-in separation in the prayers.