The Verse Repeats It to Make It Indispensable — On the Meaning of the Command in Sacrificial Matters
Ma'alin BaKodesh – 5767
On the matter of 'we need Scripture to repeat it in order to make it indispensable'
A. Introduction
B. Intention and the 'for its own sake' requirement in sacrifices
Intention and 'for its own sake'
The 'for its own sake' requirement in the passage at the end of the fourth chapter of Zevahim
The 'for its own sake' requirement in the passage at the beginning of Zevahim
Does the 'for its own sake' requirement invalidate?
Types of disqualifying 'not for its own sake' thoughts
The prophets’ rebuke and intention in offering sacrifices
C. The thought of changing a sacrifice’s designation: 'Scripture repeated it in order to make it indispensable' in prohibitions
The rule 'we need Scripture to repeat it in order to make it indispensable' with respect to 'for its own sake'
Distinguishing between a prohibition and a positive commandment
Is there a prohibition against a 'not for its own sake' thought?
Maimonides’ view of the prohibition of "it shall not be reckoned"
Is Ritva’s distinction between a prohibition and a positive commandment?
D. A necessary introduction from the laws of prayer
Introduction
The passage at the beginning of the fourth chapter of Berakhot: prayer outside its proper time
Explaining the distinction in light of the dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides regarding prayer
Nachmanides’ view
E. The unique nature of the domain of sacrificial matters Introduction
Prayer and sacrifices as 'worship'
'Scripture repeated it in order to make it indispensable'
The difference between a positive commandment and a prohibition: Ritva and the reservations of Kehillot Yaakov
The disqualification of 'for its own sake'
A. Introduction
As is well known, there is a rule in sacrificial law that we require 'Scripture to repeat it in order to make it indispensable' — the verse must repeat a requirement in order to make it indispensable. Throughout the Torah, when there is a command, it is understood as binding and indispensable; if it was not fulfilled, we have not discharged our obligation. For example, the laws of tzitzit and tefillin are indispensable unless there is a special source and reason why they should not invalidate. By contrast, in the realm of sacrifices the Sages tell us in a number of places[1] that a bare command is presumed not to invalidate, unless there is a special source teaching that it does. How does the Torah teach us that a particular command is indispensable? There are several ways to do so. For example, if the Torah repeats the command twice (= repeats it). From here derives the rule that in sacrificial matters 'we need Scripture to repeat it in order to make it indispensable'. There are other ways as well, such as writing the word 'statute' in the relevant passage, which likewise teaches that the command stated there is indispensable.
At first glance, this phenomenon is very puzzling. Admittedly, there are sometimes differences between the realm of sacrifices and the realm of ordinary matters (for example, in eating sacrifices the day follows the night, unlike ordinary matters, and so on), but these differences are apparently connected to the substantive content involved. By contrast, the rule 'Scripture repeated it in order to make it indispensable' is an interpretive rule. On first thought, rules of interpretation should not differ between sacrificial and non-sacrificial matters, because the Torah is read in the same way everywhere. If a biblical command is supposed to invalidate when not fulfilled, that should be true in every area of Jewish law; and if repetition is required to teach that it invalidates, then that requirement should likewise apply in every area of biblical Jewish law.
To be sure, some later authorities argued that this rule applies in every area of biblical Jewish law.[2] But it is hard to accept that claim in the face of what all the commentators say. Nor are the proofs they bring conclusive, and this is not the place to elaborate. In any event, according to virtually all commentators, this rule applies only in the realm of sacrifices.
And indeed, the rule calls out for explanation. Why should the interpretive rule governing sacrificial passages differ from the rules that apply in the rest of the Torah’s legal passages? Moreover, I have not found any source for this rule in the Sages or in the medieval authorities (Rishonim). One would have expected it to be a law given to Moses at Sinai, or some other tradition, yet as far as I know there is no hint in rabbinic sources to its source. Seemingly, this means that the rule is grounded in reason, and therefore requires no source. But I have not found among the commentators any reasoning that explains the meaning and force of this rule, and especially its distinctive application specifically to the realm of sacrifices.
In this article we will try to clarify the significance of this rule, and through that understand why it applies only in the realm of sacrifices.
B. Intention and the 'for its own sake' requirement in sacrifices
Intention and 'for its own sake'
As is well known, sacrifices are subject to a rule that they must be offered 'for their own sake'. Tractate Zevahim, which opens the order dealing with sacrificial matters, begins with the Mishnah and sugya devoted to this rule, and many commentators on the Talmud do the same.
The requirement of 'for its own sake' also appears in several other legal contexts (such as spinning tzitzit, processing hides for tefillin and sacred scrolls, writing a bill of divorce, writing sacred scrolls, circumcision, and more). There is a tendency to connect the requirement of 'for its own sake' to the requirement of intention in commandments,[3] but it is quite clear that these are two entirely different rules. The requirement of 'for its own sake' does not depend on the dispute found in the Sages and in the halakhic decisors over whether commandments require intention (see Eruvin 95b and parallels).
As Rabbi Lichtenstein writes in his book on Zevahim, the difference between these two rules may be seen from two main perspectives:
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From the standpoint of legal context – the rule of intention accompanies the action of performing the commandment. The requirement of 'for its own sake', by contrast, accompanies the preparation of the object for its commandment, even before the commandment itself is carried out. Hence it is commonly accepted that the requirement of 'for its own sake' is a rule about the object itself, that is, part of the nature of the object designated for the commandment, whereas intention accompanies only the act of the person performing it and does not concern commandment-objects (intention is required even in commandments that are not performed on objects or by means of them).
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From the standpoint of substantive content – the rule of intention is that we intend that we are performing the commandment because we were commanded by the Holy One, blessed be He, in order to fulfill our obligation. The focus is on our reason and motivation in performing the act. By contrast, the requirement of 'for its own sake' faces forward: I process the hide for the sake of tefillin. In other words, the focus is on the purpose of the object under discussion.
Thus, the requirement of 'for its own sake' is a special rule, and it exists in some commandment-objects whose preparation involves designating them for the commandment. Not every case of 'for its own sake' is identical. For example, the requirement of 'for its own sake' in writing a bill of divorce is somewhat exceptional, since there it means writing for the sake of the woman being divorced (and not for the sake of divorce in general). The term 'for its own sake' also appears with respect to Torah study ('Torah for its own sake'), and there too it seems to be an exceptional use of the term. The requirement of 'for its own sake' in sacrifices is also unusual in several respects, since it concerns not the preparation of an object for a commandment, but the thoughts accompanying the offering itself.
The 'for its own sake' requirement in the passage at the end of the fourth chapter of Zevahim
The requirement of 'for its own sake' in sacrifices is detailed in the Mishnah in Zevahim:
A sacrifice is slaughtered for the sake of six things: for the sake of the sacrifice, for the sake of the offerer, for the sake of the Divine Name, for the sake of the fire-offerings, for the sake of aroma, for the sake of pleasingness. And the sin-offering and the guilt-offering — for the sake of sin (4:6).
The source for most of these rules is the verse dealing with the offering of the burnt offering:
Its entrails and its legs he shall wash with water, and the priest shall make the whole thing go up in smoke on the altar: a burnt offering, a fire-offering, a pleasing aroma to the Lord
(Leviticus 1:9).
The Gemara (ibid., 46b) derives from here five intentions, one rule of 'for its own sake' from each of the five words at the end of the verse (the rule of for the sake of the offerer is derived from another source):
Rabbi Judah said in the name of Rav: 'Burnt offering' — for the sake of a burnt offering, excluding for the sake of a peace-offering; 'fire-offering' — for the sake of the fire-offering, excluding roasting on coals; 'aroma' — for the sake of aroma, excluding limbs that were roasted and then brought up, for Rabbi Judah said in the name of Rav: if limbs were roasted and then brought up, they do not count as aroma; 'pleasingness' — for the sake of giving pleasure to the Lord, to the One who spoke and the world came into being.
We learn from here that the requirement of 'for its own sake' in sacrifices includes six components: for the sake of the sacrifice – to slaughter a burnt offering as a burnt offering and not as another sacrifice. for the sake of the offerer – to slaughter for the sake of the owner and not another person (this is derived from other verses in Zevahim 4a–b). for the sake of the Lord – and not for someone else. for the sake of the fire-offerings – for burning on the altar and not for roasting on coals. for the sake of aroma – roasting on the altar and not bringing it up after roasting elsewhere (for then there is no longer aroma on the altar). for the sake of pleasingness – to give pleasure to the Holy One, blessed be He, by doing His will. And with the sin-offering and the guilt-offering, which are sacrifices brought on account of sin, one must intend to atone for the sin on account of which the sacrifice is brought.
The 'for its own sake' requirement in the passage at the beginning of Zevahim
The Gemara in Zevahim 4a–b devotes extended discussion to the requirement of 'for its own sake'. Only two thoughts are discussed there: for the sake of the sacrifice and for the sake of the offerer. The other thoughts do not appear in this sugya at all. In the sugya in the fourth chapter (46b), no source is given for the requirement of for the sake of the offerer (slaughtering for the sake of a different owner is termed by the Sages changing the owner), but the thought of for the sake of the sacrifice (whose violation is termed changing the sacrifice’s designation) is derived there from the word 'burnt offering'. By contrast, the sugya in Zevahim 4 presents another source for the rule of changing the sacrifice’s designation.
Several medieval and later authorities saw contradictions between these two sugyot and proposed various distinctions in order to reconcile them. Let us note here that Maimonides’ language in Hilkhot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot (4:11) suggests that these six requirements were stated only regarding the burnt offering and not regarding the other sacrifices.[4] His language appears to indicate that only the two intentions of changing the sacrifice’s designation and changing its owner exist in all sacrifices. Tosafot at the beginning of Zevahim raise the possibility that the sugya in Zevahim 46 deals with the burning of the sacrificial portions, whereas the sugya in Zevahim 4 deals with the other blood-services; see there.
Does the 'for its own sake' requirement invalidate?
The requirement of 'for its own sake' concerns only the priest who offers the sacrifice, and not the owner.[5] What happens if the priest did not think 'for its own sake'? Is this a prohibition? Is the sacrifice disqualified as a result?
The first Mishnah in Zevahim states:
All sacrifices that were slaughtered not for their own sake are valid, except that they do not count for the owners toward fulfillment of their obligation, except for the Passover offering and the sin-offering.
The Mishnah says that a 'not for its own sake' thought does not disqualify the sacrifice, and it is offered in the ordinary way (and the Gemara explains that one may not continue changing it; that is, if a burnt offering was slaughtered not for its own sake, it is forbidden to sprinkle its blood not for its own sake), but it does not count for the owner toward fulfillment of his obligation. The two exceptions are the Passover offering and the sin-offering: there, if they were offered not for their proper designation, they are disqualified from being valid sacrifices. Later in the Mishnah it is stated that according to Rabbi Eliezer the guilt-offering too is disqualified like the Passover offering and the sin-offering.
Thus, there are sacrifices that are disqualified in the absence of 'for its own sake', and there are sacrifices in which, when 'for its own sake' is absent, they do not count for the owner toward fulfillment of his obligation (they do not achieve acceptance or atonement). The problem with a 'not for its own sake' thought can be understood in two ways:
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The sacrifices are disqualified, or fail to secure acceptance, because the thought of 'for its own sake' was lacking in the offering. This is the situation in the other legal contexts in which a requirement of 'for its own sake' exists, and when it is not fulfilled the matzah or the tefillin are disqualified.
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The sacrifices are disqualified because a 'not for its own sake' thought actively disqualifies them. That is, it is not only that 'for its own sake' is lacking, but that there is a 'not for its own sake' thought that actively disqualifies the sacrifice (or prevents acceptance).
The Griz proves that both of these aspects are present.[6] Below we will discuss the existence of a prohibition in a 'not for its own sake' thought.
In addition to a 'not for its own sake' thought, there is the thought of piggul, which certainly disqualifies the sacrifice. Here we are speaking of a thought that is connected in one way or another to the sprinkling of the blood, and that indicates an intention to sprinkle the blood after its proper time or outside its proper place. We will not discuss that rule here.
Types of disqualifying 'not for its own sake' thoughts
It should be noted that Maimonides rules that the only 'not for its own sake' thought that disqualifies sacrifices is changing the sacrifice’s designation or changing its owner (those that appear in the sugya of Zevahim 4). The other thoughts are only initial requirements (perhaps only in burnt offerings), and their absence has no effect at all on the sacrifice. Thus he writes in Hilkhot Pesulei HaMukdashin:
There are three thoughts that disqualify sacrifices, and they are these: the thought of changing the designation, the thought of place, and the thought of time. What is the thought of changing the designation? One who slaughters a sacrifice not for its own designation, for example, if it was a burnt offering and he thinks it is a peace-offering, or if he slaughters it for the sake of a burnt offering and a peace-offering, or for the sake of a peace-offering and a burnt offering, or if he slaughtered the sacrifice not for the sake of its owner — this is the thought of changing the designation (13:1).
So too this is agreed by all the halakhic authorities.
The prophets’ rebuke and intention in offering sacrifices
The prophets rebuke the people in many places with respect to sacrifices. Some of the rebukes concern the fact that the people offer sacrifices but behave wickedly in the rest of their conduct. But another part of the rebuke concerns the meaning of the sacrifices themselves. The prophets state that offering sacrifices without intention has no meaning (see Jeremiah 6:20; 7:22; Isaiah 1:11; Hosea 6:6; and more). Thought and inward orientation are therefore central aspects of sacrificial worship.
What is that 'intention' whose absence the prophets point to? Seemingly, it is the requirement of 'for its own sake', which is the principal thought accompanying the offering. But as we have seen, the requirement of 'for its own sake' generally does not invalidate, even if at times it impairs atonement. Moreover, we already noted that the requirement of 'for its own sake' is addressed to the priest and not to the owner, whereas the prophets’ rebuke more plausibly refers to the owner.
It is more likely that they mean absence of intention, not absence of 'for its own sake'. If so, intention in the offering obligates both the priest and the owner (= the one who is atoned for), at least according to those decisors who hold that commandments require intention. It is possible that the prophets’ rebuke teaches us that with sacrifices intention is required according to all views, even according to those who maintain that commandments do not require intention (that is, that intention does not invalidate after the fact).[7]
It should be noted that the intention to fulfill one’s obligation is not included among the six 'for its own sake' thoughts listed in the Mishnah. This is a thought of different content, and as we have seen it operates differently from a thought of 'for its own sake'. Therefore it is also more fundamental: without intention to offer a sacrifice as part of our worship of God, the sacrifice is not a sacrifice at all.
C. The thought of changing a sacrifice’s designation: 'Scripture repeated it in order to make it indispensable' in prohibitions
The rule 'we need Scripture to repeat it in order to make it indispensable' with respect to 'for its own sake'
In the sugya on Zevahim 4b, after the rule of changing a sacrifice’s designation is derived, the Gemara asks: "But perhaps where he slaughtered them not for their own sake, they should be disqualified?", meaning that the absence of 'for its own sake' should disqualify the sacrifice (whereas, as we saw above, in most cases the sacrifice is not disqualified by a 'not for its own sake' thought). Tosafot[8] ask how the Gemara could have wanted to disqualify the sacrifice because of the absence of 'for its own sake', when in sacrificial matters there is a rule that 'we need Scripture to repeat it in order to make it indispensable'. If so, with a thought of changing the sacrifice’s designation the sacrifice should not have to be disqualified, since there is only one source requiring it.[9]
Tosafot resolve this by means of a discussion of the details of the sugya, which is not our concern here. We will discuss here a different resolution brought in the responsa of Hatam Sofer[10] in the name of R. David Deutsch (= hereafter: RDD), which is based on the words of Ritva in tractate Yoma.
Distinguishing between a prohibition and a positive commandment
Ritva in tractate Yoma[11] explains that Rava holds there is a warning not to bring incense without the smoke-producing ingredient, and therefore no additional verse is needed to teach that this is indispensable. His point is that with warnings, that is, with prohibitions, the rule "we need Scripture to repeat it in order to make it indispensable" does not apply. This rule exists only in positive commandments, not in prohibitions.[12]
On the basis of Ritva’s words, RDD explains that since there is a prohibition against entertaining a 'not for its own sake' thought (that is, effecting a change of designation), we are dealing here with a prohibition, and therefore no further source is needed to teach that it invalidates. Admittedly, the prohibition against thinking a thought of changing a sacrifice’s designation is not universally agreed upon, and Hatam Sofer already notes this there. In Tosafot here, it would seem not to be as Ritva says, for they assume that "we need Scripture to repeat it in order to make it indispensable" applies even to the prohibition of changing a sacrifice’s designation; still, it is possible that in their view there is no formal prohibition here, and therefore they raise their question.
Is there a prohibition against a 'not for its own sake' thought?
RDD argues that there is a negative prohibition against thinking a 'not for its own sake' thought. He brings as a source the ruling of Maimonides, who writes:
Anyone who entertains an incorrect thought regarding sacred offerings transgresses a negative commandment, for it says "it shall not be reckoned" (Hilkhot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:1).
Maimonides understands the verse "it shall not be reckoned" (Leviticus 7:18) as a negative prohibition against thinking an incorrect thought.[13] Maimonides’ source is the sugya in Zevahim 29b:
Rabbi Yannai said: From where do we know that one who entertains a thought regarding sacred offerings is liable to lashes? The verse says: "it shall not be reckoned"
The conclusion of the Gemara there is that one does not receive lashes for this prohibition because it involves no action. In that sugya it is not clear which thought is meant, but from the context it seems somewhat that the subject is piggul. RDD assumes that the thought spoken of there also includes a 'not for its own sake' thought (that is, that there is a prohibition even on a 'not for its own sake' thought), and not only on piggul. That indeed appears from Maimonides’ language, since he speaks of every 'incorrect thought,' and not specifically of piggul. This may also be seen in Rashi on Zevahim 2b (s.v. ve-nedavah), who applies the prohibition of 'it shall not be reckoned' to a thought of 'not for its own sake'.[14]
RDD himself already notes, however, that from the continuation of Maimonides’ words it seems that this 'incorrect thought' is not every thought of 'not for its own sake', for in the next halakhah he writes:
By received tradition they learned that included in this law is that one may not damage sacred offerings through thought, for this is akin to inflicting a blemish on sacred offerings, and even so he is not flogged, because thought is not an act.
It appears from his words here that the thought prohibited by the prohibition of 'it shall not be reckoned' is only a thought that disqualifies the sacrifice, and not every incorrect thought. Such a thought would be only piggul, or a thought of 'not for its own sake' with respect to the Passover offering and the sin-offering.
The same emerges from the words of Nachmanides.[15] Within the framework of this commandment he also counts a prohibition of harmful speech that disqualified the sacrifice. Therefore he also includes an animal worshiped as an idol, payment to a prostitute, and the like, all of which are disqualified sacrifices. His focus, however, is the prohibition against disqualifying the sacrifice, not a prohibition on thought. In any event, it is clear that he sees a prohibition only in what disqualifies the sacrifice, and not in every incorrect thought.
Maimonides’ view of the prohibition of "it shall not be reckoned"
Hatam Sofer there rejects RDD’s view precisely on the basis of this inference from Maimonides’ language in the next halakhah, from which it follows in his view that the foundation of the prohibition is disqualifying the sacrifice and causing loss to the consecrated property; and that does not happen in a thought of 'not for its own sake' (except for the Passover offering and the sin-offering).
With respect to Maimonides’ own intention, however, there is room for hesitation, since his wording in the first halakhah clearly indicates that every incorrect thought constitutes a violation of a prohibition, whereas in the next halakhah he merely adds an additional rule received by tradition. Therefore it seems that his intention is precisely the initial understanding proposed by RDD, according to which there is a prohibition even in a thought of 'not for its own sake', and we learned by tradition that every thought that disqualifies the sacrifice was also forbidden by virtue of that same prohibition.
Indeed, we find that Maimonides writes this explicitly:
It is forbidden to entertain an incorrect thought regarding sacred offerings, as will be explained. Therefore, if a sacrifice was slaughtered not for its own sake, or a meal-offering had its handful taken not for its own sake, whether intentionally or unintentionally — one must complete the rest of the rites for their proper sake. Even if he slaughtered, received, and carried the blood with a thought of changing the designation, he must sprinkle it with a proper thought (Hilkhot Pesulei HaMukdashin 15:3).
Maimonides writes that it is forbidden to entertain an incorrect thought in sacrificial matters. The entire context there is a thought of 'not for its own sake' (as can be seen from the language of this halakhah itself and throughout the chapter there). By the phrase 'as will be explained' he apparently refers to the halakhah we saw above in chapter 18, which brings the source for the prohibition from the verse "it shall not be reckoned". If so, it is proven from here clearly that Maimonides sees a prohibition even in a thought of 'not for its own sake'.[16]
The conclusion is that RDD is apparently correct, and at least according to Maimonides there is no need for repetition of the rule of a thought of 'not for its own sake' in order for it to disqualify the sacrifice.[17]
Is Ritva’s distinction between a prohibition and a positive commandment?
Kehillot Yaakov (ibid., s.v. ve-hazinan) discusses several difficulties with Ritva’s words, and by force of them arrives at two reservations:
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There are prohibitions whose whole essence is merely a warning to fulfill a positive commandment.[18] With respect to such prohibitions, repetition is required even according to Ritva. In such cases the prohibition too will need repetition in order to invalidate.
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A prohibition that is inferred from a positive commandment, although in law it is treated as a positive commandment, does not require repetition for it to invalidate.
The conclusion is that Ritva’s distinction is not a distinction between positive commandments and prohibitions. In law, a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment, yet for our purposes it is considered a prohibition. By contrast, a prohibition that supports a positive commandment is, in law, a prohibition, yet for our purposes it is considered a positive commandment. How can these two deviations be explained?
The author of Kehillot Yaakov (s.v. u-lefi zeh) argues that the foundation of Ritva’s distinction lies in the content of the command: if it is a restraint, then repetition is not needed for it to invalidate. But if its content is action, then repetition is required in order for it to invalidate. The conclusion is that the distinction is not between prohibition and positive commandment (that is, in the formal legal status of the commandment in question), but between restraint and a command to act (that is, in its practical content). The two deviations are now very clear: a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is, in essence, a restraint. It may be lighter, and counted as a positive commandment, but its normative-halakhic content is restraint. By contrast, a prohibition that supports a positive commandment has the normative content of action and not restraint (in practice, it is a restraint from refraining).
In the following chapters we will propose an explanation both for Ritva’s distinction and for these two reservations.
D. A necessary introduction from the laws of prayer
Introduction
To understand the foundation of the matter, we must first introduce and examine a parallel aspect that arises in the laws of prayer. In this chapter we will begin from a distinction made by the Gemara regarding prayer after its proper time, and through it we will identify a fundamental characteristic of the domain of worship, which includes both prayer and sacrificial matters. In the following chapter we will try to understand from this why the rule 'we need Scripture to repeat it in order to make it indispensable' exists only in sacrificial matters, and through that we will also propose a way of understanding Ritva’s distinction that we saw above.
The passage at the beginning of the fourth chapter of Berakhot: prayer outside its proper time
The Mishnah and Gemara at the beginning of chapter 4 of Berakhot deal with the times of prayer. The Mishnah at the beginning of chapter 4 of Berakhot states:
The morning prayer is until noon; Rabbi Judah says: until four hours. The afternoon prayer is until evening; Rabbi Judah says until late afternoon. The evening prayer has no fixed time; and the additional prayer may be said all day (Rabbi Judah says: until seven hours).
And the Gemara there asks:
Does everyone hold that only until noon and no later? But Rav Mari son of Rav Huna son of Rabbi Jeremiah son of Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: If one erred and did not recite the evening prayer, he recites the morning prayer twice; if he missed the morning prayer, he recites the afternoon prayer twice! — One may continue praying all day long (Berakhot 26a).
The Gemara wonders why one may pray only until noon and no later, when it has already been ruled that there is also a possibility of compensation at the time of the next prayer.[19] The Gemara resolves:
Until noon — they give him the reward of prayer in its proper time; from then on — they give him the reward of prayer, but not the reward of prayer in its proper time (ibid.).
That is, until noon he is given the reward of prayer in its proper time, and from that point onward he is given the reward of prayer, but not the reward of prayer in its proper time. In other words, one can pray even after the time, but that prayer is not complete, and therefore the reward given for it is likewise not complete.
How are we to understand this distinction? Seemingly, here too there is a command (admittedly rabbinic) that does not invalidate. From where does the Gemara derive the assumption that the command regarding prayer does not invalidate? In what way is it different from any other command?
Explaining the distinction in light of the dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides regarding prayer[20]
To understand this, we must first note the dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides regarding the commandment of prayer. As is well known, Maimonides counts a Torah commandment to pray (Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 5). All the details of the laws (such as times, text, the number of prayers, and the like), however, are rabbinic additions even according to him. By contrast, Nachmanides in his glosses there sees prayer in all its particulars as a rabbinic commandment with no Torah root (except for prayer in a time of distress). Let us now return to the distinction that emerges in the sugya in Berakhot cited above.
According to Maimonides, the Gemara is interpreted quite simply. On his view there is a Torah obligation to pray, and no time is fixed for it. Therefore, one who prays after the time established by the Sages has fulfilled the Torah commandment of prayer. True, he did not fulfill the rabbinic rules that establish times for prayer. Therefore he receives reward for the Torah commandment of prayer, but not full reward for prayer in its proper time as the Sages required.[21]
What would Nachmanides say about this? How does he explain the distinction in the Gemara? If indeed the entire concept of prayer is rabbinic, both the basic obligation to pray and the details of the laws, what basis is there for seeing one who prays at the wrong time as having fulfilled anything? Why think that the times fixed by the Sages are not indispensable?
Under pressure one might explain that according to Nachmanides, even on the rabbinic plane itself there are two levels of enactment: first, an obligation to pray, without any binding details (like the Torah-level definition according to Maimonides); second, an obligation to do so according to the detailed rules fixed by the Sages. But this is strained. Why would the Sages enact things in that way? From where would the Gemara derive this, and why are all rabbinic enactments not interpreted in that way? Therefore this interpretation does not seem plausible.
Nachmanides’ view
It therefore seems that Nachmanides too recognizes the existence of Torah-level prayer. Nachmanides also agrees that there is a Torah-level concept of prayer (= the phenomenon of prayer as such), and his dispute with Maimonides concerns only the question whether we are commanded by the Torah to pray. Nachmanides too agrees that one who prayed before the revelation at Sinai performed an act of prayer, as part of the worship of God.[22]
Several later authorities wrote this explicitly. For example, in Hiddushei HaGr"h[23] a distinction is drawn, in Maimonides’ view, between fulfillment of the commandment of prayer and the phenomenon of prayer as such; and in the course of his remarks he adds:
And even according to those who disagree with Maimonides, that is only regarding its obligation. But its actual fulfillment and its essence are, according to everyone, by Torah law.
What did the Sages add to the Torah-level situation? It is not plausible that after the Torah was given, and certainly after the Sages enacted prayer, the original natural prayer was uprooted. One who prays, in whatever form, is still engaged in an act of prayer. When the Sages added the detailed laws of prayer, they certainly did not intend to uproot our natural and ordinary prayer, but to establish a new obligation, so that even one who does not want to pray (and according to Nachmanides is not obligated by the Torah) would nonetheless be required to do so. If so, one who prayed not in accordance with the details of the Sages’ enactments is certainly in no worse a position than one who offers Torah-level prayer. He certainly did not commit a prohibition, and it is reasonable that his act has value as worship of God. He simply did not fulfill the specific rabbinic law.
These points are true both according to Maimonides and according to Nachmanides. As we have seen, Nachmanides too agrees that there is a reality of prayer, even before the enactments of the Sages. On his view there is no Torah obligation to pray, but one who prays, his prayer is indeed prayer. Beyond that, as a second level, there is the enactment of the Sages to pray in the pattern they established, but the first level remained in place.
Now, when we ask what is the status of one who recited the morning prayer after the proper time, the answer is clear: his prayer is an act of value, and it certainly constitutes worship of God. The Sages’ enactment did not uproot this. True, he did not fulfill the rabbinic commandment of prayer (the morning prayer, in this case), because he did not do what they commanded, but it is clear that he prayed. Therefore the Gemara says that he received the reward of prayer, but not the reward of prayer in its proper time.
It should be noted that one can see this principle clearly from a detailed analysis of the course of the sugya in Berakhot, but this is not the place. We may now return to the discussion of the question of 'we need Scripture to repeat it in order to make it indispensable'.
E. The unique nature of the domain of sacrificial matters
Introduction
The fundamental question we asked was why specifically in the realm of sacrificial matters Scripture is interpreted in so unusual a way. Why is it that in all other areas of Jewish law, the rule is that, absent special circumstances, every law that appears in a verse is indispensable, whereas specifically in sacrificial matters it is not? To understand this, we will first say a little about the relationship between prayer and sacrifices, and between these two and the concept of worship.
Prayer and sacrifices as 'worship'
According to Maimonides, the commandment of prayer is a fundamental expression of the concept of worship, and thus he writes in Sefer HaMitzvot:
The fifth commandment is that we were commanded to serve Him, exalted be He. This command was repeated several times: as it says (Exodus 23:25), 'And you shall serve the Lord your God'; and it says (Deuteronomy 13:5), 'Him shall you serve'; and it says (Deuteronomy 6:13), 'Him shall you serve'; and it says (Deuteronomy 11:13), 'and to serve Him.' Although this command too is one of the general commands, as we explained in the Fourth Root, it nevertheless has a specific application, namely that He commanded prayer. The language of the Sifrei is: "And to serve Him' — this is prayer.' They also said: "And to serve Him' — this is Torah study.' And in the teaching of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean (section 12, p. 228) they said: 'From where do we know the essential place of prayer among the commandments? From here: 'The Lord your God shall you fear, and Him shall you serve." And they said (Midrash Tannaim from Midrash HaGadol, Re'eh): 'Serve Him through His Torah; serve Him in His Temple.' That is, to go there to pray in it and toward it, as Solomon, peace be upon him, explained (1 Kings 8; 2 Chronicles 6) (positive commandment 5).
Maimonides repeats here several times, and his sources are firmly rooted in the Sages, that worship of the heart is prayer. Prayer is essentially worship. Presumably Nachmanides does not disagree with this. Later in the sugya cited above (at the beginning of chapter 4 of Berakhot), the Gemara itself states that the prayers were instituted corresponding to the sacrifices.
The fact that we saw, according to which prayer that is not performed in accordance with the directives of the Sages is still prayer (albeit not complete), is based on the assumption that worship of God is a factual reality and not merely the result of a command. If a person serves God, then he has served God. This depends only on his intention and not on his actions. The detailed practical directives of Jewish law did not come to uproot natural worship, but to channel and direct it – at most to add to it, but not to replace it. Therefore the details of the laws of prayer did not come to remove the title of prayer from prayer that is performed as it was performed before the command, but only to add to it.
From here we can also learn regarding sacrificial worship. It is reasonable that here too, if a person offered a sacrifice in an intuitive manner, out of his own natural feeling, there is worship of God here. Even if he did so not in accordance with the law, a sacrifice has nonetheless been offered here and worship has nonetheless been performed here. This may be termed 'the phenomenon of worship' (like 'the phenomenon of prayer' according to Nachmanides). In actuality, there was worship here, even if not exactly according to the rules. In light of the Gemara in Berakhot, we may infer that he will receive reward for offering, even if not the reward for offering in all its details and refinements.
The conclusion is that when the Torah lays down detailed laws regarding sacrifices, it does not come to uproot natural worship of God. After all, long before the command the Patriarchs (and gentiles as well) already offered sacrifices to the Holy One, blessed be He. Just as they prayed even before the rabbinic command. In both cases, the halakhic command did not come in place of the simple natural layer, but in addition to it. Therefore, even if a person did things not in accordance with the details of Jewish law, there is still worship here in reality, and he will receive reward for it.
'Scripture repeated it in order to make it indispensable'
The essence of our proposal is that this is the root of the principle 'we need Scripture to repeat it in order to make it indispensable'. In the realm of sacrificial matters (and rabbinically, in prayer as well), the details of Jewish law do not invalidate after the fact. If someone offered a sacrifice without one of the details, this is indeed worship that is not complete, but it is still the phenomenon of worship of God.
From this was born the rule that in sacrificial matters 'we need Scripture to repeat it in order to make it indispensable'. So long as nothing explicit was written, there is no reason to assume that a halakhic detail that was not fulfilled uproots the intuitive meaning of worship of God embodied in the offering of the sacrifice. Only if the Torah says explicitly that it uproots the worship (when it repeats the command once again, or when it writes the word 'statute', and the like) – only then is it uprooted. In such cases, the Torah teaches that the worship performed in the previous ways is invalid (and not merely incomplete). But for this a special source is required, and the default assumption is that this is not the case.
Hence it is specifically in sacrificial matters that a special indication is needed in order to say that some halakhic detail is indispensable. The reason is that sacrificial matters belong to the domain of worship, and worship exists even when it is not performed in the halakhically perfect manner, as explained.
For this reason too, no source is needed for this rule, and it indeed arises from reason. Just as the concept of 'the phenomenon of prayer' in Nachmanides’ view is generated by reason without any source. We ourselves understand that if a person serves God in his own way, there is value in that. We also understand that the Torah does not come to deny the value of that act, except where it does so explicitly.
It is important to emphasize that we are not speaking here only of reasoning about the content of worship. That is, the reasoning with which we are dealing does not tell us that it is fitting to offer sacrifices. This reasoning tells us that even if a person offers sacrifices in an imperfect way, there is nevertheless value in this as worship of God. Such reasoning belongs only to cultic commandments, such as sacrifices and prayer. Moral commandments, by contrast, even though they too are grounded in reason, do not belong to this family. Here reason does not necessarily instruct us that this is worship of God, but only that it is important to do it.[24] By contrast, with sacrifices and prayer this reasoning teaches that this is worship of God, and not merely that it is important to do it.[25]
The difference between a positive commandment and a prohibition: Ritva and the reservations of Kehillot Yaakov
We saw that the basis of the rule 'we need Scripture to repeat it in order to make it indispensable' is that if the Torah commands us to do something while offering the sacrifice, then even if we did not do it – the sacrifice is still a sacrifice, and the worship is still worship. When there is a positive commandment to do something at the time of the offering, then even an offering without that detail will still be considered worship, albeit not complete.
But what happens when we are dealing with a prohibition? In such a case, the Torah itself explicitly commands us not to do something, and by that it informs us that this act is a defective act (and not merely an incomplete one). That is, here it is clear that its intent was to uproot something from the natural and intuitive acts that we might perhaps have done earlier. Therefore it imposed a prohibition on this, and did not suffice with a positive command (which in sacrificial matters is perceived as only an initial requirement).
For example, if the Sages had instructed us not to pray after the proper time, then one who did so would receive no reward at all; this would be a commandment fulfilled through a transgression. But what exists in the laws of prayer is an instruction to pray at the proper time, and therefore even one who did not do so – still prayed and served God.
From this there emerges clearly and naturally Ritva’s distinction. Only with positive commandments do we require 'Scripture repeated it in order to make it indispensable'; but with prohibitions, it is clear that they invalidate even if Scripture did not repeat them. A prohibition invalidates by its very definition.
From here we can also understand very well the two reservations that we saw above in the name of the author of Kehillot Yaakov. We saw there that Ritva’s distinction is not aimed at the formal-halakhic axis of prohibition versus positive commandment, but at the practical axis of restraint versus action. If this command tells us that some act is defective, then it has no value even if Scripture did not repeat this. But if the command tells us to do something, then even if we did not do it, our remaining act still has the value of worship, unless Scripture explains to us (by repeating the command) that this is not so. It makes no difference whether this is a formal prohibition or a positive commandment; the question is what the content of the command is.
The disqualification of 'for its own sake'
We can now return to the point at which the question arose. We saw that Tosafot ask why the Gemara thinks that the requirement of 'for its own sake' should invalidate even without Scripture repeating it. According to our analysis, a very simple solution emerges, even without directly invoking Ritva’s principle (which, as we saw, may not be accepted by all). The fact that prayer not performed according to its regulation is still prayer rests on the fact that the person intends to serve God. If there is intention, then even if the act does not conform to the details of Jewish law, in the end he has served God in actuality. But lip movement without intention and without the motivation of worship of God clearly accomplishes nothing. No one would call such a thing worship of God without there being a command for it. Therefore such intention is indispensable. The very same reason that generally yields 'we need Scripture to repeat it in order to make it indispensable' also yields that, with respect to the basic motivation, repetition of the verse is not needed for it to invalidate.
It should be noted that specifically after the enactment of the Sages, perhaps such an act can have significance – for once prayer became a formal commandment-act, there may perhaps also be some value to prayer without intention (though this already depends on the question whether commandments require intention or not, and on the special intentions in prayer).[26] Worship of God in its natural sense has no significance at all without intention. What is the meaning of mumbling the words of prayer if there is no intention to serve God and there is no command to do so?
For this very reason, R. Chaim[27] writes that this basic intention in prayer is indispensable according to all views (even according to the one who says that commandments do not require intention). Without the basic intention of worship of God, such worship has no meaning at all.[28]
It is reasonable to assume that in sacrifices too the situation is similar. We saw that sacrifices offered not in accordance with the instructions of the Torah are still worship of value (though not complete). But that is only if they were offered 'for their own sake'. A sacrifice that was offered 'not for its own sake' has no value of its own without a command.[29] Therefore the Gemara determines in its question that if there is a source commanding us to offer 'for its own sake', we should have disqualified worship that was performed 'not for its own sake'. Here it is not necessary that the Torah repeat the command in order to teach us that this command is indispensable. Worship that is not 'for its own sake' cannot have the value of worship of God in itself, and no special source is needed for that. It should be noted that only after sacrifices become a commandment in the formal sense (as happens to prayer on the rabbinic plane, after the enactments) perhaps there is value even to offering 'not for its own sake' (as there is to prayer without intention).
It could be understood that this too is what stands behind the essence of RDD’s answer, which states that there is a prohibition here. His claim is that worship not offered 'for its own sake' is defective by its very definition, even if there is no repetition in Scripture. As we have seen, this is precisely what is called a prohibition, and therefore with a prohibition no repetition is needed in order to teach invalidation.
But now we can go one step further, and reject Hatam Sofer’s objections to RDD. RDD’s claim was that in a thought of 'not for its own sake' there is the prohibition of "it shall not be reckoned", and therefore no biblical duplication is needed to derive invalidation. We saw that, as Hatam Sofer argues against him, this claim is problematic, since not everyone agrees that the prohibition of "it shall not be reckoned" applies to a thought of 'not for its own sake' that does not disqualify the sacrifice (even in understanding Maimonides’ view the opinions are divided, although we saw that his intention certainly does appear to be so).
But according to our approach, the matter is readily resolved. Even if Hatam Sofer is correct and there is no formal prohibition on a thought of 'not for its own sake', it is still clear that the requirement of 'for its own sake' is, by its very nature, indispensable. As we saw in Kehillot Yaakov, wherever there is a command that is one of restraint, even if it is not formally a prohibition, it invalidates even without repetition. The same may be said here: even if there were no additional verse commanding us to offer 'for its own sake', it is clear that one who did not offer 'for its own sake' did not perform worship, and therefore this is indispensable, exactly as in ordinary matters.
To be sure, all this explains the Gemara’s question that slaughter not done 'for its own sake' should be disqualified. But in the conclusion, the rule of 'for its own sake' does not invalidate, and the Gemara derives this from vow and gift offerings: the sacrifice is not disqualified; only the acceptance is impaired. It is reasonable that this itself is the principle that we have seen: here we are not speaking of the basic intention that conditions the very meaning of the offering, for here we are dealing with the specific requirement of 'for its own sake' and not with the thought of offering it as a sacrifice. Regarding atonement, however, it is clear that without a thought of 'for its own sake' there is no room for atonement, and therefore in law it does not atone. And this is apparently exactly what is learned from the verse that the Gemara brings regarding vow and gift offerings. In order to disqualify the sacrifice itself, an additional command repeated so as to make it indispensable would have been necessary.
[1] See, for example, Zevahim 23b and parallels.
[2] See, for example, Hazon Ish, Nega'im §12, s.k. 20, s.v. ve-ze de-ba'inan; Kehillot Yaakov, Zevahim, end of §5, s.v. hashta.
[3] See the introduction of Keren Orah to tractate Zevahim, and Hiddushei HaGriz at the beginning of Zevahim. Their remarks require very careful scrutiny, and Rabbi Lichtenstein already noted this at the beginning of his lectures on tractate Zevahim (see Shiurei HaRav Aharon Lichtenstein, Zevahim, Alon Shevut, 1999, p. 41).
[4] To the best of our knowledge, only the Radbaz ad loc. notes this, but he too rejects this distinction outright and presses Maimonides’ language.
[5] See Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah at the end of chapter 4 of Zevahim, where he understood that the tannaim disagreed on this point. Rashi and most of the medieval authorities there interpreted the Mishnah differently. See for practical law Maimonides, Hilkhot Pesulei HaMukdashin 14:1.
[6] In his novellae to tractate Zevahim 2a, s.v. be-matnitin; and in his novellae on Hilkhot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 4:11 (especially s.v. ve-ha-nir'eh lomar). See also Rabbi Lichtenstein’s lectures on Zevahim, p. 53 and onward.
[7] Jewish law contains several special intentions that are indispensable: for example, the intention in dwelling in the sukkah ("so that your generations may know") according to the Tur in Orah Hayyim 625 (see also Bayit Hadash, s.k. 1, and Mishnah Berurah, s.k. 1 there), and intention in prayer according to R. Chaim in Maimonides’ view (see Hiddushei R. Chaim HaLevi on Maimonides’ Hilkhot Tefillah 4:1), and the like.
[8] There, s.v. ve-eima. See also Shittah Mekubbetzet on that page, s.k. 10, in the name of Tosafot of R. Peretz.
[9] One may raise a slight point from the sugya on 46b, where an additional source for this rule is brought (from the word 'burnt offering'). See Tosafot on Zevahim 2a, s.v. kol ha-zevahim.
[10] Hoshen Mishpat, addenda §204.
[11] 53a, s.v. had le-onesh ve-had le-azharah.
[12] In Kehillot Yaakov, Zevahim, note to §5, another proof is brought from the sugya in Menahot 59b: "The Rabbis taught: 'He shall place no oil upon it' — and if he placed it, it is disqualified." See also Sha'ar HaMelekh (Hilkhot Korban Pesah 1:1, especially s.v. ve-ayin Hiddushei HaRitva), who discusses this at length, and Responsa Beit HaLevi, part 1, end of §30 (s.v. ve-ra'iti le-Sha'ar HaMelekh).
[13] Although this prohibition is not counted in the enumeration of the commandments, this was already explained in Sefer HaHinukh (ed. Machon Yerushalayim, Jerusalem 1988, p. 90), at the end of commandment 144, s.v. ve-khen me-inyan.
[14] Later authorities already noted, however, that Rashi on Menahot 2b (in the parallel sugya), s.v. ve-nedavah, seems to contradict this. There a different source is brought for this point (see Hiddushei HaGriz on Maimonides, Hilkhot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 4:11). And in Beit HaLevi (cited above), it is written as a simple matter that the prohibition of 'it shall not be reckoned' also speaks about a thought of 'not for its own sake' (his proof being from Rashi at the beginning of Zevahim), and afterward he notes the language of Maimonides that we will bring below.
[15] Nachmanides’ glosses to Maimonides’ Sefer HaMitzvot, Forgotten Prohibitions (the commandments he adds to Maimonides’ enumeration), fourth commandment.
[16] It should be noted that Kehillot Yaakov (there, s.v. ve-ha-Hatam Sofer) explains that the fact that with a thought of 'not for its own sake' the sacrifice did not count for the owner toward fulfillment of his obligation is itself considered loss to the sacrifice, and therefore it falls under the prohibition of 'it shall not be reckoned'. According to our explanation, this is unnecessary, for the definition of the prohibition is not specifically loss to the sacrifice – that is only the definition of the addition received by tradition to the prohibition. We further note that our remarks also remove the force of his question in s.v. ella she-adayin, and of the entire discussion he conducts there.
[17] And in Beit HaLevi cited above (s.v. ze eino), he resolved Tosafot’s question together with Maimonides’ view by distinguishing between the Gemara’s initial assumption and its conclusion.
[18] The source of this distinction in such a category of prohibitions is Nachmanides in his novellae to Kiddushin 34a, with respect to the commandment of a parapet. It should be noted that later authorities used his principle to resolve a number of difficulties in various contexts – see, for example, Divrei Yehezkel, by R. Yehezkel Bernstein (published in Israel; publication details are not listed), §15 branch 3 (p. 152), regarding feeding minors on Yom Kippur, and more.
[19] We will not enter here into the puzzling conflation in the Gemara between compensatory prayer and prayer outside its proper time. At this stage, it seems that the Gemara identifies these two concepts; there are medieval authorities whose words suggest that this identity remains even in the conclusion of the sugya as well, but this is not the place to elaborate.
[20] See a fuller treatment in our article in Midah Tovah on Parashat Toledot, 5767.
[21] All this depends on the definitions we proposed in our aforementioned article on Parashat Toledot; see there.
[22] On the distinction between fulfillment and obligation in commandments, see my article in Midah Tovah on Parashat Vayeshev, 5767.
[23] On Hilkhot Tefillah, 4:1.
[24] Therefore, performing such commandments without recognition that the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded us in them has moral value but not religious value. See on this my article 'On Causing a Secular Jew to Sin,' Tzohar 25, pp. 11–13 (based on Maimonides at the end of chapter 8 of Hilkhot Melakhim).
[25] Therefore, with cultic commandments there is no such thing as performance not rooted in worship of God (compare my remarks in the previous note). A similar distinction appears in my article, 'Commandment, Reason, and the Will of God (An analysis of the measure and manner of separating terumah).' It is to appear, God willing, in Tzohar 30.
[26] The author of Nefesh HaHayyim elaborates on this, in Gate 3.
[27] There, in Hilkhot Tefillah.
[28] Admittedly, such a basic intention can also be supplied through a mechanism of 'an unspecified act is presumed to be for its own sake', as in the sugya at the beginning of Zevahim, but this is not the place to elaborate.
[29] It would seem that this reasoning applies primarily to thoughts of aroma and pleasingness, and less to changing the sacrifice’s designation and changing its owner.