Q&A: Anselm’s Distinction
Anselm’s Distinction
Question
In “The First Existent” regarding the ontological proof, you explain the distinction Anselm makes between two states of existence in a person’s mind: the idea of x, and the idea of x-that-exists.
At the beginning of the explanation, it is clear that the difference exists by virtue of the knowledge that the thing also appears in reality. But afterward you talk about the different states in the brain between a state of imagination and an encounter with a concrete object, the latter being accompanied by “translation sensors,” as you put it. And from this it comes out that the whole difference you spoke about between the two cognitive objects does not stem from the knowledge that the thing exists, but from the actual encounter with it.
And I want to ask: when I think about an object that I know exists (and whose definition I understand, of course) but am not currently encountering it right now—rather, I am imagining it—at that moment is the cognitive object that arises x, or x-that-exists? Or actually something else? And why?
Answer
This is not about knowing that it exists. A concept of something that exists is grasped in our cognition differently from a concept of something that does not exist. Knowledge that some object exists creates that picture in our cognition, but that picture in itself also exists in its own right (it is a certain neural structure). It can be triggered by artificial stimulation of those neurons even without knowing that it exists.