Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 24

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because it isn’t resting in that hand; it’s moving. Because the hand is moving.

[Speaker G] Fine, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the claim—look at Tosafot, where he says: that is because a person’s hand is considered significant to him as a space of four by four. That’s Tosafot’s wording: significant to him. It sounds a bit like Tosafot is saying that the hand counts as four by four because people treat it as such, not because objectively it is such a place. Right? That’s how Tosafot’s wording sounds. But notice carefully: where does Tosafot raise his difficulty from? Which part of the passage is Tosafot dealing with? Look again at the Talmud on page 5. Tosafot is speaking about the initial assumption of the Talmud, right? The Talmud brings two statements of Rabbi Yohanan, and in both of them it says that a person’s hand is regarded as four by four. The Talmud asks: why do we need both? The Talmud answers: because without the second statement I would have thought that this is only in a case where the person gives significance to his hand, and therefore it is considered a place of four by four. That is why they brought the second statement. What is written in that second statement? That I threw an object and it came to rest in the other person’s hand. What do we see from there? That even if I do not consider the hand important, it is still considered important, right? That is exactly the novelty. So where did Tosafot raise his question from? From the initial assumption, not from the conclusion. Tosafot asked his question there: the Talmud says I would have thought that a person’s hand is important only if one gives it significance, right? But here he did not give it significance—what difference does it make whether it rests in the hand or in some other place? So you see that the mechanism of subjective significance is not only when I specifically want the thing to be here. So the question was from the initial assumption of the Talmud, and therefore Tosafot answers that a person’s hand is always considered by him as four by four, because he is talking about subjective significance. But according to the Talmud’s conclusion, you do not need to get into any of that. The hand is important not because a person always treats it as important, but because it is objectively important.

[Speaker B] So therefore, subjective significance is a subjective concept. What? You said subjective significance is a subjective concept, and here it’s a…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, at least as a possibility. I’m just saying that you can’t prove from Tosafot that Tosafot means that a hand is important because people treat it that way, because all Tosafot is explaining is the initial assumption of the Talmud. In that initial assumption it is obvious that they were dealing with the mechanism of subjective significance, and about that the Talmud says that people treat the hand as being four by four. So Tosafot says yes, because a hand is always regarded in people’s eyes as four by four. But according to the Talmud’s conclusion, where we do not need to invoke subjective significance for a hand at all, the hand is important in its own right, not because of the mechanism of subjective significance. So if that is the case, the possibility is still open to say that the importance of the hand is not because people always treat it as important, but because a hand is by definition important. Okay? In the final conclusion.

[Speaker D] But then why did they bring all the… Tosafot asks why they brought all the Tannaim, so why did they bring all the Tannaim in the first place?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly.

[Speaker B] To get to that conclusion.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That—that’s what Tosafot is asking.

[Speaker D] But he doesn’t have an answer to that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he does. They brought all the Tannaim because we are still not at the point where we know that a hand is an important thing, and therefore it isn’t clear to us why in the Mishnah one is liable for using a hand. So they brought Tannaim who come to tell me that you don’t need a place of four by four. The Talmud on page 5 is the conclusion of the passage—we’re not there yet. At the conclusion of the passage it becomes clear that in fact the whole business is unnecessary, and we know that a hand is an important place, so there is no need to tie it to Rabbi or Rabbi Akiva or others or whatever. A hand is an important thing, period. When Tosafot is here, he is explaining the Talmud here. The Talmud here at this point assumes that in the Mishnah you do not need the condition of four by four. It is only at the conclusion of the passage that it says the Mishnah also agrees that you do need it, except that a hand is considered a place of four by four. Tosafot is in the middle of the process, so he explains this stage of the Talmud. Okay? Alright, so let’s take a look for a moment at the law itself—the law of subjective significance—because it does still have some relevance for us. In the Talmud in Eruvin that Tosafot brings, you see that a person can give significance to a place that is not important and thereby turn it into an important place. Because, let me remind you, according to the conclusion of our passage, you need lifting up and putting down on a place of four by four, right? You do need that. That is also how Maimonides rules, and that is the conclusion of the passage—not like we thought all along. So let’s see now what that means in Jewish law. In practical Jewish law it means that if you put something down in a hand or lift it from a hand, then of course that is fine, because a hand is always four by four. But if you lift it or place it on a small place that is not a hand, then in principle you are exempt—unless you gave that place significance, in which case you are liable. Are you with me?

[Speaker B] Is the significance learned from the fact that he repeats this action, or even if he does it only one time?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, if in this action he wanted the object to be specifically here, that means he is giving significance to this place. Okay? So once again, notice: now I’m speaking about the conclusion. At the conclusion, when I ask you what is written in the Shulchan Arukh—after we’ve finished the passage and seen the whole framework—what is written there is this. What is written in Maimonides, not in the Shulchan Arukh. It’s exactly as you rightly pointed out, or what Idit rightly pointed out earlier. In Maimonides it appears as three laws. First law—I didn’t bring it here, but for heaven’s sake—

[Speaker E] For example, in law 3 he brings the dog’s mouth.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. First law: you need placing down and lifting up from a place of four by four. Right, that is the conclusion of the passage. Second law: a hand is always a place of four by four, so there is no problem. Third law: even smaller places, where in principle you ought to be exempt—if you gave them significance, then you are liable. That is basically the summary of the passage in Jewish law. Okay? Alright? In other words, understand: if you do not need a place of four by four, then you do not need subjective significance in order to incur liability. Someone who throws into the dog’s mouth would be liable, say, if we had found a Tanna who does not require placing on a place of four by four, okay? Then someone who throws and it comes to rest in the dog’s mouth is liable not because of subjective significance. He is liable because he put it down on a place; I don’t care that the place is small. The whole necessity for the mechanism of subjective significance comes only from the fact that according to Jewish law, you really do need placing on a place of four by four. So if you put it on a small place, only if subjective significance applies will you be liable; otherwise not. Okay? Are you with me?

[Speaker D] So according to that, every placing down is basically subjective significance if you planned to place it there. Right away, then, this is exactly the story with the dog. If I threw it and by chance the dog caught it, then I didn’t plan it. But if I planned to throw it into the dog’s mouth, then it counts. So every place where I put something down—if my goal is really to place it there, I didn’t throw it, I didn’t toss it into the air and not care where it would end up—if I placed it, then it’s significant. It will always be significant.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even if you threw it—but you threw it intentionally so that it would reach the dog’s mouth.

[Speaker F] No, but if I have a place…

[Speaker D] It’s a matter of my intention. Meaning, once I perform an intentional act of placing down, it will always be an important place.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. But again, what is the basic assumption? The basic assumption is that you need an important place in order to be liable. If there is a place that is not four by four, you will not be liable. If you gave it significance, then it is considered like a place of four by four. Fine.

[Speaker F] If I place it on a place when I have another place to put it, and I just happened to put it on something that isn’t really one, then that’s not subjective significance.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, then there is no subjective significance there.

[Speaker F] It’s not about every place where I put something down.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—every place where you want it specifically there. Right.

[Speaker F] Because the hand is only because it’s a hand—that’s Tosafot’s answer regarding…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he threw it into the dog’s mouth so that the dog would eat, then he wants it…

[Speaker F] But if I just put it on some hook or something, and I could put it somewhere else, then that’s not subjective significance.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, that’s not subjective significance. If I threw it into the dog’s mouth, I want it there because I want the dog to eat. So that is subjective significance. But if I threw it and it happened to fall into the dog’s mouth, or even if I placed it but did not intend it to be specifically there—I don’t care where it is—then there is no subjective significance here. And since in Jewish law we rule that you need a place of four by four, the mechanism of subjective significance is very important. In the first stage of the passage, when we thought that our Mishnah did not require a place of four by four, then it didn’t matter to me whether there was subjective significance or not, because even a small place would create liability, right? Only according to the law, where we rule that you need a large place in order to be liable, does the question begin: what happens if you put it on a small place? If you gave it significance, you are still liable; if you did not, you are exempt. But all of this is only because, according to the conclusion of the passage, you need a place of four by four. The whole discussion of subjective significance does not arise where that is not the case. If we had not needed a place of four by four. Okay? That’s why, in order to discuss subjective significance, I had to show you the conclusion of the passage, because only after the conclusion of the passage can we begin to discuss whether subjective significance applies, when it applies, and so on. Okay? Now let’s actually look for a moment at what this subjective significance is saying. Basically, the mechanism of subjective significance says that there can be subjective valuation. The importance of a place does not necessarily have to be measured by objective criteria. A subjective evaluation can also turn it into an important place. One example that is brought—I referred you to Wikipedia—they bring two examples there, and these really are the two standard examples that are often used. There they discuss someone who squeezes liquid out of a fruit. The liquid has to be an important liquid in order for the squeezing to count as extracting or threshing, so that one would be liable for it on the Sabbath. Okay? If it is not an important liquid, then it is not considered that you squeezed. Okay? Now what happens when you squeeze pomegranates for juice? Generally people didn’t—in that period—drink pomegranate juice. Pomegranate juice was not a significant beverage; people generally did not regard it as a beverage, and therefore squeezing pomegranates did not create liability; it was not a Torah-level prohibition. But even though people did drink it? Yes, he says it still wasn’t considered a significant drink, an important beverage, unlike wine. Therefore producing that liquid is not considered producing a drink. Therefore I am not liable here on the Sabbath. Now the Talmud says that the household of Menashya bar Menachem would squeeze pomegranates. There, they did relate to pomegranate juice as a significant juice. Rav Nachman said: the Jewish law follows the household of Menashya bar Menachem. Right? So the law is that pomegranate juice is important. Rava said to Rav Nachman: is Menashya ben Menachem the majority of the world? Why should the law follow them? So they behaved that way—so what? Most of the world does not behave that way. Their opinion is nullified in relation to everyone else. What do I care that the household of Menashya viewed it as something important? Most people, the average person, does not view it as something important. So why rely specifically on them? Rather, this reason follows Rav Chisda, for Rav Chisda said: if one squeezed beets and put them in a mikveh, they invalidate the mikveh by changing its appearance, and on that we rely. So what are you forced to say? Since he gave them significance, they become a liquid. Here too, since they gave them significance, they become a liquid. What does that mean? He means to say that since the household of Menashya bar Menachem regarded pomegranate juice as a beverage, then according to their view, if they squeezed it they would be liable—not the whole world. Because for them there is a law of subjective significance. So most people who squeeze pomegranates would not be liable, because for most people pomegranate juice is not an important juice. But the household of Menashya bar Menachem, who intentionally and consistently treated pomegranates as something important—there really is subjective significance here. Now a question arises, which I won’t go into here: what happens if somebody else decides to drink pomegranates? It is not usually his way to do so. But now he decides to drink pomegranate juice and squeezes the pomegranates. Simply speaking, the law of subjective significance would apply to him as well.

[Speaker E] This is really a bit like someone who is strict about barriers, so everyone…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but I’m saying—yes—but here what I want to say is that here I’m speaking specifically about someone who doesn’t usually drink pomegranates, and right now he feels like drinking pomegranates, so he takes pomegranates and squeezes them. In that case he would be liable, because he himself specifically, in this case, wanted pomegranate juice. So you can’t say that right now it’s not important to him, even though generally yes. And then it turns out that anyone in the world, if they squeeze pomegranates in order to drink them, would be liable by the law of subjective significance. But then what are we talking about when we say that usually one who squeezes pomegranates is exempt? When you squeeze the pomegranates just incidentally, so the juice comes out, but not because you want it to drink. Okay? So that’s the mechanism of subjective significance in any event. It’s not important for us right now; it’s just an example. The same is true on Sabbath page 90: one who stores away a seed for planting, for an example, or for medicine, and then takes it out on the Sabbath, is liable for any amount. For everyone else one is liable only according to its measure. Meaning, if a person took one seed from a private domain to a public domain, he is exempt, because carrying out has a minimum measure—you have to carry out something significant, something important. If you carried out some tiny little thing, that is not considered a significant act of carrying out. But if you take a seed that had been stored away in some special place, in a special box, for certain needs—either to plant it or to demonstrate something with it or for medicine—then that storing away shows that in your eyes this seed is important. If you now take that seed from a private domain to a public domain, you will be liable. Even though it is only a tiny amount, there is no standard minimum measure of significance here. Okay? You will still be liable, because Rashi says that there is basically a mechanism of subjective significance here. Why am I bringing this? Because unlike pomegranate juice—in pomegranate juice, subjective significance turns an unimportant liquid into an important liquid. But there the importance really is a subjective matter: what people regard as important is important. There is nothing objective about juices—which of them is important and which is not. The question is what people like to drink or want to drink, right? So there it makes sense to apply the law of subjective significance. Because the law of subjective significance says that in my eyes this is important, and here all the importance depends only on the question of what people regard as important. But what happens in a place where there are fixed measures, like in our case, a place of four by four, or in carrying out where you need an olive-sized amount—say, carrying out food where you need an olive-sized amount? There one might have said that importance is determined by objective standards; after all, they establish a quantitative measure. So here it could be that subjective significance should not work. The Talmud says: no, even here subjective significance works. The meaning is that even when a measure is established, the measure is only an indication of importance. The measure is not an independent criterion, not an autonomous criterion in itself. It is a sign, not a cause. It’s not that I literally need a place of four by four; rather, four by four makes the place important. That’s all. And therefore, even when I speak about measures, which seem to be fixed quantities—why should subjective significance work here? The required measure isn’t present here—no, subjective significance can work even where measures are required. Since even when measures are required, the purpose of the measure is to make the thing important. So if you make it important even without the measure, it is also important. Why is that important for us? Because it turns out that even in our passage, where the requirement is a place of four by four, which is a requirement of a quantitative measure, I might have thought that here subjective significance would not work. We see that even in such a case it does work. Even when there is a requirement of a measure, because the measure is a subjective matter.

[Speaker C] So it sounds backwards. Meaning, because—the whole basic idea can be subjective significance. Everything else is a result of subjective significance. They gave four by four because only at that size is it important. They gave that and not—but I’m saying, subjective significance leads, not the reverse.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s exactly what I wanted to sharpen just now. One might have said not like that. One might have said that if you need a measure of four by four, what difference does it make whether there is subjective significance or not? The measure required by the Torah hasn’t been met. We see from the passage here that that is not true—exactly what Yael said—that the measure the Torah requires is not really a measure in its own right, it has no independent value, but is rather an indication of importance. So if you regard the thing as important even though the measure is not met here, it is still important. Okay? So that is the mechanism of measures. Now let’s move on a bit. In that same section that I sent you to look at about subjective significance, another law appears. And I intentionally sent you there because getting into that whole passage is madness. But he brings there in the name of Noda B'Yehuda, section 26, first edition, that when someone eats food that is unfit for eating—now if he eats it, then for him it is apparently fit for eating; he regards it as important food—there is an opinion, and it is a dispute among Tannaim, there is an opinion—Rabbi Meir says—that it is forbidden to eat it. Even though in principle, food that is unfit for eating has no prohibition attached to eating it. Pork, when it is in a state where it is unfit for eating—if I ate it, I am exempt. There is no prohibition. Okay? But Rabbi Meir says that if I intentionally ate pork that was unfit for eating, I wanted to eat it, then I gave it significance. And because I gave it significance, it is considered important food even though objectively it is unfit for eating.

[Speaker E] Is that like gelatin, for example? What? Like gelatin, where although it’s no longer fit for eating, then…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s as if—the question is whether gelatin is unfit for eating, or whether gelatin has altogether lost its original form; it goes through processes where it…

[Speaker C] Is no longer the original thing at all. But I have another question here, a more everyday question. Pork is seemingly not kosher, but suppose they slaughtered it not according to kosher law—so what, then I’m allowed to eat it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is no need to slaughter pork by kosher slaughter, there is no issue there at all.

[Speaker C] Ah okay, so it’s spoiled,

[Speaker E] It had already gone rotten.

[Speaker C] Obviously—before that they didn’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We are talking about a piece of pork that is already old and rotten and no longer fit for eating; it doesn’t matter how the pig was slaughtered.

[Speaker C] No, no, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now Noda B'Yehuda says that according to Rabbi Meir, the prohibition against eating something unfit for eating because of subjective significance is only a prohibition. It is not a rabbinic prohibition—sorry, it is not a Torah-level prohibition. It is not literally the prohibition of eating pork. What is the idea? The idea here, I think, is as follows. When you eat something unfit for eating, there are two reasons to exempt you. One reason is that the thing itself is not considered food. A second reason is that the act you are doing is not an act of eating. Because when people eat, they eat food. Something that is not food—that is not an act of eating.

[Speaker H] But if he chose to eat it, doesn’t that mean he gives it significance? Again?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t hear, it froze. You disappeared.

[Speaker H] I’m saying, if he wanted to—he didn’t just happen to eat it, he wanted to eat that piece that was unfit for eating. Maybe because of that, doesn’t it count—isn’t that subjective significance, doesn’t it count for him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Rabbi Meir says that it is subjective significance, and therefore it is forbidden to eat it. But Noda B'Yehuda says this is only forbidden rabbinically, not on the Torah level. Meaning, the prohibition here did not really return to being the prohibition of eating pork. How do we understand that?

[Speaker C] Could this be like medicine? I ate it as medicine?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s something else. Medicines are a separate whole discussion. So the accepted explanation among the later authorities is as follows. When I eat something unfit for eating, there are two reasons why I am exempt. One, the food item itself is not food. That is part of the laws of forbidden foods. Something that is not food is not included in the prohibitions of forbidden foods. Two, to eat something unfit for eating is not an act of eating. It is an unusual act, not an act of eating.

[Speaker D] And both of those make the prohibition only rabbinic?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the opposite. I’m saying because both exist, there is no prohibition. Okay? Now what happens according to Rabbi Meir, that when I eat something unfit for eating, because of subjective significance there is a prohibition, but it is rabbinic? The claim is as follows. Subjective significance cannot turn the food item itself into food. Because something that objectively is not defined as food—what difference does it make that this particular person considers it food? The question whether it is food is a general Jewish-law question. It is a general question of how this thing is defined. But with respect to the question whether the act the person performs is an act of eating—if the person really intends to eat and sees this thing as food, then he regards his action as an act of eating. So there is an act of eating here, but the object that you are eating is not food. Therefore it is indeed forbidden, says Rabbi Meir, but only rabbinically. Because you performed an act of eating, so we cannot permit it completely.

[Speaker B] But you can’t say…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That you ate forbidden foods, since the food that you ate is not food. So it is not a Torah-level prohibition, it is a rabbinic prohibition. Why am I saying this?

[Speaker E] So why does he say—and he says certainly it needs checking—why he gets lashes? What? Why does he get lashes?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he wrote there that he does not, right?

[Speaker E] That it needs checking why he gets lashes. A mistake. Not lashes. Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He does not get lashes; according to Noda B'Yehuda it is disciplinary lashes, and that is the accepted view—this is only a rabbinic prohibition.

[Speaker D] Wait, so according to one view it is no prohibition at all, not even rabbinic, because it isn’t considered food, and according to the second, since it is considered eating, it becomes a rabbinic prohibition? Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This is a dispute among Tannaim. Noda B'Yehuda explains Rabbi Meir’s opinion in that Tannaitic dispute. Okay? Now I ask: what happens in our case regarding a place of four by four? Regarding a place of four by four, Tosafot—and not only Tosafot, also the Talmud in Eruvin—says that subjective significance can turn it into a place of four by four.

[Speaker B] But is that also only rabbinic?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait—here we are talking about becoming liable on the Torah level. That is exactly the point. And the big question is why. Because true, maybe as far as I’m concerned the action is considered a significant act of carrying out or a significant placing down, but the place in itself is not an important place. How does it help that I regard it as important? After all, here too there is the issue that you need a place of four by four. What do we see? We see—and I’m just sharpening what I said before—we see that you do not literally need a place of four by four. That’s not true. What you need is that the person perform a placing down that is significant. Okay? In order for the placing down to be significant, usually the place has to be wide enough. But if I myself regard this place as a significant place, it does not have to be a place of four by four. So the concept of subjective significance turns my action into a significant act of placing down, but it does not turn the place into a place of four by four—it’s just that you don’t really need that.

[Speaker E] In order for the action to be significant, I need either four by four or subjective significance.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, because even the four by four—I don’t really need that. That is exactly the point I made earlier; I’m just sharpening it. I used Noda B'Yehuda in order to sharpen what I told you earlier—that we see that needing a place of four by four is only a means of turning my action into something significant. Therefore in our case subjective significance really does cover the entire matter and makes me liable on the Torah level. Because all that is needed is only that my action be significant. The need for the place to be significant is only a means to make my action significant. Unlike forbidden foods, where the food must be food—that is one requirement—besides which the action must be a meaningful act of eating. But it is not that the food has to be food in order for the action to be significant. Those are two independent requirements. Therefore there subjective significance cannot do all the work, because it solves only the subjective problem but not the objective one. Okay? What would happen in a hand, for example? Think about the hand. We said earlier that a hand is considered important in any case, even if I did not intend that it be specifically in the hand. Why? Because the hand itself is objectively an important place, not because people regard it that way. What does that mean? It means that if the hand is a place of four by four—suppose I place something on a place of four by four but do not regard it as important—what do you think, would I be liable or not? I put it down on a place of four by…

[Speaker B] Four by four, but I don’t regard it as important. Would I be liable or not? Yes, I’d be liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Liable or not?

[Speaker B] Liable, obviously liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Seemingly he did not give it subjective significance, so it is less… No, that’s not how it works. A place of four by four is always important. A place that is not four by four depends on whether I regard it as important or not, but a place of four by four is always important. Okay. Now think about a hand. A hand is considered like a place of four by four—I explained earlier why. Not because people subjectively regard it that way; it is not by the law of subjective significance. That was the initial assumption in the Talmud on page 5. The Talmud’s conclusion on page 5 is that a hand is objectively considered an important place of four by four. Ah—if so, Tosafot rightly says that this is true even if I don’t care whether the object rests specifically on the hand or somewhere else. Since the place objectively counts as four by four, then in that case it doesn’t matter whether you give significance to the hand or not, and there is no need to invoke the mechanism of subjective significance. That is the difference between a hand and another place. With a hand, I do not need to want the thing specifically on the hand rather than somewhere else. Why? Because what turns the hand into four by four is not subjective valuation; it is not a subjective transformation. The hand is objectively important.

[Speaker C] And that’s what I told you earlier—that this…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Proves what I told you earlier: that the fact that a hand is considered a place of four by four is not because of the mechanism of subjective significance at all. It is because a hand, in its essence, is important; it has nothing to do with subjective significance. On the contrary, the Talmud’s initial assumption on page 5 was that a hand could be important only because of subjective significance. And that is why the second statement of Rabbi Yohanan was needed—to teach me that even when there is no subjective significance here, the hand is still considered important. Why? Because the importance of the hand is not that everyone regards it as important, but that it is important, period. Not because of a mechanism of subjective significance—because it is important. And if that is so, then putting something into a hand or throwing something into a hand is like throwing or placing it onto a place of four by four, where even if I do not regard the place as important I would still be liable, because the place is objectively important.

[Speaker I] So basically we have three kinds of places: four by four, a hand, and a place that has subjective significance?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Four by four is a place where no matter what your intention is, you are liable. A hand, according to the conclusion, is like a place of four by four—no matter what your intention is, you are liable. A place that is not a hand and is less than four by four depends on intention.

[Speaker E] That’s exactly Maimonides, yes. Fine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I simply brought all this in order to sharpen for you even more the meaning of subjective significance as opposed to a place of four by four, and hand as opposed to four by four. A hand is not because of the mechanism of subjective significance. Now I want to continue. Look, I would say there are two limitations on the law of subjective significance. The first limitation is that, simply speaking, subjective significance seems to help only for putting something down, not for lifting it up. Logically. Why? Because when lifting up—I’ll take what Noa asked earlier—I take the thing from the place where it is located. Do I care where it is located? If it had been elsewhere, I would have taken it from there. But when I place the thing down, if I put it in a certain place, apparently I wanted it specifically there and not somewhere else.

[Speaker B] But if…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I lift it up from a certain place, that lifting does not prove that I wanted it specifically there or wanted to lift it specifically from there. I lifted it from there because that is where it was. And then it comes out that the mechanism of subjective significance can help only for placing down and not for lifting up. Ruti, did you want to comment?

[Speaker B] I wanted to say that sometimes lifting up is specifically from there, and I already gave this example once, like clearing stones from a garden. I specifically want to remove the stone from there; I don’t care where it ends up resting.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, there is room to discuss that, so maybe there one would indeed need it. But in general, lifting up does not usually create significance; it does not make the place important. In any event, that is the first point. In light of that, notice: maybe this could explain the rejection that the Talmud makes of Rabbi Akiva’s view. Because the Talmud says maybe Rabbi Akiva does not require a place of four by four for putting down, but for lifting up he does require it. Why? Because the Talmud thought that maybe the reason Rabbi Akiva does not require a place of four by four is because of the law of subjective significance. Because if you put it down on a small place, then true, there is no four by four there, but if you put it there then apparently you gave it significance, and therefore Rabbi Akiva holds you liable. But for lifting up—for lifting up, even if you lifted it from that place, if it does not have four by four you did not thereby give it significance. And that is what the Talmud says: therefore according to Rabbi Akiva, even though for putting down you do not need a place of four by four, for lifting up you do need a place of four by four. Because the Talmud thought that maybe Rabbi Akiva’s law stems from the mechanism of subjective significance, and not because you do not need a place of four by four. You do need a place of four by four; it is just that subjective significance turns it into an important place.

[Speaker C] Wait, sorry—where is there no four by four in lifting up? Meaning, in lifting up there will always be four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? I lift it from the homeowner’s hand. The homeowner’s hand does not have four by four.

[Speaker C] But the hand—but the hand itself…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is according to the Talmud’s conclusion. But at this stage, when we still did not know that, right now the Talmud treats a hand as something that does not have four by four. In the final conclusion, at the end of page 5a, it turns out that really the whole discussion is mistaken—a hand is an important thing, period. But all along we did not distinguish between a hand and another place. And so we said: wait, how does the Mishnah make sense, where they lift from and place into a hand, if a hand does not have four by four? So I’m saying maybe by the law of subjective significance it counts as four by four. Okay? Then the Talmud says: if so, that works only for putting down and not for lifting up, because in lifting up your valuation does not make anything important. So therefore there it has to have four by four. So maybe that is the explanation of the Talmud’s rejection.

[Speaker C] Iris raised a question in the chat. What is it? That you have clearing stones.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] She’s just commenting.

[Speaker C] Okay.

[Speaker H] She says there is the possibility that you lift something from a place that is not four by four, like a place hanging on a projection, on a tree—she just wanted to explain lifting up from a place that is not four by four.

[Speaker C] Right, right, and not only that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So she is saying, fine, it is possible to lift something from a place that is not four by four. The question is whether lifting from a place that is not four by four gives it significance.

[Speaker H] Right, yes, because she asked whether such a possibility exists, that’s what she means.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously it exists. Something is just sitting on a projection and now I took it from the projection. What do you mean—of course it’s possible.

[Speaker C] But the projection—but the projection is within four by four. What? The projection in practice is within four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it is a place in its own right.

[Speaker C] The projection…

[Speaker B] Is not four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in its own right—attached to something. The Talmud says that the projection is not four by four. Maybe you’ll have questions later, but the Talmud says the projection is not four by four. And indeed these are situations where we lift something from a small place. So look, this is one first possibility. And indeed the Sefat Emet here, in the name of the Maharal, wants to claim that this is the distinction in the Talmud regarding Rabbi Akiva between lifting up and putting down. Because the Talmud is basically suggesting that everything Rabbi Akiva says creates liability is because of the law of subjective significance, and subjective significance exists only in putting down. Therefore for putting down you do not need a place of four by four—the valuation makes it important. But for lifting up there is no valuation, and therefore there you do need a place of four by four. That is what the Sefat Emet claims. The problem is that I think there is another limitation on subjective significance, and that means that the Sefat Emet is apparently not right. Why? Because what is Rabbi Akiva talking about? Rabbi Akiva is talking about someone who threw an object. Right? And “caught as though placed”—an object passing through the air of the public domain is considered as though it had been placed there, right? “Caught as though placed.” Can there be subjective significance in that kind of placing down? Is that a placing down that gives significance to the place?

[Speaker B] “Caught” could mean it could have reached its destination.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I didn’t intend to place it there at all—it’s just passing through.

[Speaker B] In order to get to its destination. He didn’t catch it in a basket.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What difference does it make to me if it had passed there or passed somewhere else? “Caught as though placed.” If it had gone in circles and eventually arrived where I want, would I care?

[Speaker H] The passage itself has no importance at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Subjective significance, as Tosafot said, applies only if I want it specifically here and not somewhere else.

[Speaker H] So when…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rabbi Akiva, if the object is thrown and is considered “caught as though placed,” considered at rest—can that kind of placing down work through the mechanism of subjective significance? I think not. In an ordinary placing down on a small place, you can say that it works because of the law of subjective significance—that I am willing to accept. But when you want to explain Rabbi Akiva this way—Rabbi Akiva is talking about placing down by the law of “caught as though placed.” So an object flying through the air—it is impossible to say that I intended to place it on this little place and therefore I gave it significance. I did not intend that. I want to transfer it to the private domain on the other side; I do not care by which route it gets there. So here it is obvious that there is no subjective significance. And if that is so, then what the Talmud says—that there is a difference between lifting up and putting down, this rejection that Rabbi Akiva requires it only for putting down but for lifting up he still requires a place of four by four—cannot be explained like the Sefat Emet, that it is because of subjective significance. I do not think he is right. He is right that with putting down, his distinction is correct—that subjective significance exists only in putting down and not in lifting up. But specifically in Rabbi Akiva’s case there will be no subjective significance even in putting down.

[Speaker B] But what is this—isn’t it similar to throwing into the dog’s mouth? What’s the problem there? He made a throw of four cubits in the public domain, didn’t he?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, someone who threw into the dog’s mouth placed it in the dog’s mouth, which does not have four by four. So he says: since I regard the dog’s mouth as an important place, then it has four by four.

[Speaker B] I thought because there is also throwing here, and throwing…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is within four cubits in the public domain, but even in throwing, as Maimonides says, you have to lift it from a place of four by four and place it onto a place of four by four. Okay? And therefore I think that the distinction of the Sefat Emet is really not relevant. If someone places something on a projection, I am willing to accept that there could be subjective significance in that placing down. And someone who lifts something from a projection—that does not constitute giving significance to the projection. But in “caught as though placed” according to Rabbi Akiva, I do not understand how the placing there can create subjective significance; it is not relevant. Therefore what I basically want to claim is—

[Speaker G] That maybe there is another reason there: “caught as though placed,” and not because of subjective significance.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so here we now have to say something else. Why indeed does the Talmud reject Rabbi Akiva and say that where you do not need a place of four by four is for putting down, but for lifting up you do? The distinction cannot be because of subjective significance. So now I’m beginning our Talmud passage. Let’s continue reading in our passage. The Talmud goes on and says: this Rabbi—who is this Rabbi that you are citing?

[Speaker B] From which source of Rabbi that Rav Yosef said do you learn this?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Meaning, Rav Yosef said that this is Rabbi’s view. Where—who is this Rabbi? On which statement of Rabbi is he relying? Right? So the Talmud says: if you say it is this Rabbi—this Rabbi? As it was taught in a baraita: if one threw and it came to rest on top of some projection, Rabbi says he is liable and the Sages exempt him. Right? It is resting on the projection, and Rabbi says he is liable even though the projection is not four by four. Right? By the way, this projection is apparently lower than ten handbreadths, because above ten handbreadths it is an exempt domain. But below ten handbreadths, it rests on the projection and it does not have a place of four by four, and still Rabbi says he is liable. So we see that Rabbi does not require a place of four by four. The immediate difficulty that arises here is: why not distinguish between lifting up and putting down? Maybe Rabbi does not require a place of four by four for putting down, but for lifting up he does—exactly the same way you rejected Rabbi Akiva; you could also reject Rabbi that way. Now notice: here, regarding a projection, it works even better. Because as we saw in the Sefat Emet, regarding a projection there is even the reasoning of subjective significance, which says that if you place something on a projection, then you gave the projection significance as an important place. But if you lifted something from a projection, then there you did not regard it as an important place. Therefore only for putting down does Rabbi say you are liable, but for lifting up even Rabbi would agree that you are exempt. In the case of “caught as though placed” according to Rabbi Akiva, I said you cannot make this distinction. But this distinction can certainly be made according to Rabbi, because Rabbi is talking about a projection, not about throwing through the air.

[Speaker B] But it says, “he threw and it came to rest”—in this case it happened to rest on that projection; he didn’t intend that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so here indeed we need to…

[Speaker B] Discuss that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is this speaking specifically about a case where it happened to come to rest on a ledge? The later authorities discuss that here: whether it happened to come to rest on the ledge, or whether he threw it toward the ledge, and you don’t need to be so exact here. But that expression, “came to rest.” Still, you’re right. If “came to rest” here means the same thing it does in Eruvin, then seemingly there is neither placement nor lifting here. But for our purposes, this is really the difficulty that comes up here: why does the Talmud think—as Einstein says, only a fool repeats the same thing over and over and thinks maybe this time it’ll work. Meaning: you brought Rabbi Akiva, and showed me that for placement you don’t need a four-by-four area. We rejected that. We said, fine, maybe for lifting he does need it. Then you bring me Rabbi, and in Rabbi too that’s only about placement. So what makes you think that here we won’t reject you in exactly the same way—that for lifting maybe we would need a four-by-four area? Why? And here, by the way, the Talmud is not only not bothered by that, it also doesn’t reject it that way. It just doesn’t come up here. Meaning, not only is it not bothered at the outset, but rightly so—it really doesn’t come up. And the question is why. So Tosafot here asks exactly that question. He says as follows: “He threw it and it came to rest on some tiny ledge; Rabbi deems him liable. And if you say: still, your difficulty remains—perhaps it is only placement that does not require it, but lifting does require it.” Right, that’s the difficulty we asked before. Tosafot says: “And one may say,” first answer, “that in any case the challenge is valid as stated.” What does that mean? It means, true, really you could have rejected Rabbi in that way too, but in any case the Talmud had already found another rejection, so it didn’t need to say this. But in principle, yes, you could have said that too. All right? That’s the first answer. Second answer: afterward Tosafot rejects that on the basis of a later passage, page 96, not important now, and brings another answer: “And one may say that Rav Yosef held that specifically with the leniency of Rabbi Akiva, where there is no placement at all, one can object: perhaps lifting is required. But regarding Rabbi—yes, regarding Rabbi—who requires placement on some tiny ledge, the same applies to lifting: for him even the tiniest amount is enough.”

[Speaker B] Why does he learn that if placement can be on the tiniest amount, then lifting too can be from the tiniest amount?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] How does he learn that if placement is on the tiniest amount, then lifting too is from the tiniest amount?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Come on, so let me ask you: how did you understand Tosafot’s answer? What is Tosafot saying?

[Speaker F] First of all, that he thinks Rabbi is like Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel in terms of Rabbi Akiva’s principle—sorry, Rabbi Akiva is like Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel, meaning we don’t know what he thinks about the law of four by four. It’s not certain that he waives the need for four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand—what is Tosafot answering?

[Speaker G] I think it’s not the same as with Rabbi Akiva, because there in practice nothing came to rest at all, and here still—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He deems him liable, and nevertheless he deems him liable. So therefore what?

[Speaker B] And nevertheless he deems him liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So therefore what does that say?

[Speaker B] That four by four isn’t necessary, it says that four by four isn’t necessary, that despite the fact that he deems him liable, it means he doesn’t need four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The answer—

[Speaker F] Rabbi’s case is better, because you see that placement on a ledge does count. So lifting from a ledge presumably also counts, because a ledge is something.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? So why not with Rabbi Akiva too? With Rabbi Akiva also there is placement in the air.

[Speaker F] But with Rabbi Akiva it doesn’t come to rest at all, so you can’t really know—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then say that there also shouldn’t be lifting at all—what’s the problem? What, what—

[Speaker F] What?

[Speaker B] Why—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That there also shouldn’t be lifting at all, just as it doesn’t come to rest at all? If you compare lifting to placement, then compare here too.

[Speaker F] No, but he gives significance to the ledge insofar as you can place something on it, so presumably you can also lift from it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And Rabbi Akiva gives significance to the air, from the very fact that he says it’s considered as though it was placed there. So then lifting from the air should also be valid.

[Speaker F] No, he gives significance to the air only if you go with Tosafot, but if you go with Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel, then he doesn’t give significance to the air.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so for lifting too it’s like that. And what about the ground of the domain? Fine, so for lifting too it would count as though he lifted it from the ground.

[Speaker B] No, but maybe regarding the air he holds that it is considered four by four. Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because—

[Speaker B] He deems him liable, so why does he deem him liable?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? Because he doesn’t need a place of four by four—what do you mean?

[Speaker B] Oh.

[Speaker H] Maybe you don’t need a place of four by—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Four by four. But between the domain and what is located in that domain. Tosafot says something huge here. Tosafot claims that the Talmud’s rejection above regarding Rabbi Akiva is the following rejection: you think Rabbi Akiva doesn’t require placement on a four-by-four area? Wrong. Rabbi Akiva doesn’t require placement at all. Rabbi Akiva requires only lifting; he doesn’t require placement. So you have no proof that in a case where he does require something, he waives the requirement of four by four. For placement he doesn’t need four by four simply because he doesn’t need placement at all, but for lifting—where lifting is certainly required—there it may be that Rabbi Akiva would require a four-by-four area. But with Rabbi, after all, Rabbi does require placement. He just requires that it be placed on the ledge, but not that it be four by four. So if so, for lifting too he won’t require four by four. That’s what Tosafot says.

[Speaker F] But who says so? That’s only according to what it says in Birkat Avraham. Who says that? He says “caught as though it had been placed.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Birkat Avraham—one second, one second, one second.

[Speaker F] No—who says he doesn’t require placement? He does require placement, only “caught is as though it had been placed.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot says he doesn’t require placement.

[Speaker F] Because “caught is as though it had been placed,” so—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot says that “caught is as though it had been placed” means you don’t need placement.

[Speaker G] As if it had been placed—but really it wasn’t placed.

[Speaker F] “Caught”—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As if it had been placed—meaning you don’t need placement. What do you want? You only need liftings, not placements.

[Speaker F] So it’s not that you don’t need placement; you do need placement, only “caught is as though it had been placed.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Why?

[Speaker F] But that’s the law. What does that mean? So what does “caught is as though it had been placed” mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Caught is as though it had been placed” means there’s no difference between “caught” and “placed”; you don’t need placements. It’s not—

[Speaker E] He’s not comparing “caught” to “placed”; he’s comparing “placed” to “caught.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot. Tosafot. Tosafot says— I asked earlier how to explain the difference between lifting and placement in Rabbi Akiva’s view. We suggested the Sefat Emet. I said the Sefat Emet doesn’t work. Here’s the explanation. Tosafot tells us that really the difference between lifting and placement does not stem from four by four. It stems from the fact that placement simply isn’t needed at all.

[Speaker F] So wait, if there were—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You only need lifting, not placement.

[Speaker F] So why doesn’t he say that? Why does he say “caught is as though it had been placed”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what he’s saying. Who?

[Speaker F] That’s what he’s saying? No, it isn’t. He says “caught is as though it had been placed.” He could have said you don’t need placement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You mean Rabbi Akiva? Yes. No—so Tosafot says that “caught is as though it had been placed” means “caught” and “placed” are the same thing, because you don’t need placement.

[Speaker E] Then is he liable for two sin-offerings?

[Speaker F] What does it mean, you don’t need placement? Nowhere do you need placement?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you don’t need placements at all.

[Speaker F] So why doesn’t he say that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why does he say “caught is as though it had been placed”? Tosafot says that “caught is as though it had been placed” means you don’t need placements; being caught is also fine. “Caught” and “placed” are the same thing. It’s as though he says that’s the plain meaning of Rabbi Akiva’s language, but that’s how Tosafot explains Rabbi Akiva.

[Speaker B] If someone would throw an object and it wouldn’t—

[Speaker H] It doesn’t have to come to rest; it’s enough that it be caught. Meaning, you don’t need placement. It’s enough that it enters the space of the domain.

[Speaker B] So Rabbi, if someone throws an object and it behaves like in outer space, like satellites, but it remains within the public domain, at the height of the public domain, and it’s constantly moving and never comes to rest—then what happens?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Then he would be liable.

[Speaker B] So he’s liable all the time, over and over again?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. What’s the problem?

[Speaker F] So why can’t we explain Tosafot by saying that he thinks Rabbi Akiva simply doesn’t require actual placement; he only requires legal placement, like we said last week. Meaning that it’s as if it’s on the ground, but “caught is as though it had been placed.” Of course placement is required, only if it passed through the air it’s as if it’s resting on the ground. And now I can’t use that because I don’t actually know Rabbi Akiva’s opinion regarding—you want to explain—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Are you trying to explain Rabbi Akiva or Tosafot? Tosafot. Tosafot doesn’t say that. Tosafot says, “there is no placement at all.”

[Speaker F] Right, no actual placement. But clearly he needs placement, because “caught is as though it had been placed”; otherwise it just doesn’t make sense.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Explain to me the difference between him and Rabbi.

[Speaker F] Because Rabbi requires actual placement. For him there is no such thing as, if it’s caught in the air then it’s as if it rested. He doesn’t accept that rule.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand, but I’m asking why the distinction I made regarding Rabbi Akiva—between lifting and placement—you can’t say the same thing about Rabbi.

[Speaker F] Because Rabbi does require actual placement on something. And that something is not necessarily four by four. Therefore if placement on something less than four by four counts, then presumably for lifting too, where it’s something less than four by four, he’ll accept it. But from Rabbi Akiva I’m not sure I can derive that. Because he agrees that “caught is as though it had been placed” for placement, but who says he thinks the same for lifting? In terms of the legal rule, not in terms of the—okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re basically just phrasing in a different way what I’m saying. Because what does it mean to say placement is required but being caught also counts as placement? What practical difference does that make? Meaning, what case would count as a case where there was no placement?

[Speaker F] Like the case of the ledge. There? In Rabbi Akiva’s view, the ledge wouldn’t count.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Of course it would count. After all, for placement you don’t need four by four.

[Speaker F] No, who says so? If we go according to Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel, we don’t know what Rabbi Akiva says about four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud says that according to Rabbi Akiva, for placement you don’t need four by four; for lifting you do. The Talmud says that.

[Speaker F] But that’s what we said—but no, we said that it’s “caught is as though it had been placed,” but if we go according to Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel, we don’t know what Rabbi Akiva says regarding four by four. We know that he—that’s what we said last week, that’s what we said on Tuesday. I don’t know what Rabbi Akiva thinks—on the contrary—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the Talmud—quite the opposite—that goes back to the question we raised on Tuesday, because the Talmud proves from Rabbi Akiva that you don’t need a place of four by four. The difficulty was: according to Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel, why does the Talmud assume that? Seemingly according to Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel there is a four-by-four area here—it’s on the ground—so that’s the difficulty.

[Speaker F] Fine, but we solved that by saying that yes, in practice it’s not—it’s not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Four by four, but legally it is. What? We solved it precisely by saying that Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel are not relevant, because the object is not considered to be resting on the ground with respect to the requirement of a four-by-four place, only with respect to the domain, not with respect to the place. You’re bringing back the difficulty, but there was already an answer to that difficulty.

[Speaker F] No, but we said that legally it is considered as though—but not in practice.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Meaning, the requirement of a four-by-four place is a requirement for a place that is actually four by four, not legally so. So what Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel say is irrelevant to the question of a four-by-four place. The fact that it is considered as if resting on the ground is beside the point.

[Speaker B] I would have thought that “caught is as though it had been placed” is said only on the assumption that in the end the object is supposed to come to rest somewhere, otherwise they wouldn’t say “caught is as though it had been placed.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Talmud it doesn’t seem that way. What, if it passes over the public domain then it is resting in the public domain? Okay, let’s continue for a moment.

[Speaker E] Listen, I want to—I don’t understand, but I don’t understand how according to Rabbi, from Tosafot’s second answer, we understand that he also requires lifting.

[Speaker B] What do you mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t require either lifting or placement? No—

[Speaker E] What we understand is that he requires that lifting too be from four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he doesn’t require that.

[Speaker E] No—

[Speaker B] A place of—

[Speaker E] The tiniest amount.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi explains that placement on a ledge is a placement that creates liability, right? Right. On the one hand he requires placement; “caught” doesn’t help. But that placement can be on a very small place.

[Speaker E] Okay, and what about lifting?

[Speaker D] Yes, so he—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Says that when he requires something actual, he still doesn’t need four by four; so for lifting too it’s the same.

[Speaker D] Oh, okay, because he doesn’t require between—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For Rabbi, both in lifting and in placement.

[Speaker D] Okay, but what do we learn about Rabbi Akiva regarding lifting? That he requires four by four or that he doesn’t?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to what the Talmud says, for lifting it may be that he does require four by four. You have no proof that he doesn’t—that’s just a rejection, remember. It’s not an explanation of Rabbi Akiva; it’s a possible rejection. You can’t prove to me that Rabbi Akiva says such-and-such, because maybe what Rabbi Akiva said was only about placement and not about lifting.

[Speaker D] And therefore they reject it because it doesn’t fit the Mishnah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, or at least it doesn’t necessarily fit the Mishnah—a rejection. Okay, now look, for example, at the wording of the Rashba so it’ll be clearer to you—I hope I brought it here. Oh no, I didn’t bring it. The Rashba, the Rashba writes this more explicitly than Tosafot. No, I didn’t bring his wording here—that according to Tosafot there is no need for placement at all, no placement at all. Of course that doesn’t mean that according to Rabbi Akiva it doesn’t have to go from the private domain to the public domain. Obviously it has to reach the public domain; it’s just that it doesn’t have to come to rest in the public domain, yes, that’s the point. Okay, now I’ll just remind you that at the beginning of lesson nine I brought the Tosafot Yeshanim and Tosafot HaRosh regarding that question about lifting one’s body. And there they made distinctions between lifting one’s body and placing one’s body: for placing one’s body, according to everyone, that helps; but for lifting one’s body there is a doubt in the Talmud. Once again you see that the requirements for placement are lower than the requirements for lifting, right? In any case, what you see here in Tosafot is that he proposes a possibility that is neither of the two previous possibilities I mentioned in the previous lesson for understanding “caught is as though it had been placed.” One possibility was like Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel, that it is like resting on the ground. The second possibility was like Tosafot, resting in the air. Here Tosafot says: neither this nor that. “Caught is as though it had been placed” means it is not resting at all—not in the air and not on the ground—only that there is no need for it to be resting. That is a completely different conception. More than that: notice that according to Tosafot you can say “caught is as though it had been placed” only in the laws of carrying on the Sabbath. Because there is no general rule that something caught in midair is considered to be at rest—that’s what Noa kept saying all along. It’s not that something caught is considered as though at rest; rather, in the laws of carrying there is simply no need for placement. For example, remember the Be’er Heitev about tefillin. That placement of the tefillin—“caught is as though it had been placed”—when I put tefillin above the head, that doesn’t begin to work, right?

[Speaker B] Because—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because “caught is as though it had been placed” means that in the laws of carrying you don’t need placement, but with tefillin, clearly you need to place them on the head.

[Speaker B] So why—so why do they say that the labor of carrying requires lifting and placement?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They say that—but not according to Rabbi Akiva. Oh.

[Speaker B] But—

[Speaker F] If so, then altogether—the end of the previous section of the Talmud should have said not that Rabbi Akiva does not require lifting, but rather that I can’t learn anything at all from Rabbi Akiva, not even about placement, because he doesn’t require placement at all. I also can’t learn that there is no requirement of four by four, because he doesn’t require placement at all. The end of the previous section was: maybe I can learn that Rabbi Akiva doesn’t require four by four for placement, but maybe for lifting he does require four by four. But according to this Tosafot I can’t even say that, because maybe he deems him liable simply because he doesn’t require placement at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course—that’s exactly what Tosafot says. I didn’t understand, so what’s the question?

[Speaker F] But that doesn’t make sense, because then the Talmud would have written that. It wouldn’t have written, wait—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From where do you learn that—

[Speaker F] About placement—but what about lifting?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. For placement, where nothing at all is needed, then being caught counts as placed even though there is no four by four there, but for lifting they would need four by four. That’s what the Talmud says according to Tosafot.

[Speaker B] So according to Rabbi Akiva, the labor of carrying requires only lifting and transfer?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll say again: that’s a rejection.

[Speaker B] I understand, but—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Since it may be that Rabbi Akiva doesn’t require placement at all, only lifting, therefore you can’t prove anything from him. The Talmud doesn’t say that this is Rabbi Akiva’s position; it says that since there is a possible way to explain Rabbi Akiva like this, you can’t rely on him to explain the Mishnah. So I can’t say that according to Rabbi Akiva placement is not required; I can say that according to Rabbi Akiva it’s unclear whether placement is required. Okay? Now, the point I wanted to make on the page where I referred you to Birkat Avraham: Birkat Avraham brings an explanation there, which I think is very יפה—very nice—about this idea of “caught is as though it had been placed.” What he basically wants to say is not that according to Rabbi Akiva there is no need for placement, but that the whole need for placement exists only at the point where you complete the process. Meaning: when I take an object, lift it from the private domain, and move into the public domain, so long as I haven’t put it down, who says I’ve carried it out at all? Maybe I’ll go back to the private domain, go somewhere else—so it’s not finished yet. There, placement is indeed required. What Rabbi Akiva says—that placement is not required—is only in the case where he threw an object from the private domain to the public domain. Why? Because once the object is flying in the public domain, it is no longer in the person’s hand. Clearly it isn’t going to return to its original place. So there, placement is not required.

[Speaker B] Why? With a boomerang it comes back—there it’s obvious that with a boomerang it comes back. What? With a boomerang it comes back.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not dealing with boomerangs right now, Ruti, I’m talking now—what?

[Speaker B] But there is such a possibility.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is such a possibility, but with a boomerang placement would be required, whereas with an object that isn’t a boomerang placement would not be required. We’re not talking about boomerangs right now.

[Speaker B] So no, fine, but—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I throw an object from the private domain to the public domain—there placement is not required. Why? Because there, once it reached the airspace of the public domain, the act of carrying out was already performed; it’s already an irreversible act. That greatly moderates Rabbi Akiva’s novelty. You could say—and I claim this may even be Tosafot’s intent. Tosafot does not mean to say—and he doesn’t say this explicitly in Tosafot; he doesn’t even bring this Tosafot, by the way, to my surprise—but in principle he could have brought this Tosafot as proof. But what this Tosafot says is that according to Rabbi Akiva placement is not required. That doesn’t mean that in the labor of carrying generally you don’t need placement; rather, here in the case of “caught is as though it had been placed,” you cannot infer from that that a four-by-four place is not needed, because in such a situation placement is not required in the first place.

[Speaker E] That’s like “his fire is considered like his arrow.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not that in the labor of carrying you don’t need placements.

[Speaker E] Fine? And does that mean “his fire is considered like his arrow”? That once he, so to speak, released the object—what is that, sorry?—it’s already irreversible, it’s already—irreversible—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But “his fire—”

[Speaker E] Like his arrow, even though it’s no longer under his control.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “His fire is considered like his arrow” says more than that. Not only that it’s irreversible—one can do an irreversible action even if liability is only because of one’s property. “His fire is considered like his arrow” only means not just that it’s irreversible, but that it is considered damage done by my own force. And that isn’t relevant here. Okay?

[Speaker E] No, but it is by his force—he lifted it, he performed the lifting. What? Even without its coming to rest in the public domain, he performed the lifting by the very act of taking it out.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what about the placement? After all, according to Rabbi Akiva you need placement.

[Speaker B] Wait, but Rabbi, here Birkat Avraham—

[Speaker E] So Birkat—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Avraham says: right, placement is needed, but specifically here it isn’t needed, because here—

[Speaker B] If the homeowner stretched out his hand holding an object and returned it from the public domain back into his own private domain, he is exempt. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course he is exempt. But—

[Speaker B] That’s after it reached the public domain—how does that fit with what you said?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exempt.

[Speaker F] Wasn’t that on the previous page?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—

[Speaker B] I mean in the context of what you said, that once it’s in the public domain it’s already irreversible.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying that even aside from what I said before, the halakhic ruling is also that he is exempt, so certainly according to what I said before he would be exempt.

[Speaker D] But that’s the whole question with the basket that they took out—

[Speaker B] And then brought back.

[Speaker D] What’s the question?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exempt.

[Speaker B] Why, if once it reached the public domain it’s irreversible?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here placement is required! Because here, so long as it’s in my hand, as long as I haven’t put it down, the act is not finished. In such a case placement is required even according to Rabbi Akiva. Only when I threw the thing, and now it’s no longer reversible—there, placement is not required. By the way, the Ritva—I think I referred you to the Ritva—the Ritva really doesn’t learn it this way. The Ritva learns that the difference between placement and lifting is that for placement you don’t need a four-by-four area, but for lifting you do need a four-by-four area—not that placement is unnecessary altogether. And Rashi also seems to imply that. So in Ritva and Rashi you see not like Tosafot. How will they explain our passage? Like Tosafot’s first answer: true, they could also have raised this objection against Rabbi, drawing a distinction between lifting and placement, but since they raised another objection, that’s enough already; there’s no need to pile up every possible objection. Tosafot’s second answer goes in a different direction, and the difference between them is the question of how to explain the distinction between lifting and placement in Rabbi Akiva’s view. Okay, the truth is this took me really slowly. Let’s stop here.

[Speaker B] Okay, let’s stop here. Thank you very much. Did you send a summary of Tuesday?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, it was sent. I sent it last night; Noa drew my attention to the fact that I had forgotten to send it.

[Speaker B] Okay, thank you. Sabbath peace.