Simultaneous Subordination to Normative Systems Parallel to the Will of God

2006

Jewish faith is unique in several respects. One of the most prominent among them is the commitment derived from it to a detailed and comprehensive system of norms: Jewish law. Therefore, a discussion that deals with subordination to Jewish law, or to God's will in its broader sense (as will be clarified below), is in itself an indirect engagement with problems of faith. However, the discussion that follows, whose subject is the possibility of being subject to other normative systems simultaneously with subordination to the Torah system of Jewish law, touches the realm of faith far more directly. In such a discussion we will, naturally, arrive at a direct engagement with the fundamental source of the obligation to Jewish law and to Torah in general, namely faith in God.

Part One

Introduction: The Problem of Polynormativity

A. Presenting the Problem

The question of subordination to normative systems in general, and the possibility of subordination to several parallel normative systems (which will hereafter be called 'polynormativity') in particular, arises in various contexts in philosophy, especially in the philosophy of law. In recent times this question has underlain various dilemmas concerning the path of Judaism, and of the commandment-observant Jew. In these contexts dilemmas arise from a lack of fit between the principles of Judaism (at least in their traditional sense) and modern reality and modern values, or the directives of civil law, and the like.

It is important to distinguish here between two different planes of discussion:

1. Whether, and how, values from 'outside' can be introduced into the halakhic framework. This question deals with the subject of changes in Jewish law, or with the relation between conservatism and innovation.
2. Whether Jewish law needs to be changed at all, or whether one can also be subject to an external value system alongside subordination to Jewish law.[1]

The methods of discussion in these questions can also be divided into two types:

• Halakhic discussions. These discussions are conducted in light of halakhic precedents, that is, the positions of halakhic decisors and various thinkers, or in light of an examination of authoritative Jewish sources.
• A priori-conceptual discussions, analytical in character. Such a discussion deals with questions about the terms that make up the dilemma: what is 'Jewish law'? What is 'subordination'? What is a 'normative system'? The methods of such a discussion are philosophical, primarily a priori, and not ordinary halakhic methods.[2]

There is a clear connection between the form of the discussion and the plane of the question with which we are dealing. One who addresses the question on plane 1 (how, if at all, Jewish law can be changed), a question internal to Jewish law in character, must conduct the discussion by means of type A methods (halakhic methods, and perhaps also Torah-based meta-halakhic methods). He must examine what changes Jewish law permits, primarily in light of precedents. By contrast, one who addresses the question on plane 2 (subordination to parallel normative systems) cannot examine it from within one of the systems, and certainly not from within the halakhic system, but only from outside the two systems under discussion. As will be clarified immediately, and in greater detail later, it is impossible to decide about subordination to a normative system by means of tools, or according to principles, drawn from the system under discussion.

Thus a substantial problem plainly arises here: how can one decide a question that is, by its very nature, external to the system? By means of what system (normative, logical, or other) shall we decide such a question? There is no doubt that the paths to decision here must be based on extra-systemic principles (a priori), and as far as possible on principles regarded as universal. It is important to emphasize that since this is a meta-normative decision, no precedent can have decisive significance in a question of this sort. Precedents, by their very nature, are drawn from within one of the systems, and therefore they can serve at most as illustration, or as prompts for thinking in a certain direction. A statement by Maimonides, and even by Moses our Master, regarding the scope of obligation to the Torah system cannot have authoritative significance with respect to the question under discussion.[3] Therefore the discussion of question 2 will be conducted by means of type B methods (philosophical, a priori).[4]

Against this background, it is clear that the discussion of the second question, namely the one dealing with subordination as such to normative systems external to Jewish law, poses a different challenge to those who engage it. This question is essential and vital for grounding a Torah position, but it cannot be examined with the tools customarily used in treating other halakhic topics. As stated, one cannot challenge exclusive subordination to Jewish law while at the same time relying on the authority of halakhic precedents. In this context, the conclusions of the a priori discussion are decisive. Even if a precedent is indeed found for a position rejected by the a priori consideration, we must reject it, or at most remain with the matter unresolved and requiring further study.[5]

Despite the foregoing, and this is the other side of the same coin, it is also clear that even if the a priori discussion yields a theoretical possibility of a polynormative situation, this does not mean that such a situation enjoys Torah legitimacy. It is entirely possible, for example, that denial of a basic principle of faith is a coherent and possible stance on the meta-normative plane, or on the plane of fundamental philosophy. If that is so, an a priori discussion will detect no problem in such a view. But clearly such a discussion cannot determine the halakhic legitimacy of such a view. Here the issue of subordination to parallel systems must be examined on the basis of precedents and discussion of halakhic sources, that is, by an a posteriori examination. The discussion here will be conducted by the first method mentioned above. This will become clearer as we proceed.

In any event, it is precisely on this plane of discussion, the a posteriori one, that we arrive at the subject of the present book: faith. Here polynormativity is examined through the prism of faith, that is, in a discussion of the source of validity of the normative systems in question. Behind the halakhic system stands an entity that gives it its meaning: God. The question is how one can be subject to parallel systems when behind them stands an entity, or source of validity, other than God (and perhaps not even an 'entity' in the ontological sense). As we shall see toward the end, this is a discussion that touches the very nerve center of questions of faith and heresy.

Shai A. Wosner's article, 'On the Meaning of Loyalty to Jewish Law' (Akdamot, no. 11; hereafter: Wosner), is a clear example of discussion of this second question.[6] Wosner argues that one can be subject to several normative systems simultaneously, and therefore the discussion of how to act when a contradiction arises between Jewish law and values external to it is not always bound up either with changing Jewish law or with the surrender of the parallel system in favor of Jewish law.[7] This is a contradiction between parallel and distinct normative systems, and therefore it must be resolved by means external to both systems under discussion (this is a common problem in various moral theories, which discuss the possibility of deciding between conflicting values, or the very possibility of establishing a hierarchy of values).[8]

It is therefore no surprise that Wosner rightly prefaces his remarks with the reservation (see the end of section A there) that all the precedents he discusses are primarily illustrative in significance. As we saw above, the foundation of the discussion of this second question lies on the a priori plane, and therefore this is indeed the proper way to proceed when dealing with it. Nevertheless, and despite that reservation, Wosner in his article places specifically the emphasis on precedents, and therefore I have the feeling that the a priori aspects required for dealing with this question have not received the examination they deserve (either in his work or generally). Below we shall see that the same is true with respect to the a posteriori aspects, and therefore they too will be discussed as we proceed.

In this article I wish to examine the second question, namely the possibility of polynormativity with respect to Jewish law. That is, we shall try to examine whether, for the believing person, there exists the possibility of being subject simultaneously to an additional normative system. As we have seen, in examining such a question we cannot suffice with a discussion of precedents, and we must examine it also, and perhaps chiefly, from a conceptual-a priori perspective. As stated, later an additional layer of discussion will appear, an a posteriori, internally halakhic layer. But before beginning the discussion we must sharpen somewhat further the issue before us, and that is the subject of the next chapter.

B. Sharpening the Question: Polynormativity with Respect to 'Jewish Law' and to 'God's Will'

In order to remove misunderstandings that may arise in the course of the discussion, we must consider whether God's will can also find expression on non-halakhic planes.

It may be argued that God's will is that we uphold moral imperatives, the law of the state, or additional norms beyond halakhic norms. If so, then ostensibly there is here a possible Torah basis for subordination to additional systems beyond Jewish law, that is, for polynormativity. Many sources can be brought in support of such an approach, beginning with the Torah (and you shall do what is right and good, 'and you shall do what is right and good'; its ways are ways of pleasantness, 'its ways are ways of pleasantness'; the law of the kingdom is law, 'the law of the kingdom is law'; and the like), and continuing in traditional halakhic practice.

It seems to me that there is not much novelty in such an approach, for sages and halakhic decisors frequently employ considerations of this kind. Beyond that, it is clear that for the most part they all treat such problems as problems internal to Jewish law, or at least internal to Torah. According to many approaches, the accepted interpretation of the very term 'Jewish law' is: the collection of commands that express God's will for man, or at least the binding part of God's will ('beyond the letter of the law,' 'pious conduct,' 'to satisfy Heaven,' and the like are usually not perceived as part of the halakhic system, even though no one disagrees that they certainly express God's will).[9]

The matter can also be viewed from a somewhat different angle: there is no essential difference between an approach that understands reason as a legitimate source for creating halakhic obligations (as the Talmud states explicitly: why do I need a verse? It is reason, 'why do I need a verse? It is reason'; if you wish, say Scripture, and if you wish, say reason, 'if you wish, say Scripture, and if you wish, say reason'), and an approach that argues that these obligations are not halakhic yet nevertheless bind.[10] This is chiefly a semantic question, and therefore it too is not our concern here. It follows that the distinction between extra-halakhic divine will and Jewish law is of only limited value, at least in our context.

The upshot of all this is that even if a clash arises between Jewish law, in its narrower sense, and other demands of the Torah (or of the Holy One, blessed be He), that is, other parts of God's will, this is in fact an internal Torah problem, and some would say: an internal halakhic one.[11] Quite a few such situations appear in Torah literature, and pointing this out involves no significant novelty.

Therefore what is called for here is examination of a different question, one that some contemporary discussions (such as those mentioned above) seem specifically to raise: an approach of subordination to several different normative systems, which will be called here 'polynormativity.' This approach advances the following claim: admittedly, God's will, in its broadest sense (and not necessarily in the narrow halakhic sense), leads to decision A; but a different normative system, to which the Jew can also be subject, instructs him to act in a different direction (B). In such a situation, despite the Torah's instruction (God's will in the broad sense just mentioned), a person may choose direction B while taking into account the 'price' of violating God's will (the formulation is taken from Wosner's article; see there and in the continuation of our discussion in part three).[12] This is the question with which the present article deals.

The dilemma of polynormativity can be examined on three different planes:

1. One may examine whether polynormativity is a coherent situation from the standpoint of general philosophy. This plane requires analysis and justification from an a priori philosophical perspective (plane 2 of discussion and method B above). Later I shall show that from the a priori standpoint this is indeed a coherent situation.
2. The second plane of examination is empirical in nature. We must examine the factual claim that there are situations in which a person finds himself subject to two normative systems. It seems clear to me that such cases do indeed exist. Many idolaters, or various kinds of heretics, are in such situations. For example, many believers in dualism (association, or the various forms of dualism) are of this kind. Therefore the results of examination on this plane are clear, and we shall hardly deal with it in the present discussion.
3. The third plane is the substantive discussion (plane 1 of discussion and method A above): whether one can accept as Jewishly legitimate subordination to another normative system, even one external to (and perhaps even contradictory to) God's will. It is important to sharpen and say that the claim about the halakhic-Jewish legitimacy of a polynormative position is not a claim about one Jew or another (there is no empirical claim here that some Jew holds a polynormative position; that belongs to the previous plane). Nor is it a philosophical claim (that polynormativity is a possible situation; that belongs to the first plane). This is a claim about the Torah. That is, the discussion here is whether the Torah allows a Jew to act against the system of God's will while being aware of the price and taking responsibility for his act, and at the same time define himself as Torah-and-commandment observant (perhaps in the more common sense: 'Orthodox'). In terms of the philosophy of law, there is here a question about the possibility of something like a 'conscientious objection' to God's will. It is on this plane that, as mentioned above, the discussion passes into the ordinary halakhic plane.

Clearly one must distinguish, at least on the third plane of discussion, between different kinds of normative systems. It may be that there are systems which, from the standpoint of God's will, are 'optional matters,' that is, they do not touch the Torah's commands (God's will). But even if the intent is an external normative system whose content does not contradict the Torah, one must examine whether such a situation does not create a problem similar to that involved in dualistic belief, for there is here acceptance of an additional yoke alongside the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven. Clearly such a problem exists all the more with respect to a system that contradicts the Torah (though there, of course, there are also more direct and obvious problems).

As stated, if the claim about polynormativity is an a priori claim, that is, a claim on the first plane, or an empirical one, that is, a claim on the second plane, then as will be shown below these are indeed possible situations. As I already mentioned, and as will be elaborated below, this is the classic situation of heresy. But, as stated, it is unlikely that the claim of those who advocate polynormativity (if there are any such people) is simply: we are heretics. That is a trivial claim devoid of value, at least in the context of a Torah-halakhic discussion. Therefore it appears that at least in some cases the claim being presented is that this enjoys Torah legitimacy, and that is the third plane of discussion.

Already from the preliminary discussion above it emerges that a claim of Torah legitimacy for polynormativity with respect to God's will is highly problematic. At first glance it is very difficult to understand how one can act against God's will and at the same time receive Torah legitimacy for doing so. Beyond that, one must ask whether such a conception does not itself indicate non-subordination to God's will, which by its very nature is total. This problem will be discussed later in the article.

We shall now begin a more systematic discussion along the lines sketched above. In the next part of the article (the second) we shall examine the a priori possibility of the existence of a situation in which there is subordination to parallel normative systems (polynormativity), and even contradictory ones. Can such a situation arise at all, and does it not contain an internal contradiction? This is the first plane of discussion. After showing that the matter is a priori possible, I shall return to discussion of the other two planes, and especially the third one, that of Torah legitimacy, which is the more substantial. This discussion is divided into two parts: in the third part of the article we shall engage in an initial, pre-halakhic a posteriori discussion; and in the fourth part we shall engage in a Torah-halakhic discussion. Finally, there will be a concluding chapter.

Part Two

A Priori Analysis: Is a Polynormative Approach Coherent?

C. A Priori Analysis of Polynormative Situations

For the sake of an a priori examination of a polynormative situation, we adopt, as stated above, general philosophical methods. To do so, we must define several basic concepts (which will be underlined below), and examine the possible relations among them. The discussion is somewhat formal, and therefore I shall try to abbreviate it as much as possible, but in my opinion it is difficult to avoid it entirely for the reasons clarified above.

'A normative system', in the sense to be discussed below, is a system that contains at least two components:

1. A collection of commands (norms) that bind those subject to it. These commands must be: (a) unambiguous (not vague); (b) non-contradictory, or at least contain unambiguous rules of conduct even for situations of contradiction.
2. A collection of means of interpretation. Deliberately I do not use the term 'rules' here, because this component is problematic. The rules of interpretation cannot be defined absolutely and objectively, and there may be disputes as to what these rules are in relation to a given normative system, and even whether one should speak of 'rules' here in the rigid sense ordinarily attached to that term.[13]

'Subordination' to the normative system means, of course, that the person undertakes an obligation (at some level, not necessarily a full one) to carry out everything the system requires of him according to its interpretive rules, at least as he himself understands them.

We must now ask ourselves how such subordination comes about. There is no doubt that the principle from which subordination to the normative system is derived is not found within the system itself. If that principle were found within the system itself, a fundamental problem would arise: how am I subject to this very principle before I have decided, in principle, to be subject to the system?

For example, subordination to Jewish law cannot itself be a halakhic principle. For if it were a halakhic principle, then the question of subordination to this very principle would itself arise within the same discussion.[14] Therefore it is clear that the principle that determines subordination to any system, and in particular to Jewish law, is always found outside the system under discussion.[15]

One can also arrive at this determination from a different angle. The existence of a certain normative system is a fact. All its propositions amount to a demand that someone makes of me, and therefore they are nothing more than a fact: there is a system (or: an entity; see below) that demands from me a set of demands. A person's obligation to such a system is a value norm (moral, religious, civil, or other), resulting from a decision the person takes upon himself to commit and be subject to the system. The mere fact that someone commands me to do something is not enough to create in me an obligation to fulfill that command. It is well known that there is no way to infer an evaluative conclusion from a factual datum.[16]

Thus once again, and this time from a different angle, we encounter the claim that in order to ground or justify a decision to be subject to some normative system, one must rely on a principle that determines the reason for this subordination. We saw above that this principle is necessarily found outside the system under discussion. Here we have added that it also cannot be a mere fact, for if it were, it would not remedy our difficulty (if it is merely factual, it too cannot constitute a sufficient basis for creating obligation or subordination, just like the system of commands itself).[17]

Let us bring another example of this claim. If we wish to ground an evaluative conclusion, such as that acts of kindness are worthy of being done, on the assumption that acts of kindness benefit the needy person (and, in another sense, also the benefactor), we cannot do so. The fact that acts of kindness benefit the needy person is a fact. One cannot infer values from facts. To ground the conclusion in question, we must appeal to a super-principle that is not factual, such as: one ought to benefit others.[18] If we continue the example, we would say that the proposition that someone commands me to do good to others also cannot provide sufficient grounding for the norm in question. The reason is that this too is only a fact. To complete the grounding and infer the normative duty, we will need an additional principle saying that for some reason there is an obligation to obey that someone's directives.

Thus our conclusion so far is that in order to create obligation to some normative system, we need a principle that lies outside the system under discussion. This principle must have an evaluative dimension (and not be merely factual), and it is what bridges the factual plane (the existence of a normative system) and the evaluative-normative plane (the obligation, or subordination, to that system).

In light of the foregoing, let us now define the concept of a 'value principle'. This is the principle whose role is to bridge the gap between the factual plane and the normative plane. As stated, this principle lies outside the normative system, and its role is to confer 'value' on the commands of the normative system (at least for me), in order to create my obligation to it. The value principle is a bridge between the facts (that there are commands) and the normative obligation with respect to them (subordination to them).

This bridging principle, which as stated above necessarily lies outside the system under discussion, expresses a reason for a person's decision to undertake subordination to the system of norms. This decision can be based on recognition of the wisdom or goodness of the normative system, or of the one who commanded us to obey it, or on fear of the consequences of not fulfilling its principles, or on gratitude toward the commander, or even on an arbitrary decision without any foundation at all (as in Yeshayahu Leibowitz's approach to subordination to Jewish law), and the like.[19]

We now distinguish between two different kinds of value principles:

1. It is possible that the decision to be subject to the normative system is reached by a particular examination of each of the norms included in it, and acceptance of each one separately. Such a principle we shall call a 'particular value principle'.
2. It is also possible to make such a decision in a sweeping manner, as a result of a priori trust in the one who created this system and commanded us to keep it (= the source of authority), or a priori trust in the system itself for some other reason.[20] This is a 'blanket value principle'. Such a principle usually constitutes an a priori motive for accepting obligation to the whole system as a single unit.[21]

We shall now define two kinds of normative systems:

1. 'Partial systems'. These are systems whose demands leave a neutral margin, that is, in real-life situations falling within that margin they demand nothing of those obligated to them.
2. 'Complete systems'. These are systems that impose commands in all areas of human activity (and perhaps also thought). In such systems there is no margin of neutral situations.

Let us now examine the possible relations between two different normative systems. If both are complete systems, then the relation between them is one of two possible kinds: (1) they completely overlap, in which case (at least de facto) there is no situation here of two different systems;[22] or (2) they contradict one another.

In a situation of two complete systems, when the directives of each system are unambiguous (assumption A in the definition of a normative system above), there is no possibility of a third type of relation between two 'complete' systems.[23]

If the two normative systems are 'partial,' then in addition to the two previous kinds of relation there may in principle also be a state of disjointness, that is, the parallel existence of the two systems, which are different and at the same time non-contradictory (they simply deal with disjoint sets of real situations).[24]

We now ask: can there be a coherent and rational situation in which a person is subject to two different, even contradictory, normative systems? Is there not here incoherence, or an internal contradiction, within that person's worldview? As noted, clarification of this question is the aim of the present chapter.

Here we must distinguish among different situations, involving the two kinds of value principles and the two kinds of normative systems. If both systems are 'complete,' then in a case of overlap there is subordination to only one system. But where there is difference between them, they necessarily contradict, and therefore it would seem at first glance that one cannot be subject to both simultaneously.

But that is not precise. If the value principles underlying the two systems are particular value principles, then indeed one cannot accept obligation to both systems together. If the value principle is particular, then obligation to the system in question is based on examination of each of its principles. Therefore, in a polynormative situation in such a context there is a simultaneous acceptance of a principle and its opposite. On the other hand, if at least one of the principles underlying these systems is a blanket principle, a situation of subordination to both is possible despite the contradiction. The subordination is interpreted as an obligation to fulfill both. Admittedly, here that is an obligation incapable of realization, and therefore a normative dilemma is created.

For example, if a person accepts upon himself the halakhic system because of a 'blanket value principle,' such as an obligation to fulfill what his Creator commands him out of gratitude toward Him, then there is not necessarily a recognition that each of the system's principles has a particular grounding acceptable to him in itself. If so, a situation may arise in which one of the commands contradicts a norm of another normative system to which he is subject, for example the system of human morality (at least as he himself understands it). Such a situation is possible whether the value principle of the second system is blanket or particular.

It is clear that if we had a particular value principle for each and every commandment, then the obligation to destroy Amalek would be individually justified in itself, and if that truly were acceptable to us, no contradiction could arise between this command and any moral principle.[25]

If at least one of the systems is partial, then in the first two types of relation between them (overlap or contradiction) the situation is similar to that described with respect to 'complete' systems. If the relation is one of parallel existence (that is, no contradiction between them), then this is the trivial case, and it is quite clear that there is no a priori restriction on accepting obligation, or subordination, to both together.[26]

Our conclusion from this chapter is that a situation of subordination to several normative systems is a priori possible, and indeed coherent from the logical-philosophical standpoint, in two cases: (1) when both systems are partial and disjoint, so that there is no contradiction between them; (2) when there is an area of overlap between them (when one of them is complete, or also in partial systems that deal with non-disjoint domains), so long as the value principle underlying at least one of them is blanket. If the value principles for both systems are particular, this is impossible.

Thus even polynormativity involving contradictory systems (and certainly non-contradictory ones) is a priori possible, that is, logically coherent. Of course, when there is a contradiction between the two systems under discussion, the person subject to both systems, if he is in such a contradictory situation, must decide which of them he obeys in the situation at hand.

This conclusion is on the a priori-philosophical plane. We must now apply this description to the situation of simultaneous subordination to different normative systems, one of which is the halakhic system.

First, we must examine whether the halakhic system is 'complete' or 'partial.' This depends on the question whether there are discretionary areas within Torah and Jewish law, and this is not the place to discuss it.[27] We saw above that situations of polynormativity are possible in either case (whether the system is complete or partial). The matter depends on what value principles underlie the Torah-halakhic system. Thus, in practice, it is more important to understand what value principle lies at the basis of subordination to Jewish law.

In most cases, and perhaps in all of them, this is a 'blanket value principle' (for example, the assumption that one must obey the Creator of the world, the duty of gratitude, and the like). It is hard to see a particular value principle underlying subordination to Jewish law. Such a situation would describe a person who accepts subordination to Jewish law only after examining each halakhic principle in all its details and accepting it separately.[28]

In a footnote above we cited in this regard Rava's words in the Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 88a, in his debate with the Sadducee, where we saw a clear approach of a blanket value principle.

One may describe Reform, or other similar movements,[29] as movements that accept the yoke of Jewish law in light of particular value principles, and therefore do not accept upon themselves the yoke of some of the laws (those that do not pass the particular test). Orthodoxy, by its very nature, is built on blanket value principles (of course every Orthodox Jew may have a different value principle, but it seems that it will always be blanket).

From this discussion a surprising conclusion emerges. It is precisely the Orthodox person who, as we have seen, accepts upon himself the yoke of Jewish law as a result of a blanket value principle, and not a particular one, who is exposed to the emergence of situations of subordination to contradictory systems. By contrast, the Reform Jew, who accepts upon himself Jewish law in light of particular value principles, in a situation of contradiction generally will not accept upon himself the yoke of the halakhah that seems problematic to him. As was already mentioned above, questions concerning Reform are usually questions that deal with changes in Jewish law and not with subordination to systems parallel to it, and therefore they are not our concern here.

We may therefore summarize the discussion on the first, a priori plane as follows: situations of subordination to an additional and contradictory normative system are a priori possible. Surprisingly, they may arise precisely in the case of the Orthodox Jew.

The second plane of discussion, as defined above in section B, deals with the question whether the phenomenon of halakhic polynormativity indeed appears in reality. The answer is clearly yes. We noted that idolaters sometimes find themselves in a similar situation. They believe in and are subject to God, and at the same time to additional systems. Polytheism, in general, is a clear expression of such a state.

Therefore the empirical question is not essential to the discussion, and the answer to it is also affirmative. We shall now move to the third part of the article, in which we discuss the third, a posteriori plane: whether there can be justification, or legitimacy, from the Torah standpoint, for a polynormative situation.

Part Three

Initial A Posteriori Analysis

D. General Introduction

As we have seen, the dilemma of commitment, or subordination, to two contradictory normative systems is also a matter of the person, and not only of the object. That is, the fact that the systems in themselves contradict one another is not enough to rule out the possibility of such a situation, for the matter also depends on the value principles that cause the person to adhere to them, and these, by their very nature, are outside the two systems under discussion.

In discussing the Torah legitimacy of polynormativity, we must consider systems of different characters. There are systems that blatantly contradict God's will as expressed in the Torah. There are those that contradict it partially, and there are those that do not contradict it at all. The relation between the systems depends, of course, also on their character as compared with the character of the Torah system (God's will). It depends on questions such as: are they 'complete'? Are their value principles blanket or particular? And the like.

The character of the Torah system itself is also not entirely clear (see the note above). It can be viewed as a complete system (without neutral spaces), or as a partial one. If it is indeed partial, then ostensibly an additional normative system can enter the neutral space. For example, it may be that engaging in art, or in chess, is neutral from the standpoint of God's will, and therefore the system of the rules of chess is a system that naturally enters the Torah system. Additional examples might be the system of the laws of economics, or political-statecraft domains for which we have no clear Torah directives (see, for example, Yedidya Stern's above-mentioned article).[30]

As stated, in all these situations an analysis of the Torah-halakhic system itself is required in order to reach a conclusion whether, in the context under discussion, a Torah-halakhic gap exists or not. But that is not the concern of this article. Here we are dealing with a different question: even if there are parallel systems, and especially when there is no gap, can one be subject to them alongside Torah and Jewish law?

When the matter concerns a value system, or at least one with evaluative dimensions, the situation seems more complex, for it stands to reason that there are directives, even if only general ones, that emerge from God's will with respect to behavior in such domains. Yet, at least in principle, one can regard the system of accepted human morality as entering into the discretionary domains of Jewish law (though we noted that it may itself have a halakhic dimension, and certainly a Torah status). The same applies to the system of modern values mentioned above, and the like.

Even if the Torah system is complete (in the senses defined above), there may be normative systems that are neutral from its standpoint. For example, even if there is a Torah directive for every situation in life, there may be additional systems whose instructions do not necessarily contradict its instructions (such as the system of civil law). Therefore, in principle, a person may be subject to both together (see the footnote above regarding such situations).

When there are systems whose instructions blatantly contradict those of the Torah system (God's will), it is likely to be very difficult to find halakhic legitimacy for subordination to them. However, as we shall see below, even in a neutral situation the state of polynormativity is not simple. At first glance, there is here a form of subordination to an additional entity beyond God, and that itself may constitute a Torah problem.

It should be noted that systems toward which the relation is not one of subordination (such as our evil inclination) do not arouse this problem, and therefore it would seem that there is no principled obstacle to polynormativity with respect to them, unless their instructions blatantly contradict the Torah's instructions. In such a case the problem is not polynormativity but simply sin. The problem of polynormativity arises only when there is an additional factor to which we are subject, in parallel with God. Of course, the question arises what that factor is, and what it may not be. Is subordination to my own principles, for example, problematic? Or is it only a 'divine' factor, in some sense (similar to what is revealed in the context of idolatry; see the discussion below), that arouses the problem?

Wosner, in the above-mentioned article, proposes a polynormative model of subordination to Jewish law. We shall explain it briefly by means of an example that he himself brings (see his note 23 there). Suppose a doctor is asked by a movie actor whether, in his condition, he may participate in a commercial in which he will be required to smoke a cigarette, where the fee for participating is enormous. The doctor's answer was: medically speaking, you must not participate in the film, because smoking involves medical risk. On the other hand, I personally strongly recommend that you participate in the film, in order to earn the enormous sum.

The laws of medicine, which are likened here to the laws of Jewish law, instruct him unequivocally not to participate in the film. Medically speaking this is the wrong thing to do. On the other hand, the laws of (economic) survival, or at least of convenience and enjoyment, instruct him to participate in the film. Both perspectives are correct, and therefore a person can find himself subject to both normative systems, and although he advocates preserving health in all its details, in this case he will adopt the decision of the parallel normative system.

Wosner proposes a similar conception of Jewish law. Jewish law does not command us to do things; rather, it determines that they have value, and whoever violates them pays a 'price' (moral, spiritual, religious, or other). But a parallel normative system may lead him nevertheless to perform acts that do not conform to the halakhic ruling, because he is willing to do so and pay the price.

One should note, as Wosner himself emphasizes, that this is not a proposal to change Jewish law, nor for a creative interpretation of it. Nor is there here any claim about using extra-halakhic rules (which are sometimes inserted into Jewish law), such as its ways are ways of pleasantness, 'its ways are ways of pleasantness,' and the like. As Wosner himself explains, this is also not reliance on 'the fifth part of the Shulhan Arukh.' What we have here is action on the basis of extra-Torah considerations while paying the Torah 'price' involved in such acts (like paying the health price involved in participating in the aforementioned film).

When there is a conflict between the Torah-halakhic system and another system (morality, civil law, and the like), the polynormative person may find himself choosing to act according to the commands of one system or the other. Sometimes he chooses to obey Jewish law, and sometimes to violate it. The matter depends on his hierarchy of values, by which he ranks these systems and the various prices involved in the act under discussion. In this way he reaches his decision as to how he should act in that situation.

Since polynormative situations are complex and varied, and therefore difficult to characterize in a general a priori way, we shall begin by relating, albeit only in a general fashion, to several examples, and only afterward return to discussion on the general plane.

E. The Need for Essential Polynormativity: An Initial Analysis

There are several examples of systems that may come into conflict with the halakhic system. We shall now try to present and briefly discuss the relevance of some of them.

Wosner offers the following examples of normative systems that may come into conflict with Jewish law: Kabbalah (= esoteric doctrine), a 'transgression for the sake of Heaven,' monetary law according to Rabbi Shimon Shkop's conception (the human legal system), and vegetarianism. One may add additional normative systems here, such as universal moral principles, civil law, modern values (self-realization and self-expression, freedom), and the like.

In all the systems adduced by Wosner as precedents, we are dealing with systems that can themselves be viewed as expressions of God's will. Therefore all these systems can be classified as normative systems that, like Jewish law itself, also draw from God's will. As we have seen, conflict between Jewish law and God's will exists in halakhic literature, and halakhic decisors have already addressed it in quite a number of contexts. As stated, some will absorb the entire discussion into Jewish law, while others will prefer to see it as a discussion between Jewish law and external systems that also express God's will. But in any event, we are dealing here with a conflict that takes place entirely within the system of God's will, and therefore the differences between these two approaches are not substantive for our purposes.

There is no doubt that all the precedents brought by Wosner were understood by the thinkers who discussed them as expressions of God's will. Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi certainly saw the principles of Kabbalistic Jewish law as an authentic expression of God's will, and so too Rabbi David Cohen ('the Nazir') and Rabbi Kook (and earlier commentators such as Abravanel and Nachmanides on the Torah) who spoke about vegetarianism. The examples of a 'transgression for the sake of Heaven' are likewise based on values that are a clear expression of God's will (saving the people of Israel, and the like). One may add here the principle of it is a time to act for the Lord; they have violated Your Torah, 'it is a time to act for the Lord; they have violated Your Torah' (for example, the writing down of the Oral Torah, and the like). It is important to note that for all these one can bring reliable sources from the Written Torah and the Oral Torah, including patently halakhic sources, to prove that this is indeed God's will.

If so, in all these cases there is no need to appeal to polynormativity, for we have here systems that express God's will (though it appears outside Jewish law). As stated, these are conflicts that have existed from time immemorial in halakhic literature. As noted, some will insert these values into the halakhic system through principles such as its ways are ways of pleasantness and the like, but that is not essentially different from the determination that God's will can be revealed outside Jewish law. The common denominator of all these approaches is that they do not see a possibility of subordination to normative systems that do not express God's will. The root of the matter is that even if there is subordination to an additional normative system here, no additional entity stands behind it.

The need for a polynormative approach arises on the substantive plane only where one cannot reasonably ground the claim that the value to which we are attached is indeed God's will; in other words, when the entity that grounds subordination to the system under discussion is not the Holy One, blessed be He (and perhaps also when there is no such entity at all). For example, if we believe in full equality for women, while a candid and honest examination of halakhic literature indicates that this value, at least as currently understood, apparently does not emerge from it. In that case a conflict is created that cannot be resolved within the system of God's will.

Let us be more concrete. The disqualification of women from testimony, for example, emerges clearly from halakhic literature. The modern approach, on the other hand, sees a woman as a valid witness in every respect. Here it will be very difficult to claim that God's will is that we validate women's testimony, and more generally that we equate woman and man in every respect, when the whole halakhic literature cries out the opposite. One who claims this gives off the odor of subordinating the concept of 'God's will' to the speaker's private beliefs. When the Torah determined that a woman is disqualified from testimony, is there not here a clear expression of God's will? Nor will it help here to argue that there is a divine will outside the halakhic system, for Jewish law determines clear things on this matter. It is not plausible that the Holy One, blessed be He, says clear things in Jewish law, and on the other hand His (extra-halakhic) will is that we violate them. If so, in cases such as these, there is no possibility of seeing the conflict as occurring within the system of God's will. Here the question arises of the possibility and legitimacy of polynormativity.[31]

It is important to note here another aspect. In all these cases, the clash with Jewish law is not accidental, and therefore it is not plausible to speak of Jewish law as setting a 'price.' Let us elaborate a little on this point.

The clash between the values of preserving life and the Sabbath is merely accidental. The two values in themselves do not essentially contradict one another, and therefore both of them constitute authentic expressions of God's will. There are very specific situations in which these two values clash (an event of danger to life on the Sabbath). It is only in the context of an accidental clash that there is room to discuss what God's will is when the values under discussion collide. Even in a situation where there is a clash between halakhic divine will and a will that is not halakhic, this is possible only when the clash is accidental.

For example, one cannot claim that there is an extra-halakhic divine will (moral) that we not kill Amalek. Jewish law determines in the clearest way that God's will is that we indeed destroy him. Modern moral values, which condemn such a step, stand in essential contradiction to halakhic divine will, and therefore it is clear that they do not constitute an expression of God's will. It is very difficult to accept the claim that the Holy One, blessed be He, established in His Torah a commandment that He Himself does not want us to fulfill. If so, precisely here the need arises to examine the essential polynormative approach. In cases where the clash is accidental, the problem is less clear, if it exists at all.

The clash between the disqualification of a woman from testifying and judging and the modern challenge to it is also essential. This is not a situation of two circumstances accidentally converging in one place (like danger to life on the Sabbath), but a frontal contradiction. Therefore it is clear that here too one cannot speak of displacement, neither within Jewish law nor outside it.[32] Here too the proposal concerning polynormativity must be examined.

The same applies to additional cases discussed in recent years: universal moral values (for example, attitudes toward gentiles, at least according to some approaches), and according to certain views also some laws of the state (refusal of orders, and the like). So too values of art and creative freedom, various forms of personal expression that do not conform to Jewish law, and more.

In such situations, unlike the examples brought by Wosner, the only path that allows subordination to Torah and Jewish law and, at the same time, to those additional systems, is polynormativity.

It is important to note that such an approach, in such contexts, has no precedent. The reason is very simple: such an approach simply is not possible for a Torah-and-commandment observant Jew, as will be explained in the next part (and in the discussion that follows immediately concerning the words of the author of the Sefer HaHinukh). Subordination to additional systems of these sorts means, in practical terms, non-subordination to Jewish law, or to God's will, if not worse (see below).

There is one precedent brought by Wosner in which an approach explicitly allowing polynormativity does indeed appear, and that is the Sefer HaHinukh. At first glance the author of the Sefer HaHinukh proposes the 'price' model described above. According to this model, Jewish law does not express God's will but only sets a price for every step of transgressing it. Therefore, ostensibly, there is no prohibition on a woman testifying, but only a halakhic determination that if she does testify there is a 'price' for it. That is, it contradicts halakhic values, but it may suit extra-halakhic values.

Such an approach, of course, requires proof. It seems odd to say that the Torah punishes a person who violated one of its commandments even though he did not do anything bad. As stated, in the Sefer HaHinukh itself such a proposal appears, to conceive Jewish law as the setting of a 'price,' but one should note that it is rejected there outright. The author of the Hinukh (commandment 69) asks why in every prohibition there must be both a punishment and a warning. The Talmud, in several places, asks: we have found the punishment, from where do we know the warning? That is, it is not enough for us to know the punishment; the Torah must also write a warning. The author of the Hinukh explains that if there were no warning, we would think that the punishment is nothing but setting a price (in his words: like a commercial exchange, 'something like a commercial exchange'), but that violating the prohibition is not in itself a violation of God's will.

One should note that the author of the Hinukh raises this argument as an explanation of the initial assumption underlying the Talmud's difficulties mentioned above. But the fact that the Talmud everywhere insists that there must also be a warning indicates that there is a clear assumption that this is not the way Jewish law is conceived. The Talmud assumes that every punishment is accompanied by a warning precisely in order to exclude thoughts of this kind, and that is exactly the conclusion that emerges from the words of the author of the Hinukh. Thus, in conclusion, the author of the Hinukh precisely proves from the Talmud that in Jewish law there are no punishments that are merely the setting of a price.

An interesting anecdote in this context appears in the words of the author of the Minhat Hinukh on commandment 516, subsection 4. There the Minhat Hinukh raises the possibility of understanding in this way the prohibition of 'suppressing one's prophecy,' and rejects it outright. The author of the Minhat Hinukh assumes there that there is no warning for a prophet who suppresses his prophecy, only a punishment.[33] Therefore he proposes an interpretation according to which Jonah the prophet fled from the port of Jaffa because he wished to suppress his prophecy. Jonah understood that this was a legitimate act, except that it had a 'price,' and he did so out of willingness to accept the punishment ('the price') upon himself. But the Minhat Hinukh himself rejected this outright, and the reason is apparently the above words of the author of the Hinukh himself, who derives this from the Talmud, which requires both punishment and warning for every commandment.[34]

We see that this proposal, which arose explicitly in the Sefer HaHinukh, was rejected on the basis of clear proof from the Talmud. The conclusion that emerges from this is that one cannot base a proposal to conceive Jewish law in this way on the words of the Hinukh, especially when he himself proves explicitly from the Talmud that it is not so. Precisely in the author of the Hinukh we find the clearest proof of the impossibility of granting Torah legitimacy to polynormativity.

In summary, if a normative system whose directives contradict Jewish law claims that it too expresses God's will, the burden of proof rests upon it. A subjective feeling will not suffice here. When there is an essential and not an accidental contradiction between it and Jewish law, it is not plausible that the Holy One, blessed be He, conveys one message to us in Jewish law while His 'real' will is that we not fulfill it. That is precisely what the author of the Hinukh proved. In such situations, the only possible escape for one who adheres to both these normative systems is a polynormative approach. In the next part we shall discuss the possibility of Torah legitimacy for such an approach with respect to systems that contradict in an essential way, and afterwards we shall broaden the discussion to other systems as well.

Part Four

Halakhic Analysis: Can There Be Torah Legitimacy for Polynormativity?

Up to this point we have sharpened the nature and meaning of halakhic polynormativity. We have seen that the discussion is relevant mainly when what is at issue is subordination to a system that contradicts Jewish law (or God's will) in an essential way. Such a situation does not allow one to claim that this too is God's will. Therefore, in situations of this kind, the only escape that allows subordination to both systems together is polynormativity, that is, subordination to both systems and, in practice, relinquishment of the common conception of the totality of God's will.

A priori, following our sharpening of the problem, it seems that Torah legitimacy for such an approach is highly problematic. As we have seen, although this is a possible and coherent situation in the philosophical sense, and its justification is necessarily made in extra-Torah terms, and therefore it does not require Torah justification, it follows from this very point that Torah justification for such a situation appears implausible. In any event, in principle it is still of interest to examine the position of Jewish law, and the Torah generally, toward such an approach. Is this indeed a possible option for a Jew who is subject to Jewish law (even if only partially)?

As we have explained, theoretically such an approach does not require intra-Torah justification, but it is nevertheless important to examine whether such justification exists. We must examine whether one who advocates such a position is necessarily not considered subject to Jewish law. What is the Torah-halakhic status of such a person (is he a heretic)? Beyond the question whether this or that step that he takes conforms to Jewish law (it may, for example, be a 'transgression for the sake of Heaven'), there is room to ask what the status of such an approach is from the standpoint of beliefs and opinions.

F. Idolatry and Dualism

The first question that arises in the context of essential polynormativity touches directly on the foundations of faith: does subordination to an additional normative system amount to heresy, and perhaps even idolatry?

At first glance there is an essential problem in the very subordination to normative systems parallel to the Torah, systems that do not express God's will, for this involves recognition of an additional source of authority alongside God. Behind every normative system stands a binding principle (above called a 'value principle'). Sometimes behind this principle stands an entity (or, in conventional theological language, a 'personal god'), and sometimes not. When a person undertakes commitment to extra-Torah principles, there is a strong feeling of theological dualism, or belief in association. As though there were two sovereigns to whom the person is subject, and not God alone. If there is indeed association here, this contradicts the belief in divine unity, which is one of the principles of Judaism.

Let me sharpen this further. The core problem in belief in association is not its specific content, but the very fact that it is 'foreign' (like 'foreign worship'). The very fact that a person subjects himself to something in addition to the Torah and God is what is problematic. The ritual acts involved in worship of Baal Peor, or of other idols, generally do not constitute direct transgressions of prohibitions in the Torah (even though elements of sexual immorality, and even murder, often accompany them, it is clear that this is not the essence of the problem of the prohibition of idolatry). The act of exposing oneself before Peor is not an act that in itself contradicts Jewish law; it is problematic only because it is done as part of worship of Peor, that is, as part of subordination to an additional sovereignty beyond God. The problem lies in the very subordination and worship of an additional factor beyond God and His will as expressed in the Torah, and not in the act itself.

If belief in God does not exist at all, and the person subjects himself only to the other system (the idol), this is heresy and idolatry. But it is clear that this problem also exists if there is belief in and subordination to God in parallel with subordination to the idol. This is exactly what is called 'worship through association,' or duality, and it contradicts the principle of faith in God's unity and His existence as the sole, all-encompassing God.

As stated above, this problem may also exist in subordination to a normative system that does not contradict Jewish law, just as ritual actions toward the various idols do not necessarily contradict Jewish law in themselves. The root of the problem of 'association' lies in the very subordination to an additional factor.

We must therefore examine the relation between polynormativity and polytheism (= multiple gods, or idols).

The claim that identifies polynormativity with idolatry through association is not so simple. First, one must distinguish between heretical beliefs of various kinds and what is called in Jewish law 'idolatry.' The concept of 'idolatry' in its halakhic meaning involves two essential components: (1) cultic actions; (2) that those actions are directed toward a certain entity (an idol).[35]

These two components are, apparently, absent from most of the examples we brought above. For example, moral principles and modern values are not bound up with belief in a concrete entity (a personal god). There is no 'idol' here, at least not in the classical sense of the term, for ostensibly there is no ontology behind these systems of norms.[36] In addition, commitment to these normative systems is apparently not bound up with ritual acts. Admittedly, this commitment usually requires the person to act in a manner that accords with the commands of the system under discussion, but it is difficult to see these acts as ritual worship (especially against the atheistic background of modern norms). In Maimonides' language: there is no 'acceptance of it as a divinity' here. We shall now discuss these two components, one after the other.

1. We shall begin precisely with the second component: the idol. When we ask ourselves what that idol was to which ancient idolaters worshipped, it appears that the ancient idol was nothing more than a piece of wood or stone, to which the believer rendered worship in various ways. We must therefore ask ourselves: is the existence of that stone essential to the problematic nature of the prohibition of idolatry? And what if someone performs all the actions without a concrete stone? Or for an abstract 'stone'?

Does the prohibition of idolatry become more severe precisely when it is accompanied by the foolish naivete of believing in trees and stones? At first glance the main problem is the very subordination to an additional factor beyond God, and not specifically some piece of stone or other. When the heretical belief is more intelligent, and the entity to which we are subject more abstract, it seems that the prohibition would be no less severe, and perhaps even more severe.

In our modern world we are accustomed to virtual realities, and at times even attribute to them (usually metaphorically, though not always) real characteristics and effects. Therefore it is precisely in our time that it is easier to understand the dispensability of the ontological component that once stood behind the prohibition of idolatry.

The worship of an idol was the only way that could create obligation to a normative system in the ancient world. The ancient world was not prepared to accept the yoke of abstract systems lacking a concrete entity behind them (this was Abraham's major innovation), and therefore behind every idolatry there stood an idol. But it is quite plausible that the problematic nature of the concept of 'idolatry' remains even without such an entity, or where that entity is abstract. In our world, after the invention of 'secularism,' commitment to normative systems can arise with no entity behind them at all. Yet it seems that the problem involved in complete commitment to extra-Torah systems remains in force.

Perhaps one can even say more. It seems that even the adjuncts of an idol are present here, for in the modern world there is belief in some sort of 'image of man' that dictates a certain mode of action, perhaps as against (according to the secular-humanist view) the 'image of God' that obligates action according to the Torah.

There is room to compare the modern situation to what the Sages described (see, for example, Esther Rabbah 3:2) concerning wicked Haman. According to the Sages' midrash, Haman made himself into an idol and required everyone to bow to him (some commentators explained this as the reason Mordecai would not kneel or bow, despite the fact that he thereby endangered all Israel). Here we are dealing with an entity that is not transcendent, and seemingly without any 'religious' aura, but simply an ordinary human being. Yet the Sages nevertheless see here a possibility of idolatry directed toward him. Is the worship of the image of modern man (or perhaps: a person's worship of himself) not largely parallel to this description? Modern man, being more sophisticated, has turned himself (or the idea of humanity: 'the image of man')[37] into an abstract idol before which he worships. Whether or not the comparison is sufficient even on the formal halakhic level, the spirit of the matter appears quite similar.

Let us pause briefly here over another point in this context. I mentioned above (in a footnote) that there is a weighty philosophical problem, and in my opinion a decisive one, in the very subordination to a system of norms that is not anchored in an existing entity that constitutes the source of its authority. Can one really speak of 'subordination' to a system that I myself am its creator of? I do not mean the psychological claim that such subordination will not hold up (that is, it will not be effective: if there is no God in this place, they will kill me, 'if there is no God in this place, they will kill me'), but rather the substantive claim that such subordination points to the creation of an implicit idol, even if the person does not admit its existence. This idol seems to me no less tangible than the idol hidden in a piece of wood or stone to which the idolaters of the ancient world bowed.

When a person is in a dilemma, for example between moral considerations and a religious-halakhic command, he cannot suffice with saying that his conscience (= himself) does not allow him to perform a certain act that the Torah commands him to do. Such a statement is equivalent to saying: I do not want to fulfill the Torah's command. If so, in practice there is no subordination to the Torah system here, rather than that there is subordination to an additional normative system. A clash between subordination to two normative systems (especially if one of them is the Torah, or God's will) requires the existence of some sort of 'idol' (= 'image of man').

If so, one may think that in practice there is here a real idol, in the ontological sense, except that the person denies it because of its abstractness, and therefore invents for himself the possibility of commitment to a system of norms without any binding source. The discussion of this issue is lengthy and exists in the literature, and therefore I shall not conduct it here. But this point is important for the argument here, and therefore it is important to point it out.

Thus our conclusion so far is that there are weighty arguments in favor of saying that the normative systems under discussion, at least insofar as they constitute serious competition for the Torah system, do indeed draw their weight from one 'idol' or another. De facto, at least halakhically, it seems highly plausible that there is indeed an 'idol' here.

2. Up to this point we have spoken about the first component (the idol). For the sake of setting the second discussion on its own footing, let us detach it from the preceding one and assume that the systems under discussion do indeed contain an idol (halakhically speaking). We must now discuss whether there is also a cultic component here. The second component of the prohibition of idolatry, the cult, apparently does not exist here. The acts required within the framework of the normative systems under discussion do not fit, in any simple way, the category of religious ritual. But here too there is full commitment to values external to the Torah, and therefore once again it is unclear whether the cultic dimension is so essential to the matter. Let us try, in this discussion too as in the previous one, to move through a process of abstraction.

If the cult required were more abstract, and did not find expression precisely in sacrifices or other unmistakably ritual acts, would that make the matter any less severe? Maimonides rules explicitly that if one worships an idol in the manner in which it is customarily worshiped, then even if this is not one of the four principal services (sacrificial forms of worship), he violates the prohibition of idolatry (see Mishnah Sanhedrin 7:6, Maimonides' Commentary on the Mishnah there, and Laws of Idolatry 3:2-3 and elsewhere). Does acting in a clear and unmistakable way according to the principles of a normative system different from that of the Torah (and let us assume for the moment, for purposes of the present discussion, that there is an idol commanding this) not fall within the category of idolatry?

Let us add one more point on the present plane of discussion. Involvement with an idol that is not worship (for example, being healed by the wood of an Asherah tree; see Pesahim 25a and Ran and others there) is, according to Jewish law, one of the adjuncts of idolatry. For that too one must be killed rather than transgress (see, for example, the Encyclopaedia Talmudit, entry 'Adjuncts'). If so, non-cultic involvement with that idol, involving various actions, can certainly be imagined in which there would be the legal status of the adjuncts of idolatry.

Thus, worship of a pseudo-idol (or: a virtual idol), even if it is abstract worship (pseudo-worship), can raise halakhic problems of the prohibition of idolatry. This is because there may indeed be an 'idol' in the background, at least in some sense; or perhaps there is no need at all for such an idol, and a virtual 'idol' suffices. Statements that refer to such ideas as 'idolatry' sometimes appear in the context of preaching and ethical exhortation, but it seems to me that there is here also a halakhic dimension that certainly deserves attention.

We now move to the next level of the argument. As we saw above, one must distinguish between abstract belief, which is heresy or sectarianism, and belief that obligates worship, in which case we enter the category of the prohibition of idolatry. For our purposes here, it is enough if we have shown that polynormativity involves a problem of false belief. That is, even if, despite the arguments above, we conclude that polynormativity does not meet the formal halakhic criteria of the prohibition of idolatry, there is nevertheless certainly in it a problem of the false belief of 'association.' Presumably such a situation is no better than coupling the Name of Heaven with something else, an act that involves no actual association at all but only a misleading mode of speech (see Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 45b and Sanhedrin 63b, and elsewhere).

In the final analysis, even if there is no formal prohibition of idolatry here, there are certainly adjuncts of belief in association, and therefore polynormativity is suspect as a heretical dualistic belief. God requires of me not to accept the testimony of women in a religious court, whereas I undertake subordination to another system of rules in which a woman has the status of a valid witness. This system is so binding for me that sometimes I set aside God's commands because of it. There is here a strong and unequivocal subordination, to the point of surrender, to another factor (even if abstract), and this arouses a strong sense of dualism.[38]

Our conclusion, then, is that at least in the realm of beliefs and opinions polynormativity involves some sort of polytheism.

As stated above, this set of problems may in principle exist (though not necessarily) even in a situation where there is subordination to systems that are not in essential contradiction with Jewish law, but merely in the very fact that they are different from it and external to it (see, for example, the discussion below of Maimonides in Laws of Kings). This resembles the situation in ordinary idolatry, where, as we explained above, the problem is not in the ritual acts themselves, or in any contradiction between them and the Torah's commands, but in the very fact that they are 'foreign,' that is, done out of subordination to a different system.

It may perhaps be argued that what has been said thus far does not amount to an unequivocal halakhic argument, but given the ambiguity found in the laws of idolatry and in the laws of faith generally, this is not surprising. The laws of idolatry are not perceived as relevant to our generations, and therefore people have not engaged much with them. But it seems to me that simple intuition points as we have argued.

We shall conclude this chapter with a citation from the laws that open the Mishneh Torah (see also especially Maimonides' first principle of faith in his introduction to chapter Helek), where it seems to me that our conclusion is clearly implied:

A. The foundation of foundations and the pillar of wisdoms is to know that there is a First Being, and He brings into existence all that exists; and all beings in heaven and earth and what is between them exist only from the truth of His existence. (A. The foundation of foundations and the pillar of wisdoms is to know that there is a First Being, and He brings into existence all that exists; and all beings in heaven and earth and what is between them exist only from the truth of His existence.)

B. If it should enter the mind that He does not exist, no other thing could exist. (B. If it should enter the mind that He does not exist, no other thing could exist.)

C. If it should enter the mind that none of the beings besides Him existed, He alone would still exist and would not cease through their nonexistence. For all beings need Him, but He, blessed be He, needs neither them nor any one of them. Therefore His truth is unlike the truth of any of them. (C. If it should enter the mind that none of the beings besides Him existed, He alone would still exist and would not cease through their nonexistence. For all beings need Him, but He, blessed be He, needs neither them nor any one of them. Therefore His truth is unlike the truth of any of them.)

D. This is what the prophet says: 'And the Lord God is truth'—He alone is truth, and no other has truth like His. And this is what the Torah says: 'There is none besides Him,' meaning that there is no true existent besides Him like Him… (D. This is what the prophet says: 'And the Lord God is truth'—He alone is truth, and no other has truth like His. And this is what the Torah says: 'There is none besides Him,' meaning that there is no true existent besides Him like Him…)

V. Knowledge of this matter is a positive commandment, as it is said: 'I am the Lord your God.' And whoever entertains the idea that there is another god besides this one transgresses a prohibition, as it is said: 'You shall have no other gods before Me.' And he denies the fundamental principle, for this is the great principle on which everything depends. (V. Knowledge of this matter is a positive commandment, as it is said: 'I am the Lord your God.' And whoever entertains the idea that there is another god besides this one transgresses a prohibition, as it is said: 'You shall have no other gods before Me.' And he denies the fundamental principle, for this is the great principle on which everything depends.)

VI. This God is one; He is not two, nor more than two, but one whose unity is unlike the unity of any of the unities found in the world… (VI. This God is one; He is not two, nor more than two, but one whose unity is unlike the unity of any of the unities found in the world…)

Maimonides' main claim is that God needs no supplement, and that everything that exists depends only on Him; and it is self-evident that all normative systems as well, and not only all entities (material or spiritual), exist—and bind—only by virtue of the truth of His existence. One who says that there is a reality, or a norm, that does not depend on Him, presumably this too is a form of heresy. If so, belief in, or subordination to, a normative system that is not an expression of God's will (especially if it contradicts His will) is nothing other than denial of His truth and His unity.

We shall conclude the chapter with a note from another angle. One who is subject to an additional normative system that contradicts God's will (as stated, only in such a case do we require essential polynormativity) holds that he—or the source of authority of that system—knows better than God what is proper to do in a given situation. If God does not think that this is what should be done, can one seriously entertain the possibility that this would nevertheless be the more proper act?[39] From this angle one may ask whether such a person really believes in the God (good, omnipotent, and omniscient) in whom traditional halakhic Judaism believes. This is not a problem of association but of the image of God present in the belief of the polynormative person, and this is not the place to elaborate (precisely in this context, see Rabbi Kook's words cited below in the concluding chapter).[40]

G. Additional Halakhic Prohibitions

Up to this point we have dealt with the question whether polynormativity involves the prohibitions of heresy or idolatry. We now turn briefly to two additional halakhic aspects that touch upon (or at least border on) the issue of polynormativity.

1. 'Do not stray after your hearts and after your eyes.'

Maimonides in Laws of Idolatry 2:3 addresses a situation in which a person thinks to uphold norms whose source is not in the Torah, and especially such as are contrary to what is written in it and to its principles. From his wording there it appears that he defines this as falling under the prohibition of do not stray after your hearts and after your eyes, 'do not stray after your hearts and after your eyes,' and he warns that a person should not rely on his own judgment against the Torah, for he may be mistaken.[41]

We see here a far-reaching claim, much stronger than the claim about polynormativity. Maimonides determines that even if a person adds matters from his own understanding and sees them as a divine command, since he may be mistaken, there is here a prohibition of 'do not stray after your hearts.' The fact that this prohibition is detailed in Laws of Idolatry indicates that it belongs to that family of prohibitions (which is, as is well known, very broad, at least according to Maimonides).

This is Maimonides' language there:

Not only idolatry is it forbidden to turn toward in thought; rather, any thought that causes a person to uproot one of the principles of the Torah—we are warned not to bring it to mind and not to divert our attention to it, lest we think on it and be drawn after the thoughts of the heart. For a person's mind is limited, and not all minds can attain the truth in its fullness; and if every person follows the thoughts of his heart, he will destroy the world because of his limited understanding… (Not only idolatry is it forbidden to turn toward in thought; rather, any thought that causes a person to uproot one of the principles of the Torah—we are warned not to bring it to mind and not to divert our attention to it, lest we think on it and be drawn after the thoughts of the heart. For a person's mind is limited, and not all minds can attain the truth in its fullness; and if every person follows the thoughts of his heart, he will destroy the world because of his limited understanding…)

And concerning this matter the Torah warned and said: 'Do not stray after your hearts and after your eyes, after which you go astray.' That is, no one of you should be drawn after his limited judgment and imagine that his thought grasps the truth. Thus the Sages said: 'after your hearts'—this is heresy; 'after your eyes'—this is licentiousness. (And concerning this matter the Torah warned and said: 'Do not stray after your hearts and after your eyes, after which you go astray.' That is, no one of you should be drawn after his limited judgment and imagine that his thought grasps the truth. Thus the Sages said: 'after your hearts'—this is heresy; 'after your eyes'—this is licentiousness.)

And in the following halakhah Maimonides continues and writes:

Likewise, sectarians from Israel are not as Israel in any matter. And they are never accepted in repentance, as it is said: 'None who go to her return, nor do they attain the paths of life.' (Likewise, sectarians from Israel are not as Israel in any matter. And they are never accepted in repentance, as it is said: 'None who go to her return, nor do they attain the paths of life.')

And sectarians are those who wander after the thoughts of their hearts in foolishness regarding the matters we have spoken of, until they are found transgressing central Torah laws spitefully, brazenly, and with uplifted hand, saying that there is no sin in this. It is forbidden to converse with them or to answer them at all, as it is said: 'Do not come near the entrance of her house'; and the thought of a sectarian leads to idolatry. (And sectarians are those who wander after the thoughts of their hearts in foolishness regarding the matters we have spoken of, until they are found transgressing central Torah laws spitefully, brazenly, and with uplifted hand, saying that there is no sin in this. It is forbidden to converse with them or to answer them at all, as it is said: 'Do not come near the entrance of her house'; and the thought of a sectarian leads to idolatry.)

It is not clear whether we have here an additional aspect beyond those brought above, or whether we are encountering here the adjuncts of idolatry discussed above, except that here they are classified under the independent prohibition of do not stray after your hearts and after your eyes. It is important to note, and many have already pointed this out, that this prohibition appears in Maimonides under the laws of idolatry. In any event, it is clear that a polynormative stance is certainly a plausible candidate for Maimonides' descriptions here.

2. 'Do not add.'

One must also examine the parameters of the prohibition of 'do not add.' Ostensibly this is the opposite prohibition from the one under discussion, for here a person transgresses only if he really thinks that God commands him to do so. If he does something for another reason, there is no prohibition of 'do not add' here (see Maimonides, Laws of Rebels 2:9 and the commentaries there). Yet even here there is no treatment of a situation in which a person does something because of subordination to another normative system whose source is not in God. Maimonides' discussion concerns a religious court that adds a law as a fence to Torah law, as opposed to a court that wishes to add something while claiming that it is written in the Torah itself.

The prohibition of 'do not add' applies to every Jew. Precisely with regard to sages, the medieval authorities disputed whether this prohibition applies even to them or whether they are exempt from it by virtue of their status (see Babylonian Talmud Rosh Hashanah 16b, Tosafot s.v. 'and they blow,' and Rashba's novellae there). From Maimonides' words here it emerges that one who adds commandments and relates them as God's will transgresses the prohibition of 'do not add.'

One should note that the situation here is the opposite of the prohibition of 'do not stray' discussed above. The root of the prohibition here lies precisely in changing the halakhic system itself, and one who does so because of considerations arising from systems external to it would ostensibly not fall within this prohibition.

But the matter is not simple. Precisely the sages, in their capacity as a religious court legislating and enacting ordinances, are warned (according to some of the medieval authorities) not to present their laws as part of Torah law. They must distinguish carefully between the domains (between interpretation and legislation), and make this known to the public as well. But the ordinary individual may well be warned by 'do not add' even if he invents a religion, and innovates something by his own reasoning, in light of a normative system that is external to God's will.

The prohibition of 'do not add' is ramified and complex, and our early sages disputed it greatly, and this is not the place to expand upon it. Our purpose here is only to draw the reader's attention to it.[42]

H. Maimonides in Laws of Kings: 'The Dictates of Reason' and 'Inventing a Religion'

In light of everything we have said thus far, we must examine Maimonides' words in Laws of Kings 8:11, where he writes as follows:

Anyone who accepts the seven commandments and is careful to do them is among the pious of the nations of the world, and has a share in the world to come. This is provided that he accepts them and performs them because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them in the Torah and informed us through Moses our Master that the descendants of Noah had previously been commanded concerning them. But if he does them because the dictates of reason so require, he is not a resident alien and is not among the pious of the nations of the world, but only—according to another reading: and not even—among their wise. (Anyone who accepts the seven commandments and is careful to do them is among the pious of the nations of the world, and has a share in the world to come. This is provided that he accepts them and performs them because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them in the Torah and informed us through Moses our Master that the descendants of Noah had previously been commanded concerning them. But if he does them because the dictates of reason so require, he is not a resident alien and is not among the pious of the nations of the world, but only—according to another reading: and not even—among their wise.)[43]

At first glance it seems from Maimonides' language that he accepts a situation in which commandments are observed for other reasons, that is, as a result of subordination to another normative system ('the dictates of reason'), which in this case does not contradict the halakhic one. That is, it seems ostensibly that in Maimonides' eyes this is admittedly not piety, but neither is it outright heresy.[44]

But it appears that this is not Maimonides' intention, since he is not speaking here about one who undertakes another normative system, but rather about one who fulfills commandments not because God commanded them. It is important to emphasize that Maimonides is speaking about one who fulfills the commandments he is obligated in, but does so because of a different source of authority, not about one who conducts himself according to a different system of norms.[45] From his words it seems that the evaluation of one who would maintain a different system of norms would be different. In any event, Maimonides' words here seem at first glance to be a significant source for the claim that subordination to a different system is not a form of heresy, nor even an actual violation of God's will (he is not pious, but neither is he a sinner).

However, if we read Maimonides' wording carefully, we will see that the two cases he contrasts are doing commandments because of 'the dictates of reason' as opposed to belief that this is what God commanded in the Torah given through Moses our Master. Maimonides does not contrast 'the dictates of reason' with doing something because it is God's will as such. It follows from this that 'the dictates of reason' also means a belief that one should do so because of God's will, but in contrast to the belief that sees the sole expression of God's will in the Torah transmitted to us from Sinai. According to this, 'the dictates of reason' refers to a command that a person invents from his own heart and does not find in the Torah, or to one who thinks the Torah was not given through Moses and is not binding. Thus Maimonides is contrasting situations of deciding what God's will is on the basis of reason, as opposed to deciding that something is God's will because it is written in the Torah given by Moses from Sinai.[46]

The conclusion, then, is that Maimonides' words here contain no discussion at all of a person who does something because of another normative system that is not at all God's will, especially one whose commands stand contrary to God's will. Presumably, for the reasons detailed above, such a state would be classified by him as illegitimate, and therefore it is no surprise that he does not even see fit to address it.

In practice, what we have here is a situation that Maimonides elsewhere calls 'inventing a religion.' 'Inventing a religion' means introducing a commandment that does not appear in the Torah, while the innovator thinks it is imposed upon him by the Holy One, blessed be He (see, for example, Maimonides in Laws of Kings 10:9 and the index in the Frankel edition there). In light of our above discussion, it emerges that in the cited passage above as well (8:11), Maimonides is speaking of one who 'invents a religion,' that is, someone who invents a commandment that, to the best of his understanding, does not appear in the Torah (or that one need not obey the Torah that commands it), yet in his opinion the Holy One, blessed be He, expects him to keep it. This is God's will not explicitly set forth in the Torah (a category to which we referred above in section B).

Thus there is no contradiction in Maimonides' words here to our claim above that a situation of a normative system with another source of authority, that is, norms whose validity does not derive from the fact that God is their source, is equivalent to theological dualism, as explained above.

And I found that in the book Kavod Melakhim (cited in the supplements to the Frankel edition on this halakhah), a midrash from Mishnat Rabbi Eliezer is brought, as follows:

But if they kept the seven commandments and said: we heard them from so-and-so, or from our own minds, because reason so dictates, or if they associated the name of idolatry with it—then even if they did all of the Torah, they receive reward for it only in this world. (But if they kept the seven commandments and said: we heard them from so-and-so, or from our own minds, because reason so dictates, or if they associated the name of idolatry with it—then even if they did all of the Torah, they receive reward for it only in this world.)

There is here explicit reference to one who keeps the seven commandments because of association with idolatry, and this appears as an additional category, different from 'the dictates of reason.' If so, it appears that the dictates of reason are not in the category of association. But this formulation precisely fits very well with what was said above. According to our discussion above, it seems that the intention of this midrash too is that there exists a situation of 'the dictates of reason,' which is 'inventing a religion,' that is, deciding on an additional commandment as God's will. By contrast, there is a situation of another normative system, and this indeed falls under what is there called 'association with idolatry.'[47]

Summary

In this article we examined the possibility that a Jew committed to Jewish law might also be committed to an additional normative system (moral rules, civil law, various aspects of modernity, and the like). We saw that if the additional system is, in his eyes, an expression of God's will, then we have here only an internal halakhic or Torah problem, of a kind that we encounter often. This is not a substantive philosophical problem, but a question of distinction and priority among different domains of the service of God, or of changes and adaptations within Jewish law. In this article we focused on discussion of the possibility of subordination to normative systems whose source of authority is other than God's will, even in its broadest sense.

We saw that a state of subordination to such systems is certainly possible from a philosophical standpoint, and a priori it can indeed be coherent. We also saw that such a state is characteristic especially of a Jew whose faith is Orthodox in essence (derived from a blanket value principle), for in the case of the Reform Jew this kind of problem generally does not arise at all.

However, despite all this, we also saw that such a state has no possibility at all from the standpoint of the Torah's own perspective. We saw the proof brought by the author of the Hinukh, that Jewish law and the Talmud certainly do not conceive the status of Torah and Jewish law in this way. We went on to say that from a traditional Jewish point of view this is nothing other than a certain kind of heresy of association. We also discussed certain elements of the prohibition of 'do not stray' that appear in polynormativity.

Let us now return to the approaches (mentioned at the beginning of our discussion) that propose subordination to normative systems parallel to Torah and Jewish law. If those systems indeed are (each case must be examined on its own merits) systems that do not express God's will as it appears in the Torah (Written and Oral), the conclusion is that these are nothing but proposals to deny the fundamental principle. In this, of course, there is nothing new, for such proposals have been raised from time immemorial. These are indeed coherent proposals; but on the other hand, it is important to understand that one must not view them as a possible path in the service of God, as sometimes the language of those who propose them may suggest. Acceptance of the yoke of such a system means lack of subordination to the foundational principle of the Torah system, which claims the totality of God's will and His Torah.

In practice, the conclusion that emerges from this is that subordination to the Torah requires, by its very nature, the absence of extra-Torah normative systems. Every norm must be examined in terms of its relation to God's will. Therefore the only relevant discussion in this context is discussion of the possibility of understanding God's will in different ways (within Jewish law and outside it), or discussion of neutral spaces, or discussion (of type 1, according to the classification above) of changes and adaptations in Jewish law and its interpretation (the relation between innovation and Reform).[48]

In light of what we have said here, subordination to normative systems in addition to the Torah, such as civil law, the values of modernity, or morality, is possible from the Torah standpoint only if one understands that each of these is itself God's will, or alternatively that it deals with a discretionary domain in which the Torah leaves us room to act according to our own understanding (a neutral margin).

According to this, it is clear that in both cases (whether the additional system is an expression of God's will, or whether it deals with a neutral margin of Jewish law), if there is a clash (which, as we saw, must be accidental) between two such normative systems, the hand of the Torah-halakhic system is necessarily uppermost.

As stated above, the claim that a polynormative state is possible has no standing at all from the standpoint of Torah discussion. Such a claim means: 'I do not accept upon myself the authority of Jewish law, at least in certain cases.' As stated above, this is in fact the claim of many heretics, and therefore I do not find much novelty in it. Our conclusion is that the substantive problem in the polynormative approach is not a lack of philosophical coherence, but the fact that it represents dualism, that is, heresy (= lack of subordination to the Torah system) of the kind called belief in association, and perhaps even an actual prohibition of idolatry. Therefore, by its very nature, it cannot attain Torah legitimacy.

Yet now, surprisingly, it seems that retroactively an element of incoherence also appears here. True, not on the philosophical-a priori plane, but on the plane of faith itself. If subordination to Jewish law is indeed full, then subordination to the additional normative system violates several principles of Jewish law itself (idolatry, heretical beliefs, 'do not stray,' and the like). It contradicts clear proofs from the Talmud (as brought by the author of the Hinukh) that this is not how Jewish law conceives itself (in contrast to the example of the doctor and the actor brought above). If so, de facto it follows that the statement of the polynormative Jew about his subordination to Jewish law is not true. In such a situation, the value principle that stands at the basis of the obligation to the second system itself contradicts Jewish law. Full commitment to Jewish law cannot be accompanied by commitment to another system that contradicts it. This is already incoherence, and not merely a problem in faith and in subordination to Jewish law.

I shall conclude with an anecdote, which will serve as an illustration of this last point. There is a common sarcastic saying among Haredim about people associated with Merkaz HaRav, to the effect that they have great fear of Heaven, but there is a problem in the very nature of the 'Heaven' before which they stand in fear. Some time ago a friend drew my attention to the fact that the source of this saying, ironically, is Rabbi Kook himself. Rabbi Kook writes very similar things (which were probably directed against the people of the old Yishuv):[49]

There is a heresy that is like affirmation, and an affirmation that is like heresy. How so? A person affirms that the Torah is from Heaven, but that 'Heaven' is imagined by him in such strange forms that nothing at all remains of true faith. (There is a heresy that is like affirmation, and an affirmation that is like heresy. How so? A person affirms that the Torah is from Heaven, but that 'Heaven' is imagined by him in such strange forms that nothing at all remains of true faith.)

In polynormativity too there is ostensibly subordination to Torah and Jewish law, but it is not clear to what sort of subordination, to what Torah, and to what Jewish law (and, as we saw, perhaps one may also add: to what kind of God), we are referring here. As we saw above (at the end of section F, and see also Maimonides' words in the Guide of the Perplexed cited in the note there), it is not clear whether there is here subordination to the same God of whom the Torah speaks.

Despite everything, it is important to add—and not only in order to soften the criticism above—that at least with respect to certain polynormative approaches, the latter half of Rabbi Kook's words there may be no less relevant (and it too is connected to Maimonides' above words in the Guide):

And there is a heresy that is like affirmation. How so? A person denies that the Torah is from Heaven, but his denial is based only on the image of Heaven that he absorbed from minds filled with vanity and emptiness, and he says: the Torah has a source more exalted than that. He begins to seek its foundation in the greatness of the human spirit, in the depth of morality and the height of wisdom. Although he has not yet reached the center of truth by this, nevertheless this heresy is considered like affirmation, and it goes on drawing near to the affirmation of true faith… (And there is a heresy that is like affirmation. How so? A person denies that the Torah is from Heaven, but his denial is based only on the image of Heaven that he absorbed from minds filled with vanity and emptiness, and he says: the Torah has a source more exalted than that. He begins to seek its foundation in the greatness of the human spirit, in the depth of morality and the height of wisdom. Although he has not yet reached the center of truth by this, nevertheless this heresy is considered like affirmation, and it goes on drawing near to the affirmation of true faith…)

Study this carefully.

A necessary clarification: There is in my words here no attempt whatsoever to classify and determine the status of any concrete individual, but only to examine a principled approach, nothing more. Every proposal (including Wosner's, which was mentioned and discussed more than once in the course of this essay) must be examined on its own terms: what its intentions and orientation are, and what its substantive details are. Only afterward can concrete conclusions be reached concerning it.[50]

[1] It should be noted that there are those who do not distinguish between these two questions. When one wishes to argue for parallel commitment to an external value, one sometimes uses the terminology of 'changes in Jewish law.'

[2] By the term 'a priori' below we mean: prior to Jewish law, or prior to the Torah-halakhic discussion. We do not mean here the usual philosophical sense of the term (= prior to experience altogether).

[3] Clearly, if we could prove that Moses our Master (= the Torah) does not demand from us subordination in the sense under discussion, or that he does not reject parallel subordination to another normative system, this would solve the problem. But in such a case there simply is no problem, and no room for discussion at all (aside from removing errors in interpreting the Torah). As will be clarified below in greater detail, we are dealing with the legitimacy of subordination to another normative system (which often contradicts the Torah, in one way or another) without authorization from the Torah, or from the Giver of the Torah.

[4] The question of subordination to parallel systems has arisen recently, in one form or another, in several articles. This finds expression, for example, in various issues of Akdamot (see, for example, Shai A. Wosner's article in issue 11, and the articles by Arieh Baratz and Dr. Moshe Meir in issue 12, which at least touch on this question; see also my response to them in the next issue), and more.

In issue 11 of Akdamot, Yitzhak Geiger surveys what he calls the 'new Religious Zionism' (hereafter: NRZ). One of the characteristics he proposes for this phenomenon is the willingness of some among the NRZ to consider subordination to additional normative systems beyond the halakhic one. It is interesting to note that another characteristic of the NRZ, as also emerges from Geiger's article, concerns precisely the first question: grounding innovative positions—even those that deny the authority of rabbis, or at least challenge the hegemony of a single type of halakhic ruling—on precedents, sometimes marginal and even esoteric, that express diverse approaches. There is here an ambivalent attitude toward the authority of halakhic decisors and Torah thinkers: on the one hand, challenging their authority, and on the other hand using them themselves and their diverse opinions as authority that grants legitimacy to such a challenge.

[5] Concerning this the Sages said (Babylonian Talmud Hullin 124a): By God, even if Joshua son of Nun told me this in his name (and in the Shitah Mekubbetzet there, letter 5: from his own mouth), I would not obey him ('By God, even if Joshua son of Nun told me this in his name [and according to another version: from his own mouth], I would not obey him').

[6] To the best of my knowledge, he is almost the only one who squarely places the issue under discussion on the table. Many refer to, or implicitly assume, the possibility of polynormativity. Most of them wrap it in considerations of changes in Jewish law. Very few among them explicitly raise the possibility of an extra-halakhic justification for a polynormative approach.

Later in our discussion we shall refer quite a bit to Wosner's article, and therefore, in order to remove misunderstandings that may arise, the reader is directed already here to the 'necessary clarification' appearing at the end of the present article.

[7] A point for thought. The term 'changes' generally does not appear with respect to morality, civil law, or other cultural values. For some reason, in certain contexts of public discussion morality is eternal, fixed, and unchanging, whereas Jewish law is the thing expected to change.

[8] See, for example, Daniel Statman, Moral Dilemmas, Magnes, Jerusalem 1991, which discusses in detail the incommensurability, that is, the lack of a common measure, of values.

[9] On the definition of the concept 'Jewish law,' see, for example, Yosef Ahituv's article, 'Notes on the Use of the Concept of Halakhah in Orthodox Discourse,' in the collection Renewed Jewish Commitment, vol. 2, edited by Avi Sagi and Zvi Zohar, Hartman Institute and Kibbutz Hameuchad, Tel Aviv 2001.

[10] See, for example, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Kasher's article 'Sevara De-Oraita' at the beginning of his book on the thought of the Rogatchover, Mefa'ne'ah Tzefunot, Tzofnat Pa'ne'ah Institute, Jerusalem 1976. See also the well-known dispute between Penei Yehoshua and Tzelah in Berakhot 35a; the matter is old and well known.

[11] This is connected to the question whether the command to do what is right and good has halakhic status. A related question is the status of commands to act beyond the letter of the law (which some derive from the verse you shall be holy; see, for example, Nachmanides at the beginning of Parashat Kedoshim). Here too one must ask whether the command to act beyond the letter of the law is itself a legal rule, that is, whether it belongs to Jewish law. If so, then this command is itself the letter of the law. Beyond that, if this is indeed so, it is somewhat puzzling why the enumerators of the commandments did not count it.

There are other solutions to this (for example, that the parameters of such an obligation are not objective and identical for every Jew, and therefore it can enter the line of the law without contradiction). Another possibility is that it is a general prohibition, or an encompassing matter, that is not counted (like the rule of stringency in a Torah-level doubt, or a half-measure that is forbidden by Torah law, and the like), and this is not the place to elaborate.

[12] The point of the 'price' is important, for it seems to me that at this point Wosner, for example, sees the distinction between Orthodoxy and Reform. Reform does not see a price in violating some part of Jewish law if it contradicts other values. Therefore the Reform Jew in practice proposes changing Jewish law, that is, removing from it the elements that contradict his other values. Wosner proposes an Orthodox position that allows full subordination to Jewish law—that is, not changing Jewish law—yet also not always obeying it: admittedly there is a price for acts that are halakhic transgressions, but there are cases in which we must do them despite the price. Below we shall compare this to a 'conscientious objection' to the commands of Jewish law.

Thus the Reformers deal with the first question above, while Wosner proposes that Orthodoxy deal with the second. At the end of the second part of our article we shall pause over this phenomenon, and there we shall see that indeed only within an Orthodox framework can this kind of discussion arise.

[13] There are many further problems regarding rules of interpretation, and rules in general. Some of them were raised by Wittgenstein, the best known being the problem of following a rule. For our purposes here these problems are not significant, since we shall assume that the system is defined relative to any given person. I assume here that a person committed to the normative system acts according to rules acceptable to him, or at least according to his interpretation of the rules contained in the system itself. This is what will be called below 'the rules of interpretation.'

The problematic nature of interpretive acts is not relevant to the present discussion, since if there is a dispute or ambiguity regarding what the correct interpretation of the normative system is, this in no way undermines subordination to it as such. To the normative system as I interpret it now, I am fully subject, even if other people may have different interpretations regarding what exactly it instructs one to do in one situation or another. For the purposes of our discussion, the rules of interpretation are the modes of interpretation adopted by the person under discussion with respect to the normative system under discussion.

Admittedly, sometimes a person himself may be in a state of doubt or ambiguity regarding the proper interpretation. Relevant to such a situation are rules of conduct in a state of doubt (in interpretation, or because of essential ambiguity in the system's principles). These may belong either to the principles of interpretation or to principles belonging to the system itself. In the halakhic context there are rules of both types, but that is of no importance for our purposes here.

[14] In the halakhic context this question is raised by some commentators in connection with the oath at Sinai. The Gemara in tractate Nazir 4a (and likewise in Nedarim 8a, Shevuot 27a, and other parallels) determines—at least according to some commentators—that we are obligated in the commandments because of an oath we swore to that effect at Sinai. The question is how one can obligate Israel to be subject to Jewish law on the basis of an oath, when the obligation to keep oaths is itself based on Jewish law. The command to keep oaths is one of the Torah's commandments, that is, part of Jewish law. One who rebels against Jewish law will not be obligated, among other things, in the command to keep his oaths.

This question can be understood as a technical one: what use is the oath? It adds no deterrence beyond transgressing God's will as stated in Torah and Jewish law, and one who is willing to violate the Torah's commands will not be helped by an oath either. But on a deeper level, this is precisely the question discussed here: how can one subject someone to a normative system when the principle that generates the subordination is itself a principle belonging to the very system under discussion.

For an interesting implication of this argument, see responsa Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De'ah, sec. 306.

In a certain sense this is also the difficulty raised by commentators regarding Maimonides' decision to include the commandment of faith among the Torah's commandments. Many commentators ask: how can one command someone to believe in the existence of the Commander? This is not the place to elaborate.

[15] In connection with the system of civil law, see a discussion of this point at the beginning of Haim Gans's book Obedience and Refusal, Kibbutz Hameuchad, Tel Aviv 1996.

[16] Without value principles we fall into the trap that Hume called 'the naturalistic fallacy.' This fallacy consists in inferring an evaluative conclusion from a factual datum. On this see my article 'The Expertise of a Halakhic Decisor as an Evaluator of Reality,' Tzohar 7, Tel Aviv, summer 2001.

[17] See, however, Yaakov Yehoshua Ross's article 'Why Is There an Obligation to Obey God's Commandments?' in Between Religion and Morality, edited by Daniel Statman and Avi Sagi, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan 1994. His conclusion there seems at first glance to contradict our remarks, but closer examination shows clearly that this is not so. This is not the place to discuss it.

[18] One can continue and distinguish between the quasi-factual claim that it is proper to do a certain act and the claim that it is incumbent upon me to do it. This is a worn topic in twentieth-century analytic philosophy, and I shall not address it here.

[19] See in this connection Ross's above-mentioned article as well.

[20] With respect to civil law one may raise considerations of social order, or the preservation of social agreements. See at length on this in Haim Gans's above-mentioned book.

[21] This distinction appears in several places in the Sages' midrashim. It seems to me that the most prominent is in Babylonian Talmud Shabbat 88a, where that Sadducee says to Rava: 'Impulsive people, who put your mouths before your ears… first you should have listened: if you could, you should have accepted; if not, you should not have accepted' ('Impulsive people, who put your mouths before your ears… first you should have listened: if you could, you should have accepted; if not, you should not have accepted').

That Sadducee tells Rava that we should have accepted the Torah only on the basis of a particular examination of the principles to which we were committing ourselves. Rava answers him there: 'We, who walk in whole-heartedness, regarding us it is written: "The innocence of the upright guides them"; those people who walk in crookedness, regarding them it is written: "the perversity of the treacherous destroys them."' Rashi there explains: 'we walk in whole-heartedness'—'we walked with Him in whole-heartedness, as those who act out of love, and we relied on Him that He would not burden us with something we could not endure.' That is, we accepted the Torah in its entirety on the basis of a 'blanket value principle' (a priori): comprehensive and a priori trust in the Giver of the Torah. The Sadducee held that there is no way to ground subordination to a normative system in a sweeping way. He argued that we must examine each component of the system in itself, and only on that basis is it reasonable to accept obligation toward it.

It seems that this midrash alludes to another well-known midrash that can also be understood as dealing with this subject. The midrash appears in Sifrei (beginning of Parashat Ve-Zot HaBerakhah, and alluded to in Babylonian Talmud Avodah Zarah 2b and parallels) about the Holy One, blessed be He, going around to the nations to give them the Torah, and they ask Him 'what is written in it?' Every nation finds some commandment unacceptable to it (Esau—do not murder; Ishmael—do not steal; Ammon and Moab—do not commit adultery). Therefore all the nations, each for its own reason, reject the Holy One's offer to receive the Torah. Here too we see an approach that accepts the Torah on the basis of particular value principles, that is, one that examines the commandments in themselves and does not give blanket, a priori trust to the Giver of the Torah.

Failure to distinguish between these two kinds of value principles lies at the center of many arguments about the problematic nature of particular laws. Claims (secular or Reform) about the irrationality of keeping laws that do not appeal to us ('outdated' laws) often demand that Torah values be examined according to a 'particular value principle,' and do not recognize 'blanket value principles.'

I would add that the discussion here is also connected to the philosophical distinction between constitutive and regulative systems of rules. In analytic philosophy it is customary to distinguish between a constitutive system of rules, which is not an instrument for any goal, and a regulative system of rules, which is only a way of achieving a goal. Clearly, a constitutive system cannot be changed, since it stands on its own and does not serve as a means for achieving an external aim. A regulative system, by contrast, can be examined in light of its success in achieving the aims for which it was defined.

A blanket value principle is, in practice, a claim about the system's being constitutive, at least de facto. It cannot be examined in a particular way, and usually (though not always), from our standpoint at least, it is not aimed at achieving some purpose. A particular value principle indicates that the system is regulative and not constitutive, that is, each component in it is meant to achieve the purposes indicated by the value principle underlying it. The particular value principle usually assumes implicitly, and separately with regard to each law, that this specific law is meant to achieve a specific purpose, and therefore it is proper to do it. This is not the place to say more about this.

[22] For example, there are certain expressions in Rabbi Kook's writings that point to an approach according to which morality and Jewish law are at bottom overlapping systems. The question whether both are 'complete' is interesting; see an indication of this below.

[23] In principle there can be a situation in which both systems are complete—that is, they contain norms over the whole range of reality—and yet there is no contradiction between them. For example, if one system instructs a person in a given situation to stand on one leg, and the second system instructs him in that situation to recite the Shema. Since both actions can be done together, and there is no essential contradiction between them, ostensibly there is no contradiction between two complete and different systems.

This description is correct in principle, and therefore such a state may be treated as involving two partial systems. That would not much alter the analysis above, and therefore I did not take this possibility into account. It should be noted that in most interesting cases the command to stand on one leg and the command to recite the Shema do in fact contradict, because one system says to do one specific thing and nothing else, and the second says the opposite. In this context it is interesting to think, for example, about the relation between prayer, gift, and war; and more generally, between the commandment of trust and the duty of practical effort.

Since I am trying to keep the formal part of the article brief, I did not spell out additional possibilities and ramifications that could arise on the various branches of this analysis. A general theory of subordination to normative systems is not our concern here.

[24] If one system is partial and the other complete, then of course there cannot be a relation of overlap, because they certainly differ. In such a state there also cannot be a relation of disjointness, that is, parallel existence, since one of them is a 'complete system.' There may, however, be containment, that is, one system may be contained within the second, and the difference between them lies only in the domain not shared by them. Of course, contradiction is also possible if they contradict in their common domain.

In my aforementioned response to Dr. Moshe Meir's article, I noted that in his opinion secular humanism and religion are systems that relate to one another by way of containment, in certain senses. But in fact the truth is that they contradict one another. Secularism does not only say to be moral (if at all), but also that there is no need or reason to keep commandments. If so, the field of discourse of secularism, like that of the Torah—to distinguish between them—also extends across the full range of reality. There is no relation of containment here but rather contradiction. See also what we said in the previous note.

[25] Here too there is a reservation worth noting. It is possible that a given act is desirable from one point of view and undesirable from another. For example, I want to eat chocolate because of the principle of pleasure (the principle that whatever gives me pleasure I want to do), but I do not want to eat it because of the principle of survival (that it is desirable to eat only what does not harm survival, that is, health).

For the sake of simplicity in the analysis, I assume that a particular value principle is a summation of both these considerations. That is, one possible value principle is: pleasure is preferable to health. Or the reverse: health is preferable to pleasure. In such a state no problem can arise with two systems based on particular value principles. Compare the note above (the one before the previous note).

[26] We determined above that in such a state there is no a priori restriction. But it is important to note that there may certainly be an a posteriori restriction on such a state. It may be that the very subordination to an additional system contradicts the totality demanded by the second system, even though there is no direct contradiction between their directives. Below we shall see this in greater detail with respect to the Torah system.

[27] With respect to Jewish law, it is clear that there are neutral domains, that is, that it is a partial system. With respect to God's will in its broader sense (see our discussion above in part B), the problem is more complicated, and there are different approaches here. This matter is mentioned in Yedidya Stern's article 'Halakhic Accessibility to Political Questions,' in the collection Between Authority and Autonomy in Jewish Tradition, edited by Ze'ev Safrai and Avi Sagi, Kibbutz Hameuchad and Ne’emanei Torah Va-Avodah, Tel Aviv 1997. But I did not find there reasons or citations on this issue, and therefore I shall bring here two sample sources.

1. Maimonides in his Commentary on the Mishnah to the end of the first chapter of Avot divides the various kinds of speech into five parts: commandment, prohibited, rejected, desirable, and permitted. Thus, explicitly, we see that there are areas of permission (which are not even merely desirable or rejected—that is, not only matters not halakhically fixed, but even completely neutral) in reality, even with respect to God's will.
2. By contrast, see Duties of the Hearts, by Rabbenu Bahya ibn Paquda, Gate of the Service of God (gate 3), chapter 4, where he writes explicitly that, in the sense of God's will (not in the sense of Jewish law), there is no domain of permission (that is, beyond 'desirable' and 'rejected' in Maimonides' terminology above).

This is not the place to expand further on this issue.

[28] There are meta-halakhic approaches that understand every halakhic command as necessarily also moral (this seems connected to the—apparently false, in my view—dilemma known as the 'Euthyphro dilemma': whether morality is good because God commanded it, or whether God commanded it because it is good), and therefore there is here something like a particular value principle. According to such an approach no contradiction can arise between morality and any of the principles of Jewish law. These approaches require a separate discussion, and therefore I shall not enter into them here. See at length on this in Statman and Sagi's book Religion and Morality, Bialik Institute, Jerusalem 1993.

[29] It is customary to say that the difference between Reform and the Conservative movement lies in commitment to Jewish law. According to the criterion of classification proposed here, this difference becomes very blurred, and this is not the place to discuss it.

[30] However, contrary to what seems implied by Stern's article, in my opinion these examples are not neutral, nor are various other domains of reality. On this point see my article 'The Expertise of a Halakhic Decisor as an Evaluator of Reality,' Tzohar, issue 7, summer 2001.

[31] Let us note here that all the examples brought here are only examples. Someone may claim that there is a way to justify these modern values (such as sweeping equality of women) within the Torah-halakhic system, for example by arguing that women today are not like women in the time of the Torah and the Sages. In that case one must examine the claim halakhically, for it is not clear to what extent the laws under discussion really depend on a female character that has changed. But even if this is true, and we indeed decide to change the halakhic attitude toward women, we shall still treat it here only as an illustration of the problematic nature of polynormativity.

If it is claimed that in every clash of values one can find Torah justification for the external systems, this argument in practice makes the entire discussion superfluous, for in that case the discussion simply returns into the Torah system. As stated, whenever we truly need the polynormative solution, it will be where we cannot justify the claim that adherence to the value in question is God's will. If every belief can be justified within the Torah framework, the concept of 'justification' itself seems to lose its principal meaning. Therefore below we shall assume that there are cases in which only the polynormative solution can allow subordination to two normative systems, and we shall discuss the possibility of such a solution.

[32] Solutions to this conflict can be proposed within Jewish law—for example, an enactment validating women to judge (as some medieval authorities explicitly state is effective, at least in certain circumstances), or circumstances in which no other testimony is available, such as in a women's bathhouse, where medieval authorities validated women's testimony.

One might perhaps also argue—though this requires proof—that the disqualification was due to women's status and character in the era of the Sages (something like Meiri's well-known argument regarding gentiles), as noted in the previous footnote. But if the discussion is on the substantive plane, then the only 'solution' is polynormativity.

[33] Later authorities have already noted this and rejected his words. See, for example, the notes ad loc. in the Jerusalem Institute edition of Minhat Hinukh.

[34] Some also explained Rabbi Gershom's words this way in his commentary on the Gemara in Babylonian Talmud Temurah 3b, where the possibility emerges that a person may be liable for an oath and nevertheless receive lashes for it. However, see Rashi there, and in light of that also Rabbi Gershom; the matter is not compelling. I once saw these two examples in a short article by Rabbi Dov Lando (head of Slabodka Yeshivah in Bnei Brak) in some memorial volume, but I do not remember the exact source.

[35] The characterization of the prohibition of idolatry is highly problematic (for example: what exactly is 'acceptance as a divinity'?), and I am not aware of anyone who has dealt with it comprehensively. See the article by Dror Fixler and Gil Nadel in Tehumin, issue 22, 2002, p. 68 and the references there. See also Nadav Shnerb's article submitted to Tzohar (2003), not yet published.

[36] We have already grown accustomed, especially since Kant, to the legitimacy of systems of rules behind which no concrete entity stands, nor even an abstract one. This is a very problematic belief, and in my opinion an unreasonable one as well. One may further say that there is here a secularization of the religious idea of divinity. But that is not the subject of the present discussion. For our purposes it is important that most secular humanists are subject to moral principles not because of some entity that commands them, but as a personal and autonomous decision.

A similar problem arises with respect to the laws of nature. Here too we have grown accustomed—precisely following Descartes, ironically enough—to the idea that explaining an event in the terms 'this is a law of nature' is a sufficient explanation, even if there is no entity that causes the event in question to occur. In fact, according to the Humean conception that understands the concept of cause as temporal succession, classical notions of causal agency disappear. According to Hume there are no causes at all of physical, or other, events. Hume thus anticipates modern approaches in the philosophy of science that Ze'ev Bechler (in his book Three Copernican Revolutions, Zmora-Bitan and University of Haifa, Tel Aviv 1999) calls 'actualism.'

See a discussion of this (one whose details I do not accept, and this is not the place to elaborate) in Yuval Steinitz's book A Scientific-Logical Missile to God and Back, Zmora-Bitan, Tel Aviv 1998, especially chapter 2.

These questions are connected to the discussion whether religious, moral, and even scientific statements are statements about the world or only about ourselves, and this too is not the place to discuss.

[37] The common term in the modern world, 'the image of man,' which has replaced the original term 'the image of God,' indicates something of this trend. As is known (see Maimonides, beginning of Laws of Idolatry), in the days of Enosh people began to worship idols (= 'the image of man').

[38] In light of what has been said here, it follows that if there is commitment to universal morality, but it is set aside before the Torah's commands in every case of conflict, this is not a problematic approach, for there is no entity here that 'threatens' God's supreme status. Dualism requires a status equal, at least in some sense, to God Himself. Therefore subordination to civil law, for example, is not problematic so long as it is clear that its commands are overridden by the commands of Jewish law in every case of conflict. Here the law stands on a different level from God, and therefore there is no essential dualism.

One could indeed have said that even a conception that sees subordination to law as a binding system not deriving from Torah may arouse such a problem, but it is clearly lesser (if it exists at all). It seems to me that Haredi claims about an element of idolatry in renewed Jewish nationalism are aimed at this aspect.

[39] See Sagi and Statman's Religion and Morality (pp. 94-97), where they discuss a point very similar to the one under discussion here. They argue that one can reject the strong dependence of morality on religion and nevertheless not damage God's sovereignty, freedom, or omnipotence, if one adopts a position according to which moral laws are necessary, somewhat like logical necessity, and therefore it is not correct to say that God is subject to them, but simply that no other possibility exists.

[40] These two questions yield a different description of polynormativity. Such a position represents not only commitment to an additional normative system, but also a non-traditional commitment to the Torah system (God's will).

As to the point that false belief, or an incorrect image of God, means belief in another god, see Maimonides' words in Guide of the Perplexed, part I, chapter 60: And I do not say that one who attributes attributes to God, may He be exalted, merely does not apprehend Him properly, or that he associates something with Him, or that he apprehends Him otherwise than He is; rather, I say that he has removed God's existence from his mind without perceiving it… But one who attributes to Him an attribute knows nothing but the name alone, while the thing he imagines that this name is said of is not an existent matter at all, but a false invention, as though he had applied this name to a non-existent thing, since there is nothing in existence that is like this… ('I do not say that one who attributes attributes to God merely fails to grasp Him properly, or that he associates something with Him, or that he grasps Him other than He is; rather, I say that he has removed God's existence from his mind without realizing it… For one who attributes to Him an attribute knows nothing but the name alone; the thing he imagines that this name is said of is not an existent matter at all, but a false invention, as if he had applied this name to a non-existent thing, since there is nothing in existence that is such…').

Maimonides determines that one who attributes incorrect attributes to the Holy One, blessed be He, in practice does not believe in the Holy One, blessed be He, but in some other entity that does not exist at all. See there his well-known example of the distorted description of an elephant, which clarifies the point.

[41] From Maimonides' language here it appears that there can be a situation in which God's will appears outside the Torah, but there is concern about error in drawing such a conclusion. This point is important for the discussion to come, for one should not infer from him that it is impossible to find divine will outside the Torah, as I already noted in detail in the earlier chapters.

[42] See, for example, the entry 'Do Not Add' (and also 'Do Not Subtract') in the Encyclopaedia Talmudit, vol. 3.

[43] Later authorities understood this halakhah as applying also to Jews' observance of commandments, and not only to a resident alien; reason too tends in that direction. See, for example, responsa Oneg Yom Tov, sec. 19, s.v. 'And know'; responsa Sho'el U-Meshiv, second edition, part I, sec. 51, s.v. 'What'; part III, sec. 91; and third series, part I, sec. 402, s.v. 'And what seems.'

[44] Perhaps various verses in the Prophets could be interpreted against this background, such as they forsook Me but kept My Torah, 'they forsook Me but kept My Torah,' and the like. This is not the place to elaborate.

[45] This distinction bears on many apologetic arguments regarding Jews who are not Torah-and-commandment observant, who also, supposedly, fulfill many commandments (interpersonal commandments and the like). From Maimonides' words here it emerges clearly that this has no religious significance. Admittedly there is a halakhic view that commandments do not require intention, but that is only for one in whose spiritual world the concept of 'commandment' exists. One whose world lacks this concept cannot be called one who 'fulfills commandments.' The situation here resembles the words of the medieval authorities concerning 'reverse intention' (an intention not to fulfill one's obligation), where they wrote that in such a case, according to all views, one does not fulfill the obligation. Although in that context the claim is not universally agreed, here it seems simple.

[46] As we saw above, it is very difficult to dispute that there are laws whose source is reason and that are not explicit in the Torah, and the Talmud itself obviously takes for granted that if there is reason, one does not need an explicit scriptural source. According to this, it is clear that the problem, according to Maimonides, with one who invents a religion exists only if that religion in fact does appear in the Torah, or if it is explicitly negated by the verses of the Torah or by tradition. In such cases, that person, who fulfills it not because it appears in the Torah, undermines tradition. Thus the foundation of the matter according to Maimonides is not denial of God and His commands, but undermining the tradition through which the Torah reached us.

[47] Even with respect to association with idolatry, it is not clear from this midrash whether there is actual idolatry here, since it addresses only the question of what reward that person will receive for doing the commandment. There is no discussion here of the association itself. On the other hand, one may certainly learn from this midrash that there is idolatry through association with an entity (or system) that commands commandments that do not contradict the Torah, and as described here, at times it even commands the Torah's own commandments. This accords with what we said above, that such a thing can be called association irrespective of the concrete content of the commands.

It should be noted that the descendants of Noah are not warned against association, and therefore it is doubtful whether one can infer from the laws of the resident alien to laws applying to Israel. More generally, one must discuss whether there is a difference, both in Israel and among the descendants of Noah, between belief in association and idolatry through association (which is the common halakhic appearance of the concept of association), but this is not the place to elaborate.

[48] On this matter see, for example, Rabbi Yuval Cherlow's article in issue 6 of Akdamot. Much more must still be discussed about this, but this is not the place.

[49] Orot HaEmunah, 'The Shadow of Light—Heresy,' edited by Rabbi Moshe Gurevitz, Jerusalem edition, 1998, p. 48.

[50] I note here that in Wosner's case the direction and substance are truly not entirely clear to me. On the one hand, all the examples he brings are examples of areas belonging to the service of God, and in our terms: to God's will. On the other hand, he is careful to emphasize that he does not intend any of the usual kinds of solutions current in Torah-halakhic thought (see the opening of his article), but rather 'normative duality,' in his words. Therefore I truly do not intend here to analyze his claims. I used his words because he is the only one I found who raises the polynormative option clearly and sharply. As I already noted, my strong sense is that a view of this sort is hidden, in one form or another, in the writings of many authors in these fields in recent years.