Q&A: On Free Choice from an Empirical Perspective
On Free Choice from an Empirical Perspective
Question
You recently mentioned (502) that your book on free will was written, among other reasons, in order to examine the claim that this issue has by now been decided by science. Despite my appreciation for the book, I feel that it is lacking quite a bit in terms of precise conceptual definitions regarding this relationship, and I would be glad if you could elaborate on this (here or in a column), and I will explain.
Broadly speaking, the topic can be divided into two parts: a purely philosophical analysis, and the analysis at the interface with science (hereafter: scientific, despite the inaccuracy). From the scientific perspective, the topic can be divided into difficulties surrounding the principle of causality and questions that arise experimentally (Libet’s experiments and the like). My questions are about the latter perspective. Beyond the possible explanations for the results of one experiment or another, what is even possible empirically? What kind of correlation, if any, contradicts free choice (specifically 100 percent?) Is there any theoretical experiment that could test this? (In terms of precision and other possible limitations.)
Thank you, and happy new year.
Answer
Your remarks seem strange to me, since it seems to me that the definition of the concepts in my book is the best in all the literature I know. I wrote there that this is one of my criticisms of the literature in the field.
As for your question, two things: 1. It does not touch on the definition of concepts at all. 2. Besides that, it was answered in very great detail in the book. Further clarification is needed.
Discussion on Answer
A. I agree that your book is the most successful from that standpoint, and that is precisely why the question is directed to someone whom I think is capable of answering it (it was not meant as a judgmental criticism). B. Regarding the difficulties that arise from a correlation between a certain choice and a measured value, I felt there was a difficulty together with relevant answers regarding Libet’s experiment and its successors, but less of a thorough systematic analysis addressing the very question of whether the issue of free choice is not empirical at all, or whether there is some principled experiment that could clarify it. (It is clear that even the conclusion of such an experiment would depend on how one weighs different intuitions—if the intuition of choice carries significantly more weight for me than my belief that the experiments are not faked, then for example it does not even get off the ground—and this was indeed mentioned in the book.) Thank you.
I still do not understand. In the chapter on Libet’s experiments I spelled out exactly the path of a series of experiments that could bring us closer and closer to a scientific resolution, and I explained what the significance of each such experiment would be. The conclusion was that, at least along Libet’s path, it does not seem that we will get a scientific resolution even in the future. If there are other ideas, I have no way of knowing. All this is written and explained there in detail, so I do not understand what seems to you to be missing.
By the way, after the book came out, results were published from an experiment conducted in exactly the way I suggested (with a wonderful idea from Adi for how to implement it). There is a lecture by Liad Mudrik, who was a partner in it, and I brought it here on the site. The results clearly reflected my predictions. By the way, when I asked her, Liad Mudrik said she had not read my book.
Rabbi, on which page in the book did you define, for example, free choice or judgment?