Q&A: Regarding "One Does Not Administer Punishment Based on Derivation Alone"
Regarding "One Does Not Administer Punishment Based on Derivation Alone"
Question
As I understand it, there are two reasons why one does not administer punishment based on derivation alone: 1) a refutation can be raised, and 2) perhaps a severe act does not actually deserve punishment. A practical difference would be in a bamah matzinu-type derivation. Is there any halakhic ruling among the decisors on this, and are there actual practical halakhic ramifications? (That is, have you come across a court ruling or halakhic ruling that touches on this?)
Answer
There is a practical difference. For example, the Maharsha, second edition to Bava Kamma (51? regarding: if one is liable for opening it, then all the more so for digging it), wrote that for a kal va-chomer of the type "included in two hundred is one hundred," there is no possible refutation, and therefore there one may administer punishment based on derivation. Although, in my opinion, there is a refutation even for such a kal va-chomer. Clearly, there will be no ruling on this question in books of Jewish law, because they do not deal with interpretive rules.