חדש באתר: NotebookLM עם כל תכני הרב מיכאל אברהם

Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 23

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This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

Table of Contents

  • Two conceptions of “klutah is as if it were placed”
  • Medieval and later authorities: Rabbeinu Chananel and Rashi versus Tosafot
  • Tosafot: an objection to the Talmud’s objection and an expansion of the possible readings of the dispute
  • Rabbeinu Yitzchak’s answer in Tosafot: reversing the attribution of klutah to the Rabbis versus Rabbi Akiva
  • The conceptual practical difference: klutah on the ground or klutah in the air
  • The distinction between domain and place, and the connection to a four-by-four place
  • Resolutions in the approach of Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel: physical versus halakhic, and Kehillot Yaakov
  • Be’er Heitev and tefillin: the limits of the application of klutah
  • The beehive and “extend downward”: Kehillot Yaakov’s suggestion and a broader topic

Summary

General Overview

The text concludes the topic of “klutah is as if it were placed” and sets out two basic ways to understand it: klutah as though the object were resting on the ground, or klutah as though it were resting in the air. It shows that both understandings appear already among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), and it goes deeper into the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis as it is read in the Talmud and in Tosafot, including Tosafot’s objection to the Talmud’s objection and several proposed resolutions. It emphasizes that how one understands klutah affects the relationship between the law of placement and the requirement of a four-by-four place, and also the distinction between domain and place. In support of this it cites the Sefat Emet, Kehillot Yaakov, Chazon Ish, and also a note from Be’er Heitev regarding tefillin.

Two conceptions of “klutah is as if it were placed”

The text states that there are two possibilities for understanding “klutah is as if it were placed”: either the object is considered halakhically as though it were resting on the ground, or it is considered as though it were resting in the air itself. The goal is to anchor both conceptions in the medieval authorities (Rishonim), to show that they are not merely later possibilities raised by the Acharonim.

Medieval and later authorities: Rabbeinu Chananel and Rashi versus Tosafot

The text is precise about Rabbeinu Chananel’s wording: “Something caught in the air is like something placed on the ground,” and concludes that this hints to the understanding that “klutah is as if it were placed” means as though it were on the ground. The same seems to emerge from Rashi in Gittin and Eruvin. It qualifies this by saying the inference is not absolutely forced, because one could explain that Rabbeinu Chananel and Rashi are speaking only about the legal status without committing themselves to the underlying conceptual explanation; still, the word “on the ground” pushes in that direction. In contrast, it presents the reading of Tosafot as understood by later authorities such as Avnei Nezer, Sefat Emet, and Aglai Tal, according to which “klutah is as if it were placed” means placement in the air, not on the ground.

Tosafot: an objection to the Talmud’s objection and an expansion of the possible readings of the dispute

The text explains that Tosafot asks why the Talmud assumes it is obvious to Rava that the Mishnah follows Rabbi Akiva specifically in a way that proves he resolved the doubt. Tosafot suggests that linking the Mishnah to Rabbi Akiva may simply be because for Rabbi Akiva, “either way,” klutah comes out as though it were placed, whereas for the Rabbis it depends on where exactly the dispute is located. It adds that Tosafot proposes there are more than the two possibilities the Talmud presented for explaining the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis, including a possibility according to which no one says “klutah is as if it were placed,” and the dispute concerns the question, within one level, whether we derive throwing from handing across. It describes the confusion created in the lecture by the fact that Tosafot is objecting to the Talmud’s objection, and explains that Tosafot’s move is meant to justify the Talmud’s objection by showing that one cannot say Rabbi Akiva necessarily holds “klutah is as if it were placed” in every scenario.

Rabbeinu Yitzchak’s answer in Tosafot: reversing the attribution of klutah to the Rabbis versus Rabbi Akiva

The text cites Rabbeinu Yitzchak’s answer in Tosafot: “But below ten handbreadths everyone is liable, because we say ‘klutah is as if it were placed’” refers to the Rabbis, whereas Rabbi Akiva holds that “klutah is not like something placed” and obligates because “we derive throwing from handing across.” It explains Tosafot’s logic: assuming “klutah is as if it were placed” creates a basic difference between throwing and handing across, because in handing across the object is in someone’s hand and there is no klutah, whereas in throwing the object is in the air. It stresses Tosafot’s claim that if Rabbi Akiva held “klutah is as if it were placed,” then there would be no room to derive throwing from handing across, because throwing above ten would look like throwing from a private domain to an exempt area and from an exempt area to a private domain, whereas handing across is from private domain to private domain with public domain in between.

The conceptual practical difference: klutah on the ground or klutah in the air

The text formulates that this passage in Tosafot proves Tosafot understands “klutah is as if it were placed” as placement in the air, because it defines catching above ten as placement in an exempt area, not as placement on the ground. It notes that the Sefat Emet says this explicitly: “It appears that he holds that ‘as if it were placed’ means in the air, not on the ground,” and adds that according to this, “it comes out well,” because there is placement above ten, but it is placement in an exempt area. Against this, it presents the Sefat Emet’s question according to the understanding that klutah means “as though it were resting below on the ground,” in which case there should seemingly be liability even above ten, and suggests as an answer that klutah is said only below ten because above ten “it is another domain.”

The distinction between domain and place, and the connection to a four-by-four place

The text develops a different distinction between Rashi/Rabbeinu Chananel and Tosafot regarding the relationship between klutah and a place of four by four handbreadths. It argues that according to Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel, klutah as though it were placed on the ground ties together the question of placement and the question of a four-by-four place, because ground includes a four-by-four place; therefore it is apparently difficult to understand how the Talmud infers from Rabbi Akiva that we do not require a four-by-four place. By contrast, according to Tosafot, klutah is placement in the air, so the question of placement and the question of a four-by-four place are independent questions: the novelty of klutah solves “did it come to rest or not,” but does not solve “what did it come to rest on.” From that it follows that the focus of the difficulty reverses: according to Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel, Rabbi Akiva is difficult, while according to Tosafot, the Rabbis are difficult, because one could say the Rabbis agree to klutah but still exempt because of the requirement of a four-by-four place.

Resolutions in the approach of Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel: physical versus halakhic, and Kehillot Yaakov

The text proposes, within the approach of Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel, a resolution according to which “klutah is as if it were placed” is effective for the laws of domain and for defining legal placement, but the requirement of a four-by-four place is evaluated “physically” and not merely “as if,” so an object in the air does not in practice fulfill the requirement of place even if it is legally treated as though placed on the ground. It also proposes another resolution: when the Talmud says “we do not require a four-by-four place,” it means there is no separate independent requirement, because by virtue of klutah there is always “placement on a four-by-four place.” It cites the wording of Kehillot Yaakov: “Even when it is not on a four-by-four place, there is placement on a four-by-four place by virtue of ‘klutah is as if it were placed on the ground,’” and links this to the question of an object in the hand of the poor person and to the discussion in Tosafot that there is no klutah in a person’s hand. It quotes Kehillot Yaakov as bringing in the name of the Chazon Ish that Tosafot was speaking about a hand extended into another domain, where “it remains attached to the first domain,” whereas a hand located within that same domain can be considered at rest by the law of klutah.

Be’er Heitev and tefillin: the limits of the application of klutah

The text brings a discussion in Be’er Heitev regarding tefillin: when the tefillin are in the air, can that be treated as “klutah is as if it were placed” for the issue of interruption by speech? It rejects the idea that the legal fiction can replace actual physical resting on the head. This is used to illustrate that legal placement is not necessarily identical to physical presence, especially when dealing with requirements of “place” rather than “domain.”

The beehive and “extend downward”: Kehillot Yaakov’s suggestion and a broader topic

The text concludes with a note about Kehillot Yaakov’s suggestion, within the approach of Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel, to understand klutah as based on “extend downward,” such that the object is considered as though it stretches down to the ground rather than actually landing. It links this to the topic of the beehive and to the question of moving a “domain” itself as a movable object, and notes that this is a philosophical and complicated topic that they will not get into later in the year.

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, we’re in the sugya of “klutah is as if it were placed.” I’d very much like to finish it today and move on to the next passage in the Talmud, where at the beginning we’re still touching on the question of “klutah is as if it were placed,” as we’ll see later. In other words, there’s a connection between the topics. So this is finishing this part of the Talmud, but we’ll still be dealing with a similar issue. Just one more little piece. In the previous lecture we saw two possible ways to understand the law of “klutah is as if it were placed.” Either it’s like resting on the ground, or it’s like resting in the air. Two conceptions. Before I continue, I want us to look for a moment at the medieval authorities (Rishonim) to see that these two conceptions actually appear already there. I referred you to Avnei Nezer, who already says this, and to other later authorities as well, but let’s look inside for a moment. Let me share the file here. Look at the wording of Rabbeinu Chananel in our sugya: “And it follows Rava according to Rabbi Akiva, who holds that something caught in the air is like something placed on the ground.” He adds the word “on the ground.” Meaning, he apparently understands that the law of “klutah is as if it were placed,” according to Rabbi Akiva, means that an object flying through the air is considered halakhically as though it were resting on the ground, not as though it were resting in the air. In other words, he goes with the conception that klutah means on the ground. The same is true of Rashi in Gittin, in Eruvin, and elsewhere—you see there too that he understands it as resting on the ground. In principle, though, it’s not absolutely necessary. It’s not absolutely necessary, because one could say that Rabbeinu Chananel and Rashi also hold that “klutah is as if it were placed” means it is resting in the air, but when he says it is like resting on the ground, he means that its legal status is like something resting on the ground. He doesn’t mean to state the underlying reasoning of why “klutah is as if it were placed”—that this placement is considered as though it were on the ground—but only halakhically: for me, something resting in the air is like something resting on the ground, because actual placement on the ground isn’t required. In other words, he’s not really saying that it is like resting on the ground; he’s saying that the legal status of something resting in the air is like something placed on the ground, because you don’t need placement on the ground; you can have placement in the air too. So in that case he would be speaking only about the law, not about a real equivalence. Therefore this inference isn’t forced, although I think that when he adds the words “as if it were placed on the ground,” the word “ground” definitely points in that direction. Let’s say, if I didn’t have a very strong difficulty, that’s probably how I would explain Rabbeinu Chananel and Rashi.

Now, by contrast, in Tosafot several later authorities—the Avnei Nezer, the Sefat Emet—understand differently. Let’s take a look at Tosafot. Tosafot in our sugya: “For we say ‘klutah is as if it were placed,’ and Rabbeinu Yitzchak found it difficult: what is the Talmud challenging—does that mean it was obvious to Rava? How do we know it was obvious to Rava?” If it’s because Rava says that our Mishnah depends specifically on the view of Rabbi Akiva, that would imply that the Sages disagree with Rabbi Akiva on this issue. Tosafot says: that’s not necessary. “That would only be because Rabbi Akiva has it either way, that klutah is as if it were placed; but according to the Rabbis, he was uncertain, and therefore he could not have said, ‘This is the Rabbis.’” In other words, maybe when Rava says our Mishnah follows Rabbi Akiva, who holds “klutah is as if it were placed,” he doesn’t mean that it follows Rabbi Akiva specifically and not the Rabbis. Rather, he means that in any case—whether you explain the dispute as being above ten handbreadths, or explain it as being below ten handbreadths—Rabbi Akiva in either case holds “klutah is as if it were placed.” But with respect to the Rabbis, the question of what they hold depends on whether we interpret the dispute as being about above ten or below ten. So if you want to say something definite, you attribute it to Rabbi Akiva, because with Rabbi Akiva it’s clear that he holds “klutah is as if it were placed.” With the Rabbis, it depends on that uncertainty; maybe they agree, maybe they disagree. So what Rava said doesn’t force us to conclude that he understood the dispute to be below ten handbreadths. It may be that he remained uncertain, and the reason he ties it to Rabbi Akiva is that on both sides of the uncertainty, Rabbi Akiva definitely holds “klutah is as if it were placed.” With the Rabbis, it gets complicated: the question is whether the dispute is above or below, and he doesn’t want to get into that, so he says: this follows a tanna—I’ve found one—Rabbi Akiva definitely holds this way; regarding the Rabbis, there’s room to hesitate. Good question.

And Tosafot is basically claiming: where does the Talmud get the assumption that Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis disagree about “klutah is as if it were placed”? The fact that our Mishnah follows only Rabbi Akiva—because the Talmud challenges this on the assumption that here it’s clear Rava reads the dispute as below ten, and therefore it asks: but there we saw that Rava was uncertain. That’s not true. Even here it isn’t clear. Maybe here too Rava is uncertain, and the reason he says the Mishnah is according to Rabbi Akiva is because according to both sides of the uncertainty Rabbi Akiva definitely holds “klutah is as if it were placed.” According to the Rabbis, it depends on which way we explain the dispute. So he notes here once again that if there had been a different reading in the Talmud, this would work out, but never mind. He claims that the continuation—“that Rabbi Akiva held ‘klutah is as if it were placed,’ while the Rabbis held not”—that continuation is not Rava’s own words. If it were Rava’s own words, then this difficulty wouldn’t be difficult. In any case: “And some say that this is the explanation: and if Rava raised the question, then since there is reason to doubt their dispute, there is also reason to doubt perhaps according to everyone we do not say ‘klutah is as if it were placed.’ And in a case opposite one another, according to everyone there is exemption; and when they disagree, it is in one level, where Rabbi Akiva holds that we derive throwing from handing across, and the Rabbis hold that we do not derive.” In other words, Tosafot says you can suggest additional interpretations of the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis. You can suggest an interpretation according to which neither Rabbi Akiva nor the Rabbis say “klutah is as if it were placed.” For example—whether we say yes, this is discussed in the chapter “One Who Throws” on page 96, and we didn’t get into that sugya—there the main discussion is how the wagons stood in relation to the public domain. Were they standing lengthwise on the two sides of the public domain—say the public domain runs like this, one wagon is here lengthwise facing forward, and the second wagon is also lengthwise on the other side of the public domain facing forward. Now someone standing on this wagon hands something across to that wagon over the public domain, so those are two wagons opposite one another. On the other hand, it could be that we’re talking about one level—meaning the two wagons are one behind the other, okay? And there’s a gap between them and I hand it forward. The Talmud there discusses why there’s a difference between sideways and forward; I’m not getting into that here. But according to the view that it goes forward, there’s also room to say that Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis disagree in a way where you don’t say “klutah is as if it were placed” at all.

[Speaker B] But how can you say that if it’s written explicitly in the Talmud?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand. It’s written explicitly in the Talmud, isn’t it?

[Speaker B] That “klutah is as if it were placed.” On that side of the dispute, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so that’s exactly what the Talmud itself asks—what do you mean? That’s what the Talmud asks. Why are you telling me that the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis is about “klutah is as if it were placed,” and that our Mishnah follows Rabbi Akiva—that’s what the Talmud asks. Really, there’s a doubt whether Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis disagree about that, except that the doubt isn’t double the way the Talmud formulates it, but triple. And then it comes out that even regarding Rabbi Akiva it isn’t certain that he holds “klutah is as if it were placed.” And with that, the difficulty Tosafot asked is resolved. Clear?

[Speaker B] No—where is that written in the Talmud? I’ve completely lost you.

[Speaker C] No, no, I also didn’t understand that. If the Talmud in any case brings two opinions, and according to both of them Rabbi Akiva holds “klutah is as if it were placed,” how is Tosafot inventing a third opinion here? Theoretically it could exist, but not within the discussion in our Talmudic passage.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud shows that there’s uncertainty about how to understand the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis. Tosafot says the Talmud only gave two examples to show that there’s uncertainty, but really there are other possibilities for explaining the dispute. The Talmud just didn’t spell out all the possibilities. Therefore you can’t say that according to Rabbi Akiva it’s clear, under all possibilities, that he holds “klutah is as if it were placed.” Even with Rabbi Akiva there’s a possible explanation according to which he does not derive “klutah is as if it were placed.” That’s how Tosafot explains the Talmud.

[Speaker B] But that doesn’t appear here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it were written in the Talmud, there would be no need for Tosafot’s question and answer. But true—what’s written in the Talmud is only two possibilities. Tosafot says: true, but those two are only examples. The Talmud is only coming to tell you: you learn it one way, but there are other possibilities. We found one example explicitly; additional examples I can raise even if we didn’t find them stated explicitly. So where is it so obvious to you, Rava, that this is what the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis looks like? That’s the question the Talmud asks. Noa, you still don’t see this in the Talmud?

[Speaker B] No, I don’t see it in the Talmud, but I understand that Tosafot is saying that really there are more than two possibilities beyond the ones the Talmud gives.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Certainly—the Talmud gives only two possibilities; otherwise there would be no need for Tosafot. That’s obvious. The Talmud gives only two possibilities. Tosafot says: if only those two possibilities existed, then the whole inference of the Talmud wouldn’t work, because maybe Rava attributed it to Rabbi Akiva precisely because according to the two possibilities brought, Rabbi Akiva holds “klutah is as if it were placed,” while with the Rabbis that comes out only according to one of the possibilities. So it’s puzzling…

[Speaker B] But what’s the problem with saying that? What? That’s what we said last lecture, no? Why not say that Rava attributed the matter to Rabbi Akiva because Rabbi Akiva definitely holds it, while with the Rabbis we don’t know?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so that’s exactly what Tosafot asked—I don’t understand.

[Speaker B] So then why—what’s the problem—why is Tosafot asking, why say that there’s…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud doesn’t assume that; the Talmud asks a question. The Talmud says that here Rava says our Mishnah is Rabbi Akiva, and on that the Talmud asks: how can you attribute it to Rabbi Akiva? Who says the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis is of that kind—maybe it’s something else? Tosafot says: what kind of question is that? Tosafot’s question is on the Talmud’s question. Why is the Talmud objecting—what’s the problem? Maybe Rava attributed it to Rabbi Akiva because with Rabbi Akiva it’s clear that “klutah is as if it were placed.”

[Speaker C] But what Noa is really asking—or at least that’s how I understand her question—is: why does Tosafot care whether there are more possibilities? What bothers him? Why isn’t he satisfied with what’s in the Talmud? Why does he raise additional possibilities?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because of his difficulty.

[Speaker C] Meaning the two possibilities that appear in the Talmud bother him, and therefore he needs to bring in something else. So what bothers him in the first two?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I explained—it’s exactly this that bothers him, the very question he started with. If there are only those two possibilities, then according to both of them Rabbi Akiva holds “klutah is as if it were placed,” right?

[Speaker C] Last lecture we said not exactly, because we said that in the second understanding it might not be clear; it might be that only the Rabbis hold “klutah is as if it were placed.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, no—I didn’t say that. I made a remark taken from Tosafot here, but let’s go step by step. I mentioned it parenthetically. I said: when we learn this, know that there’s also another way to explain it. But leave that aside for the moment. Right now I’m talking about Tosafot’s question. Tosafot’s question says there are two possibilities in the Talmud, two ways to explain the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis. According to the first possibility, Rabbi Akiva holds “klutah is as if it were placed” and the Rabbis hold not. According to the second possibility, both hold “klutah is as if it were placed.” Tosafot says: if that’s the case—if those are the only two possibilities—then he doesn’t understand why the Talmud is bothered. The reason Rava attributed the Mishnah to Rabbi Akiva would be because according to both possibilities Rabbi Akiva holds “klutah is as if it were placed,” while according to the Rabbis that’s true only according to one of the possibilities. So really it isn’t true that in our Talmudic passage we see that Rava resolved his doubt. Even without resolving his doubt, there’s logic to his attributing it specifically to Rabbi Akiva. That’s Tosafot’s question. And that’s what brings Tosafot to say there’s no choice but to say that there is another way to explain the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis, and according to that possibility, even according to Rabbi Akiva it is not true that “klutah is as if it were placed.” So you can’t say that Rava chose Rabbi Akiva because under all possibilities Rabbi Akiva says “klutah is as if it were placed.” Those aren’t all the possibilities; they’re only the two brought in the Talmud. There’s another possibility according to which that isn’t so, and that resolves the question he asked.

[Speaker B] But in the end, Rava still says that we rule like Rabbi Akiva because…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—not that we rule like Rabbi Akiva, but that the Mishnah…

[Speaker B] Sorry—that the Mishnah is like Rabbi Akiva because of “klutah is as if it were placed,” because he thinks “klutah is as if it were placed.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, but the Talmud doesn’t accept that. The Talmud asks: how can you, Rava, attribute the Mishnah to Rabbi Akiva? That implies that the Rabbis probably disagree with Rabbi Akiva on this point, namely “klutah is as if it were placed.” But that’s not certain; that’s only one possible way to explain their dispute. There is a second possibility in which they disagree about something entirely different, and both agree that “klutah is as if it were placed.” That’s the Talmud’s question. Tosafot asks on that: what kind of question is this? The Talmud assumes that here Rava resolved his doubt. Not true. Maybe here too Rava is uncertain about the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis, just as he was uncertain there. So why does he attribute the Mishnah to Rabbi Akiva? Because according to both sides of the doubt, with Rabbi Akiva “klutah is as if it were placed,” whereas with the Rabbis that’s true only according to one side of the doubt. But not because he resolved the doubt—he didn’t resolve it; he’s still uncertain even in our sugya.

[Speaker C] But how can Tosafot say Rava is still uncertain if the Talmud itself said that Rava isn’t uncertain, that he already decided?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the question—that’s the question. Tosafot is challenging the Talmud. The Talmud says that here Rava is not uncertain, right? How did the Talmud reach that conclusion? From the fact that he set up the Mishnah as Rabbi Akiva and not as the Rabbis. Tosafot says: how did the Talmud infer that? Maybe here too Rava is uncertain, and the reason he set up the Mishnah as Rabbi Akiva is that according to both sides of the doubt it works with Rabbi Akiva, whereas with the Rabbis it works only according to one of the sides—but not because he resolved the doubt. He’s still uncertain how to explain the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis.

[Speaker B] So the option that Rabbi Akiva does not hold “klutah is as if it were placed”—what is that option? Where does it stand? I just don’t understand where it stands.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s a third option to explain the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Akiva, according to which neither of them holds “klutah is as if it were placed”—that’s Tosafot. So then why did he set it up as Rabbi Akiva? Apparently because he understood the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis in the first of the three ways. And on that the Talmud asks: but why? Elsewhere he was uncertain, so why is it obvious to him here? That’s how Tosafot resolves it. Again, Tosafot’s resolution means that the Talmud’s question is a good one. You have to understand: Tosafot’s resolution means there really is a difficulty here. It’s always confusing when Tosafot asks a question on the Talmud’s question, because then it gets confusing. So what’s the problem—fine, then you fit nicely with the Talmud, what’s difficult? No—but the Talmud itself raises an objection. Tosafot asks why the Talmud is objecting, since really it seems obvious. And he answers: no, I understand why the Talmud objects—the Talmud objects because it isn’t obvious. So Tosafot’s conclusion is that the Talmud’s question really is difficult. You see? It kind of reverses the logic of the whole thing.

[Speaker B] Usually Tosafot says, “and it indeed remains difficult,” and therefore Rava decided like the possibility that the dispute is below ten.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore the Talmud assumes in its question that if Rava set up the Mishnah as Rabbi Akiva, that’s probably because he chose only one possibility for explaining the dispute—in other words, he resolved the doubt. And on that the Talmud asks: but why did he resolve it? I mean, elsewhere he’s uncertain—why is it so simple for him here that the dispute is about the law of “klutah is as if it were placed”? That’s the Talmud’s question. Okay?

[Speaker B] Wait—but in the end we do understand that Rava resolved the doubt, that the dispute is below ten handbreadths and Rabbi Akiva holds “klutah is as if it were placed.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t understand. Yes—that’s what the Talmud understood, and that’s why it asks.

[Speaker C] I didn’t really understand this. Rava is… the Talmud starts from the assumption that Rava agrees with Rabbi Akiva.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not that Rava agrees with Rabbi Akiva, but that Rava sets up the Mishnah only according to Rabbi Akiva and not according to the Rabbis.

[Speaker C] Rava sets up the Mishnah as Rabbi Akiva, and then the Talmud objects and says: but we know that Rava was uncertain because of the two cases brought there, where in one of them Rabbi Akiva says “klutah is as if it were placed” and in the second both Rabbi Akiva and the Sages say “klutah is as if it were placed,” and then the Talmud concludes that Rava resolved that dispute and chose the second possibility.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Okay.

[Speaker C] Okay, so what is Tosafot’s problem? I couldn’t understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot’s problem is with the stage of the Talmud’s question before the answers. What bothered the Talmud? The Talmud saw in our sugya that Rava sets up the Mishnah as Rabbi Akiva, and from that it inferred that Rava probably resolved the doubt, right? Yes. Tosafot says: how did the Talmud infer from Rava’s words that Rava actually resolved the doubt? There’s no basis for that. Maybe he didn’t resolve the doubt, and the reason he says our Mishnah goes according to Rabbi Akiva is that in both possibilities Rabbi Akiva comes out holding “klutah is as if it were placed,” while with the Rabbis that comes out only according to one possibility. He really did not resolve the doubt; he’s still uncertain. The question is the Talmud’s question.

[Speaker C] I get it. Now I get everything. Now if there’s a third option in which Rabbi…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Akiva does not hold “klutah is as if it were placed.” Tosafot’s answer explains why the Talmud’s question is indeed a good one. Tosafot says: since there is another option for explaining the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis, according to which both hold “klutah is not as if it were placed,” if so, you can’t say that Rava set up the Mishnah as Rabbi Akiva because according to Rabbi Akiva it is certain that “klutah is as if it were placed.” That’s not true. There is a possibility that even according to Rabbi Akiva it isn’t “klutah is as if it were placed.” So we’re back to the question: then why did he specifically set up the Mishnah as Rabbi Akiva? Apparently he decided that this is the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis, and that’s what the Talmud asks—how could he decide, when elsewhere he was uncertain. Okay? Yes. Good—so let’s continue for a moment in Tosafot.

[Speaker C] Wait, just one second, okay? I’m just summarizing it so that it’ll sink in.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Honestly, it appears in my summary, so use that afterward—no point waiting here until… Okay, so then it also says, Rabbeinu Yitzchak says: “That which the Talmud says, ‘But below ten handbreadths everyone is liable, because we say klutah…’” Actually, this section isn’t in my summary, because it’s just a discussion we’re having here in Tosafot; it doesn’t really relate to the lecture. Fine, write for a few seconds, whoever wants to write.

[Speaker C] Okay, one minute, fine. Okay.

[Speaker B] Actually, in the previous summary there was a paragraph—I think it was on this issue—that I got completely lost in. I think it’s about this.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So maybe we’ll talk by email later, because I don’t want to interrupt the lecture here.

[Speaker B] The lecture.

[Speaker C] Okay, I’m done, thanks.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. I’ll keep reading in Tosafot. “And Rabbeinu Yitzchak further says,” another answer, “that when the Talmud says, ‘But below ten handbreadths everyone is liable, because we say klutah is as if it were placed,’ that refers to the Rabbis. But according to Rabbi Akiva, klutah is not like something placed, and he obligates because we derive throwing from handing across.” Before I continue reading—what’s the logic here? Rabbeinu Yitzchak says: let me give you another answer. There isn’t a third explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis; there are only the two that appear in the Talmud. But even within those two that appear in the Talmud, it is not true that Rabbi Akiva certainly holds “klutah is as if it were placed.” It could be that in the second explanation—yes?—where they say, “Below ten handbreadths everyone is liable because we say klutah is as if it were placed,” that refers only to the Rabbis. According to the possibility that the dispute is below ten handbreadths, specifically the Rabbis hold “klutah is as if it were placed,” while Rabbi Akiva does not. I’ll explain why in a moment, but right now the logic comes out like this. According to the explanation that the dispute is above ten, Rabbi Akiva holds “klutah is as if it were placed” and the Rabbis hold not. According to the explanation that the dispute is below ten, it flips around: the Rabbis hold “klutah is as if it were placed,” and Rabbi Akiva does not. And if so, once again Tosafot’s question falls away. Because Tosafot says: yes, Rava could say it’s Rabbi Akiva because according to all possibilities Rabbi Akiva holds “klutah is as if it were placed.” Not true. According to the possibility that the dispute is below ten, it comes out that Rabbi Akiva does not hold “klutah is as if it were placed.” And so that also resolves his difficulty. Is the logic clear?

[Speaker C] To me it’s clear.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. So what matters to me is the next part. I’m reading the Tosafot only to make sure you understood it, but really I need it only for the next section. The next section, the part underlined. Right? So now Tosafot shows how you can explain the dispute below ten in a reversed way—such that the Rabbis hold “klutah is as if it were placed” and Rabbi Akiva does not. Tosafot says like this: “For if he held that it is like something placed, then he could not derive throwing from handing across, because they are not similar at all. Since it is like something placed, one who throws above ten handbreadths is like one who throws from a private domain to an exempt area and from an exempt area to a private domain, and that is not at all similar to handing across, which is from private domain to private domain with public domain in the middle.” Right? What he’s saying is this. What happens below ten? If the dispute is below ten, then above ten everyone derives throwing from handing across, and therefore they are liable. Right? Then he says: what do you mean? You can’t derive throwing from handing across. Because if Rabbi Akiva holds “klutah is as if it were placed,” then when I throw above ten, it comes out that the object leaves the private domain, comes to rest in the public domain because “klutah is as if it were placed,” and then lands in the private domain. Okay?

[Speaker B] Below ten. What? Below ten, then it’s private domain, public domain, and private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. What did I say? No—again.

[Speaker B] Above ten. Never mind. Did I say above ten?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let me say it again. When we explain the dispute as being below ten, if Rabbi Akiva were to hold “klutah is as if it were placed”—

[Speaker B] Sorry—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “klutah is as if it were placed,” sorry—then how could you derive throwing from handing across? In handing across, I take my hand and transfer from one domain to another through the public domain, and the assumption is—and we’ll get to this later—that when an object is resting in a hand, there is no law of “klutah is as if it were placed.” Okay? Only when I throw the object and it’s in the air do we say the law of “klutah is as if it were placed.” So according to Rabbi Akiva, if he holds “klutah is as if it were placed,” there’s no basis for comparing throwing to handing across. They’re not similar. Therefore Rabbi Akiva must hold that klutah is not like something placed. Okay?

[Speaker B] But then, if we say that the dispute is below ten—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then—

[Speaker B] Why do we need to derive throwing from handing across at all? Deriving throwing from handing across is only for above ten.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again. If the dispute is below ten, then what are we saying? “Below ten handbreadths everyone is liable because we say ‘klutah is as if it were placed,’” right? That’s what the Talmud says. Tosafot says: what does that mean, “everyone is liable”? Everyone is liable—both Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis. But the continuation, “because we say ‘klutah is as if it were placed,’” refers only to the Rabbis and not to Rabbi Akiva.

[Speaker B] But why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I’m explaining now. Because Rabbi Akiva holds that klutah is not like something placed. Now let me prove it. Because if Rabbi Akiva held that klutah is indeed like something placed, then let’s think what would happen above ten. Above ten, everyone derives throwing from handing across according to this understanding—that the dispute is below ten—right? Everyone derives throwing. But according to Rabbi Akiva, if “klutah is as if it were placed,” then you can’t derive throwing from handing across. There’s a very big difference.

[Speaker B] We don’t say derive throwing from handing across, right? If the dispute is below, then we don’t say it, we don’t derive throwing from handing across if the dispute is below ten. Above ten everyone is exempt, no? And according to everyone we do not derive throwing from handing across—yes, right, sorry. Everyone is exempt, and according to everyone we do not derive throwing from handing across. Okay? Tosafot says, what does it mean—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does it mean, we do not derive throwing from handing across? What connection is there to deriving throwing from handing across? It isn’t similar at all. You don’t need to say we don’t derive throwing from handing across. Even if in principle we derive throwing from handing across, if “klutah is as if it were placed,” then it’s irrelevant—

[Speaker B] It’s simply not similar at all. You don’t need to get to the reason that we don’t derive throwing from handing across. Okay? And below ten? Then why below ten does he obligate—does Rabbi Akiva think that yes, we do derive throwing from handing across?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what they’re saying, no?

[Speaker B] No, again.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Below ten is the dispute, okay? Wait.

[Speaker B] Then Rabbi Akiva has to say that it’s not because of “klutah is as if it were placed” but because we derive throwing from handing across—that’s what they’re saying, no?

[Speaker F] Yes. I think the rabbi is having internet problems, he froze.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, I’m not freezing—I’m thinking. One second, I just lost the—ah, sorry.

[Speaker F] It’s just that the rabbi wasn’t moving, so I thought there was some problem.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I checked the account.

[Speaker F] Wait one second. When we say that the dispute is above ten, then you say Rabbi Akiva cannot hold that klutah is like something placed, because then you can’t derive throwing from handing across.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But wait, I’ll explain. I’m talking when the dispute is above ten. Sorry. Look, I’ll share this section of Tosafot again. See? This section. “And Rabbeinu Yitzchak further says”—now I’ll read and explain: “That which the Talmud says, ‘But below ten handbreadths everyone is liable’”—in what context is that said? When the explanation of the dispute is above ten, right? Again, are you with me? Yes, yes. This is according to the approach that the dispute is above ten, but below ten everyone agrees that there is liability. How have we understood it until now? That above ten there is a dispute. What is the dispute? Whether we derive throwing from handing across. Right? But below ten everyone agrees because “klutah is as if it were placed.” Fine? Tosafot says: not true. Below ten everyone agrees there is liability; according to the Rabbis it is because “klutah is as if it were placed,” and according to Rabbi Akiva it is because we derive throwing from handing across. And that of course assumes that we derive throwing from handing across even below ten, and that’s a different Tosafot in the sugya; not important right now. So that’s Tosafot’s point. And then he says, what’s the proof? Because if Rabbi Akiva held “klutah is as if it were placed,” then let’s go back up. Why above ten does Rabbi Akiva obligate?

[Speaker B] Because we derive throwing from handing across.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But you can’t derive throwing from handing across. Because if he holds “klutah is as if it were placed,” then throwing is completely different from handing across. So why above ten does Rabbi Akiva obligate because we derive throwing from handing across? At most you could say he obligates because of “klutah is as if it were placed,” but not because we derive throwing from handing across. If you say that above ten he obligates because we derive throwing from handing across, that means he does not hold “klutah is as if it were placed.”

[Speaker D] But he holds throwing from handing across above ten because in handing across, even above ten, it’s still public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what are you talking about?

[Speaker D] Yes, because in the Tabernacle, the wagons were ten handbreadths high, and the edge was above ten.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But above ten—above ten, period—the difference between throwing and handing across is that above ten, in handing across, the object is in the hand. When the object is in the hand, there is no “klutah is as if it were placed.” Okay? So that means that in handing across, “klutah is as if it were placed” is irrelevant. But in throwing, the object is in the air. So if Rabbi Akiva were to hold “klutah is as if it were placed,” there would be no room at all to compare throwing to handing across. We’re speaking, again—

[Speaker B] But that assumes that below, that assumes that below we derive throwing from handing across? Again? That means that below too we derive throwing from handing across.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The reason Rabbi Akiva obligates below is because we derive throwing from handing across, not because “klutah is as if it were placed.” Because he holds klutah is not like something placed. The Rabbis hold “klutah is as if it were placed.” Therefore above ten they do not derive throwing from handing across, while below ten they obligate because “klutah is as if it were placed.” Rabbi Akiva, below ten obligates and above ten also obligates because in both cases it’s throwing: we derive throwing from handing across. But klutah is not like something placed.

[Speaker B] But passing is only above ten handbreadths.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Very true.

[Speaker B] So where do we derive throwing below that from passing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t have to be specifically above ten. That’s what I pointed out: Tosafot himself, in our passage, is uncertain about the status of passing below ten. Was passing in the Tabernacle above ten or not? But it’s a kal va-chomer: if above ten you’re liable, then below ten—which is actual public domain—you’d certainly be liable. So that’s the question Tosafot is unsure about: is the law of passing defined only above ten, or below as well? Here Tosafot assumes it applies below as well. Okay? And then it turns out the whole story gets reversed. The explanation of the dispute—that the dispute is above ten—actually assumes that according to the Rabbis, "caught" is indeed considered as if it had come to rest, while according to Rabbi Akiva, "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest. Now what’s the point? And this is the important point: all of that is just the framework for understanding Tosafot. What matters for our purposes is the reasoning, which I’ll now read. "For if he held that it is considered as if it had come to rest, then one could not derive throwing from passing, because they are not similar at all. For since it is considered as if it had come to rest, throwing above ten is like throwing from a private domain to an exempt domain, and from an exempt domain to a private domain, and it is not at all similar to passing, which is from a private domain to a private domain with a public domain in between." He says that once you assume "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, then when you throw above ten, the object leaves the wagon, which is a private domain, and is considered to have come to rest above, above ten—"caught" is as if it had come to rest—which is an exempt domain, because it’s above ten, so it’s not public domain. So that’s an exempt domain, and then it reaches the second wagon, which is a private domain. That’s in throwing. But in passing, it goes from private domain to private domain through public domain, so there’s no basis to compare them at all. Therefore we’re forced to say that according to Rabbi Akiva, "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest.

[Speaker D] But here we see that even when it’s above ten handbreadths, in passing it’s still called public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s called that—that’s the novelty of passing. Once you’re in that case, even if you’re above ten, if you’re passing it in your hand, it’s considered as though it’s below. Because the hand, for example, is drawn after the body, and then it’s considered as though your hand is below ten and the object passed through public domain. But all that is only when the object is in your hand, not when you throw it.

[Speaker B] But not in the rule that "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, because there he doesn’t assume it’s resting on the ground, but in the air.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly. And for our purposes, that’s the important point in Tosafot: Tosafot assumes that if we say "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, then an object flying at a height of fifteen handbreadths is considered at rest—but at rest above, not at rest on the ground. Because Tosafot defines it as resting in an exempt domain. And in all the calculations throughout the whole Talmudic passage, that’s what matters. According to Tosafot, "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest means resting in the air, not resting on the ground.

[Speaker D] Or resting in the domain where it was caught.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. And therefore it’s not like Rashi and Rabbenu Chananel. Okay? That’s basically the inference the later authorities make in Tosafot, and that’s also how the Sefat Emet learns it, and how the Eglei Tal learns it, and the Avnei Nezer as well. This whole discussion says that according to Tosafot, it’s resting in the air. Maybe let’s quickly read the Sefat Emet, because we’ll need him later too. "But above ten, everyone agrees he is exempt, because we do not derive throwing from passing. And at first glance he should also be liable above ten because of the rule that ‘caught’ is considered as if it had come to rest, since it is as if it had come to rest. It is resting below on the ground." Basically he’s going in the opposite direction. He says: if you say that "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest means as if it had come to rest on the ground, then why do we not say above ten that "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest? Above ten too, it should be as if it came to rest below on the ground, and then it’s resting in public domain. "And one must say," says the Sefat Emet, "that since above ten is a different domain and not public domain at all, we do not regard it as having been caught in another domain." You see that what passes above ten, since the space above ten is defined as a space separate from public domain, there we do not apply the rule that "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, because it’s a separate space. Only below ten do we say that. That’s the Sefat Emet’s answer. And now he adds.

[Speaker D] But Rashi has a different answer. Why? Because it’s not considered caught at all above ten.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not considered as having been caught in another domain, but rather as having been caught in this domain—but not in another domain. On the contrary, he is very precise in his wording. We’ll get back to that in a moment. "And from the words of Tosafot above, under the opening words ‘that we say’"—that’s the Tosafot we just read—"who wrote that when we say that below, according to everyone, one is liable because of the rule that ‘caught’ is considered as if it had come to rest, this does not apply according to Rabbi Akiva, who derives throwing from passing above ten, because since it is considered as if it had come to rest, it becomes like going from private domain to an exempt domain"—that was the Tosafot quote until here—"it follows that"—it follows that Tosafot hold that "as if it had come to rest" means in the air, not on the ground. That "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest in the air, not on the ground. "If so, it works out well here, because the placing down is above ten."

[Speaker G] Okay,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to this, says the Sefat Emet, the difficulty I raised at the beginning isn’t difficult at all. Because what did the Sefat Emet ask? He asked that if we hold like Rashi and the Arukh, that "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest means as if it rested on the ground, then why does the Talmud say that above ten the rule of "caught" as if it had come to rest doesn’t apply? Even above ten it should count as on the ground, and that is actual public domain, so why should it matter that it’s above ten? If you hold "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, then it is resting in public domain. The Sefat Emet says there’s no choice but to say that above ten we do not say it is resting, because that is a different domain. In a different domain we do not say "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest. And now he adds: but according to Tosafot, this whole move isn’t needed; the question never starts and you don’t need the answer. Because according to Tosafot, "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest means it is considered as having come to rest in the air, not on the ground. And if so, it’s obvious why above ten this rule won’t help me. Because even if I say "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, it’s in the air, not on the ground, so that won’t help to make him liable.

[Speaker D] And in an exempt domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay? What’s next?

[Speaker D] What’s missing here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not—

[Speaker C] I didn’t really understand the inference between the two options here. One option—the Sefat Emet says there are two possibilities. One way to solve the problem is to say that we’re dealing with two separate domains, and therefore if it’s above ten handbreadths then it’s as if it’s connected to an exempt domain. Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, it’s not connected at all.

[Speaker D] It’s as if it’s resting.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And when we say "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, that is said only below ten.

[Speaker C] Meaning that "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest on the ground only below ten handbreadths.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And above ten handbreadths we don’t say "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest at all.

[Speaker C] Above ten handbreadths we don’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is not resting in the air; rather, it’s not resting at all. Okay. But according to Tosafot, who understands "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest as resting in the air, then on his view you don’t need to say that. Because on his view you can say that the rule of "caught" as if it had come to rest applies both above and below. It’s just that above, even though we do say "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, it’s irrelevant because it’s resting in an exempt domain, not in public domain.

[Speaker C] So according to Tosafot, being caught is considered as if it had come to rest in the air, and therefore above ten handbreadths too it is considered as if it had come to rest.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, but that won’t help. Because it’s in an exempt domain. It just won’t help to make him liable, because it is resting—but resting in an exempt domain, not in public domain. Let me sharpen it a bit more. Look. There’s a question here: the Talmud assumes that above ten, "caught" as if it had come to rest doesn’t apply, right? Only below ten. Above ten you can discuss whether we derive throwing from passing or not, but the rule of "caught" as if it had come to rest applies only below ten. That’s the simple meaning of the Talmud, right? So the big question is why. Why doesn’t "caught" as if it had come to rest apply above ten? I’m now summarizing what the Sefat Emet is really saying. He basically says this: if you learn like Rashi and the Arukh that "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest means as if it rested on the ground,

[Speaker D] then—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then you have to say that above ten the whole rule of "caught" as if it had come to rest simply does not apply, because it’s a separate domain, and therefore we don’t say "caught" as if it had come to rest there at all. So above ten there is no "caught" as if it had come to rest; below ten… According to Tosafot, the statement that above ten we don’t say "caught" as if it had come to rest is incorrect; we do say it even above ten. But above ten, "caught" as if it had come to rest doesn’t obligate me, because it is resting, but it’s resting in an exempt domain. In other words, Tosafot and Rashi and the Arukh read the Talmud differently. When the Talmud said that above ten "caught" as if it had come to rest doesn’t apply, that’s only according to Rashi and the Arukh. Rashi and the Arukh say that above ten, "caught" as if it had come to rest doesn’t apply. Tosafot argues that above ten too, "caught" as if it had come to rest does apply; it just makes no difference because it won’t obligate him. Okay?

[Speaker B] So why can’t we say that Rabbi Akiva thinks that below too there is "caught" as if it had come to rest, but below he is liable and above he is exempt? Meaning, his starting point is—

[Speaker D] He simply says—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But Tosafot says that can’t be, because if that were so then even above ten Rabbi Akiva couldn’t derive throwing from passing. Now, by the rule of "caught" as if it had come to rest you can’t obligate—on that you agree—because it’s resting in an exempt domain.

[Speaker B] And by the rule of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And by deriving throwing from passing you also can’t obligate, because throwing is not similar to passing. So why does Rabbi Akiva say that above ten one is liable?

[Speaker B] I didn’t understand—why is throwing not similar to passing? Didn’t we say there is no "caught" as if it had come to rest in passing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In passing, yes. But in throwing there is. Hm?

[Speaker B] But in throwing there is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because in passing it is the whole time—

[Speaker D] in the hand, and "caught" as if it had come to rest means it is resting in the air.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So according to Tosafot, what is throwing above ten? It’s someone taking from a private domain to an exempt domain and from an exempt domain to another private domain, right? Whereas passing is from private domain to private domain through public domain. So how can you derive throwing from passing? Passing would be liable, but throwing would be exempt. But you want to tell me that above ten Rabbi Akiva obligates. How can he obligate? By the rule of "caught" as if it had come to rest, it’s resting in an exempt domain, and by deriving throwing from passing you can’t derive it because they aren’t similar. That’s Tosafot’s point; that’s exactly what Tosafot says.

[Speaker B] Meaning, it’s not like they’re two separate things that… okay, if one is exempt the other can still be liable. No—if one is exempt it affects the other.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course they’re two separate things, but the problem is that "caught" as if it had come to rest interferes with deriving throwing from passing. Here it turns out to connect: because of "caught" as if it had come to rest, you can’t derive throwing from passing. Okay? That’s exactly Tosafot’s claim; the Sefat Emet just puts it in context. Because he’s basically telling us this: there are two ways to read the entire flow of the Talmud. One way, according to Rashi and the Arukh, is that above ten handbreadths there is no "caught" as if it had come to rest, because they hold that "caught" as if it had come to rest means on the ground. Then the question arises: if so, then why above don’t you say "caught" as if it had come to rest and obligate according to everyone even above? Not because we derive throwing from passing—obligate just by virtue of "caught" as if it had come to rest. Why not? There’s no choice but to say that above ten there is no rule of "caught" as if it had come to rest, because the domain cuts off that place and you can’t connect the upper space to the ground—and according to them, "caught" as if it had come to rest means resting on the ground. Only something in the airspace of public domain I’m willing to view as though it’s resting on the ground of public domain; but something in the airspace of another domain I do not view as though it’s resting on the ground of public domain. And as for resting in the air—there’s no such thing according to Rashi and the Arukh, so above there is no "caught" as if it had come to rest.

[Speaker D] So Tosafot’s logic is basically simpler. Again—Tosafot’s logic is simpler than Rashi’s.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, there’s something to that.

[Speaker D] Because in reality the object is caught there. He can’t say there’s no "caught"—the fact is, it’s above ten.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly the opposite—in reality the object is flying.

[Speaker D] Right, right, but I’m saying "caught," not "at rest." I’m calling it caught.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does "caught" mean? "Caught" means that it’s as if at rest. No—an object in motion, what do you mean? "Caught" as if it had come to rest means that it’s flying. The moment you see it as "caught," you’ve already said something akin to being at rest—but it isn’t caught anywhere. Still, in terms of the question why distinguish between above and below, Rashi and Rabbenu Chananel need explanations; in Tosafot it’s obvious. You really don’t need to distinguish, except that above it is caught in an exempt domain and below it is caught in public domain. That’s all. Okay? In that sense Tosafot really is simpler than Rashi and the Arukh. So according to Rashi and the Arukh, you need explanations for why above ten the Talmud assumes you can’t obligate by the rule of "caught" as if it had come to rest; according to Tosafot you don’t need explanations. "Caught" as if it had come to rest applies everywhere when it is resting in the air. In the air of public domain it is considered resting in public domain; in the air of an exempt domain it is resting in an exempt domain. So you don’t need to make any distinctions or any conceptual moves; there are no questions and no need for answers.

[Speaker D] Rashi follows his own line, like we learned at the beginning, that with placing down he requires placing on the ground. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And he’s talking about that Rashi. Rashi and Rabbenu Chananel, who say that "caught" as if it had come to rest means as if resting on the ground—then you need an explanation for what happens above ten. If Rabbi Akiva holds "caught" as if it had come to rest, then why shouldn’t above ten also be "caught" as if it had come to rest? Let it be considered resting on the ground below. There’s no choice but to say some answer, that above ten is a separate domain and to that the rule of "caught" as if it had come to rest was not said. The rule of "caught" as if—basically, if you want, you can see it this way: remember I spoke about the difference between place and domain. Okay? What he’s saying here is that when you are in the same domain, I’m willing to see that also as a legitimate place. If you are in another domain, I can’t use the second domain to see it as your place. If it’s not your domain, it also won’t be your place. Okay? Remember what I said, that I’m basically in the airspace of public domain, but the question is whether I’m on a place four by four. And that’s not the same thing. Now I’m saying: fine, but I can say that I view the ground as my place if I am in airspace that belongs—

[Speaker G] to that ground. But if I’m in another airspace, another domain—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] another—

[Speaker G] exempt domain—then I’m not willing to view the ground as my place, because my place belongs to that domain.

[Speaker D] And in any case—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] still there is some connection between the concept of place and the concept of domain. Okay? That’s basically the claim. So that’s the Sefat Emet, and basically from the Sefat Emet it comes out like this. And why above ten do we not derive throwing from passing? What, again? Above ten, why don’t we derive throwing from passing? Because it’s already a separate domain? Passing is within four cubits of height, no? If we derive. According to Rabbi Akiva we do derive, and therefore he is liable.

[Speaker B] No, she’s asking in the second option, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which option? Now the dispute is below ten. Now the dispute is below ten.

[Speaker G] No, above, above.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The dispute is above ten, and that’s what I was talking about. So the Talmud says the dispute is whether we derive throwing from passing. And below ten everyone obligates because "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest. I understand. So above ten, according to Rabbi Akiva, who does obligate, we really do derive throwing from passing. And according to the Rabbis we do not derive throwing from passing, because we simply do not derive it anywhere. And below ten, what makes them liable is because "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest. Tosafot learns the reverse. Tosafot says, what are you talking about? According to the Rabbis, they hold that "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, and therefore below they are liable. Above, we do not derive throwing from passing precisely because they hold that "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest. But Rabbi Akiva holds that we do not say "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest. And therefore below he obligates because he derives throwing from passing. And above too he obligates because we derive throwing from passing. Thank you. Okay, so now let’s continue. Let’s go back for a moment to the dispute of the Tannaim, Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis. I’m talking about when they dispute below ten according to all the approaches. Okay? Let’s see how we build this dispute. Maybe I’ll say one more sentence before I work this out. According to Tosafot’s approach, that "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest means that it is resting in the air, it follows that according to Rabbi Akiva you really don’t need a place of four by four, right? The Talmud’s proof is good. From the fact that Rabbi Akiva says "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, you see that you don’t need placing down on a place of four by four. Because according to Tosafot it’s resting in the air. So there is no place of four by four here. Why then does Rabbi Akiva obligate? You see that you don’t need a place of four by four. But according to the Rabbis—the Talmud says the Rabbis hold that "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest, right? Now I ask: what do they hold regarding the necessity of a place of four by four? According to the Rabbis, do you need a place of four by four or not? They hold it has to come to rest on the ground.

[Speaker C] Seemingly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They—

[Speaker D] They hold it has to come to rest on the ground, so they hold you need four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m talking according to Tosafot.

[Speaker D] According to Tosafot, where it’s like resting in the air.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Tosafot, where it’s like resting in the air, then basically it comes out like this: according to Rabbi Akiva the proof is good that you don’t need a place of four by four, because it’s resting in the air and that’s enough to obligate according to Rabbi Akiva—I’m talking below ten, yes? That’s enough to obligate according to Rabbi Akiva, so you see that you don’t need placing down on a place of four by four. But according to the Rabbis—the Talmud says the Rabbis hold that "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest. Do the Rabbis require a place of four by four or not? That is at least an open question, and in my opinion more than that. The simple reading is that according to the Rabbis too, you don’t need a place of four by four. Why? Because if according to the Rabbis you did need a place of four by four, then who says that according to the Rabbis "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest? The Rabbis could hold that "caught" is indeed considered as if it had come to rest, and according to Tosafot, "as if it had come to rest" means it is resting in the air, right? But if it is resting in the air, the Rabbis exempt because it is not a place of four by four—not because "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest. "Caught" is considered as if it had come to rest; they agree with Rabbi Akiva. It’s just that this resting is resting in the air. Rabbi Akiva, who obligates, does so because he does not require a place of four by four. But why do the Rabbis exempt? Not because they hold that "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest, but because in their opinion you need a place of four by four and here you don’t have that. Because the fact that the Talmud learns that the issue of a place of four by four is only according to Rabbi Akiva—that is, the Talmud is basically saying—the Talmud says that according to the Rabbis, "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest, right? Why does the Talmud need to get to that, that according to the Rabbis "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest? I would say that according to the Rabbis, "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest; they just do not obligate because it is not a place of four by four. Rather, what do you see? The Talmud assumes that according to them too, you don’t need a place of four by four. According to them too, like Rabbi Akiva, you don’t need a place of four by four. And therefore if they exempt, there is no choice but to say that "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest. That is why the Talmud says that according to Rabbi Akiva, "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, and according to the Rabbis, "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest—because on the question of whether you need a place of four by four, both Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis agree that you do not need it. Whew. Are you with me? I—

[Speaker C] No, because we said it several times and I feel like each time we said the opposite. We said Rabbi Akiva requires four by four—

[Speaker D] and therefore—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Rabbi Akiva does not require four by four. The Talmud says that. According to Tosafot, where it’s in the air.

[Speaker B] No no no, leave Tosafot aside for a second, I’m talking Talmud.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud says that our Mishnah, which does not require a place of four by four, goes like Rabbi Akiva, right? That’s what the Talmud says. According to Rabbi Akiva—at first it understood that there is a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis on the question whether you need a place of four by four. But in the explanation the Talmud gives, it ties this to the question whether we say "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest. That means according to Rabbi Akiva, "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, and according to the Rabbis it is not. Now I ask: if that is the explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis—whether "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest or not—and according to Tosafot that means resting in the air, yes, I’m now speaking within Tosafot’s approach—then according to the Rabbis, how did the Talmud conclude that "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest? Maybe "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, and the reason the Rabbis exempt is because there is no place of four by four here. It is standing in the air; you need a place of four by four. We are therefore forced to say that if the Talmud proves that according to the Rabbis, "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest, then apparently the Talmud assumes that according to the Rabbis too, you don’t need a place of four by four.

[Speaker D] But why, in the air, can’t it be four by four? What? Why can’t the air be four by four? Why can’t the space count as four by four?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not four by four because it is resting on—, it’s not resting on anything, it’s zero by zero. It’s not resting on the airspace; it’s resting on nothing.

[Speaker F] You could say it’s resting on the air underneath, but the air underneath is less than four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No matter how you say it, in any case the Talmud says this regardless, right? Leave those questions aside for a moment. Now I ask according to the Talmud’s own approach—let’s work it out. How does the Talmud explain the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis? That according to Rabbi Akiva, "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, and according to the Rabbis, "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest, right?

[Speaker D] Yes, that’s how it explains it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now I ask: according to that, in my opinion both Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis—the Talmud assumes that neither requires a place of four by four.

[Speaker D] Let me prove it to you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Assume for contradiction that according to the Rabbis you do need a place of four by four. Okay? If according to the Rabbis you needed a place of four by four, why does the Talmud say that according to the Rabbis "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest? It could be that "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest. Why do the Rabbis exempt?

[Speaker D] Because it’s not four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s why they exempt, not because "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest. Seemingly, according to Tosafot, both Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis do not require a place of four by four. Agreed? Yes. By the way, this is not difficult for the Talmud, because I really can read it that way in the Talmud. The Talmud says that our Mishnah follows the view that does not require a place of four by four; you see that view in Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, but the same could equally apply to the Rabbis.

[Speaker B] But can’t you say that the Rabbis basically say "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest also from the side that they require four by four?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can say it, but you don’t have to say it. So how does the Talmud know that according to the Rabbis, "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest? Maybe according to the Rabbis, "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, and you’re exempt because there is no place of four by four. How does the Talmud know?

[Speaker B] But why can’t we connect the two? Meaning, I have the basic rule that I need it to be resting on four by four handbreadths. Now I come to check whether "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest. So the Rabbis say, wait—I can’t say it has come to rest because there is no four by four here, and therefore I say that "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest according to the Rabbis.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, then you’re going back to Rashi and Rabbenu Chananel’s approach. I’m talking according to Tosafot.

[Speaker B] But according to Tosafot—why, according to Rashi and Rabbenu Chananel, doesn’t what I’m saying work out?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, according to Tosafot—

[Speaker B] You’re right, your claim is even—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Tosafot, "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest means it is resting in the air. That means you can say "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest even when there is no place of four by four—you’ll just still be exempt. But you can say "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest even without a place of four by four. I’m speaking now according to Tosafot’s approach. According to Tosafot there is nothing preventing us from saying that the Rabbis too agree that "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, and the reason you are exempt is that it is resting on a place that is not four by four. We are therefore forced to say that if the Talmud does not say this—if the Talmud says that according to the Rabbis, "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest—then apparently according to the Rabbis you must say that "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest. Why? Because if you said that "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, you would have to be liable. Why would you have to be liable? Because according to the Rabbis too, you don’t need a place of four by four.

[Speaker B] Doesn’t "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest mean that because it is in public domain, it’s as though it is resting there? Meaning, as though it came to rest there?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the air or on the ground?

[Speaker B] Let’s say in the air.

[Speaker E] It’s—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—

[Speaker B] domain—first of all that it rests, first of all that it rests.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it rests in the air, then what’s the problem? Then it can rest in the air too. So the Rabbis too can hold that "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest.

[Speaker B] Why? It rests, but not on a place of four. I have two requirements. Exactly! Exactly!

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore they exempt!

[Speaker D] Because in the air it isn’t four by four.

[Speaker B] So therefore I say: they don’t have "caught" as if it had come to rest because they don’t have a place of four, because for resting there’s a requirement that it be—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Don’t say "not as if it had come to rest." Just say: everyone agrees that "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, only here there is no place of four by four. Understood?

[Speaker B] Okay.

[Speaker E] Wait, does this depend only on four—

[Speaker F] by four? But it also depends on—wait, wait, one at a time. Right? But an object can come to rest on a place that is less than four. That also counts as placing down. Those are not related things.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If a place of four by four is required, then it is required; if not, not. The question whether it is at rest and the question what it is resting on are separate questions.

[Speaker E] Wait, we spoke about two concepts. One is four by four, and the second is public domain and private domain. If it is resting above, in an exempt domain, which is not four by four, then again it gets canceled out both here and there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Canceled out? It’s exempt, but it still counts as at rest.

[Speaker E] It’s exempt because it was placed down, okay, it is at rest, but it is at rest in a place from which he is exempt. But what I want to say here is that if it is resting above in the air, which is an exempt domain, then I don’t have a requirement of four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not that you don’t have a requirement. Again—it is resting in the air. If you have a requirement for a place of four by four, then he is exempt; if you don’t have a requirement for a place of four by four, then he would be liable.

[Speaker E] And also exempt—no—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But Yael, here we’re talking about—no, above ten he would be exempt in any case. But below ten—exempt in any case. But below ten, okay, that’s a different story.

[Speaker E] I’m talking about above.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m talking about below. Okay. Our Talmudic passage is talking about below ten. So I’ll say again: look, we need to understand this well. According to Tosafot, when we say that "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest—I see this is going very slowly, and I already don’t know how we’re going to finish it—according to Tosafot, "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest means that it is standing in the air. The novelty of "caught" as if it had come to rest is simply that although it is flying, it is considered standing. Right? That’s the novelty of "caught" as if it had come to rest. Consequently, you don’t need placing down on a place of four by four. It’s enough that it is at rest. Okay? According to Rashi and Rabbenu Chananel, when we say "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, the novelty is not that it is at rest, but that it is at rest on the ground. So according to Rashi and Rabbenu Chananel, you really can connect the question whether "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest with the question whether there is a place of four by four here. Because according to Rashi and Rabbenu Chananel it is the same question. If it is "caught" as if it had come to rest, then it is resting on the ground, and therefore there is also a place of four by four here. That comes together. But according to Tosafot these are two independent questions. The question whether "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest is the question whether it is flying or standing. The question whether you need a place of four by four is a different question, unrelated. Therefore the novelty in "caught" as if it had come to rest according to Tosafot is a different novelty from the novelty that you don’t need a place of four by four. It’s only true that according to Rabbi Akiva—because if he did require a place of four by four, then even if "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, he would still exempt. Because it is at rest, but at rest in the air. But the practical difference is with the Rabbis. Because according to the Rabbis, who say that "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest, the question whether you need a place of four by four or not remains open. Right. Practically, if "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest, then it is not at rest at all. So no, I don’t even enter the question whether a place of four by four is needed or not. Alternatively, if according to the Rabbis you need—if according to the Rabbis you need a place of four by four, then even if we say that according to the Rabbis, "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, he would still be exempt. Because according to Tosafot it is resting in the air, so there is no place of four by four.

[Speaker E] I have one more small question within this whole framework. If it is below ten handbreadths, then in what we’re talking about, does it make a difference whether it’s throwing or passing below ten handbreadths when it comes to four by four?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker E] If I throw or if I pass it? Below ten handbreadths.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s a dispute between two views in Tosafot. In the Tosafot we just read, it appears that below ten handbreadths too there is passing—there is a law of passing. Okay. Okay, so basically the point is this. Again, I want to sharpen it. According to Rashi and the Rosh, the novelty of "caught" as if it had come to rest basically combines the two laws: both the claim that it is at rest, and the claim that there is a place of four by four here, because after all it is resting on the ground, and on the ground there is four by four. Okay? Therefore according to Rashi and the Rosh it all goes together. According to Tosafot these are two independent questions. The question whether the object is at rest is one question, and the question what it is resting on is another question, because it is resting in the air. Okay? So if a place of four by four is required, then such a thing would not count to obligate, even though it is at rest; it is not resting on a place of four by four. If a place of four by four is not required, then it is at rest and that obligates. Okay? This is an important point—you need to understand that according to Rashi and the Rosh, and according to Tosafot, the novelty of "caught" as if it had come to rest is different, and its connection to the question whether you need a place of four by four is also different. According to Rashi and the Rosh these are two questions that go together. Since whenever you say "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, there is also a place of four by four because it is resting on the ground. But according to Tosafot, where "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest means that it is resting in the air, you still haven’t solved the question of the place of four by four; you’ve only said that it counts as at rest. Now you have to discuss what it is resting on—is it a place of four by four or something else? Okay? And now we need to begin working this out according to each of the approaches. So look. According to Rashi and the Rosh, where "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest means that it is as if resting on the ground, the question arises how the Talmud learns. According to Rashi and the Rosh, Rabbi Akiva is difficult; according to Tosafot, the Sages are difficult. Because according to Rashi and the Rosh, why does the Talmud say that according to Rabbi Akiva you don’t need a place of four by four? You do need it; Rabbi Akiva just holds that "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, and according to Rashi and the Rosh that means as if it rested on the ground, and the ground has four by four.

[Speaker D] Why does the ground always have four by four? Couldn’t there be a case where it’s on the ground and there isn’t four by four?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the ground is always a place of four by four.

[Speaker E] No, it can’t be.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The circumference is forty thousand kilometers, do the math. Okay, in any case, I’m saying the point is that according to Rashi and the Rosh—I told you on the page to work out the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Sages according to Rashi and the Rosh and according to Tosafot. So now I’m doing that; pay attention. You need to keep your head here a bit, but we’ve already said all the considerations—this is just doing the calculation. According to Rashi and the Rosh, "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest means it is resting on the ground, right? Now let’s learn Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Akiva holds—the Talmud says he holds—that "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest. And the Talmud concludes from this that apparently according to his view you don’t need a place of four by four, and therefore our Mishnah goes like him, right? That’s what the Talmud says. How did the Talmud conclude that? If according to Rabbi Akiva "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest means as if resting on the ground, then you do need four by four. Who says he doesn’t need four by four? It could be that he does require four by four, only that this condition is fulfilled because "caught" as if it had come to rest counts as resting on the ground.

[Speaker F] Whereas in the Mishnah he is exempt, Rabbi—

[Speaker E] And if we say that this is exactly the same thing—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that it is resting on—

[Speaker F] the ground—and if we explain that it is as if resting on the ground, I disagree, because basically it isn’t really resting on the ground, only as if, and I think therefore now it isn’t four by four. You’re already answering with solutions; first I want—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] first I want them to understand the difficulty. We’ll get to that; you’re right. Wait, okay. According to Rashi and the Arukh, again, the problem is with Rabbi Akiva. Because Rabbi Akiva says "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest—so says the Talmud. But if "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, and according to Rashi and the Arukh that means on the ground, then it is not really correct to say that according to Rabbi Akiva you don’t need a place of four by four. You do need a place of four by four—only there is one. Therefore he is liable, because it is resting on the ground, and the ground has four by four.

[Speaker E] Anywhere, basically. Okay. Once it’s on the ground, then there is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. And according to the Sages, for whom "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest, then it is resting above, right? If it is resting above, why do the Sages exempt? The Sages exempt, right? Why do they exempt?

[Speaker D] Because there isn’t four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Either because there isn’t four by four, or because there is no placing down here—that remains an open question. So even in the opinion of the Sages I’m not forced to say that they require a place of four by four. According to the Sages that’s possible; according to Rabbi Akiva it’s really not possible. Yes. So the whole thing comes out very strange according to Rashi and the Arukh when we understand Rabbi Akiva this way. Because according to Rabbi Akiva, the requirement of four by four is fulfilled if "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest. So basically there is a place of four by four here, so it could be that Rabbi Akiva does require a place of four by four—there just is one. According to the Rabbis, that remains an open question, because the Rabbis say "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest. So I ask: what do they hold about a place of four by four? I don’t know—open question. Whether yes or no, I understand why they exempt; they exempt because it is not at rest. Okay? But I’ll say more than that: why does the Talmud infer in the opinion of the Rabbis that we have to say "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest, since if we said "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, the Rabbis would obligate, right? Why would they obligate? Four by four—not necessarily because it is required or not required, but it is resting on the ground.

[Speaker D] There is placing down, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.

[Speaker B] But according to Rashi and the Arukh these are two questions that are related to each other, that are basically the same question? Seemingly. And according to the Rabbis I would indeed say—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, and it’s the same question only in one direction. If you say "caught" is considered as if it had come to rest, then clearly there is also a place of four by four, because it is resting on the ground. But if you say "caught" is not considered as if it had come to rest—

[Speaker B] then why specifically—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it could still be that a place of four by four is required and it could be that it isn’t—I don’t know. It’s not relevant because it is above, so what difference does it make.

[Speaker B] It’s not at rest. It’s not at rest, sorry, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All right. According to Tosafot, the problem is with the Rabbis. Because according to Tosafot, Rabbi Akiva, who says that something caught in the air is as if it has come to rest there, then clearly he also holds that you don’t need a place four by four handbreadths. But according to the Rabbis, who exempt, it could be that they exempt because they hold that you do need a place four by four handbreadths, not because something caught in the air is not considered as if it was set down. It is considered as if it was set down, only it’s set down in the air, and you still need a place four by four handbreadths, and therefore they exempt. Alternatively, if you tell me that they exempt because they require a place four by four handbreadths, then that would still be true even if, in their view, something caught in the air is considered as if it was set down. So according to Tosafot, the Rabbis’ view is really not understandable the way the Talmud understands the Rabbis. And according to Rashi and the Arukh, what is unclear is Rabbi Akiva’s view, because according to Rashi and the Arukh, the Talmud says that if Rabbi Akiva holds that something caught in the air is as if it was set down, then apparently in his view you don’t need a place four by four handbreadths. That’s not true — you do need a place four by four handbreadths. “Caught in the air is as if it was set down” means that there is a place four by four handbreadths; it is resting on the ground. So why does the Talmud assume that according to Rabbi Akiva you don’t need a place four by four handbreadths? Okay? Those are basically the difficulties according to the two approaches. And you have to understand that it all starts from this: what is the novelty in saying that something caught in the air is as if it was set down? Is the novelty that it is considered set down, or that it is considered as if set down on the ground? If it is considered as if set down on the ground, that solves both problems: both the issue of four by four handbreadths and the issue of whether there was a placing-down here at all. If the novelty is that it is set down in the air, then that solves the placing-down issue, but the question of four by four handbreadths remains open. So let’s start with Rashi and the Arukh. According to Rashi and the Arukh, we have to say what Nehama said earlier: that indeed, “caught in the air is as if it was set down” means it is considered as if it is resting on the ground, but the requirement that the place be four by four handbreadths has to be fulfilled physically, not halakhically. The fact that I treat it as if it is resting on the ground is with respect to the laws of placing down, with respect to the laws of domain. But with respect to the laws of location, the location has to be physical. Let’s see what the object is resting on. And here too, even if you see it as though it is resting on the ground, that’s all “as though,” as the comedians used to say. But it is in the air, and you need a physical placing-down. That is basically the claim. That’s what has to be said, otherwise you simply can’t understand what they want.

[Speaker C] What does “physical placing-down” mean? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker D] To place it on the ground.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It has to be resting on a physical place of four by four handbreadths. Even if you say that something caught in the air is as if it was set down, and that counts as if it is resting on the ground, still it is only considered as if it is resting on the ground. It still was not placed there; it is not really resting on the ground. All right?

[Speaker C] So I didn’t understand — is it resting or not resting? I couldn’t follow. Is something caught in the air considered as if it was set down, or not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Halakhically it is considered as if resting on the ground, and therefore it is basically in the public domain. But it is in the public domain, not on a place of four by four handbreadths. There is a difference between the domain and the place. “Caught in the air is as if it was set down” solves the problem of domain, but it does not solve the problem of place. There is a placing-down here in the public domain; in that sense it is as if resting on the ground. But there is no place of four by four handbreadths here.

[Speaker C] Why? On the ground there isn’t four by four?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the ground there is, but it isn’t on the ground; it’s only in the air.

[Speaker C] So according to that, it is exempt?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I can’t hear.

[Speaker C] So according to that, it is permitted?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So according to that, you are not liable, yes. Unless you don’t need a place four by four handbreadths. If you don’t need a place four by four handbreadths, then you are liable, and that is what Rabbi Akiva says. I referred you at the end of the page to Be’er Heitev — did you get a chance to look there? Be’er Heitev discusses “caught in the air is as if it was set down” regarding someone who puts on tefillin.

[Speaker E] And the question

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] is that when the tefillin are in the air, is that already considered as if they are resting on the head? For the purpose that one could already interrupt by speaking, because it is considered as though you have already put on the tefillin, or not. All right? So the simple answer is obviously no. It is not considered as if resting there. What he says there is puzzling. Why? Because seemingly, “caught in the air is as if it was set down”? “Caught in the air is as if it was set down” is a law, but you can’t say that in… so then why would I even have to put on tefillin at all? I can just leave my hand up in the air. Not only regarding interrupting by speech. I do this with the tefillin and then put them back in the bag. Finished. No need to put them on at all. That he doesn’t even entertain. Only regarding interruption by speech he says, maybe this will count as “caught in the air is as if it was set down.” And he doesn’t say, fine, then don’t lower your hand at all; it already counts as though you put them on, and that’s it. Why not? Because as long as the tefillin are not physically on the head, even if you say halakhically that something caught in the air is as if it was set down, that still does not really mean that it is on the head. Okay? And therefore, in my opinion, even regarding interruption by speech it is not reasonable to say that. I asked you what you thought there. And the same thing applies here. Rashi and the Arukh claim that “caught in the air” is as if it was set down on the ground. What does that mean? That it is in the public domain, resting. That’s what it means. But now when I ask not in which domain it is resting, or on which domain, but on which place it is resting, the place has to be a physical place. And if it is only in the air above a place of four by four handbreadths, then the requirement of four by four handbreadths has not been fulfilled.

[Speaker D] So with tefillin, it’s not a matter of domain, only a matter of place.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. And therefore holding it in the air doesn’t help there. But here, that is exactly the distinction we are making: beyond the question of domain, there is also the question of place. And therefore the Talmud proves from the fact that Rabbi Akiva imposes liability that in his view there is no requirement of a place four by four handbreadths; it is enough that you are in the public domain, resting in the public domain. Okay? That is the view of Rashi and the Arukh. A second possibility for explaining it — I think this is what Noa meant to say earlier — is that according to Rabbi Akiva it is not true that you don’t need a place four by four handbreadths, but rather that this requirement has no practical significance, because something caught in the air is as if it was set down. Do you understand what I’m saying? In other words, my question about Rabbi Akiva according to Rashi and the Arukh was this: if Rabbi Akiva holds that something caught in the air is as if it was set down, how can you infer from Rabbi Akiva that we do not require a place four by four handbreadths? According to Rashi and the Arukh, “caught in the air is as if it was set down” means it is resting on the ground, and on the ground there is a place four by four handbreadths. Now I am suggesting another answer, not the physical-versus-halakhic answer I gave earlier, but an additional answer. This answer says the following: when we say that we do not require a place four by four handbreadths, that does not mean that hypothetically it is unnecessary. Rather, it means that there is no such independent requirement for a place four by four handbreadths. Whenever it is resting in the public domain, that requirement is fulfilled; the requirement has no practical expression, because anywhere it is resting in the public domain it will also be considered as resting on a place four by four handbreadths, because we say that something caught in the air is as if it was set down. Are you with me? Yes — according to Rashi, I had previously assumed that according to Rashi and the Arukh — I’m saying what I asked. I asked: according to Rashi and the Arukh, it is not true that according to Rabbi Akiva you don’t need a place four by four handbreadths. You do need a place four by four handbreadths; it’s just that the requirement is fulfilled because the ground has four by four. The answer I’m now claiming is: right, that is exactly what the Talmud means when it says we do not require a place four by four handbreadths. When the Talmud says we do not require a place four by four handbreadths, it means that this requirement is not an additional requirement. All that is needed is that it be resting in the public domain. Once it is resting in the public domain, there will never be any further requirement for a place four by four handbreadths. But why? Because of the rule that something caught in the air is as if it was set down, because now it is as if it is resting on the ground, so there will be no practical expression to the requirement of a place four by four handbreadths. In fact, this is written in Kehillot Yaakov.

[Speaker F] Can I ask about Kehillot Yaakov? I got a little tangled up with another… does he say this about Rashi?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, wait — so we don’t lose the thread, let’s take a quick look at Kehillot Yaakov because I see

[Speaker F] that it’s a bit

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] hard for you today with my calculations. Look: “And one must say that this is indeed the Talmud’s intent when it said, regarding Rabbi Akiva, that according to Rabbi Akiva there is no need for placement on a place of four, meaning that even when it is not on a place of four there is still placement on a place of four by virtue of ‘caught in the air is as if it was set down on the ground.’” When the Talmud says that according to Rabbi Akiva you don’t need a place four by four handbreadths, it does not mean that you don’t need it. Rather, it means that it is always fulfilled automatically. There will never be a practical difference concerning that requirement, because always, due to “caught in the air is as if it was set down,” even when it is in the air it is considered to be on the ground. So therefore even if you need a place four by four handbreadths, it is fulfilled. It is integral—

[Speaker E] It is integral to “caught in the air.” What? I can’t hear.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So—

[Speaker E] Is this according to Rashi?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rashi and the Arukh. And therefore when Rabbi Akiva says that something caught in the air is as if it was set down, what is also being said here is that you don’t need a place four by four handbreadths. What does “don’t need” mean? It means it is always considered to be there, it is—

[Speaker E] present. You don’t need to say it; it is present.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nothing bothers me, okay? And therefore Kehillot Yaakov says: after all, I brought all this in order to explain the Mishnah — what is the law of an object resting in a hand, right? And therefore also when it is placed in the poor person’s hand there is a place of four, and it is considered as if set down on the ground, considered as if something is resting on the ground. And even though Tosafot above wrote that when it is in a person’s hand, “caught in the air is as if it was set down” does not apply — that was in the reference at the end of today’s page — one can say, as the Hazon Ish wrote, that Tosafot’s intention is only regarding a hand extended into another domain. There it cannot be considered at rest by virtue of “caught in the air is as if it was set down,” since it is still attached to the first domain by means of the hand. But here we are talking about the homeowner’s hand, which is in the same domain as where the homeowner himself is. In that situation, even when the object is resting in the hand, we say “caught in the air is as if it was set down.” And then what Kehillot Yaakov is basically saying is that according to Rashi and the Arukh, where “caught in the air is as if it was set down” means resting on the ground, when we say that we do not require a place four by four handbreadths, that means this requirement is not an additional requirement. All that is needed is that it be resting in the public domain. A place four by four handbreadths and “caught in the air is as if it was set down” are the same thing; it is the same law. All right? Okay.

[Speaker B] But according to this approach, then with the Rabbis it will be clear for us — we won’t still remain in doubt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? We said that when, regarding the Rabbis, we say “something caught in the air is not as if it was set down,” the meaning is that you need a place four by four handbreadths. Exactly, that’s what it means. The Talmud works out beautifully. That is exactly what the Talmud says. Therefore it makes Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis’ dispute depend on whether something caught in the air is as if it was set down, and it identifies that with the dispute over whether a place four by four handbreadths is required or not. Because now it is completely that, in every direction. Unlike what I told you earlier, Noa, at the stage of the difficulty, now it is entirely that in every direction. To say “caught in the air is as if it was set down” is the same as saying you do not need a place four by four handbreadths. Because basically it is enough for me that it is considered as if resting on the ground; I don’t need anything more, there is no additional requirement. That is exactly the point. By the way, according to this it may also resolve the ruling we saw in Maimonides. Because we saw that Maimonides rules that placement on a place four by four handbreadths is required. And I said that according to our Talmud this — wait — that it is required, yes, according to our approach it comes out that this is not according to the Mishnah; it is the Rabbis’ opinion. But Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, and our Mishnah which goes with Rabbi Akiva, is that a place four by four handbreadths is not required. According to what I am saying now, that is not true. A place four by four handbreadths is required; it is just that it is fulfilled because of the rule that something caught in the air is as if it was set down. That’s all. And then this inference regarding Maimonides is also better resolved. Okay. Now regarding the view of Tosafot — that was the view of Rashi and the Arukh. According to Tosafot, we said that “caught in the air is as if it was set down” means set down in the air. Therefore according to Tosafot these are two different questions: whether a place four by four handbreadths is needed, and whether something caught in the air is as if it was set down. We said that according to Tosafot, what is difficult is the Rabbis’ view. Yes — according to the Rabbis, why do we say that according to the Rabbis we do not require a place four by four handbreadths? Sorry — according to the Rabbis, we do require a place four by four handbreadths. Sorry. It could be that the rule is “caught in the air is as if…” The Rabbis hold that one is exempt because something caught in the air is not as if it was set down, but they too agree that we require four by four. So on that, I think I already mentioned it earlier: it could indeed be that this is not only according to Rabbi Akiva. What the Talmud says — that we do not require a place four by four handbreadths in the Mishnah — goes according to Rabbi Akiva—

[Speaker D] And there it is explicitly written.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and the Rabbis also do not disagree with him on that point. The only thing they disagree with him about is that something caught in the air is not as if it was set down. That’s all. And then in fact it is not tied specifically to Rabbi Akiva; they bring Rabbi Akiva because there it is explicit, but alternatively the Rabbis do not disagree with him either. At least they do not necessarily disagree with him. Why? Because I can say that they disagree with him about the law of “caught in the air is as if it was set down,” but regarding the requirement of a place four by four handbreadths they also agree that it is not needed. And then we get stuck with—

[Speaker B] Maimonides. What? Then we get stuck with Maimonides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, Maimonides doesn’t fit with that. Okay. Now how can Tosafot understand why above ten handbreadths we do not say “caught in the air is as if it was set down”? According to Rashi and the Arukh, we saw why above ten handbreadths we do not say “caught in the air is as if it was set down.” It is a separate domain, because — wait — yes, because it is a separate domain. Right? But—

[Speaker B] We also said that according to Tosafot, if we did say it then it would be exempt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again?

[Speaker B] No, it’s a problem.

[Speaker F] Because according to

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot, they say that we do say “caught in the air is as if it was set down” even above ten.

[Speaker B] Yes, but exempt—

[Speaker G] an exempt area.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So therefore he does not impose liability. If there is no liability, that is because it is an exempt area. Kehillot Yaakov suggests another possibility. Just a few more minutes. In the view of Rashi and the Arukh, Kehillot Yaakov suggests another possibility. He claims that if we really regard the object as resting on the ground, then why, even if you say “caught in the air is as if it was set down,” is there still a question of four by four? Wait, sorry — why according to Rashi and the Arukh, why above ten do we not say “caught in the air is as if it was set down”? So Sefat Emet said that it is because this is a separate domain from the public domain, and we do not say “caught in the air is as if it was set down” in a separate domain. Kehillot Yaakov suggested an innovative answer: he wants to claim that when we say it is considered as if resting on the ground, what that means is that the object extends from its top down to the ground. The whole airspace is filled, not that the object lands on the ground.

[Speaker D] Its lower edge, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then he has another innovation, which is a major one — for this we would have to get into the topic of the beehive, a complicated topic that apparently we won’t manage to get to this year. Namely, that when the object is at a height of, say, twelve handbreadths, even though it is resting on the ground, it is not considered as resting in the public domain.

[Speaker E] Meaning its top—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] when its top is above ten handbreadths. Otherwise the whole answer of Kehillot Yaakov doesn’t help us.

[Speaker B] What? Because everything goes by the top? I didn’t understand. Everything goes by the top? By the highest point?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, the top of the object, the top — Rabbenu Asher.

[Speaker E] What? So wait — then is a residential building not in the public domain? Is it an exempt area?

[Speaker F] But it is a… yes. A private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We are not lifting up a building and setting it down, so it is not relevant here.

[Speaker E] Okay. That is exactly

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the topic.

[Speaker F] No, no, but in general, it is a private domain, because it is big.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The topic of the beehive — that is exactly what—

[Speaker F] If something is four by four, it is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] already a domain—

[Speaker F] a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What happens when you take a building — think of a situation like this — some—

[Speaker E] Hercules. Inside it there are many domains—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, listen — he takes a building, uproots it from here, and puts it down there.

[Speaker E] Right, and that happens a lot these days.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe, but what happens in such a case? That is the beehive question. A beehive is basically a very heavy and large building, but one that is still movable; it is not attached to the ground. And the question is whether in that case this is considered lifting up, considered setting down, because the entire building is large and is itself a private domain. But now you are turning it from a private domain into an object that you are carrying; you are moving the domain itself. Is that considered carrying out from a private domain to the public domain, or not? That is the beehive topic, a fascinating and wonderfully philosophical topic. But we won’t manage to get to it. So in the end I will settle just for this point. We won’t get any farther on the page.

[Speaker D] But if you say “extend it downward” and you say “caught in the air is as if it is set down” with the beehive, then it remains the whole… if in the beehive case you say “caught in the air is as if it is set down,” then it remains a private domain the whole time, doesn’t it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker D] Then it remains a private domain the whole time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re not going into the beehive topic. I don’t want to get into that now; it is a major minefield in its own right. I only mentioned that Kehillot Yaakov’s answer itself refers us to the beehive topic regarding this issue.

[Speaker F] I just wanted to ask, to be precise — I didn’t understand Kehillot Yaakov one hundred percent. The example of “extend it downward,” is that according to Rashi or according to Tosafot? I’m already confused.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, according to Rashi and the Arukh.

[Speaker F] According to Rashi and the Arukh, that is how he describes it? Why does he think—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the thing is considered as if resting on the ground, that does not mean that the object drops to the ground, but that we apply “extend it downward” and the sides descend downward.

[Speaker F] Yes, yes, rather “extend it downward,” I got it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I just wanted to ask — did you finish the page I sent, the updated one?

[Speaker F] Yes.

[Speaker E] Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, because I mean I’ll need a little bit of the things we didn’t talk about, but these are really things that I hope were fairly simple and clear from the page itself. The main line of reasoning I wanted to work through is what I did today. That was something it was important for me to give you feedback on, to see whether you did it properly, whether your reasoning there was correct. All right? Because in the next class, when we get to the next topic, I’ll still need a little of these things. Very good. Okay, fine, we’ll stop here.

[Speaker G] Thank you very much. Thank you very much.

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