Question

I’ve already read the booklet on the ontological argument several times, and I still have a point that’s unclear to me regarding the analogy between the fool and the painter. I’d be glad if the Rabbi could clarify it.
It seems to me that I can spare the painter all his work. He only has to conceive of an existing painting, and then the painting exists! After all, in his mind there is an existing painting, and to deny that would just be skepticism. But of course the failure here is obvious: he cannot really conceive of an existing painting as long as it does not exist. He can only imagine the possibility of an existing painting, but that is not similar to someone who apprehends in his mind that the thing really exists.
If so, the fool too can argue that he cannot conceive of an existing God as long as God does not exist. He can only imagine the possibility of an existing God, but he cannot grasp in his mind that God exists. And if so, the greatest being he can conceive of is דווקא a God who does not exist.