Q&A: A Basic Question About the Physico-Theological Argument
A Basic Question About the Physico-Theological Argument
Question
Hello,
I read the third booklet on the physico-theological argument, as well as your series of articles about it. As I understand it, the argument goes like this:
- A. Complexity is an objective criterion [and even if not, the main thing is that it is objective for an intelligent being].
- B. An overwhelming majority of states will not produce something complex.
- C. It is preferable to assume that someone assembled the complex thing rather than leave it without a cause.
- Conclusion — the universe is a complex thing and requires an assembler.
I would like to ask about the third part: how do we choose an explanation for a given phenomenon? When do we leave it without a cause, and when do we prefer to posit an additional entity?
For example, regarding our argument: we see a very, very complex world, so let us assume that some intelligent being created it. That indeed would explain why the world turned out complex rather than otherwise. (So on the one hand this explanation loses points because it adds an external entity, but it gains points בכך it explains the possibility of the phenomenon rather than a random world.)
But in the end we are just transferring the complexity of the world to the complexity of the creator… so maybe it is better to assume that the world is its own cause. (That way we would not lose by adding an entity on the one hand, and in any case the complexity of the world offsets the complexity of the creator on the other.)
Answer
At the beginning of the booklet I explained that if the Creator too had been created at some stage (in which case He too would need a creator), or if the world were eternal (in which case positing a complex creator adds nothing), then you would be right. But my claim is that the physico-theological argument leads to the existence of an eternal Creator, one who was never created. Therefore, even if He is complex, He does not require an assembler.
Discussion on Answer
??? What is the meaning of the first sentence, and how is it connected to what I wrote here?
Complexity always requires an explanation, even if it is not within our experience. Only within the framework of the cosmological argument, which speaks about every entity whose existence requires an explanation (regardless of complexity), is our experience important. There may be entities whose existence is necessary or accidental and which do not require an explanation. Those in our experience apparently are not like that.
You wrote: "or if the world were eternal (in which case positing a complex creator adds nothing), then you would be right."
I replied: that implies that someone who does not accept the cosmological proof and claims that the world is eternal indeed has no reason to posit a creator…
I think your definition of complexity is as something unique and defined—"a quantity of matter that exists at certain points"—but according to that it is not necessary to claim that a soul is specifically complex. (It is not unique.) It may be wondrous and have wondrous and immense functions, but still be quite simple.
There is no connection whatsoever. Someone who does not accept the cosmological proof can still accept the physico-theological one, or the findings of physics about the Big Bang, and therefore hold that the world is not eternal.
That is not my definition of complexity, but an illustration of the concept of complexity. Any uniqueness would enter the argument in the same way.
How did the Big Bang show that the world is not eternal? It merely shifted the question from the universe to a singular point, and therefore one can still say, to the same extent, that the singular point is eternal, no, Rabbi?
The cosmological proof argues that the world is not eternal, but rather has a beginning—whether that is some primordial matter that has the power to move itself forward, or a transcendent creator.
And you also wrote in one of the responsa here on the site that physics too does not prove that the universe was created, only that it was compressed.
Moreover, here you wrote that even without the cosmological proof and even without modern science one can still use the physico-theological proof to show that the universe has a starting point, so I do not understand the Rabbi's position at all….
In any case, do you accept my claim that God is not unique (relative to the world, which is very unique), and therefore He can serve as a preferable stopping point for the regress than our universe?
I also remembered such a responsum, and I found it:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%d7%9e%d7%a2%d7%91%d7%a8-%d7%9e%d7%94%d7%A8%d7%90%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%92%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%94-%D7%9C%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%97%D7%95%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%9D/
There is a lot of confusion in the arguments.
Joseph, the singular point can be eternal, and the question would still remain how a complex world emerged from it, and who set the laws that govern these processes. That is assuming that eternity is even a coherent concept (a concrete infinity).
David, I will repeat your logical mistake once again: true, the cosmological proof shows that the world is not eternal, but even someone who rejects it does not necessarily reach the conclusion that it is eternal. There may be another proof, or simply an assumption that it is not eternal (for example, because of our acquaintance with it, that is, from our experience).
I do not accept the claim you formulated about God. His complexity is no less than the complexity of the world He created. Therefore, if He were not eternal, the difficulty would arise regarding Him too.
True, one can ask about the laws, but then stopping at them is possible exactly like stopping at God.
You wrote that the difference between the complexity of God and the complexity of the world is that God is eternal and the world is not, but one can speak of the complexity of the laws, which may be eternal. I do not understand what the Big Bang helps us with when we already agree that the proof is from the laws and not from the complex product itself (in which case the Big Bang would be relevant).
First, laws are not entities, and therefore they are not the cause of anything. It does not matter whether they are eternal or not.
Second, the proof is built on two levels: a proof from the world itself, and a proof from the laws.
I did not say they are the cause, only that the behavior of matter in a way that leads to the creation of life (for example, the constants) is eternal, like an eternal machine, and there is no need for some intelligent being to create it.
I did not understand the significance of the fact that there still remains a proof from the world, and how that explains the relevance of the Big Bang.
I also answered that in the booklet (basically through the Principle of Sufficient Reason). I think we have discussed this enough.
Well then, in any case we end up at the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which relates to eternal things, so what did the Big Bang advance for us?
In other words: were it not for the Big Bang, we would seek a sufficient reason for the unique universe itself, and then the proof would be on the same level, no?
If you see the Big Bang as the beginning of the universe's existence, it establishes the cosmological proof. If you think the singular point itself is eternal, then move to the laws and to the physico-theological proof. And even if the laws are eternal, there is the Principle of Sufficient Reason. I have exhausted the matter.
??? If the laws and the singular point are eternal, then move to the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
A moment ago the Rabbi answered that if the world is eternal, one cannot use the physico-theological proof… after all, you take the complexity of the world and explain it by means of yet another additional entity—divine and equally complex. Has the Rabbi changed his mind?
This discussion is bizarre, repetitive, and full of misunderstandings. After all, my final word: even if the world is eternal, its development is governed by special laws, and laws require a lawgiver. This is the version of the physico-theological proof from the laws. That's it. I will answer no more.
What is the difference between complexity and special laws?
Why does lawfulness require a lawgiver? Is it just a basic intuition, or something more than that? Throughout the whole booklet the Rabbi does not mention this issue; perhaps it would be worth adding an appendix on this other argument…
So according to this, it comes out that someone who does not accept the cosmological proof cannot accept the physico-theological proof?
Doesn't the Rabbi think that specifically complexity that in our experience requires an explanation—like the world—does require one, whereas the complexity of the creator does not require an explanation? (Spiritual complexity, like a great soul.)
For example, I do not think a soul needs someone to create it…