Question

Wikipedia, in the entry on the problem of induction:

Karl Popper did indeed try to overcome the problem that David Hume posed to science by arguing that the main mechanism of science is deductive, and that science operates by means of deductive refutations rather than inductive proofs—that is, that a scientific theory can only be refuted, but not verified (for example: one can know that the theory that the rooster’s crowing is not the cause of the sunrise on the basis of the fundamental refutation that exists for this claim).
However, Popper’s opponents and critics argued against him that he was actually concealing the problem of induction by means of the mechanism of refutation, not necessarily solving it: they argued that Popper assumes that if the results of an experiment point to the refutation of some theory, those results will necessarily recur in the future and thereby refute the theory again and again, and so induction is being used here as well. Popper, for his part, would argue that the refutation of a theory is not itself a theory, and therefore the requirement of repeatability is demanded only of the theory—not of the refutation of the theory; Popper does not therefore presume the future recurrence of the refuting results, but only claims that a one-time event that is not consistent with a given theory is enough to undermine its repeatability—that is, its constancy—and therefore its general validity, and thus the theory itself.

Did Popper in fact solve the problem?