Q&A: Jewish Answers to Ancient Philosophical Questions
Jewish Answers to Ancient Philosophical Questions
Answer
A.
Regarding the tree that falls in the forest, this has nothing to do with quantum theory or with the difficulty of inferring from experience (the problem of induction). Today it is clear to any reasonable person that when the tree falls it does not produce a sound, because sound is a cognitive phenomenon. The tree creates a pressure wave in the air, and when it strikes the eardrum it creates a sound within human consciousness. Therefore, if no person is there, there is a pressure wave but no sound.
The proof he brings from a futile prayer is highly problematic, because it is based on the view of the Sages—and of ancient science—that there are gaps in physics. But today we know there are none (except in the quantum micro-world).
Within his remarks he assumes, like many others, that there are miracles above nature and miracles within nature. But that is not so. Every miracle is above nature. A miracle means that according to the laws of nature, X should have happened, but the Holy One, blessed be He, intervened and Y happened. In other words, it is a deviation from nature. This is a very common mistake, but still a mistake.
I did not understand why this is connected to “humanistic” Judaism. Does he mean “dependent on human beings”? As in the literal meaning of humanism? That is not the accepted terminology.
B.
With the Ship of Theseus, one must distinguish between inanimate objects and human beings. Human beings have a soul that turns the collection of cells into an organism, and therefore even when all the cells have been replaced, it is still the same person. As for a ship, it is simply a matter of definition. By the way, Tosafot and the Ritva disagreed about this in the case of someone who vowed never to enter his father’s house, and then the house collapsed and was rebuilt—whether he may enter it or not.
The proof from ritual impurity is not compelling. For this purpose, impurity regards it as a new vessel (as stated, with inanimate things this is a matter of definition).
By the way, his last sentence eliminates the meaning of the whole matter. A vessel is defined in Jewish law by its use. Whatever is intended for human use and made by a person for that purpose is a vessel. Therefore, when the vessel breaks, that designation is nullified. But this teaches us nothing about reality itself, only about the definition of a vessel. Therefore no ontological conclusions can be drawn from here.
C.
Avi Sagi devoted an entire book to the Euthyphro dilemma in Judaism.
In my opinion, Sagi himself was mistaken, and so is your grandson, because this is a question of definition. In the world as it appears before us, the good is good by virtue of being such. But the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world to be this way. About a world with a different character and nature from ours, we have no ability at all to judge. Therefore both sides of the dilemma are imaginary. It is exactly like asking whether the sum of the angles in a triangle is necessarily 180 degrees, or whether that is just a contingent fact. The Holy One, blessed be He, created space as flat, and then necessarily the sum is 180. But He could have created curved space, and then it would have been different. This is somewhat connected to your article about two kinds of necessity (knowledge and choice): it is true necessarily, or necessarily true.
Now all his proofs obviously fall away. He argues that the benefit preceded the commandment, but the benefit derives from the structure of the world, which the Holy One, blessed be He, created.
I completely reject his remark about observing the commandments when it is known that they have no benefit. First, he assumes an identity between the commandments and moral-social good. I disagree with that. Second, he assumes that obeying the religious court is not itself a good. I do not understand why (the author of the homilies of Rabbenu Nissim writes exactly this: one who knows that the religious court erred must nevertheless obey them, because disobeying them is also a transgression that brings spiritual and social harm). Third, he assumes that one must obey a religious court that erred, but that too is not precise. There are many opinions on the matter, beginning with the passage in Horayot 2b: “one who errs regarding the commandment to obey the words of the Sages.”
Discussion on Answer
1. I understand that you accepted my main comment about the falling tree. In your remarks you addressed only the question of why to rely on the Sages. But even there you gave me an educational-didactic answer, whereas I asked a substantive question. If the Sages are not a proper source on which to build philosophy because they are mistaken in these areas, it does not help to say that such a construction is useful because people rely on them. People who rely on them are mistaken. I argue that the Sages were not authorized in philosophy or science, and they have authority only in Jewish law. To my mind this is similar to a situation in which you would build, on the basis of the Sages, a theory that the earth is not round because people accept their authority in these matters. Does that sound reasonable to you?
The belief that miracles can be treated as part of nature (which appears among quite a few medieval authorities and thinkers) is mistaken, as I explained. What I mean is that miracles constitute a deviation from the laws of nature known to us. Therefore, the question of when they were created is of no importance (before the world or within it). Bottom line: when a miracle occurs, the laws of nature known to us are temporarily suspended. All this is unrelated to the role of the miracle (whether to save the believer or not). I am speaking about the very occurrence of the miracle as such.
B. But if that is so, then the conclusion you drew from the laws of impurity regarding consciousness creating reality falls away, since this is a matter of definition and not an ontic phenomenon. So what connection does this have to quantum theory? By the way, even in quantum theory they no longer really believe this today (they did a double-slit experiment without human consciousness, and there was still collapse). Think about a concept defined in relation to the human being, like “a chair comfortable for sitting.” Suppose the person has now become thinner and that chair is no longer comfortable for him. Would you claim that this shows that human consciousness affects reality? Is it correct to draw from this an analogy to “humanism” in the style of quantum theory?
C. As I explained, there is no connection between the proofs you brought and the Euthyphro dilemma. It does not matter whether the good is relative or absolute.
As for one who errs regarding the commandment to obey the words of the Sages, the medieval authorities disagreed about this. Some wrote as you did. As I recall, there is an article by Yaakov Blidstein on this, and much more.
All the best and much success,
Greetings to you, Rabbi.
A. — Regarding your point that there is something problematic about relying on the view of the Sages: in fact, the article was written from the opposite premise. There are other important advantages to the biblical text in the field of philosophy in general, and in the areas of ethics and the philosophy of language in particular.
The great skepticism prevailing in philosophy today does not allow for any proof or stable basis for agreement among human beings. Philosophy, and ethics in particular, must fundamentally rely on education, on culture. For the sake of social existence, society needs a social covenant that will be accepted by all, and that was one of the main goals of the giving of the Torah. In the Middle Ages, Maimonides arranged the Jewish canon in the areas of thought and faith in the model of the principles of Jewish faith. Those principles—foremost among them the principle that the Torah is from Heaven—which were accepted in Jewish communities as axioms, I see as a stable basis for the authoritative growth of Jewish philosophy.
Therefore, relying on the absolute acceptance of the Mishnah and the Talmud throughout the Jewish diaspora, I chose specifically to develop rabbinic sources into philosophical outlooks touching on other issues.
—The things were written מתוך faith that all miracles can be treated as being within nature (except for the ten things that were created on the eve of the Sabbath at twilight). Wonder at the low probability of their occurrence always accompanies them, but they are not inconceivable as natural. In any case, the main point of miracles is the salvation of the believer, not necessarily to prove their divine source. (As for a sign and wonder that come in order to encourage the weak in faith, we are warned not to take them too seriously: “And the sign or the wonder comes to pass, of which he spoke to you, saying: Let us go after other gods and serve them…”)
B. — Certainly, naming a vessel is, as you said, a matter of definition, and it relates to the human use of the vessel. So it is with the Ship of Theseus, and so it is with the vessels mentioned in the Mishnah. Beyond that, I find no ontological significance in the artificial name of the vessel.
—Indeed, in using the term “humanism,” the intention is that the human being is the measure of the world. As was explained at the end of the third question: “It is humanistic, since it relates to laws, whose purpose is the eternal good, as revolving around the human being according to his condition.”
C. — The reference is to the widespread use of the word “good” as usually meaning relative rather than absolute good. Thus the commandments too came as a response to reality in order to improve it.
—On the contrary, the higher “good” of obeying the religious court was indeed mentioned, and it outweighs present moral-social good. Regarding the discussion you referred me to in tractate Horayot, as far as I remember it is only when the religious court would have retracted had it understood properly, and not when it was stubborn in its claim (as in the case of the Oven of Akhnai, where they insisted against Rabbi Eliezer). Am I right?
Best regards,