On the Public Debate over Conversion

With God's help

Makor Rishon – 2008

Reflections on Shlomo Fischer's article ('The Truth of Peace,' Parashat Chukat)

Introduction

In recent weeks a public debate has been taking place, in the religious world and beyond, about conversion to Judaism. This debate has several axes, some of which appear in Shlomo Fischer's article. Despite the ocean of verbiage that has been spilled on these questions, in my opinion a real discussion of the important points has still not even begun (!).

Therefore, although it seems as if the subject has already reached saturation, and perhaps precisely because of this mistake, I would like to sketch here briefly a schematic and preliminary map of the debate, and leave it at that. It seems that merely presenting such a map is enough to understand the absurdity of the way the debate has been conducted thus far.

Background

The latest affair began with a ruling of the Rabbinical Court in Ashkelon, where Rabbi Attiya decided to invalidate the conversion of a couple who came before him to divorce, and in the course of his remarks he even broadened the scope and invalidated the conduct of the entire conversion system headed by Rabbi Druckman. The matter assumes added importance because almost all conversions in recent years have been carried out within this framework.

On appeal to the Supreme Rabbinical Court, the judges of that court surprised everyone by upholding Rabbi Attiya's ruling, and even strengthening it with additional arguments, some directed at the system headed by Rabbi Druckman and the way it operates, and some directed at Rabbi Druckman and the judges themselves. They used extremely harsh language, which is generally not accepted in rabbinical rulings, and they even invalidated all the thousands of conversions carried out in this system in recent years. The handling of the entire case raises serious questions regarding proper procedure and substantive consideration.

Following these rulings, a severe dispute arose, in which Religious Zionist ideology is increasingly taking center stage. My impression is that almost the entire public sees the dispute as a political argument in a supposedly halakhic guise, that is, as a discussion not conducted on the merits.

Several starting points

When discussing these matters, several important assumptions should be emphasized:

1. An ideological dispute can certainly find expression in different rulings of Jewish law (and not only with regard to Hallel and/or a blessing on Independence Day). There is nothing wrong with this, and it does not mean that the dispute is not substantive, or not for the sake of Heaven.

2. Even if there are deviations in procedure and modes of expression, this does not necessarily mean that the side adopting them lacks a basis in Jewish law. One may criticize its manner of conduct while at the same time agreeing with its contents. And conversely, although Scripture says God seeks the pursued (God seeks the pursued), we are also commanded do not favor the poor in his dispute (do not favor the poor in his dispute). If someone is persecuted and suffering, that does not necessarily make him right. The fact that 'we were offended,' or that 'he started,' does not exempt us from addressing substantive problems and arguments.

3. The vehemence and exceptional nature of the dispute do not necessarily indicate improper motives. Sometimes Torah-driven fervor leads judges or rabbis to express themselves in sharp ways, because they are anxious about the fate of Jewish law (as they understand it). This does not necessarily point to hatred, or to improper motives. Of course, this argument does not legitimate improper modes of conduct; it only focuses the discussion about them and places it in proper proportion.[1]

4. When a discussion raises several independent questions, it should be broken down and conducted separately with respect to each of them. One should draw the conclusion only at the end. A tendentious discussion (public or halakhic), conducted with conclusions already assumed, is usually shallow and not on the merits. Begging the question has one clear advantage, since it always leads to the desired conclusion, but this is still not the recommended way to conduct a systematic and in-depth clarification of the issue.

Axes of the Debate

I will now lay out only some of the main axes of the discussion in this issue. Because of limited space, I will give only a little detail under each heading. My main purpose, of course, is not to discuss all these matters, but mainly to show the number and variety of the questions, and even more, their independence from one another.

The principal axes of the discussion are as follows:

A. Is the conversion policy of Rabbi Druckman's system sound? This axis ought to include a principled discussion in Jewish law (including legal policy: what ought to be done, mainly regarding the requirements of acceptance of the commandments), and afterward a factual examination (what was actually done). I am not familiar with any serious discussion of these matters.

B. Even if one reaches the conclusion that the conversion was not carried out properly, should the conversion be invalidated retroactively? Here there are discussions about the language of Maimonides and the halakhic decisors, but this is not the place for that. The main discussion concerns the question of unexpressed intentions with respect to acceptance of the commandments (can an assessment of intentions nullify explicit statements?), and the manner of determining the intention of the person converting. I should note that here one sometimes encounters arguments that are utterly baseless, and they receive no serious discussion because they suit the ideological agenda we cherish. I will address this on another rabbinic-Torah platform.

C. Even if the conversion before us is invalidated, should the invalidation be extended sweepingly to all the conversions of the system, and under what conditions? Here the ruling raised two grounds for invalidation: the conversion procedure (especially regarding acceptance of the commandments), and disqualification of the judges before whom the conversion was performed. Each of these involves questions of legal and halakhic procedure, and of authority, and this is not the place. All this also involves clarifying complex questions concerning 'do not place a stumbling block' and more.

D. Is there room for one religious court, and especially the Supreme Rabbinical Court, to disqualify the judges of the other courts? Seemingly, at least legally, that is the role of a supreme court. What is a judge on the Supreme Rabbinical Court supposed to do if he sees a judge in another instance who, in his opinion, has acted improperly? Is he to remain silent? The question whether he acted correctly, and whether this is indeed the case here (I personally am convinced that it is not), is of course a different question.

E. Who determines the Jewish law in this case at all? Does the Supreme Rabbinical Court have halakhic authority over the ruling of another court? In my view there is no doubt that it does not. Legally, that is another story altogether (and even that is far from unambiguous).

F. Do the various rulings have halakhic significance, or only legal significance (since in the State of Israel Jewish status is still determined by Jewish law, more or less)? In other words: do all those whose conversions were invalidated become non-Jews in halakhic terms, or is it only that the state is supposed not to recognize them as Jews (which has almost no practical implication)?

G. Is there a limit to judges' modes of expression, even in a dispute? It would seem so. But if this is not a dispute but a condemnation of judges who are taking control of conversion within the Jewish people (at least in the view of those judges), then it is their duty to sound a public alarm with whatever severity they deem necessary.

H. Is the conduct of the Supreme Rabbinical Court proper (taking cases contrary to the view of Rabbi Amar, the president of the court, publishing a ruling without hearing one of the sides, adopting a position in advance, and the like)? It seems to me that no one disputes that it is not. Again, the issue is not one of Jewish law but primarily a legal and administrative one.

I. Can Rabbi Druckman's approach, even if it is possible from the standpoint of pure Jewish law (see section A), come to govern the conversion policy of the Jewish people and the State of Israel without establishing broad agreement among the halakhic decisors? One must remember that conversion is by its very nature a public act: the acceptance of the convert into the Jewish people as a whole. It is reasonable to require that this be done with broad agreement, regardless of our personal opinion on the matter. See further on this in the next section.

J. Against the background of the previous section, what is the position of the various halakhic decisors who responded on the various issues? Do all those who publicly rejoiced over the humiliation of Torah scholars (mainly from the Religious Zionist camp) necessarily agree with Rabbi Druckman's halakhic approach? I have no doubt that they do not. To the best of my understanding, most of them oppose his halakhic approach, and it is no accident that the public notices focus on Rabbi Druckman's honor and ignore the substantive questions. I should note that in my opinion they are not acting properly, for by doing so they allow a marginal approach to take center stage in the field of conversion. Perhaps that is the reason some of those who care about the matter make sharp statements. Without that, it seems that no one would have awakened to discuss the issue.

K. Is all this connected to a Haredi or Religious Zionist worldview, and if so, how? See the previous section, and the conclusions are self-evident. I should note that in my personal opinion there is indeed such a connection, and it finds a particularly interesting expression here. But I will elaborate on that, God willing, elsewhere.

L. Is all this connected to a principled conception of Jewish law, and does that itself necessarily constitute an expression of Religious Zionism or Haredism? I personally think so, but the fact is that some of those involved in the debate themselves do not think so. See section J.

M. What is it appropriate for me to do (as a rabbi and halakhic decisor, or as an ordinary citizen)? In recent weeks I have heard quite a few public statements, attacks, and 'learned' opinions from people who are not at all conversant with the halakhic material, nor with the subjects under discussion (for example, at a conference held at Bar-Ilan University on this issue, the guise of an apparently Torah-academic discussion was used in order to engage in one-sided and tendentious ideological preaching. In the press as well, opinions are being written by laymen who speak nonsense, and no one raises a peep). The tendentious ideological 'certification' granted to the various positions enables people to express completely groundless views on the basis of non-substantive reasons, and to win stormy applause and wall-to-wall agreement. This tendentiousness gravely and blatantly paralyzes critical thought.

I would add that these are only some of the axes of the discussion, formulated at a very general level. The concrete questions for discussion are far more numerous. For example, within the halakhic discussion of retroactive invalidation of conversion (section B), several different arguments arise, as well as several different proofs in each direction. It should be emphasized that even among these more specific questions there is no interdependence. My view about proof A can differ from my view about proof B. Indeed, at the end of the day one must reach a bottom-line decision, but the subject of my remarks here is the form and character of the discussion itself.

The conclusion that emerges without much analysis is that we are dealing here with many dozens of questions, most of which are unrelated to one another. For some reason, my impression is that at least on the public level the division regarding all the questions is sweeping: if you are 'with us,' then you must answer all of them with 'yes,' and if you are 'with our opponents,' then you must answer 'no' (choose the side, and the affiliation, as you understand them). All this is regardless of the arguments advanced in favor of the 'correct' side, and of their quality and strength (which are dubious in many cases). The only thing that determines anything is ideological affiliation, and nothing more.

I have no objection whatsoever to blunt statements (quite the contrary. See also the footnote above). But when they serve as a substitute for substantive discussion, and even neutralize it, then the real debate that exists on the various issues, and that it is very important to conduct, does not come up for discussion at all, and that is regrettable.

These remarks apply both to the rabbinic discussion (is there any such discussion at all?) and to the public discussion. In my humble opinion, both are being conducted disgracefully, out of lack of intellectual honesty and shallowness (and in fact are hardly being conducted at all).

Michael Abraham

[1] A note relevant to sections 2-3: The dispute between Hillel and Shammai is described in the Mishnah as a dispute for the sake of Heaven, and the Jerusalem Talmud relates that their disciples came to kill one another. By contrast, the dispute of Korah and his congregation, which is described there in the Mishnah as the antithesis, was apparently conducted peacefully and gently, through the raising of criticism from substantive arguments. If so, politeness and manner of conduct are not the exclusive parameter for evaluating disputes.