You wrote elsewhere that two intuitions conflict: that of free will and that of the causality that governs the world.
And accordingly, by lex specialis, it is more reasonable to assume that causality governs almost all reality, and to exclude will from causality in order to make room for both intuitions, rather than nullifying one before the other.
That is, you are not proving freedom of the will, but relying on the intuition of it, and explaining that this intuition is reasonable.
The problem is that we have become too accustomed to the intuition of freedom being wrong. Every scientific discovery weakens belief in that intuition. It shows that a phenomenon that we experienced, at first glance, as “free” (that is, not explicable by a causal mechanism), turned out to be “deterministic.” In fact, as such explanations multiply, the belief becomes rooted in us that everything has a technical explanation, and even if we have not yet discovered it for a certain phenomenon, we already believe that it exists.
I understand that Kobi (the questioner) would have been happy had you gone into the details—that is, examined the nature and force of the intuitions, and shown why it is still more reasonable to believe in freedom than to believe in determinism and say that we simply have not yet discovered the explanation? In short, more than a logical argument, what seems called for here is “strengthening the faith” (perhaps through rhetoric).

Thank you for the response. It seems I really did not understand the first part of the book, even though I read it many times—the explanation of choice, chapter 6 (the second part of the book really is understandable).

But I still do not really understand what this will is. Is it an independent entity that is created, or does it only describe a certain state of consciousness that has changed? Because in the book you relate to it more like the first option. Even though it seems obvious that it is more like the second.
B. How is the will able to choose its purpose if it did not exist before it was created? And thinking about the purpose is always also a choice.

Israel,
In my opinion no scientific finding weakens this, and I explained that very clearly in my book. And if you have become accustomed to the idea that the intuition of freedom is mistaken (just as determinists become accustomed to determinism), then get rid of that habit. I do not see how your habit leads you to accuse me of clinging to habits.

Kobi,
We have a faculty called will, and within it specific desires take place. Just as we have a faculty of thought (= intellect), and within it thinking takes place and specific thoughts arise. The faculty called will is the ability to will, and it is embedded in us from birth. The specific desires arise over the course of our lives.

Heaven forbid that I should accuse you… (I am only trying to sharpen the point that still needs explanation).
I did not say that you are clinging to habits. I only asked whether you have an argument that would persuade me to get rid of my habits.
Or: how did you get rid of the habit of determinism? (What convinced you that the feeling of freedom is not mistaken?)

I did not accuse you of accusing me. I wrote “accusation,” but I meant it only in the logical sense. You claim that my position is merely the result of habit, and I pointed out that, at least by your own logic, your position is also such a result—and even more so than mine.
My claim is that we experience freedom of the will in the most intimate way imaginable, whereas causality is a speculative hypothesis with no basis at all (and randomness is something altogether inconceivable that we have never experienced). Moreover, the basis for it also depends on freedom of the will (that is, on the ability to exercise judgment). So it seems a bit strange to me that דווקא the libertarian is the one who has to bring proofs for his position. To me, this is like someone claiming to a person who believes what he sees with his own eyes that he must bring proof for it because it is only a habit.
This, beyond lex specialis, leads me to the clear conclusion that free will exists. The very fact that I have conclusions already presupposes the conception that I have judgment and therefore freedom.

A. How is the hypothesis of causality so speculative if it has already predicted countless observations?! The chance of predicting even one observation approaches zero…
B. It surprises me that someone who denies causality is considered a believer—why should we not also claim that the world came into being ex nihilo without any prior cause? …

C. And regarding the continuation of your remarks, that determinism leads to abandoning judgment—true, but such a claim changes nothing. After all, who says that his machine is indeed defective? Casting doubt on his machine is the same as casting doubt on the chooser’s brain…. True, there is the upgrade you wrote about in the book—that his machine produces false intuitions—but even so, the determinist has a very good explanation of how each one arose (moral intuition—from environment and evolution; intuition of choice—from outside and from the process of shedding doubts, etc.).
And likewise with Plantinga’s “objections,” one could answer that intelligence is a major key to survival. I’m amazed that a professor of philosophy can come out with such nonsense.

If I understood correctly, you are making a very strong claim: the very perception of causality is based on the perception of freedom, like any act of judgment that is impossible for a deterministic mechanism.
I only want to ask whether you can explain (briefly is fine too) why a mechanism cannot draw conclusions (on the face of it, a computer seems to arrive at certain conclusions)?

Hello Kobi, I have to say that in light of the rather meager understanding you display here, I would be cautious about accusing professors of philosophy—and certainly people as intelligent as Plantinga—of talking nonsense.
A. The hypothesis of causality has not predicted even a single observation. The principle of causality says that everything has a cause, not that there is such a thing as a causal relation. By the way, even the weaker hypothesis—that there is a causal relation—has not predicted anything. What you are saying reflects a complete misunderstanding.
B. I did not deny causality. I completely accept it, but I exclude free will from it. How many times do I have to explain this?!
C. I have already explained several times the difference between the objection to libertarianism, which is a skeptical objection, and the objection to determinism, which is an essential one, and I will not repeat it here again.
The determinist has no explanation for anything, because explanations can be offered only by someone who has judgment. Beyond that, he does not even purport to give explanations for morality, but only for the illusory feeling of morality. In his world there is no morality, and certainly he does not have even a shred of an explanation for morality. I explained this in the fourth booklet, part 3.
As for intelligence and survival, I already explained that too, and I will not repeat it.
I think I have exhausted the matter.
Israel,
A computer does not arrive at any conclusions. See column 35. Beyond that, even if you call what it reaches “conclusions,” there is no basis whatsoever for placing trust in those conclusions, as I explained in my book The Science of Freedom and in the article.

The principle of causality predicted all the regularity that exists in nature, did it not?

Absolutely not. First, it is usually accepted as a result of observations, not as their predictor. Second, there is a debate about that very point (David Hume): do the observations reflect causality or only correlation? And third, as I explained above, the principle of causality states that everything has a cause, not that there is such a thing as a cause. Nature’s regularity certainly cannot teach us that.
The principle of causality is an a priori assumption of ours, not the result of observations.

If it does not predict them, then why do we fly in airplanes and make use of science…
Even if it reflects correlation, at the end of the day there is some sort of cause here. Not like free choice, which is something from nothing.
Indeed I agree that one should ask whether the principle of causality is valid for the claim that everything has a cause. And that is another question.

B. I saw that in the book you wrote that free choice has a sufficient reason why it is this way and not another—the desired result, even if it has no prior cause. And so this blunts the determinist’s objection. But in my opinion this is not precise, because a person could have chosen not to choose that result (according to your view). So I do not think this really blunts the determinist’s question. If indeed the person had to choose the desired goal, then it would blunt the determinist’s question.

Hello Kobi.
You assume that if there is a correlation, then there is probably causality in the background—but that very point is what the debate is about.
I did not understand question B. The person does not have to choose what he chose, but when he does so, it is in order to achieve some result (to realize some value). He could have chosen not to realize that value, or to choose another value instead.
I am not familiar with a determinist objection that this is supposed to answer. There is the question from the dilemma: either there is a cause, in which case this is determinism, or there is not, in which case it is randomness. Therefore, either way there is no free will (= choice). To this I answered that even if there is no cause, that does not mean randomness: if there is also no purpose, then it is randomness, but if there is, then it is choice. In my view, I answered that difficulty completely.

What do you say about this answer to the dilemma:
Randomness is an “effect” without a cause.
Those who hold the doctrine of free choice do not believe in randomness,
but rather in man as a “first cause,”
that is, a cause that is not itself caused by a prior cause
[for that is its essence: it is not an “effect” but a “cause”
(one who cannot think of the pure concept of cause
cannot distinguish between the concepts of cause and effect,
and therefore cannot present us with the dilemma)].

I am five hundred parasangs away from the postmodern view, but if the assumption is correct that a person’s will acts upon natural reality—perhaps there is room for the postmodern notion that truth too is determined by the will? That sounds bizarre to me, and so I leave it as a question for analysis and discussion.

With blessings,, S.Z. Levinger

Israel, I did not understand.

I will try to explain more.
Above you wrote as follows: “The dilemma: either there is a cause, and then this is determinism, or there is none, and then this is randomness.
Therefore, either way there is no free will (= choice).
And to that I answered that even if there is no cause, that does not mean randomness: if there is also no purpose, then it is randomness, but if there is, then it is choice.”

I understood from these words that what distinguishes cause from randomness is whether there is a purpose or not.
And the mistake in the dilemma is that it ignores this distinction and sets randomness and causality against each other as a dichotomy.

My feeling is that even without the distinction of purpose, one can propose a third option (and thereby escape the dilemma).
For this I first define randomness: an effect without a cause.
Now I see that the dilemma sets against this an opposing view, according to which there is no effect without a cause,
and from that derives that every “cause” has a cause—which leads to determinism.

And here I say: stop! It is true that “there is no effect without a cause,” but one must not ignore the fact that in this sentence there is a distinction between the concept of cause and the concept of effect. The concept of “cause,” in its “purity” (that is, considering only the “causality” aspect within it), means the “source” and “generator” of the effect. From this it follows that the cause is “primary,” meaning that it is not merely an “instrument” in the hands of a prior cause; [for if so, it is not a cause, that is, not a “source and generator” (it seems obvious to me that the pen is not the “cause” of the writing, but an “instrument” in the hand of the writer, who is the cause of the writing), and then the two sides of the dilemma are equal: either there is no cause, or there is a cause that is not a cause—that is to say, there is no cause].
If so, the statement “there is no effect without a cause” requires a cause only for the “effect,” not for the cause itself. And now I ask the one who raises the dilemma: who gave you permission to apply the correct principle to the “effect” (there is no effect without a cause) to the “cause” that you were talking about? For in the very concept of “cause” it is implied that it is not an effect, because if it were, it would only be an instrument and not a cause!

I did not understand the claim. The determinist claims that there is an infinite causal chain. It never began and will never end.
The claim of the dilemma is that the only alternative to a deterministic connection is randomness (an effect without a cause, or something caused without a cause).
I claimed that there is another alternative: an effect without a cause but with a purpose.
So what is the meaning of your distinction between cause and ground? And why is there a different answer here from mine to the dilemma argument?

I am trying to show that there is a flaw in the dilemma.
Infinite causality is disguised randomness, because in the final analysis, in infinite causality (as in randomness) there are not really “causes” but “means,” and their totality is called “reality,” and this totality has no cause—which is to say, it is random.

Apparently my reply here “drowned” in the sea of responses to your latest post, and therefore escaped your notice….

Infinite causality is not randomness. Either it does not exist at all (because it is a concrete infinity), or it does exist, and then it is causality through and through.

You still have not refuted my argument (three stages):
1. A cause that has a cause is an “instrument.”
2. An “instrument” is nothing but a “tool” in the hand of its cause (it is not really itself a “cause”),
3. Therefore, infinite causality is a chain of “instruments” that has no cause, meaning random.

Israel. Read and you will see that I answered everything. That is enough.