Q&A: Coercion Regarding the Commandments
Coercion Regarding the Commandments
Question
You explain that coercion regarding the commandments (in the area of prohibition and permission) is entrusted, at least in principle, to a religious court, because “coercion regarding the commandments is a public matter.” I didn’t understand how coercing me about one particular commandment of mine (for example, let’s say I don’t want to fulfill the commandment of the sukkah) suddenly becomes a public matter. What does that have to do with the public? My halakhic obligations (from Yoreh De'ah) are my own business, so why is coercion about them considered a public matter?
Answer
Greetings.
First of all, when asking here it is advisable to refer to the source where I explain this. That is useful at least for the other readers, and also for me (I don’t always remember everything I wrote, the context, and what exactly I meant).
The use of coercive force is itself a public matter. A private individual has no authority to use force against another person. After all, you could ask why the prohibition against robbing another person is a public matter in civil law, since it concerns only the two of us. Anything that pertains to relations within society is public. The use of force, especially when it is meant to preserve a public character, is a public act. This is the accepted practice in every legal system in the world. One of the defining features of a legal system is the right and authority to use force for the benefit of the public.
See, for example, here: https://www.idi.org.il/media/11194/law-and-policing-human-rights-and-police-powers.pdf
It is true that in Jewish law there may perhaps be use of force for enforcement purposes directed at the private individual and not only for the sake of the public, but it is still an institutionalized use of force, and that is reserved for the public. In extreme cases a person may take the law into his own hands, but there are quite a few limitations on this, and certainly not in an institutionalized way (such as a private police force or private courts).
Discussion on Answer
1. It is, just not monetary obligations and rights. See Rashba on Ketubot 75 regarding “on condition that you have no claim upon me for sustenance, clothing, and conjugal rights,” and whether conjugal rights are considered a monetary matter.
2. Exactly the opposite. It is a social change that has religious implications. See the article Midah Tovah, 5767, for the Torah portion Ki Tetze, and Maimonides’ explanation at the beginning of the Laws of Marriage there.
One more thing regarding coercion about the commandments. When the religious court coerces, what do they actually want? They want me to fulfill the commandment. But the problem is that when I fulfill a commandment because of the coercion of the religious court, then once again I am not fulfilling it because God commanded it, but because the religious court is coercing me! Maybe I’m missing the meaning of the “I want to” in the phrase “we coerce him until he says, ‘I want to.’” It seems questionable to me—if they beat me, of course I’ll say “I want to.” That would be a hypocritical “I want to.”
I explained this in several places here. See, for example, Column 199.
Thanks
Clear and sharp words, I understand, thank you.
What I quoted above is from several passages in The Standing Ones, p. 384 in the hardcover edition.
Two more points, if I may:
1. After you explained that monetary law belongs to Choshen Mishpat and has a particularistic character because it is a discourse of my obligations derived from the rights of another, you ask what characterizes Even HaEzer, since “apparently Even HaEzer does not deal with rights and monetary law” (there, p. 385). I didn’t understand why in Even HaEzer this is not also a discourse of obligations derived from rights, like in Choshen Mishpat—except that in Even HaEzer these are the obligations of a husband/wife derived from the rights of the wife/husband?
2. “To be a married couple is a determination of social status. It is the public that recognizes the couple as married” (there, p. 386). What does that mean? Becoming husband and wife, becoming married—isn’t that first and foremost a change in religious status? Before, I was single and certain things were permitted to me; now that I’m married, there are new things permitted to me and other things forbidden to me. I agree that it is also a social change, but that seems secondary, technical. Essentially it is first of all a religious change; the social change follows from the personal-religious change. If so, it doesn’t make sense that a halakhic category like Even HaEzer would be defined by a technical and secondary criterion, does it?