Q&A: Scientific Evidence for Free Choice
Scientific Evidence for Free Choice
Question
Greetings to the righteous and pure Rabbi Michael Abraham. I have two questions for you: in one of your lectures, if I understood it correctly, you argue that something happens in the brain without a cause when a choice occurs. If I’m not mistaken, you said that “an electron moves without a cause.” I was wondering: do you think it is possible, theoretically or practically, to prove this in an experiment or observation? Do you think it would be possible to scan a person’s brain and see an electric current in it without another current preceding it? I don’t pretend to be a physicist like you, but doesn’t the fact that the electric current is created on its own open the door to machines that produce energy out of nothing? (It could be amusing: a factory of people with wires connected to their brains who have to make choices day and night in order to produce energy.) I think you spoke about this in your lecture, but either I missed it or I didn’t understand you, so forgive me if you have to repeat it here as well. You argue, as I understand it, that free choice is neither deterministic nor random. Can you tell me, in clear words, what causes a person to choose option A rather than option B? If, a moment before a person makes a choice, you were to copy his entire universe exactly, is there a chance that the choice in the first universe would be different from the choice in the second universe? If so, then what changed? Thanks in advance.
Answer
Hello,
The electron moves with a cause, but a non-physical cause (our will). Theoretically, it might perhaps be possible to demonstrate this experimentally if you could measure the force acting on the electron and find that it is 0, and yet the electron still moves. In practice, I think that is very difficult and perhaps impossible. But the immediate feeling of freedom indicates that this is the situation. You also would not be able to demonstrate the relation of cause and effect in an experiment either (as David Hume showed), and still almost everyone in the world is convinced that such a relation exists (and in fact that it always exists).
There is no production of energy out of nothing here. The will transfers energy from food and from other mechanisms that store energy in our bodies, and uses it to move that electron. No need to worry, you won’t produce a perpetual motion machine here.
As for choice, you have a conceptual mistake. You are looking for the cause of the choice (what “causes” us to choose this way or that), whereas the claim is that the choice happens without a cause, so there is nothing to look for. Therefore, in another universe a different choice could certainly occur. That is precisely the claim that choice is not causal.
You can see more detail in my book The Science of Freedom, and more briefly in my article here:
Discussion on Answer
This is the relevant passage. I can’t write lectures here. That’s why I wrote a book (where I also explain that choice is aimed at a purpose, determinism comes from a cause, and randomness has neither purpose nor cause), and an article that is shorter.
Here is the relevant passage from the article:
So after all, what are we talking about here: what is libertarianism?
So if libertarianism does not accept conduct that is the product of external influences, nor of internal influences (the person himself), then what is happening here? What nevertheless influences or generates our conduct? Are we dealing with something random, causeless, free of any scientific or other description? The answer to some of these questions (not all of them) is in a certain sense yes, but it is important to clarify this further.
A first point is that the libertarian does not claim that a person is not influenced by various factors, external or internal. His claim is that a person is not always influenced by them, or that the influence is not complete. In other words, he is not determined by them, but at most influenced by them. Second, the libertarian also agrees that sometimes a person acts under the influence of irresistible impulses, and then he is not choosing. Third, he agrees that sometimes a person acts casually, without making a choice or decision, and then again he is not choosing. Fourth, the libertarian fully agrees that the laws of physics act on the human body, and on the brain as well. So the libertarian does not deny environmental and other influences on human action. His only claim is that the sum total of all these influences does not yield the conduct itself in a one-to-one way. He claims that a person’s conduct is not a simple sum of all these things.
This can be compared to movement within some topographical terrain. When a small ball moves across a surface with a given contour, its progress is dictated in a one-to-one way by the layout in which it moves. It will strive toward minimum energy, and the forces acting on it will dictate its path of motion. When it encounters a valley, it will roll into it, and it will never climb a mountain (unless it already had momentum). But what about a person moving within such a terrain? Clearly, he too will feel the different forces trying to bring him to minimum energy. The difference between him and the ball is that the person considers the totality of the forces acting on him, but in the end he decides for himself whether to go along with them (toward minimum energy), or to go in another direction (to climb the mountain and not slide down into the valley). As stated, the environment definitely has an influence, but it does not determine the conduct in a one-to-one way.
This topographical terrain is, for our purposes, a metaphor. The collection of all influences, external and internal, acting on a person (genetics, the laws of nature, the structure and state of the brain, the influence of the environment, education, culture and values, and so on) creates some topographical contour within which the person acts. That contour definitely influences his conduct, and tries to push him toward certain directions of behavior or repel him from moving in other directions. But unlike the ball, the person can choose whether to comply with the dictates of this topographical contour or to act otherwise. This final decision is not the result of any influence or factor, because all the influencing factors are located within the surrounding topography. The decision is entirely free, except that it also weighs and takes into account all these influences. Clearly, given a different topographical complex, the conduct may be different. The same person, with the same degree of love for scenic lookouts, when standing before a small hill will probably decide to climb it in order to enjoy the view. By contrast, when standing before a high and difficult mountain, he will tend to stay below and not climb it, even if it is the same view. Does that mean his decision is dictated by the environment? Not necessarily. It is influenced by the environment, but in the final analysis it is his decision.[4] This is a schematic description of the libertarian view.
Three models: randomness, determinism, and free choice
If we summarize what we have seen so far, we can speak of three mechanisms of conduct:
Deterministic conduct, according to which every state is a necessary result of previous states. The circumstances that prevailed in the previous moment (the topography and the person’s location within it) dictate the next moment. The person is a kind of little ball.
Random conduct, according to which a person behaves in a way completely detached from influences. This can be described by a lottery model. When a person has to decide what to do, he conducts a lottery and acts accordingly.
Free choice, according to which a person’s conduct is influenced by the topographical contour, but not determined by it. The decision is made through his own free judgment, which also weighs and takes into account the constraints and influences of the environment.
It is important to understand that, contrary to common views in discussions of determinism, the last two mechanisms are not identical. In both of them there is no cause that dictates the result, but in the second mechanism this is mere arbitrary randomness, whereas in the third mechanism it is judgment aimed at realizing the person’s values and goals. True, the conduct is not the mechanical result of a cause that produces it, but it certainly cannot be seen as random conduct. One could say that in the first mechanism conduct is determined by causes; in the third, it is conduct in light of purposes, or on the basis of reasons, but not out of causes (a person can decide to climb the mountain even if that direction is contrary to the forces acting on him and does not bring him to minimum energy). And in the second, it is meaningless conduct, grounded neither in causes nor in purposes and reasons. In the second mechanism there is no judgment producing the decision; in the third, there is.
The election parable
This threefold distinction can be clarified and sharpened further by means of a parable. Imagine free political elections in which a person enters a voting booth, freely chooses a ballot slip, and drops it into the ballot box. The ruler is chosen by a majority of the voters’ votes. These political elections serve here as a parable for the choices a person makes in his private life. Let us now see three different applications of this model:
In Syria, everything proceeds as described above, except that in the voting booth there is only one kind of ballot slip. This is, of course, fake freedom. This is determinism. Despite the illusion of freedom, the current situation dictates the result in a one-to-one way.
In Switzerland, this indeed happens with several kinds of ballot slips, but in our metaphorical Switzerland there is no real issue to solve. It does not really matter who the ruler will be, since nothing depends on it. Here the elections are comparable to a lottery, because in fact one could have held a completely random drawing and gotten a reasonable result. There is no consideration of purposes toward which the voters are striving, and in effect they function as one big lottery machine. Therefore these “free” elections actually express randomness rather than freedom. There are no causes and no purposes or reasons for the choice, and therefore this is not really a choice but a lottery.
By contrast, in Israel there are also several problems awaiting solution. In the voting booth there are several kinds of ballot slips for the voter to choose from, and he chooses one of them and drops it into the ballot box.[5] The results will largely dictate the conduct, and they will have costs, for better or worse. Here there is no cause dictating the result (the elections are free), but there is conduct of judgment in light of purposes, and therefore this is not randomness. This and only this is the state parallel to freedom of choice, or free will.
These three models parallel the three mechanisms described in the previous section and help sharpen the difference between the last two.
You said that “in the third mechanism we are dealing with judgment aimed at realizing a person’s values and goals.” I’d like you to zoom in a bit on that “judgment.” If, for example, I have a certain value A and a value B and I need to choose between them, what is the decisive factor here? What does “free” will mean? If you say that it depends on which value is stronger in me, then isn’t the “strength” of those values embedded in my deterministic brain?
Read the article or the book. Are you expecting me to rewrite it here to save you the trouble?
Sorry, sorry, I’ll read the book when I get a chance!
(But just to make sure, the book does answer the question I asked, right?)
It explains why the question is based on a misunderstanding. There is no way to zoom in on something that has no mechanical-causal description. It’s like zooming in on something that is one simple unit. What I do zoom in on is the explanation of this principle (the principle that says you can’t zoom in).
If that’s the case, I don’t think I’ll read the book. When you claim that there is free choice, you are making a scientific claim—the laws of determinism that apply everywhere in the universe do not apply in the human brain. If you don’t know what is there in place of determinism, philosophical excuses of one kind or another for why you don’t have an answer won’t convince me personally. For some reason I thought that when you said there is a “third mechanism,” you also knew how it works. Thanks for your time anyway.
If someone doesn’t want to read in order to understand where he is mistaken, that is of course completely legitimate. I just don’t understand why start a discussion if you don’t want to clarify it. If all you want is to remain in your original position at any cost, there is no need to start discussions. All the best.
Thank you for the answer. My eyes went dark when I saw how long the text was, so with your permission I’ll ask here so that your skilled mind can pull out only the answer that interests me. If you say that choice happens without a cause, what distinguishes it from randomness? If it isn’t based on anything, how can it be anything other than random? (Again, sorry if you answered this in a thousand other places; I hope one more time won’t be too much trouble for you.)