Q&A: A Half-King
A Half-King
Question
In Sanhedrin 20b there is a dispute between Rav and Shmuel whether what is stated in the section about the king (I Samuel chapter 8) is something a king is permitted to do, or whether the prophet Samuel was only threatening them with what would in fact happen.
According to the view that a king is permitted to do those things, I understand that there is still an element of threat here as well (and that also seems implied by the verses).
A. Is it correct to prove from here that the people of Israel could not assemble a partial collection of royal characteristics exactly as they wished (and call him, say, a “ruler”), in a way that would neutralize the “threat”? Meaning, it is a package deal, so that all the laws apply, and not that every condition within kingship is valid as a stipulation.
B. In Maimonides, Laws of Kings chapters 1–4, I saw that a king (based on the commandment “you shall surely place a king over yourselves”) has personal qualifications, a procedure of appointment, obligations owed to him, obligations incumbent upon him, rights, permissions, and powers. (For example: that he be male and that his mother be from Israel, that he be appointed by a religious court and a prophet, that one may not use his scepter, that he does not perform levirate marriage or halitzah, that a Torah scroll is with him, that he bequeaths the kingship to his sons, and that a king from the house of David sits in the Temple courtyard.)
The powers include, among other things (with limitations), killing rebels, acting for the sake of repairing the world, striking for his honor, collecting taxes in money and manpower, and declaring war.
Assuming the answer to A is yes, is it correct to prove from this Talmudic passage that the agreement of the entire nation is not enough to grant someone all these powers (which are basically freedom for him and his agents to violate certain prohibitions), on the assumption that this is what actually interested the people, and not the other details? That is, the people wanted to grant the king some subset of powers, and Samuel informed them that that subset cannot exist without the whole set.
C. Less interesting, but still — unlike the above collection of laws of kingship, in the verses the people only want a judge and a military leader (“and we too shall be like all the nations, and our king shall judge us and fight our battles”). So just from the verses themselves, what exactly is the problem with their accepting upon themselves a judge and appointing him as military leader without giving him any of the other royal powers that they do not want, such as “he will tithe your flocks” and “he will take your sons and your daughters,” etc.
Answer
They wanted a king like all the nations, and such a king has absolute powers. But that does not mean that it is impossible to accept upon ourselves a king with only partial powers. By simple reasoning it is obvious that this is possible.
There is no fundamental problem with a partial appointment (the judges were probably something like this), but Samuel is pessimistic about what will come of it. Such a partial king may also take for himself powers that were not granted to him. History is full of such cases.
Discussion on Answer
A religious court may strike and punish beyond the letter of the law. And judges or a government can be appointed to make such decisions, of course when there is moral justification for it (and that is also required of a king).
You are right that even according to Shmuel this can be a threat.
Thanks. If possible, please sharpen it for me one last time, because I got confused.
Shmuel in the Talmud says that everything stated in the section about the king is permitted to the king. Meaning, the prophet Samuel informed the people what the full set of powers of a king is. And that itself is the threat: that they should know just how far-reaching, according to the Torah, what they are taking upon themselves really is. (There has to be some threatening element in the picture, because it is clear from the verses that the prophet Samuel tells them all this so that they’ll get cold feet.)
But the truth is that they could have defined a new role with partial powers.
So I do not understand why the prophet Samuel reads to them the full powers according to the Torah — what do those powers have to do with anything? Let him set up for them a king exactly according to what they want, and then there is no threatening element at all. (If they insist on arranging for themselves a king who can take their sons and daughters, then there is no point threatening them that he will take their sons and daughters.) And if he is worried about a slippery slope, then surely the end of that decline will not stop precisely at the Torah-defined powers. It is like someone going to the market to look for an unpaid bailee, and the local halakhic decisor comes and warns him that if the deposit is stolen or lost then the bailee will be exempt — three exclamation marks. Instead, the decisor should calmly tell him: know that the default is such-and-such, and if you want something else, then make an explicit stipulation and good health to you.
The truth is that in Samuel he is writing about the dangers of dictatorship. To me it is an amazing speech by Samuel.
Because if they want a king, then it is a king. Want something else? Fine by me — up to the dangers of taking extra powers.
Is this a broad and comfortable interpretation, or do you have to pay the price of a forced reading in order to maintain the reasoning that partial powers are possible? (If partial powers are impossible, then on the straightforward reading it is easier to understand why Samuel does not offer them the healthier option — because there isn’t one.)
I’m writing a slightly strange message, and may it be God’s will that I not kick against the very structure of truth itself (as is known, one who interprets another’s words negatively does not escape violating “you shall not hate your brother in your heart”). I think the proof here is a good proof from the Talmud that the people’s agreement is not enough to grant some person (who is not a religious court, and not acting for the sake of repairing the world) partial powers that amount to permission to violate prohibitions.
And your rejection of that did not find pathways into my heart; it left a sandbank there, and after examining myself I can see that it caused me to lash out in other threads about command and free choice (what they call in foreign speech “displacement”). But after returning to myself, I regretted it, and from here on I think such excesses in Israel will cease, cease. Even though presumably this is nothing and what difference does it make and who cares, etc. etc., still, perhaps it is less pleasant for the other readers in terms of the general atmosphere.
I would appreciate it if you could please give it a bit more thought — maybe this proof does have a place, and if it doesn’t, then it doesn’t.
I do not understand what is wrong with my rejections. As a matter of Jewish law, there certainly is such authority, as many halakhic decisors wrote regarding communal ordinances and the powers of communal institutions.
Are you interpreting “Samuel is pessimistic about what will come of it” even according to the view that “everything stated in the section about the king is permitted to the king”? I understood that according to that view (as opposed to Rav’s view there, that it was said to threaten them), the prophet Samuel simply read out to them the laws as clearly as a practical code, so they would know exactly what they were asking for (albeit with the aim that they would regret it).
Thanks for the argument that it is obvious this is possible [to be honest, I had thought it was obvious דווקא that you cannot split up an authority that is a halakhic permission to murder and steal].