Lecture from 12 Tammuz 5777

This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

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The impossibility of combining logical hermeneutic principles with a generalization-detail-generalization structure
The common denominator as the only candidate for combination
The verses about swarming winged creatures and identifying the exegetical structure
The Sages’ exposition in Chullin 63b: “according to its kind” as a generalization, and the appearance of repeated generalization-detail-generalization
The identification table and translations: names, disputes, and identifying the species
The signs of the locust in the Mishnah and the gap from the verse
The methodological distinction from Eruvin and the need to expound each detail separately
Tanna d’Bei Rav: multiplication of parallel species and the restriction of “short head”
Tanna d’Bei Rabbi Yishmael: “these are broad generalizations and these are narrow details” and neutralizing traits
Diagramming and dependence on the dispute of “specifically the first generalization” versus “specifically the last generalization”

Summary

General Overview

Rabbi Michael Abraham’s lecture (Thursday, 12 Tammuz 5770, June 24, 2010, at Machon Tal) argues that combining a logical hermeneutic principle such as a fortiori reasoning or an archetypal derivation with a textual principle such as generalization-detail-generalization can almost never work, and in fact has virtually no examples in the literature of the Sages except for one unusual passage, which he tries to show does not really work either. He explains that logically, generalization-detail-generalization already exhausts the extension to the whole class of things similar to the details in the relevant characteristics, so there is no “second stage” in which a fortiori reasoning or an archetypal derivation could add anything without running into a dilemma or a refutation. He identifies the only case that might still remain open as a common denominator built from the result of generalization-detail-generalization together with another independent source, and marks that as the target for examination in the Chullin passage about locusts.

The impossibility of combining logical hermeneutic principles with generalization-detail-generalization

Rabbi Abraham states that a textual extension by means of generalization-detail-generalization defines a class according to two relevant characteristics, so anything that fits those characteristics is already included in the initial generalization. He argues that an archetypal derivation from the result of generalization-detail-generalization adds nothing, because anything “similar in two respects” is already included. He argues that a fortiori reasoning likewise cannot operate on that basis, because if the derived case bears those same relevant traits, it is already inside the category, and if it does not bear them, then the refutation arises: “what about the source case, which has that trait,” and the whole structure collapses by a dilemma either way. He emphasizes that a refutation to a fortiori reasoning can arise from any single relevant difference, and once the Sages define certain traits as relevant to the law through the generalization and detail structure, those very same traits block a fortiori reasoning regarding a case that lacks them.

The common denominator as the only candidate for combination

Rabbi Abraham leaves one single theoretical opening where a combination might work: to take the result of generalization-detail-generalization together with another source “from outside” and build from them a common denominator for a third case. He notes that a common denominator needs two source cases, not two derived cases, so only a combination in which the result of the generalization-detail structure serves as one source together with another source can even be considered. He explains that because of an a priori analysis of how hermeneutic principles work, one can filter out almost all possible combinations immediately, and the present passage is introduced as almost the only place to test this, because such combinations hardly appear at all in the literature of the Sages.

The verses about swarming winged creatures and identifying the exegetical structure

Rabbi Abraham reads the verses in Leviticus about “the swarming winged thing that goes on four” and the details “the locust according to its kind… the bald locust according to its kind… the cricket according to its kind… the grasshopper according to its kind… and every swarming winged thing… it is an abomination to you,” and shows that they contain both a list of examples and general framing clauses that immediately raise suspicion of a generalization-detail structure. He points out a linguistic and conceptual difficulty in that the outer general clauses prohibit while the details in the middle permit, and he cites the Talmud in Chullin 63 about a case where a general clause in a prohibition and a detail in a positive formulation (or the reverse) is not expounded in the usual way. He presents two possible ways to read the middle verses: one reading in which “that has jointed legs… to leap” is a permitting general clause followed by specification, and another reading in which the Torah is saying, “from among the class of leaping creatures, only four specific ones are permitted.” He emphasizes that the existence of both possibilities may explain the repetition of “these of them you may eat” as a marker of the boundary between generalization and detail.

The Sages’ exposition in Chullin 63b: “according to its kind” as a generalization, and the appearance of repeated generalization-detail-generalization

Rabbi Abraham notes that the Talmud in Chullin 63b, “surprisingly,” expounds a generalization-detail-generalization structure specifically in the two middle verses, while ignoring the framing verses at the beginning and end, and explains that the words “according to its kind” are treated as general clauses. He presents the rabbinic reading as a serial structure in which the first general clause (“that has jointed legs…”) serves as a primary generalization, and each detail (“locust / bald locust / cricket / grasshopper”) is followed by a complementary generalization of “according to its kind,” creating a sequence of general-detail-general around each item. He notes that this raises a question about a kind of “typographic midrash” and about how the initial general clause is attached to each detail, sharpening the gap between conceptual meaning and a formal reading of a “scriptural pattern” that could theoretically be identified algorithmically.

The identification table and translations: names, disputes, and identifying the species

Rabbi Abraham presents a summary table meant to make it possible to track the biblical names against the language of the Sages: Arbeh is Govai, Sal’am is Rashon, Chargol is Nippul, and Chagav is Gadyan. He notes that the sources also contain a reversal of terminology between Rabbi Yishmael and Rav regarding Chargol and Sal’am, in a way that seems to him to reflect a real dispute about identification and not merely different naming. He emphasizes that the table is essential for understanding the passage, and that without it he himself found it difficult to get through the sugya. Later in the passage, it becomes clear that the discussion requires working with classes and traits, not just with an orderly list of items. He explains that Chagav is exceptional because it is a “type” rather than a specific creature, and that this is a unique feature of the verse, where one of the four items is actually a group.

The signs of the locust in the Mishnah and the gap from the verse

Rabbi Abraham cites the Mishnah in Chullin: “And among locusts, any that has four legs, four wings, and jumping legs, and whose wings cover most of its body,” along with Rabbi Yosei’s opinion, “and its name is locust.” He shows that the verses mention four legs and “jointed legs above its feet to leap with them,” but there is no mention in the verse of “four wings” or of “its wings covering most of its body,” so these signs seem to be the result of exposition rather than the plain meaning of the text. He describes Rashi’s explanation, according to which the “jointed legs” are two additional legs above the four legs, and emphasizes that the historical process is that the Mishnah states a result without explanation, while the Amoraim reconstruct the derivations that lead to it.

The methodological distinction from Eruvin and the need to expound each detail separately

Rabbi Abraham compares this to a passage in Eruvin where all the details were expounded together because they all shared the same characteristics, whereas here each of the items also has unique traits, and therefore the exposition is built separately around each detail. He explains that the linguistic structure here is “generalization, detail, generalization, detail, generalization, detail, generalization” because of “according to its kind” after each item, and that justifies repeatedly applying generalization-detail-generalization around each detail. He notes a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) over whether in every generalization-and-detail pattern one always expounds each item separately, or whether that is only true here because of “according to its kind.” He suggests that even in Eruvin it is possible that an initial filtering of unique traits took place but was absorbed into the Talmud’s presentation.

Tanna d’Bei Rav: multiplication of parallel species and the restriction of “short head”

Rabbi Abraham quotes the baraita of Tanna d’Bei Rav, which translates the species and explains “what does Scripture teach by saying ‘according to its kind’” as coming to include Tzipporat Keramim, Yokhna Yerushalmit, Ha’Artzuvya, and Harazvanit, each corresponding to the item in the verse. He raises the question whether these inclusions are individual items or the inclusion of whole groups, and remarks that the wording of the baraita sounds like a single item even though later in the passage, in Rabbi Yishmael’s approach, it becomes clear that the examples represent groups. He notes in advance that according to Tanna d’Bei Rav there is no inclusion for locusts “whose head is long,” and his conclusion is that according to this approach only “short head” is permitted.

Tanna d’Bei Rabbi Yishmael: “these are broad generalizations and these are narrow details” and neutralizing traits

Rabbi Abraham describes the exposition of Tanna d’Bei Rabbi Yishmael as a chain in which each “according to its kind” marks a general clause, and each specific name is a detail, leading to the statement: “these are broad generalizations and these are narrow details.” He presents the structure as follows: from Arbeh we learn “that which comes and has no hump,” from Sal’am we learn that also “that which comes and has a hump” is included, and from Chargol we learn that also “that which comes and has a tail” is included. Thus the traits of hump and tail are neutralized as irrelevant to the law of permissibility for eating, while short head remains common to the three examples. He emphasizes that the Talmud itself formulates the derivation in collective language—“I only know… from where do I know”—and infers from this that terms like Tzipporat Keramim are examples and not a single individual item. He points to an internal difficulty: in order to neutralize two traits, a different structure might have been enough, but it may be that zoological reality does not provide an item with a particular combination of traits, and so the chain had to be built as it was.

Diagramming and dependence on the dispute of “specifically the first generalization” versus “specifically the last generalization”

Rabbi Abraham explains that the Talmud’s focus on the “hump” stems from the structure of trait-groups as they emerge from the table, and he sketches the idea of a concentric diagram in which “no hump” is the narrower circle, “no tail” is broader, and “short head” is broader still. He argues that in such a diagram the result “no hump” fits an exposition in the style of “specifically the first generalization,” whereas “specifically the last generalization” ought to lead to the result of “short head.” He notes a difficulty, since Rashi writes in one place that there is a view of “the one who says specifically the last one.” He suggests the possibility that Rashi is anticipating the total result of a union of derivations that later neutralizes traits, or that the real diagram is not concentric but made of independent traits, in which case different intermediate results later combine in a way that erases certain parameters. He concludes by saying that the detailed explanation of the union structure and the difficulty in Rashi will be completed later in the lecture, after they save the pages for continuation.

Full Transcript

[Speaker A] Thursday, 12 Tammuz 5770, June 24, 2010. A lecture by Rabbi Michael Abraham at Machon Tal, about ten minutes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A logical extension built on top of a textual hermeneutic principle. In the result of the textual extension, we then make some kind of logical extension, by a fortiori reasoning or by an archetypal derivation. Although it’s worth thinking that even that—no, it will never work. In all the literature of the Sages, both in the Talmud and in midrash, from every direction, except for this sugya and one more sugya that we’ll get to, there’s no other example. And I’m going to try to argue that even this sugya doesn’t work. Beyond that, even on the logical level: when we expound a generalization-detail-generalization structure, we’re extending to the whole class that has certain characteristics. So there’s no room left here for an archetypal derivation or for a fortiori reasoning, because anything we would extend through an archetypal derivation would already be included in the class to which we extended by the generalization and detail itself. Let’s say we have the items written in the verse, and we extend from them in two respects. So we’ve reached the whole class that resembles the items written in the verse in those two respects. Now what are we going to do with an archetypal derivation? Take something else that also resembles them in two respects? Well, that’s already included in the class we reached with the generalization-and-detail extension. It doesn’t happen in two stages; it happens immediately in the first stage. Anything similar to the result of the generalization and detail is already included in it. It won’t be done in two stages. It’s part of that same class that resembles the items written in the verse in two respects. So there’s an analogy between this and the other cases. What will the analogy be? That this one has those two aspects and that one has those two aspects. But we already extended to the whole class of things that have those two characteristics. So there’s no room to continue with an archetypal derivation.

[Speaker A] Maybe you could do a fortiori reasoning from what you just learned?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But how would you do a fortiori reasoning? Does the derived case in the a fortiori have the two traits we want to compare to the detail? If it does, then it’s already included in the extension itself. If it doesn’t, then how are you going to infer it by a fortiori reasoning?

[Speaker A] Maybe there are other relevant things that are different?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that can’t be. Because if there are—again, either way. If it has them—look, if we have items, okay? And let’s say we remember the common denominator, so we draw the aspects around the items. These are the items written in the verse, and let’s say we require similarity in two respects. Similarity in two respects means this whole class.

[Speaker C] Fine, but you can still construct a fortiori reasoning. What? You still can. Wait, just a second.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So now we’ve extended to this whole class. Now let’s examine the possibility of perhaps making another archetypal derivation or a fortiori reasoning from something here.

[Speaker C] Just explain to me—when you do a fortiori reasoning, do you do it from two sides that differ in logic?

[Speaker A] No, I want the result of the generalization and detail.

[Speaker C] That’s not the result of the generalization, because on one side let’s say it’s prohibited, but you still don’t know that one would get lashes for it. And then by a fortiori: just as that gets lashes, so too this and all these would get lashes. That isn’t written on one side.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m talking right now about a logical extension built on top of generalization-detail-generalization.

[Speaker C] Right, you extended all these things, you said they have a certain law. Generalization-detail-generalization says that this whole population has a certain law. Right. Now by a fortiori I could say that this whole population has an additional stringency from something else, by a fortiori reasoning.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore what? Therefore the law that I learned here can apply to them too.

[Speaker C] The law I learned there will apply to the whole population here. No, the other way around—that’s the source case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I want to extend the derived case by means of the a fortiori reasoning. No, that’s the source case.

[Speaker A] The source case can’t be that—we already said that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Generalization-detail-generalization can’t learn from the result of a fortiori reasoning.

[Speaker C] No, but you do a fortiori reasoning about other things. Then what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then how is it built? That’s what I want to explain. It can’t work. Because how is it built? Let’s say I extended it to this class. And let’s say this thing is learned from here. And now I say, fine, but this thing is lighter than this thing. So if this has the law that I learned, then all the more so this will have the law that I learned. That’s the way a fortiori reasoning would work from generalization-detail-generalization, right? But now let’s see. Does this thing have those two traits? No. If so, then it’s here. No—if it has those traits… exactly, exactly. So if it has those traits, then it’s already here; you don’t need the a fortiori reasoning. If it doesn’t have those traits, then explain to me how the a fortiori works. What about this one, which has those traits, compared to that one, which doesn’t? So either way it can’t work. “What do we find”? Not for a fortiori. It doesn’t matter—“what do we find,” there’s a refutation there too, same thing. It makes no difference. So I think—at least that’s how I think—if you have some data point here, you—

[Speaker A] can’t learn a sugya like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, a common denominator—that’s what there is here—but even a common… let’s leave that for what’s coming. In principle, for a common denominator you need two source cases, not two derived cases. So if this is the derived case, then what are your two source cases going to be? This plus something else from outside. That maybe is possible, the only thing that maybe is possible. And that really may be what’s written there—we’ll see in a moment. Therefore, if anything at all is possible after we filter things out a priori, I can filter out almost all combinations. The only combination that may be possible is to take this result of the generalization-detail structure plus something completely different and unrelated, and from those two learn a common denominator for a third thing. Then what will I say? What about this one, which has the two traits of the other two sides—yes, two traits in common with that one—so that will prove it. And then if this one has two traits, I’ll say these will prove it, and then the law returns, and one can learn the common denominator from that. That’s the only one even worth considering. And in fact it wouldn’t be surprising if we found that here in this sugya the only case in the whole literature of the Sages where there’s a combination of a logical hermeneutic principle built on a generalization-detail structure is a common denominator. And even here I’m going to try to argue that it doesn’t exist.

[Speaker A] Why can’t there be some trait of this whole group? Let’s say there’s a third trait that isn’t relevant to what you learned from generalization and detail, and that third trait together with the other two creates an a fortiori reasoning for something outside.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There may be such a thing, but does it have the two traits that are here? No. It doesn’t have these two? Then those are the refutation. No, that’s a refutation to the a fortiori reasoning.

[Speaker A] What about the source case, which has those two traits.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if it does have them, then it’s here too. Either way. I don’t think that exists; it seems to me it doesn’t. Only a common denominator might possibly be relevant, and that’s what we’ll check in our sugya. This just shows you how an a priori analysis of these forms of derivation—if you understand correctly how they work—you can understand a great many things that otherwise might look like some difficulty where it’s not at all clear why, why they really don’t want combinations of hermeneutic principles like these. Just trying to understand how these hermeneutic principles work gives almost all the answers immediately. The common denominator is the only thing still left open, and that’s the target of the sugya here. So we even have a sugya to test this issue on. Other than that, with everything else we’re not surprised that it doesn’t appear. Everything else doesn’t appear, and it wouldn’t make sense for it to appear.

[Speaker A] I’m just thinking about the refutation. It could be that the outside case doesn’t have those traits. But that’s because it has both that and something else, so let’s say—who knows—something makes one thing easier, so all the more so it should make the other thing easier. Do you understand what I mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s go here… no, not from that trait. That trait has some law in it that I learned from—

[Speaker A] I don’t care why you learned it. I now want to do some kind of a fortiori from—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you can’t. Why? Because if there are two traits that this one has and that one doesn’t, the refutation will come. Not a fortiori.

[Speaker A] Because it has this circle, there’s a third trait that this one and that one have. I’ve decided that it has both the third and the—so there’s some law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then there’s a refutation if—

[Speaker A] for the Torah it only works with this circle.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A refutation is enough if there’s even one difference. Similarity in the direction of leniency won’t work. Any difference at all. If I’m… if I’m smarter than they are—

[Speaker A] they’re not the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I’ll give an example. Any refutation at all. And only regarding the refutation to an a fortiori reasoning. No, it has nothing to do with that at all, but a refutation in general—if the source case is more stringent than the derived case in even one respect, even if it is more lenient than it in another parameter, you can’t make an a fortiori reasoning.

[Speaker A] That’s the connection, not because—no, it doesn’t depend on that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Since the law you learned is based on those two aspects, that means those are aspects relevant to the law.

[Speaker A] In this matter, yes, but not in that matter. But that’s the matter you’re learning, there is no other matter. That’s the matter you’re learning. The law that I learned—let’s say it’s that one may redeem second tithe in Jerusalem with it. That’s the law I learned, and I learned by generalization-detail-generalization that one may—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] do it also with brine. That’s the sugya in Eruvin we discussed. Okay? So what did I learn? That brine, which belongs to this group, can be used to redeem second tithe in Jerusalem. Now I want to know—maybe one can also redeem second tithe in Jerusalem with clouds. Clouds don’t have the traits; they’re not produce of the ground, they’re not fruit from fruit, all the traits we found in Eruvin. So I say, the law is that—who knows—if it’s tangible, one can redeem with it in Jerusalem, so clouds, which are abstract, all the more so one can redeem with in Jerusalem. I’m just trying to understand the logical structure. I say, fine, from that angle the a fortiori reasoning would work. But from another angle—namely that this is fruit from fruit and produce of the ground, and that isn’t—that becomes a built-in refutation to the a fortiori reasoning. Because fruit from fruit and produce of the ground are the two traits the Sages decided are relevant to the law of being redeemed in Jerusalem for second tithe. Those are exactly the traits because of which I decided it’s possible. So they are relevant traits; you can’t say they’re not relevant to the law being learned. Once they’re relevant, they’re a refutation.

[Speaker A] And that’s the foundation of the law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. Otherwise this isn’t one hermeneutic principle built on top of another. If you’re learning from it a completely different law, then it’s not built on top of generalization-detail-generalization. In my opinion, that can’t happen. Fine. So let’s look at everything. First of all, the verses. Look at the sheet in front of you, the verses at the top. “These you may eat from among every swarming winged thing that goes on four, which has jointed legs above its feet to leap with them upon the earth. These of them you may eat: the locust according to its kind, and the bald locust according to its kind, and the cricket according to its kind, and the grasshopper according to its kind. And every swarming winged thing that has four feet is an abomination to you.” So we can already see that there’s a list of examples here, and there’s also a general statement, and that should immediately catch our eye that there’s some appearance here of generalization and detail. I still don’t know which. Generalization and detail, detail and generalization, generalization-detail-generalization—but something here means I now need to start checking. And then we start applying our algorithm. First stage: identify what scriptural pattern stands before us. What is this? Is it generalization and detail? Is it detail and generalization? Is it generalization-detail-generalization? What pattern appears here? It’s not trivial. What do you say before I go into the Talmud? What structure is there here?

[Speaker D] A generalization. It starts with a generalization.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? It starts with a generalization.

[Speaker A] Yes.

[Speaker D] Generalization and detail.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Generalization and detail? What’s the generalization? Every swarming thing.

[Speaker D] Every swarming winged thing. Every swarming winged thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who are the details? Or the detail? The locust, the bald locust, the cricket, and the grasshopper.

[Speaker A] Names.

[Speaker D] Names.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. And at the end, again, another generalization: “And every swarming winged thing that has four feet.” So there’s another generalization at the end.

[Speaker A] Right.

[Speaker D] Generalization-detail-generalization.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Generalization-detail-generalization. But there’s a problem here. The first generalization and the second generalization both prohibit. And the details in the middle permit.

[Speaker D] No, but the last one is negative. The last one is negative.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “It is an abomination to you” as well. And the inner part permits. The Talmud in Chullin 63 says that if the generalization is in a prohibition and the detail is in a positive formulation, or vice versa, then we don’t expound generalization and detail. We don’t expound generalization and detail because that’s not the general category of those details. It’s something else. It’s the opposite. If we look at the generalization as a set, then the initial generalization is actually the dual set, not the set itself.

[Speaker D] Yes, but that generalization is kind of more complex, because it specifies exactly what not, and everything else yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a more expanded generalization because—

[Speaker D] it specifies exactly what not, and everything else yes. It’s a more spread-out generalization. Right. Right. It’s negative, positive, and negative.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the text there isn’t a general expression about what one may eat. Right.

[Speaker D] But everything else may be eaten? So that’s an even more… some even broader generalization?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that isn’t written. Right. That’s your conclusion, but it isn’t written. After all, our trigger for exposition is textual. There isn’t a generally phrased instruction in the text about what one eats, then specific language, then general language.

[Speaker C] There is also a generalization and detail here. There is. Even the permitting part is generalization and detail. It’s not even just generalization and detail. Now let’s look, for example, at the verse in Re’eh.

[Speaker A] There at the beginning it says, “whatever your soul desires,” and so on and so on.

[Speaker C] There it says, “and whatever your soul desires.”

[Speaker A] That’s a generalization. Here it doesn’t say that. It says, “These you may eat from among every swarming winged thing that goes…” and so on. “These of them you may eat.” Meaning that’s the detail; the generalization only appears afterward. Linguistically, in my opinion, the detail jumps out immediately. There’s no generalization. “These of them you may eat”—that’s the details. On the permitting side there is—on the permitting side there is generalization and detail. Right. On the permitting side there isn’t even a generalization.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is.

[Speaker C] “These you may eat from among every swarming—”

[Speaker A] winged thing that goes on four, which—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “These you may eat from among every swarming winged thing.”

[Speaker A] That’s the generalization. Now come the details.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But “These you may eat from among every swarming winged thing” is general language.

[Speaker A] That’s a generalization. If I take the verse in Re’eh, “and whatever your soul desires”—there it says, “and whatever your soul desires.” That’s a generalization. Here it doesn’t say that. If it had said, “These you may eat: every swarming winged thing,” that would be a generalization. But it doesn’t say that. It says, “These you may eat from among every swarming—”

[Speaker C] winged thing that has jointed legs.

[Speaker A] You—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You could make that distinction, but still it’s clear that this whole phrase is unnecessary. So why write it? It could have said, “These you may eat: the bald locust, the locust, the cricket,”—

[Speaker A] “the cricket,” and that’s it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Once you add an opening that’s general—

[Speaker A] Maybe that limits you to eating those also from among all, and you also can’t eat animals in general?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then that limitation itself is generalization and detail. That limitation.

[Speaker A] Meaning, that limitation refers only to the class of swarmers. That’s the reference group. No, obviously.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the generalization is always the reference group. In the section of Re’eh, “whatever your soul desires” is the reference group, and then it writes what specifically. The generalization is always the reference group.

[Speaker C] There’s something strange here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s both generalization and detail on the permitting side, and also a general statement on the prohibiting side. Okay, let’s check the Sages. The first and last verses interfere here. Without the first and last it’s nice. What’s nice? The generalization or the detail, apparently, right? Without the first and last, it’s all fine—generalization and detail completely.

[Speaker D] Yes. “That goes on four, which has jointed legs above its feet to leap with them upon the earth.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What?

[Speaker C] “That goes on four, which has jointed legs above its feet, leaping with them upon the earth.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Every swarming winged thing that goes on four”—that’s a prohibiting generalization. No.

[Speaker C] “Which has jointed legs above”—that’s a permitting generalization. Take the second and third verses. Well?

[Speaker C] “From among every swarming winged thing that goes on four—”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that’s a permitting generalization.

[Speaker A] Which verse?

[Speaker C] No, but it comes after “These you may eat.” The second verse is the same generalization you have in the first verse.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what we said before, but still it’s a permitting generalization. It’s unnecessary. If you only wanted the details, you should have written only the details. Yes. And the—

[Speaker A] The second verse ends with the words, “which has jointed legs above its feet to leap with them upon the earth.” Right. There are two theoretical ways to analyze the second and third verses. One possibility is to say: “These you may eat from among every swarming winged thing that goes on four”—colon. And now the explanation: whom is one allowed to eat from among these swarmers? Generalization: “that has jointed legs above, to leap,” and then the specification will come—locust, bald locust, and so on. That’s one way of reading it. Okay. And there’s still a structure of generalization and detail here. Another way of reading it, another way of reading it with a completely different meaning: “But these you may eat from within a reference group that I’m now going to describe—from among every swarming winged thing that goes on four, which has jointed legs above its feet to leap with them upon the earth.” Meaning: from among all the swarmers that are capable of leaping, from among them you may eat these—the four specific ones in the verse.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But in any case there’s still generalization and detail here.

[Speaker A] More than that—even according to the first reading, no, you need “that goes on four, which has jointed legs above its feet.” If it were only detail, only details would be listed. Not only that—even according to the first reading, it really is generalization and detail. The Torah first says whom you can eat—those that have jointed legs for leaping—and then the next verse comes and says locust, bald locust, and so on. That’s simply the structure of generalization and detail. Okay. But according to the second reading, there’s no generalization and detail here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Torah says—

[Speaker A] from among all the leapers you may eat the four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, “from among every swarming winged thing that goes on four” is a generalization. From among all the leapers—and still, no.

[Speaker A] You can’t read the second verse without the third verse that comes after it. And according to your reading, “These of them you may eat,” and then comes the specification. Exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think the addition of “These of them you may eat” says that this isn’t—

[Speaker A] You can’t read it that way. Exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think that precisely because of this double possibility, the Torah added the second “These of them you may eat,” to tell you that up to this point everything was a generalization. Right. And now the details begin. That’s why it repeats “These of them you may eat.”

[Speaker C] Wait, you could say—

[Speaker A] that the second verse was also the third detail and the first verse wasn’t needed, and then say “These you may eat from among every swarming winged thing that goes on four”—colon—and then “the swarmers that leap.” Whom from among all the swarmers?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s what I said before.

[Speaker A] Those that leap—that’s the generalization.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, “from among every swarming winged thing.”

[Speaker A] “From among every swarming winged thing” is a generalization, and then the answer is “that goes on four.” But because it’s written at the beginning, you can’t. “Every swarming winged thing.” “Every swarming winged thing” is one term of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but “that goes on four” is connected to “swarming winged thing.” “Swarming winged thing”—that’s in any case. If we try—

[Speaker C] “Swarming winged thing—”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, one second.

[Speaker C] If we say that the word “but” comes to exclude—let’s say that here in the details of the details, it comes to bring the details. There’s a prohibiting generalization, then the detail that permits, and then again the prohibiting generalization. “These you may eat” is exactly parallel to “These of them you may eat.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning what? That it’s all just details? A detail—this is a detail. So that’s what they suggested before. It’s basically what he pointed out before: that this is just an introduction to the details, because the details define what from the general category may be eaten. But still that general phrase is unnecessary. They could have written the details directly. So why this opening phrase? I think that’s exactly the basis for the fact that we do nevertheless expound here generalization and detail. Because otherwise why is there this opening phrase, “from among every swarming winged thing that goes on four”? Just say directly: locust, bald locust, cricket, and grasshopper.

[Speaker A] The word “but” here… the word “but” here makes it different—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] not a generalization, it makes—

[Speaker A] it a detail.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But linguistically… linguistically you’re right, but still the general introduction is unnecessary. So why did they add “every swarming winged thing that goes on four”? They should have said directly: locust, bald locust, cricket, and grasshopper. They added a generalization here so that we would expound generalization and detail.

[Speaker C] “That has jointed legs…” “But that has jointed legs”—you may eat. I’m skipping all this. “But that has jointed legs above its feet.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because earlier it already says, “that goes on four is an abomination to you,” and it’s already written at the beginning. Isn’t it enough that it has legs? No—jointed legs.

[Speaker C] “Jointed legs above its feet.” Yes. So. “But”—what is “but that has jointed legs”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Details. “But that has jointed legs above its feet you may eat.”

[Speaker C] What are you saying about these? That’s a detail.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And what about the locust, cricket, and the…? Again, that’s another specification of the specification—I don’t know what to call it. There’s a generalization and after it details: cricket, bald locust. Really, this specification, this specification—wow, how hard it’s trying.

[Speaker D] Is there there what to eat?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. In any case, the Talmud in Chullin 63b really does expound generalization and detail in the two middle verses. The first and last verses, the framing verses, are ignored. The two middle verses are expounded, and surprisingly they expound here generalization-detail-generalization, not just generalization and detail. And the reason is because the “according to its kind” is understood as—understood as a generalization. So each such item stands between the first generalization and the “according to its kind” that comes after it. So in effect there is here a series of generalization-detail-generalization structures, with the initial generalization standing before all of them.

[Speaker A] What is—

[Speaker D] “jointed legs above its feet”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The initial generalization is in parentheses, and afterward there is detail-generalization, detail-generalization, detail-generalization, but the initial generalization relates to all of them. That’s how the Sages read it. I don’t know exactly why or how, but that’s the fact at the moment—I’m describing what the Sages…

[Speaker C] Why is “according to its kind” a generalization?

[Speaker A] There, that’s the structure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—“jointed legs above its feet.” Why is the first generalization understood as referring to each of the details that follow it, while the “according to its kind” follows each and every detail?

[Speaker C] It follows.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It follows each and every detail?

[Speaker C] “These, all four of these, according to their kinds”—that broadens it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s clear. Now structurally, why is this generalization considered to be a distributed appearance in each one of the details?

[Speaker D] That’s true, how—

[Speaker A] can you—

[Speaker C] read it otherwise?

[Speaker A] can you—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] read it otherwise? That’s the question. A question of what’s written, not from the standpoint of content. Is it written here in the form of generalization-detail-generalization, generalization-detail-generalization, generalization-detail-generalization? If so, I’d learn it as an obligation.

[Speaker C] The limited linear editing of the Five Books of Moses.

[Speaker A] You can’t open four channels in parallel.

[Speaker C] Yes, but again you go back to—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, the limitations of writing—you’re going back to phenomena of content, not of writing.

[Speaker A] That’s why I’m saying, pay attention.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand that this is the conceptual meaning of what’s written here. But a Jew looking at it—as a kind of typographic exposition of text—a computer could in principle produce the exposition. So I need there to be generalization-detail-generalization, generalization-detail-generalization, generalization-detail-generalization. You can see that apparently it’s not completely like that. That’s all—I’m just sharing in your joy; I don’t have much more than that to say here.

[Speaker A] And what horned thing goes on four and has four legs? I don’t think so.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think so. I didn’t find it; it’s neither here nor in the defense charts.

[Speaker A] Now,

[Speaker C] here—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Basically in this sugya I think methodologically it’s not correct to begin from a list of items, as I did in the sugya in Eruvin. Here too there isn’t a tidy list of items. Here we work more with the groups. So let’s assume—look at the table on your page. Do you see the table? There are four kinds of locusts or swarming winged things here: Arbeh, Chargol, Sal’am, and Chagav. Those are the four items that appear in the verse. And each of them, in parentheses, is its translation into the language of the Sages.

[Speaker A] Say—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Arbeh in the language of the Torah is Govai in the language of the Sages, or in the language that was spoken then in that period. The point of the sugya is translations. What I want more is to relate to the names, to understand in the sugya when they’re talking about what. Sometimes they talk about Govai, about Nippul, about this… so who is Arbeh? Who is Chargol and who is…? I invested effort in this sugya. This table summarizes everything. Everything you need to know appears here. So it’s very important that it be in front of your eyes; that’s why I printed the sheet again here.

[Speaker A] In lines two and three that means that sometimes the Sages call Chargol—yes, that means—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that for some reason Rabbi Yishmael and Rav use opposite terms for Chargol and Sal’am. One translates Chargol as Nippul and Sal’am as Rashon, and the other translates Chargol as Rashon… or maybe they really identify the species differently. I think it’s a real dispute. It’s not just terminology. They identify differently the locusts that the Torah refers to. They think it’s the Rashon that we call it, and not the Nippul.

[Speaker A] How—in traits? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not in traits. Those traits are only relevant for Rabbi Yishmael. Rav doesn’t relate to traits, so it’s not that.

[Speaker C] No, Doratini.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Abaye and Rava definitely learned in Yiddish.

[Speaker C] Who didn’t learn in Yiddish?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Anyone who knows how to learn—Duratini.

[Speaker C] Okay,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So in the first column you have the name of the item as it appears in the verse, and in this table you have the translation into the language of the Sages, okay? The next three rows are the important ones for our purposes. These are the characteristics of each of these items. The locust has no hump, no tail, and it has a short head. Okay? The chargol has a hump, it has a tail, and it has a short head. The salam has a hump, no tail, and its head is short. And chagav is not written here, and not by accident—chagav is a category, chagav is not one specific creature. Chagav is a type. That’s another unique feature of this verse: one of these four items is a group, it’s not a single item.

[Speaker A] What does “according to its kind” mean? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “According to its kind” means each one—after each one it says “according to its kind,” and we treat it as a category.

[Speaker A] Exactly. So it turns out that chagav itself is a group.

[Speaker C] Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And “according to its kind” means there’s a broader inclusion. We’ll talk about that. But for now I’m just showing you what characterizes the biblical appearance here.

[Speaker A] Arbeh, chargol, salam… yes. Since it adds all of them, do you read it as a group?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but it appears as a proper name, and the Sages relate to it as some kind of particular item—not completely. We’ll see later that they don’t really expound it as a straightforward general-particular-general. It’s a very interesting phenomenon. And after we finish this topic, I’ll show you a parallel formulation in everyday language that could be interpreted the same way. We talked about how these general-and-particular interpretations are based on some kind of logic that can also appear in non-biblical texts, and I just—we just built a present-day example, an example from our own lives today, with all the relevant characteristics, with a list of companies. Instead of arbeh, chargol, salam, and chagav, we took—I don’t know—General Motors and a set of four companies, each with characteristics that match this table exactly. We built characteristics that matched this table exactly, and we formulated this verse about them as a criterion for which company we would help when it’s in crisis. Let’s say the American government says: we will help any company such-and-such, such as General Motors and this and that, and now we have to decide what “such as” means—which companies we’ll help and which we won’t. And I’ll show you that there really is a textual logic here, not specifically biblical. I’m not saying in every detail exactly, but the logic is basically a logic that you can absolutely hear in a non-biblical text as well. Okay? But we’ll leave that for the end. First let’s get through this topic. Now in the next two columns this is already a summary of what comes out of the Talmudic text, and I’ll tell you now so it’ll be easier for us when we go through the Talmudic text. In the next column there are two schools that expound these verses. There is the tanna of the school of Rav and the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael. The tanna of the school of Rav includes from arbeh the vineyard bird, some kind of other creature that apparently has the same characteristics as the locust, namely that it has no hump, has no tail, and has a short head… no tail, sorry, yes. And likewise with chargol, then the artzuvya… in short, they include another creature that has exactly the same characteristics as the creature written in the Torah itself. And the inclusion according to Rabbi Ishmael also points to specific creatures, but the Talmudic text explains that according to Rabbi Ishmael these specific creatures are only examples—we include groups of these types. Okay? So just keep this table in front of your eyes; every time you annoy me or you don’t remember what nipul is and what rashon is and so on, look at the table. It helps a lot. Until I wrote and made this table, I couldn’t get through the passage. And even when you extract these details from the passage, it’s also not… What? What is a hump? A hump means that its head is bald, that it has no hair on its head. That’s how Rashi explains it. Okay, so the Mishnah in tractate Hullin—look at the beginning there—that’s stage one; I numbered the stages in the passage so it’ll be easier for us to orient ourselves. Stage one is the Mishnah. The Mishnah is on page 59, the Talmudic discussion is on page 65, much later, but the part of the Mishnah relevant to us says as follows: “And among locusts, any that has four legs, and four wings, and jumping legs, and whose wings cover most of its body. Rabbi Yose says: and its name is chagav.” Meaning there is also a requirement that its name be chagav. Apparently there are creatures that aren’t called chagavim but still have the characteristics the Mishnah mentions, and we want only those that are called chagavim. Okay, those characteristics are not enough.

[Speaker A] What is its name? The characteristics…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which of these characteristics is written in the verse? So let’s make a quick review. Four legs is written in the verse, right? “Karsulayim”—Rashi explains that this means the two jumping legs above its feet with which it leaps on the ground. We’re talking about—he has four legs, and then here near the neck there come out two more legs, on which it jumps. Okay? That’s called the jumping legs above its feet. The four legs are below, and it has two more legs above.

[Speaker A] So that’s six actually? What? That’s six actually, one that has four legs and one—

[Speaker C] that walks—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] on four legs, meaning it’s really six. Yes, yes, but the Torah speaks about both of them as having four legs.

[Speaker C] Those are jumping legs above its feet, those aren’t legs.

[Speaker A] Those—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] those are jumping legs above its feet, for leaping with them. Okay?

[Speaker A] Those are like the hands, like—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] hands—besides the four, besides the four there are another two, so six altogether. That’s how Rashi explains it. He says this is besides the four. Okay? So that’s the karsulayim. And it also has wings. Four wings—that isn’t written in the verse at all. Right? It’s not there in the verse. In the verse there are legs and jumping legs. No wings.

[Speaker A] And whose wings cover most of its body.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Whose wings cover most of its body”—

[Speaker A] that also isn’t written in the verse.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wings aren’t written there at all. And Rabbi Yose says: “and its name is chagav.” Chagav is written in the verse, so that we already know. But wings, and that its wings cover most of its body, are not written in the verse. So where did they get that from? From the singling out of the four items? Apparently there’s some kind of generalization here. In the Mishnah there’s no hint as to how they got it. Notice again the historical process. The Mishnah says also wings that cover most of its body. From where? Why? How did that come out? In the verse nothing of the sort is written. Then the Amoraim come and reconstruct what happened here. Amoraim—or Beitus, or the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, or the tanna of the school of Rav—yes? Probably later generations, and they reconstruct what happened here, how they arrived at this result, and then they bring the interpretations, and that’s how it starts and that’s how it starts. The chagav in it—that’s the jumping legs. Okay, yes.

[Speaker C] Those are the jumping legs, the ones it leaps with.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It has four legs, and these are the jumping legs.

[Speaker A] Wait, there’s some lesson of mine here. Birds and locusts.

[Speaker C] Who? Who are these people?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Moshe.

[Speaker C] People in Rabbi Yose’s academy. In Babylonia, from where they spoke Aramaic, they didn’t call it “its name is chagav.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a translation for chagav in Aramaic. Fine, but they didn’t call it chagav.

[Speaker C] Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Anyway, this generalization—that it has wings and that its wings cover most of its body—

[Speaker A] is a generalization that isn’t written in the verse.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where does it come from? Apparently it’s the result of the interpretation. I think at this stage we’ll settle for just saying that it’s a characteristic shared by all the particulars. Simply a characteristic shared by all the particulars, so the Sages understood that it too is part of the picture; we derive that from the particulars. But this is not the interpretation of general-particular-general—that’s before we even begin the discussion. All four of these characteristics, is that from an analogy?

[Speaker C] From an analogy across all four of these.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, right, so there are two things that are found in all of them, so from our perspective that’s also a sign. And from here on, all four of these signs that appear here—that is, four legs, the two karsulayim, the jumping legs above, the wings, four wings, and that the wings cover most of its body—these are four signs. This whole foursome, from our standpoint, is one side. That’s how the Talmudic text treats it: this entire foursome is one side. I assume it’s one side because it’s shared by all of them. Right, and then there are the additional sides—some have them and some don’t. We’ll see in a moment what to do with that. And this is a first hint of the difference between the passage here and the one in Eruvin. We said that in the passage in Eruvin they interpret all the particulars at once, whereas here they interpret each particular separately. One of the differences is that in the passage in Eruvin all the particulars have the same characteristics: fruit of fruit, produce of the ground, offspring of offspring of the earth. All of them. All four particulars. Here, each of the particulars also has unique characteristics. These four characteristics are common to all of them. But besides that, each of the particulars also has unique characteristics, as you can see in the table. The table summarizes the unique characteristics that each of these examples, these particulars, has. So that’s why we interpret each one separately. Beyond that, of course, there is also the linguistic structure, because in the verse here there is a general clause attached to each of the examples. It’s not like in Eruvin where there was a general clause at the beginning, a general clause at the end, and a list of examples in the middle. Here it’s general, particular, general, particular, general, particular, general. Meaning there is a private general clause for each of the particulars that appear in the Torah, so that’s another reason to interpret each one separately as general-particular-general. The medieval authorities (Rishonim) disagree about this. There are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say that in every structure of general and particular, you interpret each item separately unless there’s a good reason not to. You don’t need “according to its kind” after each one for us to do that; that’s always true. It’s not unique to this structure. And there are those who say it’s because—this is really a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot—there are those who say it’s only because here it says “according to its kind” after each of the particulars. As I said before, at least according to the view that in any case, even without “according to its kind,” each of the particulars is interpreted separately, then you have to understand why in Eruvin they didn’t do that. Because in Eruvin they interpreted all the particulars together. But as I said, since in all the particulars the characteristics were identical, interpreting each one separately and interpreting them all together comes to the same thing. There’s no point making four interpretations and then seeing that the results are identical; just interpret them all together and that’s it. Alternatively, you could say—I mean, these are all speculations—but perhaps there too there were special characteristics, say wine and strong drink are fruit of the tree, unlike an animal and things like that. So it has a unique characteristic. The process—which the Talmudic text doesn’t describe at all, because it starts immediately after the milk—had already sifted out all the unique characteristics and left us only with the characteristics common to all the particulars, and from there the interpretation begins. So there was actually also a process, which we’ll see is carried out here—maybe it was there too—but the description in the Talmudic text starts only after it. As if they did that intuitively; they didn’t do it explicitly, it was just obvious to them. Okay. Now begins the interpretation of the tanna of the school of Rav. The tanna of the school of Rav. “The Rabbis taught,” in section two on your page—this is already the Talmudic text on page 65. We jumped six pages. “The Rabbis taught: ‘These of them you may eat: the arbeh, etc.’ Arbeh is govai, salam is rashon, chargol is nipul, chagav is gadyan.” Again, a translation into the language of the Sages, what appears for you in parentheses in the table. “What does the text teach by saying ‘according to its kind,’ ‘according to its kind,’ ‘according to its kind,’ ‘according to its kind,’ four times? To include the vineyard bird, the Jerusalem yochna, the artzuvya, and the razvanit.” Respectively, of course. Meaning, each of the items in the verse includes—each “according to its kind,” sorry—after each item in the verse includes one more item that is completely similar in all the relevant characteristics to the item written in the verse.

[Speaker C] Is there a difference here between “according to its kind” and “according to their kinds”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the Talmudic text here doesn’t interpret that.

[Speaker C] What did he say, what did he say?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So apparently there are actually creatures here whose appearance may be different—it’s a different creature—but it has the same relevant characteristics in terms of tail, short head, and so on, exactly like the item written in the Torah. There’s room now to wonder: is Rav, the tanna of the school of Rav, talking here about groups?

[Speaker C] Why are you saying “the school of Rav”? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Later Rav says something, and it’s identified as the school of Rav. Is the tanna of the school of Rav talking here about groups or is he talking about individual items? Meaning, when he says “to include the vineyard bird,” does he mean all the locusts that have characteristics similar to the arbeh, such as the vineyard bird, or does he mean no—the vineyard bird. To include one more specific one. The vineyard bird. In Rashi it seems the meaning is one specific item, an additional individual. Except I don’t fully understand how that can be, because if so, something has to distinguish the vineyard bird from the rest of the locusts that are similar in characteristics to arbeh.

[Speaker A] Maybe—

[Speaker D] there aren’t any others like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe there aren’t any others like that. That’s a possible solution.

[Speaker A] And if there’s something exactly identical to the vineyard bird, would that also be included? That’s the question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I don’t know. That’s the question, because it’s brought here as a single item. We’ll indeed see later that Rabbi Ishmael also formulates it similarly, and afterwards the Talmudic text says that he’s talking about groups, not individual items. Okay, so we’ll see. But he really does interpret it differently. So that’s why it looks that way later.

[Speaker A] What did you want to ask? Whether “to include” is by matching, or? What? That “to include the vineyard bird” means to include it in correspondence to—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes. The vineyard bird—look in the table, again. Go back to the table.

[Speaker A] No, it doesn’t say in the table “to include other species.” Oh, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so the table isn’t intelligent, I don’t know that. This is Rashi—or it’s taken from the Talmudic text—Rashi says: the vineyard bird is included from arbeh, artzuvya from chargol, yochna from salam, and razvanit from chagav.

[Speaker A] Which is according to the order of the verse. Okay. Arbeh, salam, chargol, chagav.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You know, it’s not as though Shakespeare wrote this—this Macbeth son of Dosa—who also wasn’t called Shakespeare. Meaning, what difference does it make? If you call this razvanit “artzuvya,” as far as I’m concerned that means the same thing. It’s the same one that resembles arbeh—call it whatever you want. Okay. The tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael. Now section three. Okay? Where were you? Fine, so now the bottom line according to the tanna of the school of Rav is: they do not include—the Talmudic text says later, I’m just saying it here in advance—they do not include locusts with a long head. Notice in your table: all the examples have a short head. What, chagav? Chagav is a category, so it doesn’t include—there are some like this and some like that. But there is no example here with a long head. According to the tanna of the school of Rav, it’s clear that this is only locusts with a short head. Meaning, you can add to the signs in the Mishnah—not only the four signs that appear there. According to the tanna of the school of Rav, there is also a requirement that it have a short head. A long head is forbidden to eat. We’ll see later that the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael says that even a long head may be eaten; they include long-headed ones as well. We’ll see later how that works. Now the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael interpret their interpretation. “The school of Rabbi Ishmael taught: these are general generalities and these are particular particulars. Arbeh is—”

[Speaker A] Govai.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning they are basically saying this: we—Rashi explains to us, I’ll look inside Rashi, but I’ll say it by heart—Rashi says that “according to its kind” comes basically to tell us to interpret general-particular-general around each of the items. And this is a sequence built in stages; in a moment I’ll spell it out, and that’s what is called “these are general generalities and these are particular particulars.” And now they begin to specify. What does that mean? Arbeh is govai—up to here it’s like the tanna of the school of Rav. Okay? We included the govai. “According to its kind”—to include the vineyard bird. Yes, like the tanna of the school of Rav. “I have only one that comes and has no hump. From where do I know one that comes and has a hump? The text says: salam—this is nipul. ‘According to its kind’—to include the oshkaf. And I have only one that comes and has no hump, one that comes and has a hump; one that comes and has no tail—up to here. From where do I know one that comes and has a tail? The text says: chargol—this is rashon. ‘According to its kind’—to include the karsafet and the shakhlanit.” How is this interpretation built? We take the three items besides chagav, the three items arbeh, chargol, and salam. Yes? Now we begin with arbeh. So far this is like the tanna of the school of Rav—this is to include the vineyard bird. What characterizes them? Look in the table: no hump, no tail, and a short head, right? Now the Talmudic text says, “I have only one that comes and has no hump.” Fine? So I learned that one without a hump may be eaten, right? Because that is the interpretive expansion of arbeh. Wait. What?

[Speaker A] One second. When we include arbeh as equal to govai and include it to the vineyard bird, is that basically everyone who has no hump?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. In a moment we’ll see what happens with the short head and with the tail—we haven’t yet said anything about those. Why did they suddenly choose specifically the hump? Why not the short head? Why not no tail?

[Speaker A] So because only two particulars here are included?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the Talmudic text doesn’t say that. That’s why I say that in Rabbi Ishmael at least, the Talmudic text says explicitly that when they say “the vineyard bird,” they mean a group. The vineyard bird is only an example. And the proof is that immediately afterwards the Talmudic text says: “I have only one that has no hump.” That implies anyone who has no hump. So what do we do with one that does have a hump? How do I know that? What do you mean, how do I know that? Who said that’s included at all? The Mishnah says so. The Mishnah didn’t derive that there be no hump, right? Meaning that a hump is not a relevant characteristic. So if we include only one that has no hump, clearly there has to be some continuation here that includes also one that has a hump. And that is what the Talmudic text asks: from where do I know one that has a hump? Where do we know one that has a hump? So that we learn from salam. Look in your table: what is the characteristic of salam? It has a hump, right? It is similar in the other two characteristics exactly—notice also in what order. Salam is similar also in terms of the tail and also in terms of the head—it is similar to arbeh. The difference between them is only in the hump.

[Speaker A] Why did you put it third in the table? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why did I put it third in the table? I don’t even remember. It seems to me that later we did some common denominator, and I think it was more convenient to see the common denominator when it was arranged like that. But I don’t even remember. We’ll see in a moment. So we learn it from salam. Salam and arbeh are similar in terms of tail and short head, so what have we actually learned up to now? Up to now we have basically neutralized the characteristic of hump, right? Both no hump and hump are permitted to eat. Meaning, forget it—hump is not a relevant parameter. What are we left with? No tail and short head, which do remain, because they characterize both arbeh and salam. Right? So now the Talmudic text continues. Yes, the oshkaf is the one that has a hump—it’s the same thing. “And I have only one that comes and has no hump, one that comes and has a hump; I have only one that comes and has no hump, one that comes and has a hump; I have only one that comes and has no tail.” All this I already know. One that comes that has no tail, regardless of whether it has a hump, but no tail. “From where do I know one that comes and has a tail?” Short head isn’t mentioned, but certainly the intention is also short head, yes? “From where do I know one that comes and has a tail?” Now we neutralize the characteristic of tail. The text says chargol. Look in the table at chargol: chargol has a tail, right? We learn from chargol that in fact the characteristic of tail is also not relevant. “Chargol, according to its kind”—to include the karsafet and the shakhlanit. What is the characteristic—

[Speaker A] of the karsafet and the shakhlanit?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look in the table, everything is in the table—

[Speaker A] that’s plus plus plus.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The karsafet and the shakhlanit have the same characteristics as the chargol. Why do we need “according to its kind”? You’re asking why do we need “according to its kind”? Isn’t chargol enough? Chargol already shows it. No, because if there were only chargol, then we would have a structure of general and particular, and in a structure of general and particular it tells me not to expand even to something completely similar. We would leave only the chargol itself. That’s why you need “according to its kind” after it, just a second—that’s why you need “according to its kind” after it, to tell me that chargol is only an example of anyone who has a hump and those characteristics, and only then does it work.

[Speaker A] According to the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael there’s something strange here, because what this is coming to tell us is that there are two characteristics—hump and tail—such that whether they are present or absent doesn’t matter. Right? Okay. For that purpose we brought three items—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] where one has both of them, one has neither of them, and one has this one and not that one. It would have been enough to take two: one that has this and not that, and another that doesn’t have this and does have that. If there had only been two like that, that would have been enough.

[Speaker A] What about short head?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Short head appears in all of them. Short head, both of them have it—the three of them have it. So those two would have a short head. Because they could have said if he has—

[Speaker A] two things and not one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I had two items, one with this and not that, and short head in both of them. First of all, the question is whether there are such items—maybe there isn’t such an item? In fact that’s the only one missing here. Maybe there is no item that has a tail and no hump. In fact no such item appears in the table. It could be there isn’t an item that has a tail and no hump. Exactly.

[Speaker C] That has a tail and doesn’t have—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The passage doesn’t—

[Speaker A] appear here.

[Speaker C] Apparently that’s exactly why they needed it.

[Speaker A] Because it could have been that if it has one of the two—then if it has both of them, then not. What are you answering me? Because all these are things that you don’t eat, so the arbeh escapes.

[Speaker D] How many—

[Speaker A] rabbis are there who can understand what’s going on here?

[Speaker C] The arbeh escapes.

[Speaker D] If it has both of them or none of them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Usually, yes, but that would already have been a common-denominator derivation, and in a common-denominator derivation we neutralize—we don’t—

[Speaker D] assume—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that the two objections remain. Look—

[Speaker D] at what we saw there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the methods of interpretation it doesn’t work that way. In a common denominator—

[Speaker D] it does—

[Speaker A] work.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But in a moment we’ll come back to this. For now I’m only sketching the big picture so we have a complete picture. Now let’s look in more detail at the interpretations. That’s the interpretation in general. The continuation, section six. Section six is already the continuation regarding short head and long head; that’s the next part of the passage. So for the moment we stop at the end of section five, and I now want to explain in more detail how this whole business works. So let’s begin. We have a basic interpretation from arbeh, yes? Rashi tells us that from arbeh we learn a general-particular-general. What are the characteristics of arbeh? The characteristics of arbeh are that it has no hump, no tail, and a short head. Besides that, you have to remember that all of them have the four characteristics in the Mishnah—everyone has those, meaning that in the background there is always such a side, okay? When we draw the Venn diagram of this problem—so you asked what I actually want to explain here? The Talmudic text is basically saying—go back to the Talmudic text for a moment, look at section four. “I have only one that comes and has no hump; from where do I know one that comes and has a hump?” Meaning, we learned from arbeh, we learned the vineyard bird, which has no hump. What if it has no tail? What if it has a short head? Why did they choose specifically the characteristic of hump? There are two other relevant characteristics here too, right? Why does the Talmudic text focus specifically on hump? So now let’s look at the table. When we want to draw a diagram of the characteristics: no hump, no tail, and short head. And short head. What is the relation between them? At least according to the table—and here I say this is speculation, because I don’t know the zoology. I’m fed by the passage, and in the passage as it appears, look. No hump is the smallest group—that’s only arbeh. See? So that’s really the inner circle. No tail includes arbeh and salam, right? Meaning it contains the group lacking the hump. An enclosing circle, right? And short head contains all three of them. Right? And the foursome of course contains everything. So basically the structure is concentric. This is no hump—

[Speaker A] no—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] tail, and short head, and the foursome with the jumping legs and the feet and the wings. Okay? Now, what the Talmudic text is basically saying is: I include everyone who has no hump. That is the result of the interpretation. Let’s now try to reconstruct what the Talmudic text did, because it doesn’t spell it out for us. How do we reconstruct it? We use the tools we learned in the passage in Eruvin. We basically have a structure of general-particular-general. A structure of general-particular-general, yes: the first general clause is arbeh and “according to its kind.” Right? That is its private general-particular-general around arbeh. Now these are the characteristics of arbeh; that is the diagram of the interpretation. And now I ask: how did I interpret it? So if the first general clause is the decisive one, then I begin with general and particular in five sides. Five sides means—or really four in total. Five sides means only the particular that is written; we do not include even something completely similar to it.

[Speaker A] The written particular is found somewhere here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay? Only it. We don’t include even this circle.

[Speaker A] But the latter general clause—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] qualifies that—

[Speaker A] and says four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right? And then the result is exactly this. What will happen if we want the latter general clause to be the decisive one? We begin from particular and general. What do we do in particular and general? One side. One side is the whole foursome. Right? And the first general clause qualifies it and says short head. Meaning that the conclusion is in fact that the Talmudic text made the interpretation according to the method that the first clause is decisive. And therefore it says “no hump.” We asked why they focused specifically on the characteristic of hump and not short head or no tail. Very simple. If this is the diagram, “no hump” is the innermost one. In an interpretation of four sides, the result is no hump. That’s the result. There is no other result. Why—

[Speaker A] did they start talking about arbeh?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The order of writing. So the result is no hump. Now another point, which I won’t be able to get into now: Rashi insists for some reason in this passage on claiming—you can see this in several places; in one place he says it explicitly. Look under the heading “And if you say,” I think, section seven in Rashi. Rashi is also numbered according to those same sections, so you can connect Rashi quickly to the relevant sections in the Talmudic text. So I numbered it according to those same sections. Look in section seven in Rashi, third line, “And if you say.”

[Speaker D] “I hold,” yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And there is one who says that the latter is decisive”—do you see, in the third line of that comment? That means Rashi there says that here we interpret according to the method that the latter clause is decisive. That doesn’t fit this result. The method that the latter clause is decisive should have yielded short head—that anything with a short head, whether it has no tail and whether it has a hump is irrelevant. Short head—that should be the result. And for some reason we say “no hump.” So maybe Rashi is speaking only about the continuation, and here it’s the first clause that’s decisive? But that’s strange, because why would you suddenly change interpretive method in the middle of a passage? The method ought to be consistent throughout.

[Speaker C] That’s Rav Hiyya. He goes and gives Rav Hiyya’s understanding. Yes, yes, that’s not the move of the passage.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll get to that in a moment, we’ll see. That’s one possibility; we’ll soon see further on. That’s one possibility. A second possibility is that maybe the diagram really isn’t this one. In the passage before us, according to what I drew from the table, this was the diagram. But who says the table contains all kinds of creatures? In the most general form, there is a diagram like this, assuming the three characteristics are independent. Meaning, there could be no tail but a long head, there could be a short head and a tail—meaning all these characteristics are independent in pairs. So if that’s so, then this is the diagram: this square contains everything, and inside it are no tail, no hump, and short head. Now in such a case, if we make the latter general clause decisive, then the latter general clause being decisive means we want two sides, right? Two sides means this, all this. Okay? Here two sides means short head; here two sides means all this, okay? Now later we’ll see that the subsequent interpretations also add generalizations just like the first interpretation, and the final result is the union of the results of all the interpretations. And then what happens is that it is entirely possible that Rashi sees the diagram like this, and then he says that the result is—let’s call it A, B, and C—the result is basically this and this. So C and B is this circle, right? And the intersection—let’s say this is C, this is B, and this is A. A and B is this, and B and D is the three circles. The union of all those is the result, right? But as we’ll see later, if for example later we have A complement and B as well—say A is, say, no tail—then we’ll have tail and B. Once there is the union of those two, it turns out that A disappears; it becomes irrelevant, right? The intersection of those who have no tail and have the foursome of characteristics is one group. A second group is those who have a tail and have the characteristics. What is the union of those two groups? Everyone who has the four characteristics. The tail becomes irrelevant, right? And then maybe Rashi is just anticipating later developments here. We say “no hump” because we already know that the rest gets erased later. So he writes only that, but really the result is also this or this or this, not only one of them. The didactic way to arrive at that is to say “no hump,” because the rest get erased. So I’ll spell that out more next time.

[Speaker D] Good, kol hakavod. Help us carry this.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So it’s worth keeping the pages, and maybe put them there so we can keep them for next time. Yes. Keep them in two groups. Yes. Goodbye, bye-bye.

Lecture from 12 Tammuz 5777

Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

The impossibility of combining logical hermeneutic principles with generalization-detail-generalization

The common denominator as the only candidate for combination

The verses about swarming winged creatures and identifying the exegetical structure

The Sages’ exposition in Chullin 63b: “according to its kind” as a generalization, and the appearance of repeated generalization-detail-generalization

The identification table and translations: names, disputes, and identifying the species

The signs of the locust in the Mishnah and the gap from the verse

The methodological distinction from Eruvin and the need to expound each detail separately

Tanna d’Bei Rav: multiplication of parallel species and the restriction of “short head”

Tanna d’Bei Rabbi Yishmael: “these are broad generalizations and these are narrow details” and neutralizing traits

Diagramming and dependence on the dispute of “specifically the first generalization” versus “specifically the last generalization”

Full Transcript

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Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

The impossibility of combining logical hermeneutic principles with generalization-detail-generalization

The common denominator as the only candidate for combination

The verses about swarming winged creatures and identifying the exegetical structure

The Sages’ exposition in Chullin 63b: “according to its kind” as a generalization, and the appearance of repeated generalization-detail-generalization

The identification table and translations: names, disputes, and identifying the species

The signs of the locust in the Mishnah and the gap from the verse

The methodological distinction from Eruvin and the need to expound each detail separately

Tanna d’Bei Rav: multiplication of parallel species and the restriction of “short head”

Tanna d’Bei Rabbi Yishmael: “these are broad generalizations and these are narrow details” and neutralizing traits

Diagramming and dependence on the dispute of “specifically the first generalization” versus “specifically the last generalization”

Full Transcript

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