Q&A: A Kal Va-Chomer Toward Leniency
A Kal Va-Chomer Toward Leniency
Question
Hello Rabbi,
In the past I received the Middah Tovah sheets, and thank you for that.
I ran into an issue, and I do not remember whether it was discussed there at the time. I would appreciate your help in directing me to a relevant sheet, if indeed it was.
The Talmud in Avodah Zarah 46b sets out a rule that when there are two possible outcomes for a kal va-chomer, one stringent and one lenient, we follow the stringent one.
It is not clear to me whether this is a rule connected to the mode of inference, or whether it is a "law" within kal va-chomer itself. It is hard to accept that this is a rule of inference, because the leniency and stringency seem accidental, as derivatives of the inference. On the other hand, it is also hard to accept that this is a rule in the "laws of kal va-chomer," because immediately afterward the Talmud wants to challenge the rule by means of a case of kal va-chomer between a Torah prohibition (slaughtering on the Sabbath) and the prohibition of sprinkling on the Sabbath (rabbinic), and therefore it seems that the stated rule belongs to the methods of logical inference.
Likewise, it does not seem that this is a result of the rule that in a rabbinic-level doubt one must be stringent, for the reason mentioned above.
I would be very grateful for your help
Answer
Hello. I do not recall a Middah Tovah article that dealt with this. As for an analogy toward leniency or stringency, the later authorities discussed whether this is a rule in the laws of doubt or a definition within the hermeneutical principles themselves. I wrote about this once (perhaps only in a lecture), and I do not remember where. For now I found an article about it:
יש ללחוץ כדי לגשת אל asif%201%20238-248.pdf
Regarding kal va-chomer, I looked now at the passage (because I did not understand how it could be possible to derive a kal va-chomer in two opposite directions), and I saw that that is not the issue there. There it is a kal va-chomer based on two data points rather than three, and therefore it can be made in both directions. The writers on the rules say that such a kal va-chomer should not be made at all, because one could prove from it that a doorpost requires tzitzit or that tzitzit require a mezuzah. About that, we did indeed write, in the article for the Torah portion of Shelach; see there.
You are right that in the Avodah Zarah passage it appears that even when there are two data points, one still derives and always goes in the stringent direction. The problem is that in the examples I brought there, both are stringent. When I get the chance, perhaps I will look into this.
Your conclusion does seem to follow from the Avodah Zarah passage, namely that this is a rule in the methods of analogy and not in the laws of doubt, but it is still possible that it is unique specifically to kal va-chomer. That, of course, would depend on the dispute among the later authorities that I mentioned regarding analogy; see there.
On second thought, it could still be a matter of the laws of doubt, because the rule that in a Torah-level doubt one must be stringent is a positive, obligating rule: one is obligated to be stringent. The rule that in a rabbinic-level doubt one is lenient is a negative rule: one is not obligated to be stringent (one may be lenient, but is not obligated to be). Now you have before you two halakhic conclusions, and you are uncertain between them. It turns out that you have a doubt involving a Torah-level application, and therefore it is clear that in that doubt you would go stringently and be stringent. True, it follows from this that even in a rabbinic-level doubt one is stringent, but as stated, that does not contradict the rule, because it is a negative rule.