Q&A: A Question About Free Will (Deleted Because of the Site Malfunction)
A Question About Free Will (Deleted Because of the Site Malfunction)
Question
Hello Rabbi. Lately the Rabbi has been speaking about free will. I have a simple proposal for resolving the “contradiction.” It’s clear to me that the Rabbi will reject it; I just want to know why. Theoretically: why can’t we say that a person also chooses the entire script that is predetermined for him? Suppose it is known that a certain person will choose a certain thing—does that mean that at the moment of choice he had no choice? He feels that he chose! That same person feels that nothing external to him forced him to do what he chose to do. It seems to me that the way to approach my question depends on the question of how free choice is defined. If you define it as the feeling of choice—not in the sense of fantasies, but in the sense that it really is the choice—then a person does have free will (and it is really not relevant that it was known in advance that he would choose a certain thing, and it is not even relevant that his choice had circumstances that led him to the act he chose to do). Thank you very much!
Answer
Claims like this have come up in the talkbacks. What you are describing is either compatibilism or the “movie” argument. Compatibilism is not free will but the illusion of free will (a feeling proves nothing). The movie theory has been discussed at length in the columns.