Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 25
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Its law follows its main trunk, and “caught is as if placed”
- Rules in the Talmud, Yad Malakhi, and the example of migo
- The question of gud asik and its implications
- Impurity breaks through and rises, and the analogy to this mode of analysis
- A source for Rabbi in the law of a ledge, and the Talmud’s rejection
- A note on Talmudic editing and Maharsha on Tosafot versus the Rif
- Why the Talmud’s rejection assumes a hand is not treated as “following its main part”
- Whether “we treat its branch as following its trunk” also applies to a building ledge
- Comparison to the sugya on page 8 and the difference between a place-problem and a domain-problem
- Three possibilities for understanding “we treat its branch as following its trunk”
- Rashi, Tosafot, and Maharsha on the two versions
- Tractate Makkot and the Ritva on different interpretations of the same formulation
Summary
General Overview
The lecture continues the discussion of the principle of we treat its branch as following its trunk as a principle that in some ways parallels caught is as if placed, and focuses on the question of what exactly this principle does: does it solve the problem of a place measuring four by four, does it define a domain, or is it a general formulation that receives different interpretations depending on context. The Rabbi places the sugya within a broad network of recurring questions in the Talmud about “is the thing considered to be resting above or below,” and shows how the same form of analysis reappears in the laws of gud asik and in the rule that “impurity breaks through and rises.” He then analyzes the Talmud’s rejection, which explains the law of “some tiny ledge” as referring to a tree standing in a private domain whose branches lean into the public domain, and from there develops an interpretive dispute between Rashi and Tosafot regarding the meaning of we treat its branch as following its trunk, with comparison to the parallel sugya on page 8 and to the sugya in Tractate Makkot and the Ritva.
Its law follows its main trunk, and “caught is as if placed”
The Rabbi defines we treat its branch as following its trunk as a principle that brings us back again to the same foundational questions of “standing above” versus “being placed below,” similar to caught is as if placed. The Rabbi presents a possibility in Tosafot according to which the expression caught is as if placed is not a metaphysical claim that the object is “resting,” but rather a localized halakhic claim that sometimes “placement is not required”; in that case, the general wording conceals a rule that is not broad-based but context-dependent. He connects this to a broader question: is there “one general principle” that recurs in many contexts, or is this a uniform term that covers several different laws depending on the place in which it appears.
Rules in the Talmud, Yad Malakhi, and the example of migo
The Rabbi notes that there is an entire literature of “rule-books,” and cites Yad Malakhi of Rabbi Malakhi HaKohen for the rule that there are concepts that appear in the same formulation in several places in the Talmud, yet are interpreted differently in each place. As an example he brings the concept of “migo,” which is sometimes interpreted as “why would I lie” and at other times as other concepts such as “it is in his power” or distinctions between different kinds of argumentative strength. He uses this example to justify the possibility that we treat its branch as following its trunk may be read differently in different contexts, even if the wording is identical.
The question of gud asik and its implications
A question is raised about integrating gud asik into the discussion, and the Rabbi replies that there is no need to reach gud asik in order to explain caught is as if placed, because that principle appears independently in many places in the Talmud. He distinguishes among different understandings of gud asik regarding “a private domain breaks through and rises,” and presents a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) as to whether this comes from gud asik, which raises the walls upward, or from the idea that walls are not needed above at all, and it is enough that there are walls below, and even a third approach that identifies the very idea that “they do not need to rise” as the meaning of gud asik. The Rabbi emphasizes that the discussion here trains forms of thought that can be applied in other sugyot in which the same hesitation returns: do “the walls rise,” or “do they not need to rise.”
Impurity breaks through and rises, and the analogy to this mode of analysis
The Rabbi offers as another example the rule that “impurity breaks through and rises,” explaining that when a person forms a covering above something impure below, the impurity rises and renders him impure. He presents the question of priests flying over a cemetery as a practical example of the discussion, and emphasizes that here too one can ask whether we are dealing with “a strip of impurity that rises” all the way upward, or with the idea that “the impurity does not need to rise,” and it is enough that the person is above the trajectory of the impurity. He presents this as another instance of the same basic interpretive dilemma concerning a halakhic description: are we speaking of an imagined reality of “rising,” or of a legal definition that makes such rising unnecessary.
A source for Rabbi in the law of a ledge, and the Talmud’s rejection
The Rabbi returns to the sugya that seeks a source showing that Rabbi does not require a place measuring four by four, and cites the baraita: “If one threw and it came to rest on some tiny ledge, Rabbi obligates and the Sages exempt,” as apparent proof that no minimum area is required. The Talmud rejects this proof and explains the law as referring to a tree standing in a private domain with its branches leaning into the public domain, so that according to Rabbi “we say: treat its branch as following its trunk,” while according to the Rabbis “we do not say that.” The Rabbi explains that this rejection is intended to allow one to say that Rabbi does indeed require a place of four by four, and nevertheless obligates there because the branch takes on the status of the trunk.
A note on Talmudic editing and Maharsha on Tosafot versus the Rif
The Rabbi notes that when the Talmud in one sugya refers to another sugya that will appear later in the tractate, that is a relatively rare phenomenon, and it hints at the editing of a cluster of pages by a single editor who had the whole corpus before him. He contrasts this with other phenomena in which there are contradictions between sugyot without any explicit indication that they disagree, which suggests a kind of “pasting together” without coherent editing. He cites Maharsha, who characterizes the Tosafists as seekers of coherence who reconcile contradictions, as opposed to the Rif and the sages of Spain, who are more willing to say that sugyot disagree and to rule locally. He notes an affinity between these approaches and the difference between traditional yeshiva learning and modern Talmudic scholarship.
Why the Talmud’s rejection assumes a hand is not treated as “following its main part”
The Rabbi infers from the rejection that the Talmud assumes that what is said of a tree is not said of the homeowner’s hand in the Mishnah, because if one could say “we treat his hand as following his body,” it would still be possible to explain the Mishnah according to Rabbi, and there would be no rejection. He mentions possibilities for explaining the difference, such as that a hand has movement unlike a branch, or that the trunk-branch relationship in a tree is one of nourishment and life that does not exist between legs and hands. He raises another possibility, according to which a tree can be regarded as attached to the ground in a way that gives meaning to “casting” the branch downward, whereas a human being does not “draw nourishment from the ground,” and emphasizes that the Talmud itself does not spell out the mechanism, so several explanatory directions can be explored.
Whether “we treat its branch as following its trunk” also applies to a building ledge
The Rabbi examines whether the rejection teaches that we treat its branch as following its trunk is also said regarding a building ledge, since at the beginning of the discussion the case is a “ledge,” not a tree. He suggests that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) understand that the Talmud in effect replaces the ledge with a tree branch, and does not create an analogy between a building ledge and a tree, so that it should not emerge that the rule applies equally to inanimate things, where we do not find such usage. He notes that from reading the continuation of the sugyot it appears that the discussion in practice shifts to a tree, even though the language of the baraita uses the word “ledge,” and this shows a certain complexity in the Talmud’s move.
Comparison to the sugya on page 8 and the difference between a place-problem and a domain-problem
The Rabbi cites the sugya on page 8: “If one planted a reed in a private domain and threw and it came to rest on top of it, even if it is a hundred cubits high, he is liable, because a private domain rises up to the sky,” and the attempt to connect this to Rabbi’s opinion from the case of “some tiny ledge.” He explains that Abaye rejects this there as well and explains the baraita as referring to a tree standing in a private domain whose branches lean into the public domain, with Rabbi and the Sages disputing we treat its branch as following its trunk. The Rabbi emphasizes that in the sugya on page 4 the rejection must use we treat its branch as following its trunk to solve the problem of a place of four by four, because that is the issue from which they tried to prove, whereas on page 8 there is room to understand that the mechanism may mainly solve the domain-problem, and this also depends on a version that adds or omits the phrase “apparently we do not require a place of four by four.” He develops the possibility that when we treat is read in terms of domain, one must assume that the throw is not four cubits within the public domain, because otherwise even the Rabbis would obligate on the basis of four cubits irrespective of the question of domain.
Three possibilities for understanding “we treat its branch as following its trunk”
The Rabbi formulates three principal readings: one in which we treat its branch as following its trunk solves only the domain-problem and defines the object as resting in the domain of the trunk; a second in which it solves only the place-problem, in that the trunk “confers significance” on the branch as an important place even though the object remains in the domain where the branch is located; and a third in which the object is seen literally as “resting on the trunk,” so that both the domain and the significance of the place are solved together. The Rabbi notes that Maharsha ties the discussion also to the question of whether the trunk itself must measure four by four, and presents an alternative possibility in which the “placing” relates to the ground from which the tree draws nourishment, so that there is always four by four regardless of the area of the trunk itself.
Rashi, Tosafot, and Maharsha on the two versions
The Rabbi points out that Rashi on page 4 writes explicitly that the object is “as though resting in the public domain on a place of four,” and that “the trunk confers significance on the branch,” meaning that we treat solves the place-problem and does not change the domain. He explains that Maharsha uses this to interpret the two formulations in Rashi in the parallel sugya on page 8: the first formulation goes in the direction that the trunk confers significance on the branch as a place of four by four, while the second formulation fits Tosafot’s understanding, which presents we treat as defining the domain. He cites Tosafot, who asks why Abaye needs to explain the case as a tree whose trunk is in a private domain and whose branches are in the public domain if the entire issue is only “the significance of the place,” and concludes that Tosafot is inclined to understand that the split between the domains is meant to say that we treat defines the branch as a private domain, not merely as a significant place.
Tractate Makkot and the Ritva on different interpretations of the same formulation
The Rabbi cites the Mishnah in Tractate Makkot concerning an inadvertent killer in a city of refuge who climbs a tree whose trunk is inside the city of refuge and whose branches are outside it, and makes the question whether the blood avenger may kill him depend on the rule of we treat its branch as following its trunk or in the opposite direction, “the trunk following the branch.” He notes that according to Rashi’s reading on page 4, where we treat does not change the domain but only gives significance to the place, it is not clear why someone sitting on the branch would be considered as though he were inside the city of refuge, and therefore one must say that the term is interpreted differently in that context. He concludes with the Ritva there, who sharpens the point that there are cases in which the same formulation in the Talmud covers different meanings, and that in Tractate Makkot as well they do not cite the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages as a general basis, which suggests that these are different manifestations of a similar principle rather than one uniform overarching rule.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so today I want to continue with the sugya we started last time, even though on the face of it this is a separate law, namely the rule of treating it as following its main trunk. But as we’ll see, it really still revolves around similar questions: a place of four by four, and what exactly this “we treat it as following” means. In that sense it’s somewhat parallel to “caught is as if placed.” So every such principle—like “caught is as if placed,” like “we treat it as following its main trunk”—is on the one hand a broad principle that comes up in many contexts, and on the other hand it keeps bringing us back to the same questions: is this considered as standing above? Is it considered as placed below? The different understandings we saw regarding “caught is as if placed” also come up in this context of “following its main trunk.” And in addition, there’s also the question of how far we’re dealing here with a general principle, or maybe this is just a formulation that looks general but is actually speaking specifically about our context. We saw that with “caught is as if placed,” at least in the option I mentioned in Tosafot, where basically when we say “caught is as if placed,” what we mean is that placement isn’t required—not that this counts as placement, but that no placement is needed at all. If so, then it seems that the principle of “caught is as if placed” is actually not some broad principle in Jewish law at all. It’s not that everything flying above is considered as if it were resting. Rather, specifically regarding carrying on the Sabbath, the rule is that placement is not required. That’s a statement about the laws of carrying on the Sabbath; it’s not a statement about flying objects, even though the wording of the principle sounds like a general formulation—as if there’s some general principle that “caught is as if placed.” Now, these things come up in many contexts, and they’ll come up here too. Toward the end of the page I also referred you to a parallel sugya there in Tractate Makkot and to the Ritva there, who deals exactly with this question: are we dealing with a general principle or a specific one? Do we actually have several different principles all sheltered under the same wording? And this is something you need to know: even though from the standpoint of language it’s a little forced—they tell you “caught is as if placed,” or “we treat it as following its main trunk,” so they’re stating some principle that really looks like a general one, and it appears in several contexts in the Talmud—and still, it could be that in each context it’s interpreted differently, which is strange. There is—now I’m remembering—there’s actually a rule like this. There’s an entire literature called the literature of rules. They developed various rules—halakhic rules, rules of halakhic decision-making, and rules of study and interpretation of the Talmud. And that literature, which by the way people don’t deal with all that much, it’s not very popular in yeshivot, but it can be useful—one of the well-known books there is called Yad Malakhi by Rabbi Malakhi HaKohen, a later authority, and he wrote an important rule-book. And one of the rules there—I just suddenly remembered it—one of the rules there says that there are concepts that appear in several places in the Talmud in the same wording, but in fact they are interpreted differently in each place. Meaning, they actually hide under them different concepts even though they’re called by the same name. Right? An example of something we may have encountered in previous years is migo. Right—migo, this principle of “since I could have lied better, believe me in what I’m saying here”—that’s the common explanation of migo in various places. But migo itself appears in other contexts in the Talmud with different meanings. Sometimes it means “it is in his power,” sometimes it’s migo in the sense of argumentative force as opposed to migo in the sense of “why would I lie.” The details don’t matter right now; I’m just giving an example for anyone familiar with it. This is an example of a concept that appears under the same term, and yet we’re apparently dealing with several different concepts. So in our context too, when we say “we treat it as following its main trunk,” it’s not certain that we’re supposed to interpret it the same way in different places. And I asked you what to do with the sugya in Makkot in light of Rashi’s view here, and there indeed you see some difference in interpretation. Fine, I’m just saying that in general in order to point out the lines of similarity between today’s sugya and the previous sugyot.
[Speaker B] Rabbi, I want to ask one small thing about “caught is as if placed.” We didn’t deal with it, but I think there really would have been room—and I think there are people who bring into it the discussion of gud asik, which also exists regarding partitions, in the sukkah laws, in Eruvin—so here this is some kind of broader or more general conception, and not necessarily something specific to us.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, with “caught is as if placed” you don’t need to get to gud asik. “Caught is as if placed” appears on its own in several places in the Talmud. It’s obviously a broad issue. That’s clear—on the contrary. I’m not looking for examples of that; that’s the simple part. On the contrary, what I want to claim is that even though it looks like a broad, general issue, sometimes it’s not exactly that. Sometimes it’s interpreted differently in each appearance. Now regarding gud asik specifically, there it seems to me—if I remember correctly—the discussion there is different. Assuming we go with Tosafot, that “caught is as if placed” means it’s considered as resting in the air, then one could say that there’s a kind of “bring downward” with respect to the walls of the object, or the sides of the object that’s standing in the air, as if it descends downward, and that reminds us of the Kehillot Yaakov, who says that the object essentially
[Speaker C] like,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] extends downward and rests on the ground without actually descending.
[Speaker D] But what we learned today—there was a section there where he spoke about the private domain going upward—doesn’t that involve gud asik?
[Speaker B] It breaks through and rises—it breaks through
[Speaker D] and rises.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “A private domain breaks through and rises”—there’s a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), as far as I remember. There are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who claim that it’s because of gud asik. A private domain needs walls of ten handbreadths. So why does it break through and rise? Because the walls of ten handbreadths rise upward via gud asik. Others claim that there’s no need to get to gud asik, because you don’t need there to be walls above; it’s enough that there are walls below—not that they somehow rise upward, but rather they don’t need to rise upward. And that’s the pillar in sukkah. And there’s a third approach that says that this itself is gud asik. Gud asik doesn’t mean that the walls rise; rather, gud asik means that the walls do not need to rise. That’s what gud asik means. So look, I’m lingering on this so that you’ll see that basically what we’re learning in a very specific sugya repeats itself in other sugyot. Meaning, these are ways of thinking that, if we remember them and internalize them, we can apply elsewhere too, and that basically gives us general methods or general modes of viewing many sugyot, not just the one we’re dealing with. These things—the question whether something stands in the air or is down below, whether the walls rise upward or whether they don’t need to rise upward—all of this comes back in very many places, and it’s just worth noticing so that you can make use of it in other sugyot too.
[Speaker B] Is that also connected to the issue of impurity, that it sort of breaks through and rises? I mean, flying over a grave, all those questions that came up?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not gud asik. There is a rule that impurity breaks through and rises.
[Speaker B] Not because that’s a domain. It’s not connected to domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But you can ask the same questions there too. The question is why impurity breaks through and rises—whether there really is that the object, the impure thing—I’ll maybe put it differently. “Impurity breaks through and rises” means that when I pass and create an overhang above something impure that is below, then the impurity rises all the way up and renders me impure above. Okay? And then the question arises—you can ask exactly the same questions we’re asking here in that context too. Here, that’s another good example.
[Speaker D] You can ask that like in the case of priests over the Temple Mount, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t hear.
[Speaker D] If a priest flies over the Temple Mount.
[Speaker B] Specifically the Temple Mount doesn’t have impurity.
[Speaker D] Oh, so I don’t know—something there—a cemetery.
[Speaker B] A cemetery.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Over a cemetery. If a priest flies in a plane over a cemetery, that’s a non-simple question. There are many who are careful about this, many priests who are careful not to fly on routes where there’s concern they pass over a cemetery, because basically that makes the priest impure by his forming an overhang over the cemetery, and that renders him impure. But that’s a different discussion. In any case, for our purposes, what I want to say is that there too, when we discuss impurity that breaks through and rises, you can ask the same questions I’m asking here. What does that mean? Does it mean that there’s some strip of impurity that rises all the way upward, and therefore whatever passes up there actually encounters the impure object? Or on the contrary, maybe the impurity doesn’t need to rise upward, because it’s enough that I’m on the trajectory that is above the impurity; we don’t need to think that the impurity really breaks
[Speaker F] and rises upward.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay? So there too exactly the same questions arise, and therefore this is just a mode of thinking or a way of approaching things that it’s worth getting used to, because it’s applicable in very many sugyot and in many places. When you ask that question, it can suddenly raise several different possibilities, there can be practical differences between them, it can resolve difficulties, contradictions between places. Meaning, it’s just worthwhile to get used to this form of analysis. Okay, so let’s go to our sugya. And in our sugya, what are we talking about? We’re looking for a source for the view that Rabbi does not require a place of four by four, and they bring Rabbi’s statement about the ledge—right, as it was taught in a baraita: “If one threw and it came to rest on some tiny ledge, Rabbi obligates and the Sages exempt.” Right, that’s the Talmud we saw last time. And you see that since the ledge is just any tiny amount, that means you don’t need a minimum area, so that means you don’t need a place of four by four. And then the Talmud rejects it. And that’s the point we want to address today. The Talmud says as follows—I’ll maybe share the file. The Talmud says: “There, as we are going to say later”—“later” means the sugya on pages 7–8 that I referred you to—“according to Abaye. For Abaye said: Here we are dealing with a tree standing in the private domain, whose branches lean into the public domain, and one threw and it came to rest on its branch”—that means on the branch, right? “Rabbi holds: we say, treat its branch as following its trunk. And the Rabbis hold: we do not say, treat its branch as following its trunk.” So there is a dispute whether “we treat it”—right, we throw, cast, project, that’s the word used here. “Treat its branch as following its trunk,” as if you project the branch and regard it as located in the trunk. The trunk means the roots or the trunk—really it means the trunk. And the Rabbis hold that we do not say “treat its branch as following its trunk.” So here the Talmud links the explanatory setup used there and tries to apply that same setup here as well. By the way, that itself is another interesting point. It’s not so common in the Talmud for one sugya to refer to another sugya that appears somewhere else. Usually it’s the medieval and later commentators who connect sugyot, raise difficulties, offer resolutions, make comparisons. But when the Talmud itself—meaning, the editor of the sugya himself—refers to a sugya that will appear several pages later, that exists, but it’s relatively rare. And that somewhat indicates—and these are questions that interest Talmud scholars more—it somewhat indicates, or at least hints, at how this whole thing was edited. Because in this case it seems that this whole sequence, the first few pages of Tractate Shabbat, were probably edited by one editor. Because the fact is that when he is on page 4b, he refers to a sugya on page 8. Meaning, this entire corpus was before him; he planned and edited the whole thing, and that’s why he can refer from one place to another. Because in many places it seems there’s no such connection. For example, the medieval authorities (Rishonim) identify disputes between different sugyot, and no one in sugya A comments that it contradicts sugya B; rather, the medieval authorities (Rishonim) suddenly notice that it seems different, and some reconcile it, while others say there’s simply a dispute between the sugyot. And that basically means there wasn’t some single hand editing the whole matter and trying to make it coherent. Coherent doesn’t mean without dispute. Coherent means that when there is a dispute, you put it on the table and say that it’s disputed, that one position disagrees with the other. That’s what happens within one sugya itself: Abaye says this, Rava says that. But when there are two different sugyot, one of which assumes one thing as obvious and the second assumes the opposite as obvious, and nowhere is it mentioned that one disagrees with the other, that means there was no editor here; the thing was somehow pasted together without editing. And here, the note we see here actually hints that here there was some editorial hand—there was someone who polished the whole thing and noticed that there are different sugyot here, and he refers from one to the other. Fine, that’s just a side remark. In any event—and this is maybe another side note; today I’m giving a lot of methodological remarks, but it’s just worth being aware of these points. This has been accepted already since Maharsha in the sixteenth century, one of the great later authorities (Acharonim) of that time. He wrote that this is what distinguishes the approach of the Tosafists—the Ashkenazi sages, the early Ashkenazi authorities in France mainly, a little Germany, but mostly France—from the Rif and the sages of Spain. “Spain” here of course means North Africa, not Spain. The Eastern sages, who have much less difficulty seeing each sugya on its own, and seeing the Talmud as not fully edited, not fully coherent. And therefore they have no problem saying that there is a dispute between the sugyot and not trying to hunt for reconciliations. And the Ashkenazim—the Tosafists—Maharsha writes that they make the Talmud into a ball, as if they roll it up into one thing and everything has to fit everything else. And that’s why Tosafot always raises difficulties from one sugya against another and then offers resolutions, because its assumption is that the sugyot are supposed to be coherent. So when it raises a difficulty between sugyot, it also bothers to reconcile them to explain that there is no contradiction. The Rif writes locally; he rules the Jewish law on the spot according to what emerges from this sugya, and generally—there are places where he does, but generally—he doesn’t mention parallel sugyot and doesn’t get into the question of how to reconcile them, because from his perspective it may be that the sugyot simply disagree. Sometimes he even says they disagree. And that’s a fundamentally different approach. You could say that the Eastern sages are closer to what is accepted today in the academic study of the Talmud, and the Ashkenazi sages are closer to what is accepted today in the traditional yeshiva world, mainly Ashkenazi but not only. So it’s interesting that the roots are already there. Fine. In any event, there are sugyot that give hints supporting the approach of Tosafot, like the sugya here, where you do see some kind of editing, some attempt at coherence. And there are sugyot where the apparent silence points more in the direction of the Rif and the Eastern sages. Okay? Fine. In any event, the Talmud here says that we’re dealing with a tree standing in a private domain, and its branches—that is, its branches extend into the public domain—and someone threw an object. The one who threw it and it came to rest on the ledge—it’s not a ledge, it’s a branch of a tree, where the trunk or the roots are in the private domain, and only this branch on which the object came to rest is in the public domain. And over that Rabbi and the Rabbis disagree: do we treat its branch as following its trunk, or do we not? And consequently, what comes out regarding a place of four by four?
[Speaker G] You can take this in two directions. Either from this you learn that it counts as four by four, or from this you learn that it’s from the public domain to the private domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that’s already moving us into the medieval authorities (Rishonim), but at the moment I’m not yet entering that issue. I’m just saying what the Talmud wanted to do with this rejection.
[Speaker H] It wanted to say that Rabbi does in fact require a place of four by four, because if you go by “its branch follows its trunk,” then since in the trunk there is four by four, that’s why he obligates there. So Rabbi does require it, and not as we said at first—that Rabbi obligates on some tiny ledge, which would mean that he doesn’t require four by four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, a rejection in the Talmud means rejecting what the Talmud tried to claim earlier. Earlier the Talmud tried to claim that from Rabbi in the law of the ledge, one can prove that you don’t need a place of four by four, and then explain the Mishnah according to Rabbi. Then the Talmud rejects that and says: no, you have no proof. It may be that Rabbi says you do need a place of four by four, and then he won’t help you with the Mishnah. Why here, even if it rests on a ledge, are you liable despite the fact that there is no four by four? Because he says “treat its branch as following its trunk,” and then it’s considered a place that halakhically does have four by four, because the trunk is what determines matters, not the branch. And then you can’t prove from Rabbi here that he doesn’t require a place of four by four. Now of course—I’m already noting this here—regarding our Mishnah, since we’re talking, say, about the hand of the homeowner, and after all that’s where this whole story began: how is the homeowner’s hand considered a sufficient place for lifting up or setting down, when a hand doesn’t have four by four? Why don’t we also say about a hand, “treat his hand as following his body”? Then the Talmud’s rejection still won’t help, because even if you say that in Rabbi’s view here one does need four by four, but here “we treat its branch as following its trunk” and therefore there is halakhically a place of four by four—fine, that means Rabbi doesn’t help you, and you need another source. Why doesn’t Rabbi help you? Fine, I can accept that. But it would still help me, because I can explain the Mishnah in exactly the same way.
[Speaker G] But in the Mishnah too—a hand isn’t like a branch.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah—so we have to say that the Talmud, at least at this point, assumes that with a hand we certainly do not say “treat his hand as following his legs.” Even someone who says “treat its branch as following its trunk” won’t say that about the relationship between the hand and the body. You understand? That has to be the case, otherwise you can’t understand the Talmud here. And that immediately raises the question: why? Why indeed are we prepared to say “treat its branch as following its trunk,” at least according to Rabbi, and still even Rabbi, who says it regarding a tree, won’t say it regarding a hand?
[Speaker G] But again, the Talmud’s conclusion
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] is that a hand is important, and maybe that’s what it says there. But I’m talking about this stage of the sugya. At this stage of the sugya, the Talmud is looking for four by four. Okay?
[Speaker G] A hand has the ability to move, unlike a branch.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so of course one can connect it to many things. One can connect it to the fact that maybe a hand has movement, as Ruti says. One can connect it to the fact that a hand does not draw nourishment from the legs. Right? In a tree there is a relationship between trunk and branch. Why is the trunk called the trunk, the main part? What we call the trunk—why is the trunk called the main part? Because the branches—it gives life to the branches, it is their main part, right? Legs don’t give life to hands.
[Speaker G] But if you were to say “following his body,” then you couldn’t answer that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, נכון. And then you’d have to discuss it. It could be that this has practical implications—for example, what happens if his heart, which perhaps really is what gives life to the limbs, is in a different place. Then maybe you wouldn’t go after the legs but after the heart. The practical difference, for example, according to Rashi and Rabbenu Hananel, where we want to say that “caught is as if placed” means as if placed below—then if “below” doesn’t mean the legs but rather the heart, that might not help. If the heart is above ten handbreadths, maybe that wouldn’t help. Okay, there can be practical differences. I’m not getting into that now. I’m only trying to show you that when you read the Talmud here, something ought to jump out at you—or even two things, I’d say. The first thing is what I said here: why does the Talmud see this explanatory setup as a rejection of what was said earlier? The Talmud apparently assumes that in the Mishnah—even Rabbi, who says “its branch follows its trunk,” will not say that about the homeowner’s hand in the Mishnah. Right? That’s what the Talmud is assuming here, otherwise there’s no rejection here. So already here you can see some conception of the rule of “its branch follows its trunk”: with a tree we say it, with a hand we don’t. Now you can think about why, but first of all, that’s what you see.
[Speaker H] I want to ask something for a second. Wait—but regarding four by four in the trunk, why does Abaye assume here that the trunk is definitely four handbreadths wide? Maybe it isn’t, and then that would fit Rabbi.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the thing is—no, the question is the opposite. After all, the Talmud here is trying to reject, not to prove. When the Talmud tries to reject, it’s enough for it to present an option. It doesn’t need to prove that this is a place of four by four. It says: maybe we’re dealing with a trunk that has four by four, and then you don’t need to say that Rabbi holds you don’t require four by four; rather, there is four by four. Maybe yes, maybe no—but you can’t prove from Rabbi that there is a view saying you don’t need a place of four by four.
[Speaker H] Okay. So in a tree there are possibilities—in a tree there are possibilities that there is four by four, or not. And a person—does a person even have the possibility of being within four by four? Maybe his feet simply aren’t four by four, so you can’t compare it at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s obviously true.
[Speaker H] And therefore—that’s the difference, whether his hand follows his feet.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then indeed what you’re saying is that in principle we say “its branch follows its trunk” regarding a person too, in principle. It’s just that regarding a person it won’t help us, because even though the hands are drawn after the feet, there still isn’t four by four in the feet either, so it won’t solve the problem of four by four. Right. That’s basically what you’re saying. You’re saying that what’s written here is not a principle about the law of “its branch follows its trunk.” No—we say that regarding a person too, in principle. It just doesn’t help there, because it doesn’t solve the problem of four by four. Okay, that’s also…
[Speaker G] But a person does have a place of four by four.
[Speaker B] Don’t we say about a person that he occupies four cubits by four cubits? I mean, the place he is in? Handbreadths, I don’t know.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, we’re talking about handbreadths. And second, even in handbreadths—what is said about a person is that “a man sitting occupies one cubit by one cubit,” that’s a Talmudic statement in Sukkah. Meaning, a person who sits does occupy a cubit by a cubit. Because a person who is sitting really does take up some area. But a person who is standing does not occupy four by four handbreadths. Feet—my feet are large, yes, but that’s not forty centimeters in length, even with a shoe. Four by four is forty centimeters by forty centimeters. So what we can infer from here—and again, as for explanations, you’re offering several, and perhaps we could even suggest more—but first of all, we see: the Talmud assumes here that “its branch follows its trunk” is not relevant to a person. Either because we don’t say it about human beings, only about trees, or as Hani suggested, maybe we do say it about people too, it just doesn’t help there because there’s no four by four in the feet either. Okay. But another possibility could also be raised: if indeed when we say “its branch follows its trunk,” what we mean—and this will relate to what we’ll discuss later—is that the branch is considered as if it is on the ground, not on the trunk. Meaning, the trunk takes the branch and now the branch is considered as resting on the ground, not on the trunk. According to that, perhaps we wouldn’t need four by four in the trunk itself, because the ground has four by four. The trunk is only the intermediary. Since the branch draws nourishment from the ground through the trunk, what basically comes out is that the whole tree, including the branches through the trunk, is considered as situated in the ground. And then two things follow. First, you don’t need four by four in the trunk itself. What you saw there in Maharsha and others depends on this. And second, you can distinguish in another way between a tree and a person, because a person doesn’t draw nourishment from the ground through his feet. So in a person it wouldn’t make sense at all to say “its branch follows its trunk,” according to that suggestion. And all these suggestions are possible, because the Talmud gives no hint as to what exactly lies behind this principle and why it isn’t said regarding a person.
[Speaker G] But if you say “following its main part,” then what? If you say “following its main part,” then it doesn’t have to be the feet. Why are you saying that for a person “following its main part” is specifically the feet?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, I mentioned earlier—maybe it’s the heart and not the feet. Fine. But still there isn’t four by four. Fine. At least usually there isn’t four by four, even in the center of the body.
[Speaker G] Fine. In any case, regarding the ledge in the wall, the way they explained it earlier—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.
[Speaker G] In the first case the Talmud brings, it’s a ledge in the wall, right? Something protruding from the wall. Right. So maybe there it’s because it doesn’t have life, because with the wall you can’t say that it’s the source of its life.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second, one second—I’m getting to that in just a moment.
[Speaker B] I want to ask one more thing. What’s the difference between what we’re saying now—between “following its main part”—and “passing”? What does it mean when he extends his hand?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.
[Speaker B] He stands in one place, in one domain, and extends his hand into the second domain. That’s exactly what’s happening here with the trunk and the branch. Granted, he’s not attached to the ground, but he stands in one domain and extends part of himself, or his limb, into a second domain. It’s like a branch.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Passing” is a different issue. The discussion in the law of passing doesn’t deal with the question of where the object is considered to be resting when I’m holding it in my hand.
[Speaker B] And where my body is standing?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The law of passing applies when there are two wagons that are considered a private domain, and between them there is a public domain. And I pass an object from one wagon to the other over the public domain. And there the question is whether I performed an act of carrying out. The question is not where the object is considered to be, where it is standing. Here we’re dealing with another question: does he perform an act of carrying out? Here the question is where the object is considered to stand. Is it standing above, below, in the private domain, in the public domain? So that’s a completely different question. The law of passing is a law about the act of carrying out, not about the location of the object. The law is whether the act of passing also counts as an act of carrying out or not. Okay? So the first inference I want to draw from the Talmud here is that if the Talmud saw this as a rejection, then it’s clear that the Talmud understood that it does not make sense to say “following its main part” regarding the homeowner’s hand. Because otherwise there’s no rejection here—you could still explain the Mishnah according to Rabbi. Now of course that raises the question: why? And here many possibilities have come up, both from you and from me, and each of them is possible. I don’t know how to decide between them, but each one is possible. You just need to remember that everywhere in the Talmud where we speak about “its branch follows its trunk,” in practice it always concerns trees. Factually. Maybe that’s incidental, maybe it exists regarding other things too, but first of all, it always concerns trees. Now if I project this now to the matter of the ledge, after all Rabbi’s initial statement is that an object came to rest on a ledge. A ledge is something protruding from a structure or something like that, some sort of projection into the public domain. Can we take from the tree case of “its branch follows its trunk” and say it also regarding a ledge? From the fact that the Talmud brings the tree and the law of “its branch follows its trunk,” it would seem that it is willing to say “its branch follows its trunk” also in the case of a ledge, no? Otherwise, how does the whole thing help?
[Speaker H] But this ledge—who says it’s in the public domain? Maybe it’s in the private domain?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—explicitly…
[Speaker G] that protrudes into the public domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The ledge is in the public domain. He threw it and it came to rest on some ledge; that means this is throwing within the public domain. He threw it four cubits in the public domain and it came to rest.
[Speaker H] I thought he threw it from the public domain into the private domain, and it came to rest on a ledge that is not a place of four by four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. In our Talmudic passage it’s talking about the public domain, and therefore—Rashi explains it that way too, and it’s also clear in the Gemara—because afterward that’s what the Gemara says: that it’s dealing with a tree standing in the private domain whose foliage leans into the public domain. Why does it need to say that its foliage leans into the public domain? Because the original ledge was talking about the public domain. So the Gemara wants to say: yes, but it’s talking about a case where only the ledge is in the public domain, while the main part is in the private domain. That’s the Gemara’s rejection. And now I’m asking: so what does that mean—that even regarding a building ledge we say that its foliage, or extension, follows its main part? If so, then we’ve found a nice example. We have an example that isn’t a tree, and about it too we say that its extension follows its main part.
[Speaker H] Wait a second—this ledge that the Gemara is talking about, this ledge is in the public domain, but its other part is located in the private domain?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what the Gemara apparently wants to say.
[Speaker H] That’s the situation in the Gemara again, in the rejection.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At first the Gemara thought it was talking about an ordinary ledge in the public domain, just some protrusion in the public domain. Okay? Some kind of pillar there in the public domain.
[Speaker H] So then what’s the problem? Why would he be liable?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s what the Gemara says: apparently from here we see that you don’t need a place of four by four.
[Speaker H] No, no, I didn’t understand why in the public domain you’d make someone liable if he put it down.
[Speaker E] He transferred it four cubits in the public domain.
[Speaker H] But if he didn’t transfer it four cubits, then he just put it down?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no—he threw it and it came to rest on the ledge.
[Speaker H] Ah, he threw it. Got it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s the Gemara at first. Then the Gemara rejects it and says: just as with a tree, it could be that the ledge is in the public domain but the building holding it is in the private domain. Then you can’t tell me that according to Rabbi you don’t need a place of four by four; maybe you do need it, except that its extension follows its main part. If that’s what’s going on, then it comes out that the rule that its extension follows its main part is said not only about trees but also about building ledges. Because otherwise, why are you comparing the tree to the question of the ledge?
[Speaker G] But if that were true, then there would be no need to bring the example of the tree. Why? Because they could have discussed the ledge directly. Why bring another example?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The example of the tree is because “I might have said later on”—after all, later you made just such an interpretive setup about a tree that…
[Speaker G] But really there is a reason to say it, because if the wall were destroyed, then the ledge wouldn’t remain there. I didn’t understand. If the wall were destroyed, then the ledge wouldn’t continue to exist on its own.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not destroyed—it’s standing there. What? I didn’t understand.
[Speaker G] I’m saying, suppose they demolished the wall. That would damage the ledge too. That shows that the ledge’s primary standing is because of the wall.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore what?
[Speaker D] A branch is like that too.
[Speaker G] No, therefore you really could say it about the ledge too.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m talking about what “could” means. The Gemara says it about the ledge. The Gemara says it about the ledge, doesn’t it? That’s what it says here. Just as you make such an interpretive setup on page 8 regarding the tree, so too here regarding the ledge. But if so, there’s a novelty here. The novelty is that we say the rule that its extension follows its main part not only about plants, not only about trees, but also about inanimate things, and that we haven’t found anywhere else. And in fact, it seems to me that from a simple reading of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), unlike the Gemara, it looks like they didn’t learn it that way. The medieval authorities understood that the Gemara does not bring the tree as an example; rather, it says that the ledge under discussion is not a ledge—it’s a tree. Look what I’m saying. The Gemara is not making an analogy. The Gemara is not bringing the interpretive setup of a tree and then applying it here while here it’s talking about a ledge. Rather, the Gemara says: no, no, it’s not talking here about a ledge at all; it’s talking about a tree. Then we can say that its extension follows its main part, because here too we’re talking about a tree, not a ledge; and with ledges there really is no rule that its extension follows its main part. That’s at least how it looks when you read the medieval authorities: they stopped talking about ledges and moved to talking about trees. And then what comes out of this is something very strange, because at first I didn’t learn it that way. Why? Because when the Gemara brings—look, the Gemara first brings the statement, and it talks about a ledge. So what do I want to say, that this ledge is a tree? But a ledge is not a tree; a ledge is part of some structure. What, so you want to tell me that the ledge—after all, the language of the baraita talks about a ledge—so you want to interpret that the ledge under discussion is actually a tree and not a ledge? If you say it’s just an example, then you say: just as I said on page 8 regarding the tree, I’ll do the same thing regarding the ledge here and say that the structure is in the private domain, the ledge protrudes into the public domain, and what we said there about the tree I’ll say about the ledge, and then everything is fine. Except that then the price is that we say the rule that its extension follows its main part also about inanimate structures and not only about trees. But from the medieval authorities it seems that this is not the Gemara’s approach. Rather, the Gemara’s approach is that the Gemara replaces the ledge with a tree. This ledge is actually a branch of a tree; it’s not part of a structure. That’s what it’s about—not a ledge, but a tree. Then you can’t infer from here that the rule that its extension follows its main part can also be said about things that are not trees. No—it’s only about trees, and here too it’s talking about a tree. Okay? So there really is an unclear question here about the Gemara’s line of reasoning. Okay, now I’m moving to the parallel Gemara there, what we just saw. So the Gemara says that no one disputes Rav Chisda: if one planted a reed in the private domain, the private domain rises up to the sky, and therefore whoever threw something and it came to rest on top of it is liable, okay? There of course it’s talking about someone who threw from the public domain to the reed that is in the private domain. Here our discussion is about someone throwing within the public domain. Abaye rejects this and says: no, in the private domain everyone agrees. Here it’s talking about a tree standing in the private domain whose foliage leans into the public domain, and someone threw something and it came to rest on its foliage. All right? Rabbi holds that we say its extension follows its main part, and the Rabbis hold that we do not say its extension follows its main part. Now, the comparison between… I’m continuing the comparison between the passages. When I talk about our passage—yes, in our Gemara—when we say its extension follows its main part, is that talking about the place or about the domain?
[Speaker G] You can understand it either way. If it’s about the place—if its main part…
[Speaker E] is in the private domain, then its foliage…
[Speaker G] would also be considered private domain. Or, if its main part is four by four, then its foliage too would be considered four by four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If its foliage is considered private domain—if we’re talking here about the domain—then why is that relevant to the passage?
[Speaker G] Because it’s from the public domain to the private domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait—it’s not resting on a place of four by four. If it’s not resting on a place of four by four, why do I care that it’s private domain? After all, I need to explain why he’s liable.
[Speaker G] So they said—they brought an explanation that maybe no, it’s not ten handbreadths high above it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, leave the explanation aside. I’m reading the Gemara now without all the calculations of the medieval authorities. Why—why am I liable? After all, it’s not resting on a place of four by four, and here the Gemara wants to tell me that even according to Rabbi you need a place of four by four. Right? That’s the meaning of the rejection. So the Gemara says: no, here he is liable because its extension follows its main part. Now if you tell me that this can be interpreted as referring to the domain, not the place—it doesn’t work.
[Speaker G] Maybe both?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, “both” is something else; I don’t know. But as for the place, it’s certainly talking about the place. Whether it also talks about the domain or not—maybe yes, maybe no—that’s not interesting. Since our discussion is clearly about the place, not the domain, right? Here it’s clearly about the place, because what was missing here—what we’re looking for is how he becomes liable, since you need a place of four by four. So the Gemara says its extension follows its main part, and therefore it is considered a place of four by four. In other words, the rule that its extension follows its main part deals with the problem of place, not the problem of domain. The question of domain is another question. It may be that this also does the job for the domain, but we don’t need that. Since someone who throws four cubits in the public domain is liable even if the domain is the public domain, as long as the object came to rest on a place of four by four. So it’s enough for me that its extension follows its main part solves the problem of place in order to say that Rabbi imposes liability. There’s no need to assume that it also does something regarding the domain. Therefore, in our passage it is clearly about the question of place. Agreed?
[Speaker F] Well, maybe that’s in the conclusion, but initially, in the assumption when we’re talking, maybe it’s similar to the dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis—we don’t assume at all that it’s talking about the same case, where it stands in the private domain and its foliage is in the public domain. Rather, we think it could also be talking about the private domain, and the dispute is about four by four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but I’m talking about the Gemara’s rejection. Before that we thought it was all the public domain; there was no private domain here. But now the Gemara sets it up as a tree whose main part is in the private domain and whose foliage is in the public domain. Now, what does the Gemara say? That its extension follows its main part, and therefore what? Therefore he transferred it into the private domain? No. Rather, therefore he placed it on a place of four by four in the public domain. Right—that’s what the Gemara is saying.
[Speaker F] Wait—is the Rabbi now talking about our passage or about the passage on pages 7–8?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second, one second. No, I’m talking about our passage. In our passage, I’m saying that the problem was: how can Rabbi impose liability if he requires a place of four by four? Answer: he does require a place of four by four, but its extension follows its main part, right? That’s the answer. What does that mean? That its extension follows its main part solves the problem of place; it considers this branch to be a place of four by four. It has no connection at all to the question of domain. It may be that its extension follows its main part also determines the domain, and then it comes out that I placed it on a place of four by four in the private domain, maybe—but we don’t need to get there, because even if it doesn’t change the domain, it’s enough that it just considers this tree, this branch, to be a place of four by four. I’m liable even if it is in the public domain. Therefore there is no reason to assume that it does anything in the domain issue; it is talking about the issue of place. Are you with me? Yes. This is in our passage—that’s the point.
[Speaker F] I still think that in the initial assumption, yes, I thought that maybe in the initial assumption Rabbi, according to this passage, does not require four by four. Yes. But in the rejection he says: yes, but actually the dispute is about something else—not four by four, but the domain in general.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but that won’t help us. That’s why I prefaced it by saying…
[Speaker F] Therefore Rabbi may in fact still require four by four, it doesn’t matter.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not true. That’s why I prefaced with what I said before: here the Gemara presents this as a rejection. A rejection means the following. At first the Gemara wanted to say that according to Rabbi you don’t need a place of four by four. The Gemara says that’s not necessary; Rabbi may well hold that you do need a place of four by four. Why then does he impose liability here? Because it’s talking about a tree whose foliage leans into the public domain. That means the assumption is that according to Rabbi you do need a place of four by four.
[Speaker F] But maybe here in this case the dispute is not about four by four at all, but about the domain in general. So it gives no indication whatsoever about four by four, and not—no, that’s not right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The dispute may not be about a place of four by four, but with Rabbi, when you say its extension follows its main part, you’re saying that in order to solve the problem of four by four space. It could be that the Rabbis also agree—that’s another discussion—regarding four by four space and they only disagree about this rule. But regarding Rabbi, when you say its extension follows its main part, what problem does that principle solve? It solves the problem of place, not the problem of domain. Necessarily. It has to be that way.
[Speaker F] Maybe it doesn’t solve the problem of place at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it doesn’t solve the problem of place, then there is no rejection here. The Gemara brings this as a rejection, and the Gemara says: let me show…
[Speaker F] You—I wanted to prove from here, sorry, I wanted to prove from here that Rabbi does not require a place of four by four, right? And afterward I said that their dispute is actually connected to something else entirely.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m asking now whether Rabbi requires a place of four by four or not.
[Speaker F] So from here I don’t know. I just don’t know.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You want to say that if they dispute whether its extension follows its main part, then Rabbi too requires a place of four by four.
[Speaker F] Right, you can say that, I understand—but you can also say that from here I can’t draw any conclusion at all about four by four; it’s a dispute about something else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re missing the logic of the passage. There are two possibilities here. The rejection is trying to offer an alternative, not something necessary. I’m asking: what alternative is the rejection offering? It offers an alternative that shows Rabbi can hold that a place of four by four is required and yet his words can still be understood. That’s what the rejection is offering. True, it’s not necessary—that’s the nature of a rejection. A rejection means that there is a way to explain Rabbi as requiring a place of four by four. And I asked what that possibility is if we say its extension follows its main part. So what does that mean? That its extension follows its main part turns the foliage into a place of four by four; it solves the problem of place and does not touch the problem of domain. That is the logic of the passage. The fact that, in the end, this whole explanation of Rabbi is not necessary is obvious, because this whole explanation is only a rejection. A rejection says: there is a possible way to explain that Rabbi relies on its extension following its main part, and that we’re dealing here with a tree and an interpretive setup and all sorts of things like that. But that is all only a possibility; it is of course not necessary. Rabbi may still not require a place of four by four. All the Gemara is saying is: yes, but it could also be that he does. And therefore you cannot claim with certainty that Rabbi is the tanna who does not require a place of four by four. So I’m saying that according to that side, it comes out that its extension follows its main part—which is the basis of that possibility—solves the problem of place and not the problem of domain. Okay? So that is regarding our passage. Let’s look at the passage on page 8; there the situation is a little different. The Gemara there is not talking at all about a place of four by four, right? The Gemara there does not mention it. “Because the private domain rises up to the sky.” Right? That is the Gemara’s discussion there; it’s not connected to a place of four by four.
[Speaker G] Maybe because the reed ties the object to the ground?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Anything is possible. I’m not getting into why right now; I’m not interested in why at the moment. The Gemara does not deal with the question of a place of four by four. You can now come and ask: wait, but what about four by four space? After all, it’s not a place of four by four. And then answer whatever people answer: either you don’t need it, or it is fulfilled—anything. But that is not the subject of the passage. The subject of the passage is: what is the law when someone throws onto a reed? About that the Gemara says that it’s talking about “he threw it and it came to rest on a ledge,” where Rabbi makes him liable and the Rabbis exempt him, and they establish it as a tree. Okay? What does that mean? Basically, it could be that the explanation of the law is because it solves the problem of domain, not the problem of place. Why does Rabbi impose liability? Rabbi does not require four by four space. Could be. Why does Rabbi impose liability here? Because it is considered as though it rests in the private domain or the public domain—it doesn’t matter—and he does not require a place of four by four. The law, as Nechama noted earlier, can indeed be explained that way as well. In the Gemara on page 4, this is brought as a rejection, so that rejection—which deals with the issue of four by four space—forces us to say that its extension follows its main part solves the problem of place, because otherwise you can’t read the Gemara there at all. Here in this Gemara it is not necessary. It could deal with the issue of domain, and it could deal with the issue of place. When you explain Rabbi here, where Rabbi says one is liable, either Rabbi says one is liable because you don’t need a place of four by four, or he says one is liable because you do need a place of four by four, but it is fulfilled because its extension follows its main part. Therefore here it is a more open question than in our passage.
[Speaker H] I didn’t understand, but there are parentheses here showing that it does discuss a place of four by four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You understood very well—why do you say you didn’t understand? Those parentheses that add the words “therefore we see that we do not require a place of four by four,” if we were to read the Gemara with the parentheses removed and read the text inside them as part of the Gemara, then it would be clear in the Gemara that here too it is talking about a place of four by four. But why do they put it here in parentheses?
[Speaker G] Because place is not the discussion.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be that this leaves open the option that according to the version that does not include those words, that deletes those words, then it really comes out that maybe the discussion here is about domain and not place.
[Speaker E] But why wouldn’t I assume that on my own? After all, with Rav Chisda it’s obvious to everyone that he doesn’t require four by four. So why do we need the parentheses? If I’m trying to compare Rabbi…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to Rav Chisda, either there is four by four, or since it’s in the private domain there’s no problem of four by four. You can say many things. The Gemara here is not dealing with that.
[Speaker F] But in the Vilna edition there were no parentheses. Where in Vilna?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, no, my dear, I’m using the Bar-Ilan Responsa Project, so I don’t know what’s going on in the printed edition. There are no parentheses there.
[Speaker F] In my DBS there are, but in the Vilna print there aren’t. What? So do the words appear or not? In Steinsaltz too they don’t.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean they don’t? They appear without parentheses?
[Speaker E] In mine there are parentheses, there aren’t parentheses…
[Speaker F] I can show you…
[Speaker E] In mine there are parentheses, I don’t know. Okay, never mind. In the regular Gemara there are parentheses.
[Speaker D] We also saw the parentheses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah no, in Vilna there are. Let’s move on, it’s a waste of time—this is research for Talmud archaeologists. I’m talking about the principle. If we read the Gemara with the text in parentheses—that is, we remove the parentheses and read the text itself—then here the Gemara explicitly says that the discussion here too is the question of place, even though it didn’t have to be, but that is what the Gemara says. Okay? But if we omit the words in parentheses, that is, we don’t include them in the text…
[Speaker E] then the discussion here is about place or domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The discussion here is about place or domain. And that may be the meaning of these parentheses, because these parentheses basically force the issue of place into the passage, whereas if we didn’t read the words in parentheses I could read the discussion here as being about the issue of domain, not the issue of place, and that the rule that its extension follows its main part solves the problem of domain. How is the problem of place solved? Maybe you don’t need a place of four by four. Who said you do?
[Speaker E] But the parentheses say, “therefore we see that we do not require a place of four by four.” That means the discussion is in the issue of domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the opposite.
[Speaker G] Why? Four by four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah—“therefore we see that we do not require a place of four by four” means not that we do require it and its extension following its main part solves it…
[Speaker E] but that everyone is clearly assuming that four by four is not required…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and the rule that its extension follows its main part is needed only to solve the problem of domain.
[Speaker E] Isn’t that the meaning?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, you’re right, you’re right, you’re right—I missed that. You’re right. And if we…
[Speaker H] Can we start over, because I got confused?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. You know what, let’s do it this way—look.
[Speaker E] I don’t understand how this can be understood as about place here. Just a second.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look, I’m deleting these words, okay? There. Now we read the Gemara like this, all right? So if we read the Gemara like this, you can interpret what Rabbi and the Rabbis are disputing. Rabbi makes him liable because this is basically private domain, okay? And the Rabbis exempt him because this is…
[Speaker G] Rav Chisda makes him liable.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait. Yes, Rav Chisda, who makes him liable like Rabbi, says that because… wait…
[Speaker G] whose opinion of domain to domain?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s say the private domain rises to the sky, or because you don’t need a place of four by four, for all sorts of reasons connected to the labor of carrying out; it doesn’t matter right now. And the Rabbis exempt him. But there is no mention here of the issue of place. Now when Abaye says that in the private domain everyone agrees that the law is so, that could be either because a place of four by four is required and that requirement is met, or because it is not required at all. And then the dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis concerns the tree. What is the dispute there? It can be explained in two ways. Either you say that the dispute is about the question of where the object is resting—in the private domain or in the public domain—but according to everyone you do not need a place of four by four. Or, the dispute is whether saying its extension follows its main part gives this place the status of four by four. Right? Two possible ways to understand it. So there is a possibility of understanding that its extension follows its main part solves the problem of domain, and a possibility of understanding that it solves the problem of place. By contrast, if I now include those words there… oh, what did I do here?
[Speaker E] I don’t understand how it solves the problem of place. After all, it’s clear—that’s what the Gemara says—“in the private domain everyone agrees, in accordance with Rav Chisda.” That means it’s clear to everyone that in the private domain one is liable; there’s no issue here of four by four, no? Or because the…
[Speaker G] Maybe because the reed extends down to the ground, so it counts as four by four?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you read it—if you now read it this way, with the parentheses, okay? Meaning, without parentheses—the words are present, okay? If the words are present, then the issue on the table is a place of four by four, right? If the words are present—“therefore we see that we do not require a place of four by four”—that means that is the discussion. We see from here that you don’t need a place of four by four. And that is what Abaye now comes to reject, right? Abaye comes to reject it and say: no, no, it is not proven from here that we do not require a place of four by four, because it may be that we do require it, only according to Rabbi…
[Speaker E] only according to Rabbi, its extension follows its main part. According to the Rabbis, a place of four by four is required, and according to Rabbi too it is required, only it is fulfilled because its extension follows its main part. But that won’t work in the private domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean it won’t work in the private domain? How? If we say that it’s not true that… if we say that a place of four by four is indeed required, then how in the private domain does everyone… Or maybe in the private domain it’s not required—who said it is? Or maybe in the private domain it is fulfilled because it is considered as though filled, or because the private domain rises to the sky, so the question of four by four does not arise.
[Speaker E] You can suggest many explanations.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But our discussion is about the private domain—I don’t understand.
[Speaker E] Rav Chisda’s whole discussion is private domain. At the beginning. And about that Abaye says, what do you want? In the private domain no one disagrees.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What Rabbi and the Rabbis dispute is a tree whose foliage leans into the public domain. And what is the dispute there? Two possibilities. You can say everyone agrees that a place of four by four is required, and the dispute is whether…
[Speaker E] whether its extension following its main part solves the problem of four by four space or not. Or everyone agrees that four by four isn’t needed; the only question is whether it is resting…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in the private domain or not. And about that we say its extension follows its main part, so it is resting in the private domain. The question is whether its extension following its main part solves the problem of place or solves the problem of domain. That is an open question in the passage there.
[Speaker E] And on the assumption that private domain is a completely different law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the Gemara itself says so. Abaye said: in the private domain everyone agrees, in accordance with Rav Chisda. So it’s a different law. I’m not getting into why right now. The medieval authorities here discuss why, but I’m not going into that now. It will of course depend on the two possibilities we’re talking about—whether it solves the problem of place or the problem of domain. But I’m not getting into that now. That’s what the Gemara says. First of all, I’m just reading the Gemara. Then the Gemara says: rather, here it is talking about a tree standing in the private domain, and there it is a different dispute. What is the dispute there? Two possibilities. You can say that the Rabbis, who exempt, of course do not view it as resting in the private domain and not as resting on a place of four by four. Okay? But according to Rabbi, who imposes liability, I need one of two possibilities. Either Rabbi does not require a place of four by four, and therefore he imposes liability because since its extension follows its main part, it is resting in the private domain. So it is not resting on a place of four by four—but that’s fine, it isn’t needed. Second possibility: no, it is resting in the private domain or the public domain, not important right now, but the place—its extension following its main part solves the problem of place. And Rabbi also requires a place of four by four.
[Speaker E] But according to the reading that this is about the problem of place—meaning that everyone thinks that in the private domain you don’t need four by four—then I don’t understand at all what all the problems are in our passage. Here, we found Rabbi and Rav Chisda and everyone thinks that in the private domain you don’t need a place of four by four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, Rav Chisda is an amora. And we are looking for a tanna, because we are looking for a basis for the Mishnah.
[Speaker E] Fine, but both Rabbi and the Rabbis think…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that…
[Speaker E] a place of four by four is not required in the private domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A rejection, a rejection, Noa… Noa, sorry. It’s a rejection. Once we’re not sure that we found a tanna, it’s not enough for us, right? That’s the whole movement of the Gemara in our passage. Here too, you can explain Rabbi as not requiring a place of four by four. But it’s not certain, because you can also think that he does require it. So just the possibility that Rabbi does require a place of four by four is enough to say that Rabbi is not a sufficient candidate for us.
[Speaker E] But in the public domain we have that uncertainty. In the private domain we say that everyone thinks like Rav Chisda, that there is no need for a place of four by four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That too is only a rejection. Who said so? Maybe not. Abaye offers it as a suggestion. Maybe in the private domain there’s no dispute at all and the entire dispute is only in the public domain. Abaye’s whole statement is a rejection. It’s not certain; it’s a suggested explanation. And not only is it a suggestion, it’s an amoraic suggestion. I cannot find here a tanna about whom I can say with certainty that he does not require a place of four by four.
[Speaker E] Never mind, but he says it about tannaim. The whole discussion in the Gemara is amoraim discussing tannaim.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As a rejection, as a rejection. So even if Abaye himself thought this, the fact that it isn’t certain—why should I care that Abaye thinks this? And even Abaye himself is not necessarily sure this is what he thinks; maybe he is only raising it as a rejection.
[Speaker D] In this discussion we have no tanna at all—only Rabbi is a tanna, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Rabbi and the Rabbis are both tannaim.
[Speaker D] Yes. Okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Just one second.
[Speaker C] It did something to me here…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It changed my microphone default somehow. Can you hear me well? Yes. Okay. So do you understand what I’m saying? The Gemara in our passage is looking for a tanna about whom I can say with certainty that he does not require a place of four by four. The Gemara brings Rabbi, and already in our passage the possibility comes up that he is the right tanna. But since there is also another possibility, that gets rejected. In that sense, the Gemara there is no more helpful for us. So in short, what I want to say is that from the reading of the Gemara itself, in our passage it seems that its extension following its main part solves the problem of place. In the passage there, that is an open question. Either it solves the problem of place or it solves the problem of domain. Okay? All right? Now I’m returning to Noa’s earlier comment. I retract my retraction. I actually was right at the beginning. That is, when the Gemara says, “therefore we see that we do not require a place of four by four,” the Gemara is basically saying at the first stage that there is no problem of four by four space according to any of the tannaim. Then Abaye comes in the next passage and says: not true—it may be that Rabbi does require a place of four by four, except that its extension following its main part gives him that requirement. Meaning that according to this reading, its extension following its main part deals with the problem of place.
[Speaker F] Wait, wait, I didn’t understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? You didn’t understand?
[Speaker F] Sorry, but we just brought Rav Chisda’s view, and parallel to it a dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis as a dispute about whether there is a need for four by four. If everyone thinks there is no need for four by four, why is there a dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis according to that viewpoint?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A different dispute. “Therefore we see that we do not require a place of four by four.” Their dispute is about something else.
[Speaker F] What does “therefore we see” mean then? Rabbi—or the baraita—it’s only “let us say that Rav Chisda holds like Rabbi”; maybe he said like Rabbi. That there is a dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis on this issue, where he throws, yes, and they disagreed about that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Therefore we see that we do not require a place of four by four.” All right?
[Speaker F] According to Rabbi. According to Rabbi. But according to the Rabbis maybe they do.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. But Abaye’s rejection…
[Speaker F] Fine, fine—for Rabbi, maybe, but maybe there is someone who does require it. Fine. Okay, Rav Pappa. Maybe this dispute, and Rav Chisda’s position too, is based on four by four. But if we don’t say that, then maybe they actually have their own reasons.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s the question. I’m saying: if you include here “therefore we see that we do not require a place of four by four,” then we prove from here that according to Rabbi a place of four by four is not needed, and that is what Abaye comes to reject.
[Speaker F] Right, maybe they have other reasons. Fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—so when Abaye says its extension follows its main part, he is basically saying that this solves the problem of four by four space. Necessarily. So it addresses the problem of place, as in our passage. But if we do not include “therefore we see that we do not require…”
[Speaker F] then he needs to reject that side of Rabbi, yes, Rabbi.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But…
[Speaker E] So the parentheses are only about Rabbi? Yes, the parentheses are only about Rabbi. Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Rabbi makes him liable—therefore we see that we do not require a place of four by four. The Gemara wants to connect Rav Chisda to Rabbi’s opinion. Right? The Gemara says: “Let us say Rav Chisda holds like Rabbi.” Well—
[Speaker I] What does he say? No, no.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi makes him liable—therefore we see that we do not require a place of four by four. If Rabbi imposes liability, then apparently he doesn’t require a place of four by four. And Rav Chisda goes with him. Then Abaye comes and says: what are you talking about? In the private domain this is according to everyone—both Rabbi and the Rabbis all agree about the private domain; that’s not the issue. Their whole dispute is about a tree from the private domain into the public domain and the rule that its extension follows its main part. This rejection says that the reason Rabbi imposes liability is not because he does not require a place of four by four, but because its extension follows its main part. So what follows? Does that mean that its extension following its main part solves the problem of four by four space and Rabbi does require four by four? Or no—Rabbi does not require four by four, and the rule that its extension follows its main part only comes to say that it fell in the private domain and not the public domain. And that is the dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis. Then, if I read it that way, when they threw this object and it came to rest on the ledge—and now this ledge is the tree, yes—then apparently, according to the reading that it is talking about the issue of domain and not the issue of place, they probably threw it a distance of two cubits and not four cubits. Are you with me?
[Speaker D] Afterward we had the matter of three and four.
[Speaker F] Why does that matter, exactly?
[Speaker D] Why exactly—why did they throw it two?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll explain. If the dispute is that Rabbi and the Rabbis both in fact do not require four by four space, and the rule that its extension follows its main part comes only to solve the problem of domain, then think of a case: I threw an object…
[Speaker F] Why does it solve it? I didn’t understand. The Rabbis exempt because there weren’t four cubits.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, exactly. Because otherwise the Rabbis would impose liability on the basis of throwing in the public domain regardless of whether its extension follows its main part. Do you understand what I’m saying? Again: if I throw an object in the public domain and I threw it four cubits and it fell on this branch of the tree, then according to Rabbi, who says its extension follows its main part, it basically fell in the private domain and therefore I am liable. You don’t need four by four, yes? According to everyone you don’t need a place of four by four; the dispute is only about the question of domain, not about the question of place. Okay? If so, then according to Rabbi I am liable because I threw from the public domain to the private domain. According to the Rabbis I am exempt. Why am I exempt? Fine, we do not say its extension follows its main part, so it fell in the public domain; it is not considered to have rested in the private domain. But even in the public domain, four cubits creates liability, so why do the Rabbis exempt? We have to say that I threw it a distance of two cubits. And the meaning of “its extension follows its main part” is that if I threw it two cubits and we do not say its extension follows its main part, then I threw it two cubits from public domain to public domain, and according to the Rabbis I am exempt. But according to Rabbi, who says its extension follows its main part, then even though I threw it only two cubits, I threw it into the private domain and not into the public domain, so of course I am liable. If the discussion is about the issue of domain and not about the issue of place, then we must say that the throw was not four cubits but only two cubits. Then if it is considered as resting in the private domain, I am liable, but if not, I am exempt. Why? True, I threw in the public domain, but I didn’t throw four cubits, only two. I feel like you’re not with me.
[Speaker E] Meaning, if the discussion is about domain, then everyone thinks that four by four is not needed. Right. Okay, fine. If the discussion is about place—okay?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So these are basically two ways to read the Gemara: whether the discussion is about domain or whether the discussion is about place. And I think…
[Speaker D] But the place will always be in the public domain. We don’t have a problem with the private domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. The question of place is whether the thing on which the object is resting has an area of four by four. I don’t care right now whether it’s public domain or private domain. That is the question of place. The question of domain—those are two different questions. And the question is whether, with the rule that its extension follows its main part, we are dealing with the question of domain or the question of place.
[Speaker I] And in the matter of domain, if it’s from the public domain to the private domain, you don’t need four by four in the private domain? No?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I transfer something from the public domain to the private domain, even twenty centimeters, I’m liable. The requirement of four by four cubits applies only when I throw or carry an object within the public domain itself. Why? In order to define the place the object reached as a different place from the one it left. So the gap between them has to be four cubits. But if it’s a gap between two different domains, from the private domain to the public domain or vice versa, you don’t need distance. What defines it as a different place is that it’s a different domain.
[Speaker D] It’s as if Rashi said from beginning to end—that is, he did define some kind of boundary area for those four cubits between the private domain and the public domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here at first we’re talking about four cubits in any case, because initially we understand that we’re dealing with the public domain. But afterward, in Abaye’s interpretive reading, when he says we’re talking about a tree standing in the private domain with its branches extending into the public domain, here it’s no longer certain that you have to say it’s specifically four cubits. It could be only two cubits. And the reason he’s liable is because the law of “its branch follows its trunk,” so he threw it into the private domain, and then he doesn’t need four cubits. And according to the Rabbis, who do not say that the law of “its branch follows its trunk” applies, then he really is not liable—he’s exempt. But if it were four cubits even according to Abaye, then in any case he would seemingly be liable, because whether the branch follows the trunk or not, what do I care whether it’s in the private domain or the public domain? He threw four cubits; even in the public domain he’s liable. And then you have to arrive at the point that the dispute is about the question of place, not the question of domain. I feel like you’re not with me.
[Speaker E] But if we assume that—I mean, I don’t understand the side that says the dispute is… I understood what I learned was that the dispute is about the domain on page 7. Meaning, clearly they disagree about the place; nobody needs four by four, like Rav Chisda. And the question is whether we follow the branch back to the trunk regarding the domain. How can this be understood in terms of place? After all, if I say that Rabbi holds that we go by the place, that means he thinks the projection is still in the public domain, right? Because he’s not transferring from the public domain to the private domain. So how is he like Rav Chisda at all? Rav Chisda is talking about a projection in the private domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the rule that “its branch follows its trunk” gives you a place of four by four.
[Speaker E] I understand, but they want to show that he’s like Rav Chisda.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s not like Rav Chisda. That’s a rejection. The Talmud says that Rabbi is like Rav Chisda. Then Abaye comes and says that’s not correct; not necessarily, he’s not like Rav Chisda. Fine. So that’s the point. It’s a bit confusing here, but that is exactly the calculation—the Maharsha’s calculation, and the two explanations in Rashi and Tosafot—it’s really all this. So it’s not so bad that we spent a lot of time on it, because this is really the issue. The issue is whether we read this as a question of place or a question of domain. Those are Rashi’s two explanations. And that’s his dispute with Tosafot in our passage.
[Speaker H] I’ll tell you—I’m just stuck on one thing. I understood that if we read the words in parentheses, then it’s a discussion about four by four. Right. What I didn’t understand is: if we don’t read them, if we delete the words inside the parentheses, why do we understand it as either being about four by four or about domain? That’s what I didn’t understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’ll suggest the following reading. Suppose I want to explain that the rule that “its branch follows its trunk” is speaking about the question of domain, not the question of place. Okay? Then I’m basically saying this: according to everyone, you don’t need a place of four by four. Right? Because that’s not what they’re arguing about; you don’t need four by four. Okay?
[Speaker H] How do I say that according to everyone you don’t need it, because everyone agrees that in the private domain—where are you inferring that from in the discussion here? I’m not managing to understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If we claim that according to Rabbi, the law of “its branch follows its trunk” means it’s considered as resting in the private domain, right? According to Rabbi. And what about a place of four by four?
[Speaker H] Maybe that too. What do you mean, that too? Because we said—we started out from the assumption that the trunk has four by four from the outset; we took that into account from the beginning.
[Speaker E] Again, I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m starting from the assumption that the rule that “its branch follows its trunk” speaks about the domain. You’re asking me how this can be read in the Talmud, so I’m explaining. I’m assuming it. Obviously, you can also say it speaks about place. But you’re asking whether it can also be set up as speaking about the question of domain. My answer is yes, it can. How? I say as follows: Rabbi, who obligates, says that we apply “its branch follows its trunk,” therefore it is considered placed in the private domain. Okay? What about a place of four by four? You don’t need it. So therefore one is liable, even without it being a place of four by four. According to the Rabbis, who do not apply “its branch follows its trunk,” then it is not placed in the private domain. Fine? Therefore according to the Rabbis he is not liable. Ah, but he threw four cubits in the public domain? No—he threw two cubits in the public domain. According to that possibility, he threw two cubits.
[Speaker H] So therefore with the Rabbis we don’t understand that he needs four by four, and from Rabbi we understand that he doesn’t need it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. With the Rabbis it remains open. Okay. Fine? So the point is that you can also read it this way. Of course, you can say that “its branch follows its trunk” solves both things: it both places it in the private domain and turns it into a place of four by four. And the Rabbis, who disagree, disagree about both things. I’m only saying—that’s also a possibility. I’m just saying there’s a way to understand it regarding place, there’s a way to understand it regarding domain, and of course there’s also a way to combine them both. Meaning, that it speaks about both. So there are really three possible ways to read the Talmud here.
[Speaker H] I also wanted to ask about that. Suppose really these are two separate discussions: “its branch follows its trunk”—there’s one possibility, as we said, to understand it regarding domain, and another possibility to understand it regarding four by four. But could these laws contradict one another? You can say it’s only domain, but not four by four. I mean, if you go by—there’s no contradiction.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can say that “its branch follows its trunk” solves the domain problem, but doesn’t touch the question of four by four. But if—come on—
[Speaker H] Fine, I’m just saying, suppose they obligate us to require a place of four by four in any case. When I say “its branch follows its trunk” and I refer only to domain, then obviously you can’t say that an object is on the branch, but it’s in the public domain, and yet it does have four by four because the trunk has four by four. In other words, if I go after the trunk, then I’m also going regarding the place and the size. You can’t contradict that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.
[Speaker E] When we discussed Rabbi Akiva in the law of “an object in the airspace is as if it has been placed,” we distinguished between place and domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There we said—and we keep talking about this all the time—that there are really two questions. One question is: in which domain are you? The second question is: on what sort of place are you resting?
[Speaker H] I’ll explain. Suppose the trunk is four by four—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the branch—
[Speaker H] Is in the public domain, and I place something on it. Okay. Now I can say that I placed something in the public domain on a place of four by four. Yes. Meaning, I go after the trunk as far as a place of four by four, but not after its domain?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But then—
[Speaker H] That’s an illogical contradiction in basic reasoning, like—really not.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s very logical. In the end, that’s also how Rashi understood it, by the way. That’s how Rashi understood the law of “its branch follows its trunk.” Rashi basically understood that the object is in the same domain where it actually is. “Its branch follows its trunk” only gives it the significance of a place, and therefore it is resting on the branch in the public domain, and the branch is considered a place of four by four. It is not resting in the private domain; it is resting in the public domain.
[Speaker H] Exactly—that, I understand that Rashi learned it that way. To me it just sounds illogical to say such a thing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? What’s the problem? You’re assuming that “its branch follows its trunk” means you take the object and view it as though it were resting on the trunk and not on the branch. But it could be that “its branch follows its trunk” means that the importance of the branch—the branch itself is considered significant, because after all it sits on a trunk, and the trunk is certainly significant. Not because the object is resting where the trunk is. That’s how I began today’s class: these are the different ways of understanding all these rules, like “an object in the airspace is as if it has been placed,” or “its branch follows its trunk.” What’s the question? Whether I see it as resting below, as we asked regarding Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel there in “an object in the airspace is as if it has been placed.” Do I view it as resting below, or for my purposes is it considered resting, but above? Similarly here, I say that “its branch follows its trunk” can be understood in two ways. Even when it solves the problem of place, it can still be understood in two ways. How? First, there is the question whether it solves the problem of domain or the problem of place. Second, even when it solves the problem of place, it can be understood in two ways. One way is to say: since the trunk is significant, then for me the branch too, which is part of it, is considered significant, without considering the question of which domain the object is in. It is on the branch, and the branch is in the public domain. I’m only asking whether the branch is considered significant. The answer is yes, it is significant. True, by itself it has very little area, but it is attached to a tree with meaningful area, so that means the branch is significant. But that means—it does not mean that the object is below where the trunk is; the object is above, on the branch. The trunk only gives significance to the branch—that’s one possibility. A second possibility is to say no: the object is considered as resting on the trunk, and therefore it is significant. Then in fact we tie together the question of domain and the question of place, because we are basically saying that the object is resting in the private domain, and because of that it is also considered resting on a significant place. That is exactly the third mode of reading I spoke about earlier, where we connect the two things—both the question of domain and the question of place—and the practical difference will be precisely that. Because if we say that “its branch follows its trunk” also changes the domain and also solves the problem of place, then clearly these are not two independent principles; rather, we simply view the object as resting on the trunk. So that has two implications. One implication is that in terms of domain, it is in the private domain. A second implication is that it is on a significant place, because the trunk is a significant place. But there is another possibility: no, no—it does not touch the question of domain; it touches only the question of place. Then what I am saying is that the place above, where the object rests, is considered a significant place, because after all it derives from the trunk, and the trunk is significant.
[Speaker B] Is that similar to giving something importance by intent, or like the palm of the hand, which is significant, or not really?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not giving it importance in the sense that a person attributes importance, but rather the trunk gives importance to the branch. In other words, these three ways of reading are really exactly equivalent to the three ways of understanding “its branch follows its trunk.” One possibility is that it does not touch the question of place; it only determines what the domain is. A second possibility is that it touches only the question of place; it does not touch the question of domain. It makes the place significant, but the domain remains the same domain. A third possibility: no, no—we actually view the object as resting below, and then that both changes the domain and gives significance to the place, because the place where it is resting is truly a significant place. It does not give significance to the branch; rather, the object is simply not resting on the branch, it is resting on the trunk, and the trunk is significant.
[Speaker F] And if we’re talking about a tree that does not have four by four, then the meaning can only be regarding the domain and not the place.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I asked you why the Maharsha notes that the practical difference is that the trunk must have an area of four by four. So first of all, we see there that he is speaking about place and not domain, and he wants the trunk to give significance to the branch, so the trunk has to have the significance of four by four. Alternatively, it could be that he understands the object as resting on the trunk, and the trunk has to have four by four in order to be significant. But there is another possibility—not like the Maharsha. If I claim that the trunk means that it is resting on the trunk—
[Speaker F] Did I understand correctly that he also requires, regarding domain, that the trunk have four by four, because otherwise the branch does not receive significance at all?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, no. Even if the trunk also does not have four by four, that doesn’t matter to me; the object would still be resting on the trunk, but it wouldn’t help because it’s not a place of four by four. It’s not that you need a place of four by four in order to apply “its branch follows its trunk” to the question of domain. The question of domain has nothing to do with four by four. But the question of domain will not solve the problem unless I have also solved the problem of place. Otherwise it doesn’t help me that the object is in the private domain. It’s in the private domain, but not on a significant place.
[Speaker F] But I don’t require in the private domain that there be a place of four by four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then he would be liable, but not because of “its branch follows its trunk.” That rule has nothing to do with the matter.
[Speaker F] I didn’t understand. If “its branch follows its trunk” says that the branches of the tree are considered in the same place where its roots are, then when I put the object there it’s as if I transferred it to the private domain, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously, but in the private domain too there has to be a place of four by four if the trunk itself doesn’t have it—
[Speaker F] But we said you don’t need four by four in the private domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.
[Speaker F] We said it’s possible to explain it as everyone holding that in the private domain—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s something else. That’s not because of “its branch follows its trunk,” but because of Rav Chisda’s rule that in the private domain you do not need four by four. No problem. But in any case, the law of “its branch follows its trunk” is not dependent on the area being four by four. What you wanted to say was that even applying it to domain works only if the trunk has four by four. That’s not correct. Applying it to domain is unrelated. I could be liable regardless, because a place of four by four is not needed in the private domain. But what “its branch follows its trunk” does is only transfer me into the private domain, and for that you do not need the area to be four by four. Only if it solves the problem of place does the place need to have an area of four by four. The only thing one could challenge in the Maharsha is to say that when we view the object as though it were resting on the trunk, that means it is resting on the ground. After all, the trunk too draws from the ground, and the ground always has a place of four by four. Therefore it could be that one can say this even if the trunk itself does not have an area of four by four, as the Maharsha writes. The Maharsha assumes it is resting on the trunk, not on the ground. Meaning, the relevant area being discussed is the area of the trunk, not the area of the ground. But if I understand “its branch follows its trunk” to mean that the object is resting on the ground, then I don’t care whether the trunk itself has an area of four by four—what do I care? The ground does. Okay? That was basically what I meant in my question about the Maharsha. All right, this really took quite a lot of time.
[Speaker H] But I need to go back a bit, to Rashi before the Maharsha. Yes. What are Rashi’s two explanations?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: the Maharsha explains Rashi’s two explanations. Broadly speaking, what the Maharsha explains is that Rashi’s first explanation is that we are dealing here with the question of place. Rashi’s second explanation—sorry, place. And the second explanation is that we are dealing with the question of domain.
[Speaker H] But where do you see that in Rashi? I got a bit tangled up in that. Where in Rashi do you see these two explanations? I saw it in the Maharsha, but I didn’t see it in Rashi.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, you didn’t see that there are two explanations in Rashi?
[Speaker H] But I couldn’t understand what the point of his two explanations is. In one he claims they agree with Rav Chisda, and in the other that they disagree with him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And Rav Chisda is neither like Rabbi nor like the Rabbis, right? That’s the first explanation: “because it is considered significant due to its trunk, which has four”—the branch is considered significant due to its trunk, which has four—and Rav Chisda is neither like Rabbi nor like the Rabbis. That’s the first explanation. “Another wording”—second explanation—Abaye is speaking according to Rav Chisda, that in the private domain even the Rabbis agree, and what the Rabbis dispute is “its branch follows its trunk.” Those are Rashi’s two explanations. Now, in order to explain those two explanations, the Maharsha—Rashi is totally ambiguous, which is why I referred you to the Maharsha. Because the Maharsha explains what the difference is between Rashi’s two explanations. Rashi’s first explanation basically follows what Rashi says in our passage. After all, in our passage Rashi says explicitly that the issue is the question of place, right? Look at Rashi in our passage. I’ll share it with you for a moment. This is Rashi in our passage: “Its branch follows its trunk, and it is as though it rests in the public domain on a place of four, for the trunk gives significance to the branch.” Here Rashi writes very clearly, right? Basically what he’s saying is that even though the trunk of the tree is in the private domain, in terms of domain, where is the object resting? In the public domain.
[Speaker H] In the public domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning that “its branch follows its trunk” does not address the question of domain, right? Right—it is resting in the public domain on a place of four. How is that a place of four if the branch is small? “For the trunk gives significance to the branch.” The trunk makes the branch significant. Meaning that “its branch follows its trunk” is a solution only to the problem of place, and not to the problem of domain. Right—that’s Rashi here. There’s no question here, it’s not ambiguous, it’s clear. Okay? Now what the Maharsha explains is that Rashi’s first explanation in the Talmud there is this Rashi in our passage. In Rashi’s second explanation in the Talmud there, he goes with Tosafot here. Look at Tosafot here, at least the beginning. Tosafot writes as follows. He’s speaking here on page 4: “about a tree standing in the private domain with its branches extending into the public domain. Here in our discussion it could have been explained as a tree whose trunk and branches all stand in the private domain, and its trunk has four. Rabbi holds that ‘its branch follows its trunk,’ and the place is considered four”—do you notice? Here it is certainly a question of place, right? Because both the trunk and the branch are in the private domain. Here there is no dilemma what “its branch follows its trunk” does. Here it speaks about the question of place, to regard the branch as a place of four. “And the Rabbis hold that we do not say ‘its branch follows its trunk,’ and it is not a place of four.” “For our discussion assumes that even in the private domain we require a place of four by four,” in contrast to Rav Chisda in the passage there. In the basket case he brings proof for that. Okay? Wait just a second. Now he says: “But it is difficult: why didn’t Abaye answer there”—now he moves to the passage there—“with a tree standing entirely in the public domain and its trunk has four”? Why does the tree need to have its trunk in the private domain and its branch in the public domain? Let it all be in one place. Right? That’s basically the question that the Rashba also asks on Rashi, right? According to Rashi, if the whole issue of “its branch follows its trunk” comes only to solve the problem of place and not the problem of domain, then why did the Talmud set it up as a tree whose trunk is in the private domain? Let it set it up as a tree whose trunk is in the public domain and whose branch is in the public domain, and “its branch follows its trunk” would mean that even though the branch is a small area, the trunk gives the branch significance—confers significance on the branch. Why is there any need to split the domains between the trunk and the branch? That is the Maharsha’s question on Rashi, and it is also what Tosafot asks about this explanation here. Are you with me?
[Speaker H] Yes. I didn’t understand—what do you mean, but if Abaye said that there was a split between the domains there, then presumably there isn’t another teaching?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there isn’t another teaching. Abaye made that interpretive reading. So I’m asking: what for? Why are you setting it up for me as a tree whose trunk is in the private domain and whose branch extends into the public domain? Set it up as a simple tree entirely in the public domain. After all, what is he asking? What is the subtext here? If you—Rashi and those who follow him—say that “its branch follows its trunk” solves only the problem of place and not the problem of domain, then there is no point in getting into distinctions of domains. Why did the Talmud get into that at all? Why set up the tree with its trunk in the private domain and its branch in the public domain? Let them set up a tree entirely in the public domain—that’s the simplest. And if we say “its branch follows its trunk,” then the branch is a significant place, and if not, then the branch is not significant. That’s all the dispute is. Who brought the private domain into this? What for?
[Speaker B] That is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Rashba’s difficulty on Rashi. And therefore Tosafot says there is no choice; it is forced by the Talmud that “its branch follows its trunk” deals with the question of domain, not the question of place. That is what he says here. “And according to what Abaye establishes there in accordance with Rav Chisda, here it mentions a projection of any size, for even if it were four wide they would still disagree. The Rashba says it mentions any size because above ten handbreadths, if it were four wide, it would be a private domain and the Rabbis would not exempt”—no, that’s a different answer, a different discussion. Wait. And here: “For according to Rabbi, the branch becomes the public domain because we cast it after its trunk, just as we cast it after its trunk to render it a private domain.” Tosafot understands that “its branch follows its trunk” means turning the branch into the private domain, not giving it significance as a place. That is Rashi’s second explanation there. And Tosafot is forced into that because of the distinction Abaye makes between the trunk of the tree, which is in the private domain, and its branch, which is in the public domain. According to Rashi it is not clear why there is any need to split the domains, since the whole discussion is only about the significance of the place. On the other hand, as we said, on page 4 it is unambiguous that the discussion is about the question of place and not domain. So you have to say that according to Tosafot, solving the problem of domain also solves the problem of place. Because if you say “its branch follows its trunk,” that’s the third reading I mentioned earlier—because if “its branch follows its trunk” and it is considered resting in the private domain by virtue of its trunk, the trunk is also significant, so the problem of place is solved too. It solves both problems. At least on page 4 you have to say that, because from the Talmud itself it is clear that the discussion is about the question of place. On page 8 it’s a dilemma, but on page 4 it is clear that the discussion is about place. So how does Tosafot say that “its branch follows its trunk” works on the question of domain? Because Tosafot understands that if you have solved the problem of domain, you have also solved the problem of place. Yes, is that clear? This took me much longer than I thought, but the main points are more or less the main points. Look afterward in the summary if you want more detail. Just one final point nevertheless, because I want to finish this passage today and not come back to it again: there is the Mishnah in tractate Makkot, yes, regarding—did you see it, did you have time to see it? No? Yes. Okay, for whoever did at least, I’ll just make one comment here. The Mishnah there talks about an inadvertent murderer. An inadvertent murderer goes into exile to a city of refuge, and there he is protected—the blood avenger cannot harm him. What happens if there is a tree planted in the city of refuge and its branches extend into the public domain? And now the inadvertent murderer climbed onto the branch of the tree. The question is whether the blood avenger can kill him there, or whether he is considered situated in the city of refuge. There too they tie it to “its branch follows its trunk.”
[Speaker G] No, right—it’s the trunk following the branch there—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand, the reverse there, that the trunk follows the—
[Speaker G] Branch—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They tie it to the question of whether we apply that rule. Whoever doesn’t, doesn’t, and whoever does, does—but it depends on that question. On the side that says “its branch follows its trunk,” then the blood avenger is forbidden to kill him, right? Yes. But why? According to Rashi it is not clear. Because according to Rashi, “its branch follows its trunk” does not solve things in terms of domain. It’s not that you are in the city of refuge—you are not in the city of refuge. Only the branch you are sitting on is an important branch. What do I care that it is an important branch? It is an important branch outside the city of refuge. According to the first formulation—
[Speaker E] Of Rashi.
[Speaker F] But Rabbi, didn’t you also say earlier that the same terms can have different meanings in different places?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What I said earlier—that’s exactly because of this. Meaning, and that is exactly what I want to say: we see here, at least according to Rashi, that when we speak of “its branch follows its trunk,” it is context-dependent. There, it is about a principle; there Rashi will explain it the way Tosafot explains it here.
[Speaker E] Rashi himself has a first formulation and a second formulation. And in both cases he thinks once that it’s about domain, and once that it’s like Tosafot.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, of course. But on page 4, for example, Rashi brings only the first formulation. And here he doesn’t bring—anyway, the point is: Rashi’s first formulation on page 4—how will he read the Mishnah in Makkot? He will read it in the sense of Tosafot. And that doesn’t bother him here. Now I asked: so why didn’t he bring Tosafot’s approach already there? So that’s the Ritva there—whoever had time to see it—the Ritva says: in different contexts, it has different meanings. It depends on what question is being asked of us. Now here, first of all, you have to notice that the Talmud in Makkot did not bring Rabbi’s and the Rabbis’ dispute, who directly disagreed on this very issue. If the Talmud is interested in the matter of “its branch follows its trunk,” why didn’t it bring the dispute of Rabbi and the Rabbis and start examining things on that basis? It doesn’t mention it at all. And the Ritva brings other places there too where we discuss “its branch follows its trunk” and Rabbi and the Rabbis are not brought anywhere. It seems that Rabbi and the Rabbis are a unique instance of “its branch follows its trunk.” It is not the ordinary meaning of “its branch follows its trunk” in other places. And that is the introduction I gave at the beginning of the class, and the rest is already written in the Ritva. I’m not going to get into it now because we didn’t have time. Thank you very much. Thank you very much.
[Speaker D] Okay, so see you.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Thank you very much.