Shabbat Tractate, Chapter 1 – Lesson 22
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- The requirement of lifting up and setting down from a place of four by four handbreadths in transfer between domains and in carrying
- The distinction between the domain in which the object is located and the place on which it rests
- The early sources for the requirement of a significant place
- The structure of the passage: attributing the Mishnah to a tanna who does not require a place of four by four
- Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis: “caught as though it had come to rest” and its connection to a place of four by four
- The apparent contradiction in Rabbah’s words, and the clarification between “caught” and throwing as derived from handing across
- The Talmud’s rejection: perhaps only setting down does not require it, but lifting up does require it, and the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot
- What does “caught as though it had come to rest” mean: ground or air, and why “caught” does not apply to a hand
Summary
General overview
The text returns to the laws of carrying out on the Sabbath and raises a difficulty about the poor person’s liability in the Mishnah when the lifting up or setting down is done into a hand, even though a hand is not a place of four by four handbreadths. Maimonides rules that lifting up and setting down do not incur liability unless one lifts from a place of four by four handbreadths and sets down on such a place, and the medieval authorities (Rishonim) struggle with the source of this requirement: according to Rashi it is a matter of reasoning, a “significant place”; according to Rabbenu Tam it is the normal manner of setting something down, and that presumably was how things were done in the Tabernacle; and according to the Ri there is an exposition from the verse “Let no man go out from his place,” which hints also to the place of the object. The structure of the passage then becomes clear: the Talmud attributes the Mishnah to a tanna who does not require a place of four by four, and begins to clarify who that is, with the first suggestion linking it to Rabbi Akiva and the rule that “caught is as though it had come to rest,” while examining the wording difficulties in the Talmud and the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot over the meaning of the inferences.
The requirement of lifting up and setting down from a place of four by four handbreadths in transfer between domains and in carrying
The Talmud asks: “The poor person stretched out his hand” — why is he liable? After all, we require lifting up and setting down from atop a place of four by four, and that is missing here, because in the two cases where the poor person is liable, he is either placing the object into the householder’s hand or lifting it from the householder’s hand, and a hand is not a place of four by four handbreadths. Maimonides rules: one who transfers from domain to domain, or one who carries in the public domain beyond four cubits, is not liable unless he lifts an object from a place that has four handbreadths by four handbreadths or more, and sets it down on a place that has four by four handbreadths. It is clear from his words that the requirement applies both to the lifting up and to the setting down. The text explains carrying four cubits as a subcategory of carrying out, with the medieval authorities explaining that the four cubits around a person are considered like “his own domain” within the public domain, even though everything is still technically the public domain.
The distinction between the domain in which the object is located and the place on which it rests
The Talmud does not challenge the fact that an object the householder is holding in his hand inside the house is considered an object located in the private domain. The whole discussion is only whether it is resting on a place of four by four within that domain. The text sharpens a non-obvious assumption in the Talmud, according to which there are two “coordinate systems”: one determines in which domain the object is found, and the second determines what place it is resting on or lifted from, and the two are not identical. The text illustrates this with the analogy of ownership versus sovereignty in the conflict with the Palestinians, in order to show that “domain” parallels sovereignty, while “place” parallels the logical layer of “what is this resting on,” separate from the question of which domain it is in.
The early sources for the requirement of a significant place
Rashi explains that a place of four is considered significant, so that its setting down counts as a setting down and its lifting up counts as a lifting up, and a hand is not a place of four. The text reads Rashi as saying that the basis of the requirement is simple reasoning: a small place is not a meaningful “place” for lifting up and setting down. The text notes that Rashi gives examples only from the poor person’s cases, and raises the possibility that later authorities inferred from this that the discussion concerns only the householder’s hand and not the poor person’s hand, with a possible rationale that in the public domain there are no separate “places,” only the public domain as such. Still, the text says it is not sure about that inference, and Tosafot explicitly writes that the law applies on both sides. Rabbenu Tam in Tosafot ties the rule to the fact that people do not normally set things down on less than four, and therefore that is presumably how things were done in the Tabernacle; the text emphasizes that Tosafot uses reasoning as an indication of what happened in the Tabernacle, not as an independent source. The Ri in Tosafot derives it from the verse “Let no man go out from his place,” meaning that the object too must have a “place,” and explains that there is no important place smaller than four. Nachmanides is cited as saying that this is simply a received Talmudic tradition and has no scriptural source.
The structure of the passage: attributing the Mishnah to a tanna who does not require a place of four by four
The text presents the main difficulty: the Mishnah imposes liability for lifting up and setting down into a hand, and the Talmud resolves this by saying that the Mishnah apparently holds that a place of four by four is not required, and therefore begins to investigate which tanna holds that way. The text keeps in mind the structure according to which the first suggestion ties this to Rabbi Akiva with the rule that “caught is as though it had come to rest,” and later the passage moves on to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and additional possibilities. The text raises a halakhic-methodological problem: if Maimonides rules that a place of four by four is required, it would seem that the Mishnah is not the practical Jewish law, even though there is no internal dispute stated in the Mishnah itself, and the text leaves this as a problem to be clarified later.
Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis: “caught as though it had come to rest” and its connection to a place of four by four
Rabbah attributes the Mishnah to Rabbi Akiva, who said that we do not require a place of four by four, and brings proof from the Mishnah: one who throws from the private domain to the private domain, with the public domain in between — Rabbi Akiva deems him liable and the Rabbis exempt him. The Talmud explains that Rabbi Akiva holds that we say “caught is as though it had come to rest,” while the Rabbis do not. The text raises a difficulty with the wording of the Talmud: if the Rabbis exempt because there was no setting down at all, then perhaps their dispute is over the very fact of setting down, not over a place of four by four, and if so it is unclear how one proves from here that Rabbi Akiva does not require a place of four by four. The text suggests a possibility that the attribution to Rabbi Akiva is only meant to show that there is at least one tanna who does not require four by four, without necessarily saying that the Rabbis dispute the requirement itself, and cites the methodological rule “we do not multiply disputes unnecessarily” in support of not positing more disagreements than needed — while noting that this still creates a serious difficulty vis-à-vis Maimonides.
The apparent contradiction in Rabbah’s words, and the clarification between “caught” and throwing as derived from handing across
The Talmud asks how Rabbah can state so simply here that the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis concerns “caught” within ten handbreadths, when elsewhere Rabbah was unsure whether the dispute concerns below ten, over “caught,” or above ten, over whether we derive throwing from handing across. The text explains the background of handing across in the Tabernacle, from wagon to wagon above ten handbreadths, and the discussion whether throwing is derived from handing across. The Talmud answers that in the course of his uncertainty, Rabbah later reached a conclusion. But the text points to a linguistic difficulty: it would have been more fitting to say that it became clear to him that the Rabbis do not say “caught,” rather than saying “Rabbi Akiva holds that ‘caught is as though it had come to rest,’” because even under the second possibility Rabbi Akiva might still agree to that principle. The text brings Tosafot in the name of the Ri, who explains that according to the second possibility Rabbi Akiva specifically holds that “caught is not as though it had come to rest,” and yet he obligates because we derive throwing from handing across. This makes the wording of the Talmud a decisive proof for Tosafot, because it distinguishes between Rabbi Akiva’s own position in the two possibilities.
The Talmud’s rejection: perhaps only setting down does not require it, but lifting up does require it, and the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot
The Talmud adds: “Perhaps it is only setting down that does not require it, but lifting up does require it,” and the text emphasizes that this is not just a casual “maybe” question; it must be based on a compelling inference. Rashi explains that the inference comes from the fact that the case does not incur two liabilities, because if neither lifting up nor setting down required a place of four by four, there would be room to impose two liabilities. Tosafot objects that the absence of two liabilities could stem from the rule that one is not liable for a subcategory where the principal category already applies, and in one lapse of awareness one brings only a single sin-offering. Tosafot proposes a different explanation: from the Tabernacle we see that they lifted from a box that had four by four and handed to the artisan’s hand, so it is possible that only lifting up requires four by four, whereas setting down does not. The text sharpens the point that lifting up and setting down are required according to everyone; the dispute is only at which stage a place of four by four is needed.
What does “caught as though it had come to rest” mean: ground or air, and why “caught” does not apply to a hand
The text presents two basic understandings: either “caught as though it had come to rest” means that the object is considered as if resting on the ground, or it means that the object is considered as if resting in the air and there is no need for resting on the ground, while still preserving the need for some act of setting down. The text shows that if “caught” means “as though resting on the ground,” then it is hard to understand how the Talmud proves from Rabbi Akiva that there is no need for a place of four by four, because the ground itself is certainly a place of four by four. The text quotes Tosafot, who writes that when the object is in the hand of the poor person or the householder, “caught” does not apply, and brings proof from the law that when the householder places it into the other’s hand and he takes it out, he is not liable. It explains that Tosafot’s claim fits with the view that “caught” functions as the equivalent of setting down on the ground, and therefore does not apply in a situation where the object is in someone’s hand. The text concludes by saying that so far this was a careful reading of the Talmud and Tosafot, and notes that the discussion will continue next time, with participants mentioning that they did not get to Kehillot Yaakov.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, fine, right? Is it recording now? You see? It’s recording, yes. Okay, fine. So we’re going back to the laws of carrying out. The Talmud says: “The poor person stretched out his hand” — why is he liable? After all, we require lifting up and setting down from atop a place of four by four, and that’s missing. Right? So in the two situations where the poor person is liable by Torah law, basically he is placing the object into the householder’s hand or lifting it from the householder’s hand, and a hand is not a place of four by four. Here the four by four is handbreadths, not cubits. In any case, that’s the required measure for liability. And here we see that he is liable even without that. And Maimonides indeed — I mentioned this Maimonides to you — rules as practical Jewish law: one who transfers from domain to domain, or one who carries in the public domain beyond four cubits, is not liable. What does that mean? I mentioned that one who carries four cubits in the public domain is a subcategory of carrying out. That too is called carrying out; it’s called carrying. Okay? Just as there is transfer from the private domain to the public domain, so too when you move something four cubits in the public domain, that also counts as carrying out, as if from one domain to another. Some of the medieval authorities explain that four cubits in the public domain are considered some kind of special domain, and when I take something beyond four cubits in the public domain it’s as though I moved from one domain within the public domain to another. So really…
[Speaker B] Wait, but it always has to be defined, meaning I’ll always be within a four-by-four in the public domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, of course, of course. These are just explanations. At the end of the day, the liability for carrying is when he moves it four cubits in the public domain. The medieval authorities explain the idea behind it. The idea is that from our standpoint, the four cubits around him are considered as though they are his domain within the public domain. It’s not a separate domain — it’s part of the public domain — but since he takes it from these four cubits to other four cubits, it’s like moving from place to place, even though both the starting point and the destination are part of the public domain. Fine, that’s just a parenthetical remark. In any case, the claim is that whether you transfer from domain to domain or carry in the public domain beyond four cubits, you need lifting up and setting down. And the lifting up and setting down, he says, one is not liable until he lifts an object from atop a place that has four handbreadths by four handbreadths or more, and sets it down atop a place that has four by four handbreadths. First of all, you see that this is required both for lifting up and for setting down. That’s just a hint of what will appear later in the passage, where they make a distinction there. In any event, that’s what Maimonides rules, so it really seems that this principle exists in practical Jewish law. What is the source of this law? It’s really not clear; the medieval authorities struggle with it. But before I get into what they say about it, I want to make a point that will come back later. The Talmud is basically challenging the cases in the Mishnah where I lift from or place into the householder’s hand. But the Talmud is not saying that this doesn’t count as lifting from the private domain. It’s obvious that an object the householder is holding in his hand while standing in the private domain is considered an object resting in the private domain. There’s no discussion about that. The whole question is whether it is considered to be resting on a place of four by four in the private domain. But there is no dispute that the territory — yes? — is defined; the domain in which the object is found is the private domain, that’s obvious. There is just an additional requirement: besides taking it from the private domain and transferring it to the public domain, there is another requirement, that the place where it is resting in the private domain be of size four by four. Or in the public domain, likewise, it has to be of size four by four.
[Speaker B] That’s why I asked before — after all, the whole private domain is a private domain. Anywhere I stand in the private domain, I can define it as four by four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, how can you? The hand is only one handbreadth by one handbreadth.
[Speaker B] But I’m standing in a private domain within a four-by-four space.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you are standing there, but not the object. The object is resting in the hand. That’s exactly what I’m sharpening right now: notice that the Talmud is assuming something very non-obvious here. On the one hand, it recognizes that the object the householder is holding in his hand is in the private domain. There is no problem in the sense that this is not a transfer from private domain to public domain — it is a transfer from private domain to public domain. The problem is that the condition is not fulfilled that the lifting up and setting down be on a place of four by four. That is, the Talmud distinguishes between two coordinate systems within which I identify the object. One system determines in which domain the object is found — private domain, public domain, and so on. The second system is the place where the object is found — not the domain — and that has to be a place of four by four. The place where the object is located is not the same as the domain where it is located. Those are two different things. And that is a very non-obvious assumption in the Talmud. I’ll come back to it later. Sorry.
[Speaker B] I still find it hard to picture what you’re saying. If the object is in my hand, then my hand is at a certain height off the floor, fine. But my hand is inside some space that is four by four — I can define that space.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right. But the place where the object is located is the hand. The domain where the object is located is the private domain — the householder’s house. But the place where the object is located is the hand. And what the Talmud is assuming here is that besides the requirement that, in carrying out, you take something from the private domain to the public domain — because otherwise you’re not liable — there is another independent requirement. Because a private domain is always four by four; it is at least four by four cubits, not just four by four handbreadths.
[Speaker B] Can I say, for example, that if an egg is inside a spoon in my hand, I can move it — meaning, it’s not in a four-by-four place?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. That’s exactly what the Talmud is saying. So if that’s the case, there would be no prohibition on carrying it out.
[Speaker B] Okay.
[Speaker C] But why don’t we say here that the hand is drawn after the body?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait. “The hand is drawn after the body” — that’s a complicated passage. I hope to get to it next time. For now I’m setting it aside. It also depends on the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot about what exactly “the hand is drawn after the body” means.
[Speaker C] There, right, fine, but… yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll get to that. But let me do this step by step, otherwise we’ll get tangled up. This will take us at least into next time too, meaning we won’t finish today. So right now all I want is to draw your attention to this point: we are distinguishing here between the domain where the object is located and the place on which it rests or from which it is lifted. Okay? Two different things. Now, the private domain is always of size four by four — more than that, much more even — but certainly it contains four by four handbreadths. If we identified those two things, there would be no room for this whole discussion in our Talmudic passage. Because any object found in the private domain is in a domain that has four by four. So what is the meaning of this additional requirement that the lifting up and setting down must be from a place of four by four? The fact that we see there is this additional requirement means that the Talmud understands there to be, as I said, two coordinate systems. There is one coordinate system that determines in what place you are, and another coordinate system that determines in what domain you are. Two different things. Okay? It’s like saying: I am now in my house in terms of the question who it belongs to, and I am in the State of Israel in terms of the question who the sovereign is. Okay? And we know there is a distinction between the definition of who has sovereignty over a piece of land and who owns the land. For example, many of the claims in the conflict with the Palestinians — sorry that I’m slipping into current events — but many of the claims in the conflict with the Palestinians are really claims about monetary theft, taking a house or land from a Palestinian who owns it as property; and there are claims about theft of sovereignty. That is, when the State of Israel applies sovereignty to an area where there are Palestinian homes, there is no theft in that. Ownership of the houses remains with the people who own the houses. All that changes here is the sovereign framework — who is the governing authority or the institutional state authority that envelops the whole place. But that has nothing to do with ownership. So I think that’s not a bad analogy for what we see here. A lot of times the claim is that the moment the State of Israel was established there was theft in that. But that’s not correct. Theft means taking someone’s house that belonged to someone. There were also such things. I’m just saying, that’s not the same claim. The claim that I imposed a framework of sovereignty over the area is not related to the question whether I stole houses or not. Two different things.
[Speaker D] I understood the analogy, just not what it’s meant to explain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The point is the same here. When I say that here too, when I look at the location of the object, I can ask what domain the object is in, and I can ask what place the object is resting on. Those are two different things. The domain parallels sovereignty. Meaning, the domain — who is the sovereign here? The sovereign here is the individual, the owner of the house. Fine? That’s why it’s called the private domain, because it belongs to an individual. Okay? The question of what it is resting on is what parallels ownership, not sovereignty. Meaning, that’s the question. Of course it’s not the same thing, but it’s parallel on the logical level. Okay? So I can ask what it is resting on independently of the question what domain it is in. Two different things.
[Speaker C] Maybe that can also answer the issue of “the hand is drawn after the body” — that maybe it refers to the domain and not to the place.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so right now — we’ll get there. At the moment I’m just placing the pieces on the board. After that we’ll start playing with them a bit. All right. In any case, let’s go back to the Talmud’s assumption that you need a place of four by four to lift from and to set down upon. What is the source of this law? So Rashi says: from atop a place of four, which is significant enough for its setting down to count as a setting down and its lifting up to count as a lifting up. And the hand is not a place of four. And our Mishnah teaches this both for lifting up and for setting down, as it says, “the poor person placed it into the householder’s hand” — that is setting down — or “he took it from it” — that is lifting up. Fine? So basically Rashi is just telling us these are the two cases in the Mishnah under discussion, showing that both lifting up and setting down require a place of four by four. Why, says Rashi? Where does it come from? From Rashi it sounds like there is no textual source; it is reasoning. The reasoning says that in order to say that you lifted an object from some place, that place has to have some significance. Otherwise you can’t say the object was lifted from some place. If the place isn’t really a place, then the object was not lifted. Okay? In other words, the object was not set down in a place either, if the place is not significant. So Rashi says this is basically a definition grounded in logic. If you want to say it was lifted or that it was resting, that means it has to be a meaningful place, a significant place. There is still room here to discuss whether this requirement applies to the domain or to the place. Because the domain is certainly something significant. There is a house here belonging to someone, it is large, so of course a private domain is something significant. But here we are requiring not only that the domain be significant, but that the place be significant as well. Meaning, the place from which I take the object also has to have some significance. And something smaller than four by four handbreadths — roughly forty by forty centimeters — such a place is not significant. You can’t say the object was lifted from there or set down there. It’s not important enough. That’s Rashi’s claim. Another point: some people inferred from this Rashi that Rashi is speaking only about the householder’s hand. What about the householder’s lifting up and setting down from the poor person’s hand? There too the Mishnah says that the householder is liable in those two cases. So one might have thought that the Talmud’s question is really on all four cases. Because in all four cases where there is Torah liability — “the acts of carrying out on the Sabbath are two that are four” — there are four cases with Torah liability: two of the poor person and two of the householder. So in the Talmud I would say that even though it starts with the words “the poor person stretched out his hand,” it means all the cases in the Mishnah. In all four cases it is unclear why there is liability, because after all there is lifting up or setting down from a hand. But when Rashi spells it out, he says: our Mishnah teaches this both for lifting up and for setting down, and he brings the two examples of the poor person. What about the two examples of the householder — when it is the poor person’s hand and the householder lifts from it or sets into it?
[Speaker B] So can’t we infer one from the other?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We can, but why doesn’t Rashi say it? Why does Rashi focus on the poor person?
[Speaker B] Saving writing space.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right — it’s possible to say that Rashi just gives two examples to show that we’re talking about both lifting up and setting down, but obviously it applies both to the poor person and to the householder. There’s no difference. For Rashi that was obvious, so he didn’t bother to spell it out. But some later authorities want to claim that the whole discussion really applies only to the poor person and not to the householder. And I think a possible rationale behind that could be the following, and it also connects to what we said. When I distinguish between place and domain, as I said earlier, you can do that only with the householder’s hand. Why? Because when an object is resting in the householder’s hand and the householder is standing in the house, then you can speak of the hand as some independent place, because the private domain is a very, very specific place. And the question is whether the hand is absorbed into it, or whether it is really defined as some sub-space, some independent space within the private domain. In the public domain, where the masses are moving around, the whole thing is a jumble that mixes everybody together. So in the public domain I would not make the distinction between domain and place. In the public domain there are no places. Fine? In the public domain there are only domains. Anything found in the space of the public domain, in the area of the public domain, no matter under whose hand or what and where, is in the public domain. The public domain by definition is a domain that includes everything. There are lots of components in it, but the whole idea of “public” is that I do not focus on the specific component I’m dealing with right now; rather, it’s part of the public. So the public domain is simply the public domain. And I’m not willing to define separate places inside the public domain. Therefore, an object resting in the poor person’s hand while the poor person stands in the public domain — it may be that in such a case, from my perspective, that is certainly fine. By “fine” I mean it counts as a place of four by four, because it’s all in the public domain; it is resting in the public domain. The hand does not define a separate place for itself within the public domain.
[Speaker C] Doesn’t that contradict Maimonides? Again? Doesn’t that contradict what Maimonides wrote? What? Maimonides is talking about everything in the public domain; he also claims that in the public domain you have to carry from four handbreadths to four handbreadths, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That in the public domain too you need to lift and set down on four handbreadths. Yes, okay — so what’s the question?
[Speaker C] So why, if the public domain is something where you don’t need to pay attention to location — to place, sorry…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m seeing this in Rashi. In Maimonides it apparently does not work that way. If that inference is correct — and with Rashi too it’s not certain — for example, later I’ll show you that Tosafot explicitly says not like that: that it applies both in the private domain and in the public domain.
[Speaker C] Right, Tosafot writes on both sides.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. So there’s no problem that Maimonides writes that way. The question is only whether this inference in Rashi is really a valid inference. I’m not sure it is. It could be that Rashi just gave two examples. But if the inference is right, it seems to me that one could suggest this rationale for it. Maybe yes, maybe no. I don’t know. Okay. Now Tosafot, when discussing this in the name of Rabbenu Tam, brings another explanation or source for this law that lifting up and setting down require a place of four by four. Rabbenu Tam says that people are not accustomed to setting an object down on less than four, and presumably this was also the case in the Tabernacle. First he begins with a line of reasoning, a move that comes up all the time in the laws of the Sabbath. You begin with reasoning: you say that the normal way is that when people set an object down, they put it on some place of a certain size. You don’t set an object down on the head of a pin. When people put something down, they put it on some place that has some size — say four by four, that’s more or less a reasonable size. Fine? Tosafot says: if that is the reasonable situation, then that was presumably also the case in the Tabernacle. Now I can already say that this is not like Rashi, because Rashi grounds it in the reasoning that a significant place is needed. Tosafot does not stop with reasoning. Tosafot uses the reasoning to show that this is how it was in the Tabernacle. In the end, why do you need a place of four by four? Because that is how it was in the Tabernacle. Not because that’s what logic demands. The only question is: how do I know that’s how it was in the Tabernacle? Because the normal way of doing things is in that manner, and unless proven otherwise, what was done in the Tabernacle was probably the normal way. So for Tosafot, the reasoning serves as an indicator of what happened in the Tabernacle. According to Rashi, the reasoning itself is the source of the law. The law is because of the reasoning — that lifting up and setting down require a significant place. According to Tosafot, there is no independent requirement that lifting up and setting down be from a significant place. What is required is that it be like the Tabernacle. Tosafot only says: since this is not the normal way of doing it, presumably they did not do it that way in the Tabernacle either. So when you do something that was not done in the Tabernacle, you are exempt. And it sounds a bit similar to Rashi, but notice that it really isn’t. Because according to Tosafot, this law has a source — the fact that it was so in the Tabernacle. The only question is how I know that, since I wasn’t there. I know because generally what was done in the Tabernacle was done in the normal way. And by the way, we’ve already met this more than once. For example, if you remember when we discussed a water mill and the upper stone and all the discussions we had there, I said that if I have two reasonable ways to grind — for example a water mill and a hand mill — then I have no way of knowing which of the two was done in the Tabernacle. And since that is so, I cannot know which of the two is prohibited by Torah law. Because what determines Torah prohibition is what was done in the Tabernacle. Again, exactly the same move as here. Meaning, I look at what is likely as a mode of action and what is unlikely as a mode of action, but not because that itself is important; rather, it is an indicator of whether it was or was not done in the Tabernacle. And what was done in the Tabernacle is what defines the prohibited labors of the Sabbath. Fine? The same move exists here too, and it recurs often; I’m just drawing your attention to it. Then they bring in the name of the Ri later in Tosafot, in that same Tosafot: and the Ri further says that “let no man go out from his place” implies that it also refers to the object — that is, from the object’s place. We expound this — notice: its place, as distinct from its domain. Because going out itself is already going out from the private domain to the public domain. Why then say “from his place”? Because besides going out, as it were, from the private domain, it also has to be from its place. We expound in Eruvin 17a: “let no man go out” means “let no man carry out.” Even though the simple sense of the verse refers to a person’s place, meaning his four cubits, nevertheless it also implies the place of the object, and there is no important place smaller than four. Okay? So again, the Ri also combines reasoning and verse here. The verse says that one has to define the object’s place. Now the reasoning comes and says that a meaningful place is four by four. But I still have a textual source, a verse, requiring there to be a place here. The reasoning only says what counts as a place, but the law itself has a scriptural source. It is not only reasoning. Fine? The Talmud says — Nachmanides claims that this is a received Talmudic tradition, some sort of oral tradition, maybe a law given to Moses at Sinai or something like that, and it has no verse; meaning, it does not come from the verses. Fine. That’s not important for our purposes. In any case, the point now is this. At the moment we are standing in the difficulty. How can the Mishnah impose liability on the poor person when he lifts from or places into the householder’s hand? After all, lifting up and setting down require a place of four by four, and the householder’s hand is not a place of four by four. That was the question. The Talmud resolves it by saying that the Mishnah apparently holds that a place of four by four is not needed. Our Mishnah disagrees with that law. It says that even without a place of four by four one is liable, and therefore taking from or placing into a hand also incurs liability. After that, the whole movement of the passage continues by trying to find who that tanna is — whether there is such a tanna, and who he is — who holds that a place of four by four is not needed. Because as practical Jewish law, apparently we rule that it is needed, as we saw in Maimonides. So if you tell me this Mishnah holds otherwise, then tell me, prove to me, that there is such a tanna, that such an opinion exists at all. And now the search for that tanna begins. The first section of the passage ties it to Rabbi Akiva with the principle that “caught is as though it had come to rest.” After that it moves to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, then to other possibilities. But keep the broad structure of the passage in mind. The broad structure says this: if you tell me that lifting up and setting down in the householder’s hand — or the poor person’s hand, depending on how you read Rashi — incurs liability, that means a place of four by four is not needed. But according to practical Jewish law we rule that it is needed. So apparently the Mishnah follows some tanna who holds that it is not needed — not as practical Jewish law, by the way, but that is his view and the Mishnah follows him. Who is this tanna? A whole list of possibilities, and today we’ll deal only with the first proposal — the proposal of Rabbi Akiva with “caught is as though it had come to rest.” The later proposals will bring other tannaim as the source of this opinion that four by four is not needed. Okay? But the structure of the passage is important to keep in mind, because from here on we’re going to enter into the issue of “caught is as though it had come to rest,” and we need to understand what niche that occupies within the whole passage. Why do I say this? Because really, what comes out here is this: if Maimonides rules as practical Jewish law that lifting up and setting down require a place of four by four, then our Mishnah is apparently not the practical Jewish law. Because the Talmud assumes that our Mishnah holds that a place of four by four is not needed — the proof being that it imposes liability even for lifting up and setting down from a hand. Right? And the Talmud says: but this doesn’t fit with the view, with the principle, that requires lifting up and setting down on a place of four by four. The Talmud answers: right, it doesn’t fit, but there are tannaim who disagree. They are not the practical Jewish law, but there are tannaim who disagree. So if we rule — if Maimonides, for example, rules that lifting up and setting down require a place of four by four — then in principle he should not rule in accordance with the law of our Mishnah. Right? Because our Mishnah is, say, Rabbi Akiva. Or the Rabbis. Are you with me?
[Speaker D] How can it be that the Mishnah is not according to our practical ruling — that we don’t rule according to this Mishnah? There’s no dispute stated in this Mishnah. No differing opinions appear within the Mishnah itself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] True, but there are differing opinions elsewhere, so what difference does that make? After all, that’s what the Talmud says.
[Speaker D] And there’s no possibility…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What?
[Speaker D] There’s no other way to explain Maimonides?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At the moment, no. We’ll see later. At the moment, no. If the Talmud ties the Mishnah to the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis, then what does Rabbi Akiva hold? That a place of four by four is not needed, and the Mishnah follows him. Right? In what do the Rabbis disagree with him? They hold that a place of four by four is needed, and therefore “caught is as though it had come to rest” does not help them, right? And the practical ruling — Maimonides rules like the Rabbis, right? Because he indeed requires lifting up and setting down from a place of four by four. That means our Mishnah, which follows Rabbi Akiva’s view, should not be ruled as practical Jewish law — because Maimonides rules like the Rabbis. Why Maimonides ruled like the Rabbis — that can be discussed. But assuming that Maimonides rules like the Rabbis, I would have expected him not to bring our Mishnah as practical Jewish law. But he does.
[Speaker E] Maybe there’s another solution — like, in principle four by four isn’t needed, but sometimes…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Maybe there’s another solution” solves every question. Maybe…
[Speaker C] But Maimonides is talking about the public domain…
[Speaker E] Maybe our case is an exception. Usually you need four by four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where, in what sense, is our case an exception? Who is the source that says it’s an exception? Because our Talmudic passage says it isn’t. The Talmud says the Mishnah is not an exception. Because if it were an exceptional case, there would be no need to tie it to the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis. The Talmud should have said: true, lifting up and setting down generally require four by four, but our Mishnah is an exception. But the Talmud doesn’t say that.
[Speaker E] Fine, we’ll see later. Okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore I’m saying: to say there’s some solution doesn’t solve the problem. I’m assuming there is a solution if Maimonides wrote otherwise, but we have to find it.
[Speaker E] But Maimonides — read the continuation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, we need to. I’m just — we haven’t finished the passage yet. I’m reading it in order. I’m only drawing your attention to where we stand at each stage. When we continue, we’ll have to keep checking whether something has changed. But at least for now, the situation appears to be that our Mishnah is not the practical Jewish law, or at least not according to the Rabbis, but only according to Rabbi Akiva. And one who rules like the Rabbis should not rule like the Mishnah. Right? That’s basically what comes out. Okay, later we’ll see whether the Talmud remains with that or not, but for now at least that seems to be the state of affairs. Now I’m entering…
[Speaker C] Wait — aside from Maimonides, does this appear elsewhere in Jewish law? I mean, I don’t know, the Rif — do others write this as practical law, four by four?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I need to check, but I assume yes. I didn’t check. I assume yes; I’m sure yes. The accepted view is that lifting up and setting down require a place of four by four.
[Speaker C] Yes? Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But — and I’ll comment on this in a moment; we’ll get there. So that is the framework within which the discussion proceeds. Now I want to enter the Talmud’s first proposal, which is the passage we learned today, and that proposal basically says that the tanna whom the Mishnah follows is Rabbi Akiva, in the dispute over “caught is as though it had come to rest.” And now our subject is this principle. I’m leaving the broader passage aside, okay? Rabbah said: who is the author of this? Rabbi Akiva, who says that we do not require a place of four by four. For we learned in a Mishnah: one who throws from the private domain to the private domain, with the public domain in the middle — Rabbi Akiva deems him liable and the Rabbis exempt him. Rabbi Akiva holds that we say “caught is as though it had come to rest,” and the Rabbis hold that we do not say “caught is as though it had come to rest.” There is a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis about one who throws from the private domain to the private domain, with the public domain in between. Rabbi Akiva deems him liable in such a case, and the Rabbis exempt him. Rabbi Akiva, who obligates, assumes that when the object flies through the air and passes over the public domain, it is considered as though it rested there. So what happened? I carried an object from the private domain to the public domain, and then from the public domain it passed back into the private domain, and therefore I am liable. In a moment we’ll see whether that’s one liability or two, but in principle I’m liable. Okay? And the Rabbis exempt. And the dispute, the Talmud explains, is whether we say “caught is as though it had come to rest” or not. Okay? How is this connected to our discussion of whether a place of four by four is required or not?
[Speaker F] I want to say something for a second. Basically Rabbi Akiva is operating with three parameters; he differs from the others in three ways. Besides domain, for him a place of four by four is also not necessary, and also movement — there’s no resting here, and even an object that is in motion counts as though it had come to rest. Here there are three parameters in which he’s really different from the others.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a major question, what you’re saying. Because according to you, for example, on what do the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Akiva?
[Speaker F] Only on the place and the movement, no? Interesting. They didn’t really raise it, but that’s what it seems like to me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or maybe the opposite. Maybe the Rabbis also agree with Rabbi Akiva that a place of four by four is not needed — sorry, that it is needed — I mean, not needed, like Rabbi Akiva. It’s just that what bothers them is not that it rests in that small place, but that it rests…
[Speaker F] While it’s in motion.
[Speaker C] But then that doesn’t help for the Mishnah. That doesn’t help us explain the Mishnah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Both Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis…
[Speaker C] But the Talmud says “who is the author? Rabbi Akiva.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. That’s why I’m saying that from the Talmud it sounds like the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Akiva not because of the movement of the thing, but because the place is not a place of four by four. Right?
[Speaker F] And if this is so
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then it turns out that even according to Rabbi Akiva, movement is not an important parameter either. Rabbi Akiva’s novelty is that the item does not come to rest on an area of four by four, and you’re still liable. The fact that it’s in motion is not interesting; the rabbis aren’t bothered by that either. That’s what seems to emerge from the plain meaning of the Talmudic text. Okay? So now, for our purposes, I’m coming back to our issue: how does this dispute show that there’s some discussion here about an area of four by four? On the simple level, when Rabbi Akiva sees the object passing through the public domain, from his perspective it is considered to be resting in the public domain. But in fact it’s in the air. So in terms of domain, it’s the public domain, but in terms of place—we said there are two requirements—there is no area of four by four here. Where is there an area of four by four in which the object is located? Not in terms of domain, but in terms of place? There isn’t one; it’s in the air. Since that’s so, we see that Rabbi Akiva does not require placement on an area of four by four.
[Speaker C] That’s only for someone who thinks it’s in the air, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, we’ll get there, we’ll get there. But right now I’m deliberately presenting it vaguely, because in a moment I want to open this up further. But in the meantime, you don’t need an area of four by four. In principle it can’t depend on that, do you understand, Noa? Because the Talmudic text—everyone has to fit the Talmudic text, all the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—and the Talmudic text proves from Rabbi Akiva that you don’t need an area of four by four. So that means that even the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who think it’s resting on the ground will have to explain this somehow; we’ll see in a moment. In any case, Rabbi Akiva holds one liable and the sages exempt, and the dispute, at least as the Talmudic text understands it, is over the question of whether an area of four by four is needed or not—that’s really the question. And the phrase “it is considered as if it had come to rest” is basically synonymous here. “It is considered as if it had come to rest”—so Rabbi Akiva really holds that it is considered as if it had come to rest, and therefore what? Therefore he says you’re liable even though there is no area of four by four here, right? Are you with me? Yes, yes.
[Speaker B] There isn’t here
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] an area of four by four, and even so he says you’re liable because it is considered as if it had come to rest. And what are the rabbis disputing?
[Speaker B] They say that
[Speaker C] You’re not liable.
[Speaker B] Not liable—why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because there was no
[Speaker B] four by four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So they do not say that it is considered as if it had come to rest? I don’t understand. The rabbis could disagree with Rabbi Akiva and say: yes, we do say that it is considered as if it had come to rest, but you still need an area of four by four.
[Speaker F] No, but they’re claiming altogether that there’s no such thing as “it is considered as if it had come to rest.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, the question is: who told you that?
[Speaker C] But that’s the reason, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the reason—“it is considered as if it had come to rest.” The Talmudic text explains the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis that way. They themselves simply disagree with Rabbi Akiva and claim that he is exempt. The continuation, the explanation afterward—that’s the Talmudic text’s explanation.
[Speaker D] What’s the explanation of the concept “it is considered as if it had come to rest”?
[Speaker E] We need to understand that.
[Speaker F] “Caught”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] means in motion through the air
[Speaker E] of the domain
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of the public domain. Okay?
[Speaker F] I think they’re claiming that if it’s above ten handbreadths, then maybe it’s an exempt area?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no—that comes later. For now we’re not there yet; right now the discussion is below ten handbreadths.
[Speaker E] Because if you think it is considered as if it had come to rest, then in some way you have to interpret that as if it rested on four by four—for example, on the ground.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m saying: if the rabbis hold that it is not considered as if it had come to rest, then their problem with Rabbi Akiva is not on the plane of whether an area of four by four is required. They too might hold that you don’t need an area of four by four; they’re just claiming that here it simply was not at rest at all. Not that it rested on a small place, but that it did not rest at all.
[Speaker C] So that’s the reason why? That’s the reason this is not… It seems like the sages think that’s the reason it is not considered as if it had come to rest.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What reason? That what?
[Speaker C] That it isn’t on an area of four by four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, then what? Then it is considered as if it had come to rest, only the place is not four by four. But no—according to the sages, there is no placement here, no placement.
[Speaker B] So that’s why I’m saying: if there’s no placement here, then the sages should have disagreed with Rabbi Akiva differently. They should have said to Rabbi Akiva: you’re right, it is considered as if it had come to rest.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but we said they are not discussing it on the plane of
[Speaker C] whether the object came to rest or not. From their perspective, the fact that it passes through is the same thing as its resting. They just need it to be in a place of four by four for this to count as transfer from public domain to public domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As we said earlier, because that really is what emerges from the Talmudic text. But now, when I read the explanation the Talmudic text offers for the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis, apparently that is not what it says there. Because I would have expected the Talmudic text to say this: Rabbi Akiva held—it’s important to understand that the citation of the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis is simply: Rabbi Akiva holds one liable and the sages exempt. Period. Up to there, that’s the Mishnah. Everything after that is the language of the Talmudic text. The Talmudic text is now explaining what Rabbi Akiva and the sages disagreed about. So let’s see how the Talmudic text explains it. Rabbi Akiva held: we say that it is considered as if it had come to rest. What does that mean? He sees the object as resting, and according to his view it does not need to be resting on an area of four by four, right? And therefore one is liable. Now the rabbis, who disagree with him—what do they hold? I would have said: they disagree with him because in their opinion you do need an area of four by four. So even if it is considered as if it had come to rest, here one would not be liable because it is not resting on an area of four by four. But the Talmudic text doesn’t say that. The Talmudic text says: and the rabbis hold that we do not say it is considered as if it had come to rest. I would have expected the rabbis to say: no, we also agree that it is considered as if it had come to rest; we just claim that this is not an area of four by four.
[Speaker F] They relate to the fact that it’s in motion and not at rest.
[Speaker D] I didn’t understand what “it is considered as if it had come to rest” means.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m asking whether the rabbis require four by four or not, according to the Talmudic text’s formulation.
[Speaker C] According to the Talmudic text’s formulation, obviously yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They require four by four?
[Speaker C] Because they say—according to whom is this view?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rabbi Akiva, and then they bring the Mishnah.
[Speaker B] No, you’re obviously speaking according to the beginning of the Talmudic text. I’m speaking according to the Talmudic text when it explains the dispute. I’m talking about that Talmudic text.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m talking about that Talmudic text.
[Speaker B] I think not, because they absolutely assume that passing through the air here—the “caught”—there’s no issue of placement here, so why get involved in that at all? Exactly. Exactly, that’s what I’m claiming. But they’re not speaking here about place and not about domain. They’re speaking about a state of—as Yiska said earlier—a state of motion or transit; you can’t call this “caught.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good. That is exactly my claim. And therefore I don’t understand what the Talmudic text wants. Because when the Talmudic text itself presents the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis, it says that the rabbis are not disagreeing with Rabbi Akiva on the question of whether an area of four by four is needed. From the rabbis’ perspective, that is not relevant at all because there was no placement here. If there had been placement, then I would start discussing whether it was placed on an area of four by four or not. But here, according to them, there simply was no placement at all.
[Speaker D] So why does Rabbi Akiva hold one liable?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because Rabbi Akiva claims there was placement here, because he holds that it is considered as if it had come to rest.
[Speaker D] So I’m sorry, I didn’t understand what “it is considered as if it had come to rest” means. I haven’t managed to understand it.
[Speaker B] Today we described it as wanting to say that if you’re flying over Saudi Arabia, then we are in Saudi territory. Meaning, we go from place to place, and in the middle we are in some airspace that is a certain domain. So Rabbi Akiva thinks that’s liable?
[Speaker D] No, I didn’t understand. If placement is required in any case, then the whole question is only whether it needs a place of four cubits by four cubits. No, but according to Rabbi Akiva there was no placement at all—we haven’t even started the discussion.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is considered as if it had come to rest.
[Speaker D] What does that mean?
[Speaker C] The very fact that he holds one liable.
[Speaker D] If it was somewhere in the air, then it’s as if it is resting?
[Speaker C] Yes. That’s what he claims. That’s why he says one is liable.
[Speaker D] And according to the sages, they do not claim “it is considered as if it had come to rest,” so there is nothing at all—so from their perspective obviously they exempt. What does this have to do with a place of four cubits by four cubits?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good, that is
[Speaker C] what the Rabbi is asking.
[Speaker D] What’s the problem? It’s a perfectly fine Talmudic text. The Talmudic text says according to Rabbi Akiva…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmudic text is not perfectly fine. Up to this point I agreed completely—you repeated exactly my question—but it’s not correct. That’s what I’m saying: the Talmudic text is not perfectly fine. Because the Talmudic text claims that Rabbi Akiva holds that an area of four by four is not required, implying that the rabbis disagree and hold that you do need an area of four by four. But that’s not true. It could be that the rabbis also agree that you don’t need an area of four by four; they exempt here because it simply was not at rest.
[Speaker D] But it doesn’t say anywhere that the rabbis do not hold by a place of four by four. The dispute brought here is over the question of whether there is such a thing as “it is considered as if it had come to rest.”
[Speaker C] But I don’t understand—yes it does, because at the beginning it says that this Mishnah is according to Rabbi Akiva. So apparently the view about four by four is according to Rabbi Akiva.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Akiva—that means it doesn’t fit with the rabbis, only with Rabbi Akiva. So what is that?
[Speaker E] Maybe according to the rabbis—I simply don’t know—maybe it fits and maybe not, but regarding Rabbi Akiva I understood that he does not need
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] four by four is not required.
[Speaker E] Did I understand that correctly?
[Speaker C] Right, that sounds correct.
[Speaker E] Maybe I really don’t know what the rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Akiva think. About them I don’t know their opinion on four by four, but about Rabbi Akiva I understood that he does not require it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good. A first possibility to explain this is really to say that when Rava says, “Who is this? Rabbi Akiva,” it does not mean that it works only according to Rabbi Akiva. Rather, Rabbi Akiva is certainly a tanna who does not require four by four. So first of all, if you ask me whether we found such an opinion—the answer is yes, Rabbi Akiva. As for the sages, maybe they require it, maybe not; I have no idea, because what they disagree about is that they claim it is not considered as if it had come to rest. So I don’t know their opinion about whether you need an area of four by four or not. It could be that our Mishnah also follows the sages, but certainly it follows Rabbi Akiva. Where would the big difference be? The big difference would be on the question whether our Mishnah is Jewish law in practice or not—the point I made earlier. After all, if our Mishnah is taught within the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the sages, then in that dispute Jewish law follows the sages, because the rule is that Jewish law follows Rabbi Akiva against one colleague, but not against many colleagues. When the many are against him, Jewish law follows them. So if our Mishnah goes only according to Rabbi Akiva, then as I noted earlier, I would expect it not to be ruled as Jewish law in practice. But if our Mishnah also goes according to the sages, and the Talmudic text here just didn’t go into that, then it could be that our Mishnah is also Jewish law in practice. That, for example, could be a possible solution to the point I raised earlier. Okay? So what emerges from here according to this suggestion—we’ll come back to it—but what emerges here is that at least for now the Talmudic text does not really make the Mishnah depend on the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the sages. The Talmudic text says: if you ask me who this is—whether there is a tanna who does not require an area of four by four—first of all, yes, there is: Rabbi Akiva. There may even be the sages as well, maybe they’re also there; I don’t know. But at least I found one tanna. So there is no longer any difficulty about the Mishnah—whose opinion it follows—as if there were no such opinion at all. There certainly is such an opinion. More than that, I think I mentioned this one of the previous times: there is a methodological rule; in the language of the later authorities (Acharonim) it is called “we do not multiply disputes unnecessarily.” What does that mean? If I see that Rabbi Akiva and the sages disagree on the question whether it is considered as if it had come to rest, there is no reason to create another dispute between them. Why assume there are two disputes if what is proven is only one dispute? Why just add another dispute on my own? Occam’s razor says we should choose the simpler option. So the dispute over “it is considered as if it had come to rest” I already found that they have between them—that’s what the Talmudic text says. So regarding the need for an area of four by four, reason would say that if so, then the sages agree with Rabbi Akiva. Otherwise I also wouldn’t think that—otherwise how does the Talmudic text itself know that what the rabbis disagree with Rabbi Akiva about is the law of “it is considered as if it had come to rest”? Maybe they disagree with Rabbi Akiva on the question whether an area of four by four is needed—how does the Talmudic text itself know this? Apparently the Talmudic text assumes that four by four is not in dispute; they hold that you don’t need four by four. So what remains? Apparently they disagree about the law of “it is considered as if it had come to rest.” But then it really comes out that our Mishnah goes according to everyone. Where do we get stuck? In Maimonides. Because Maimonides rules that an area of four by four is required. And if I’m right here, then it comes out that this fits neither Rabbi Akiva nor the sages, because both claim that four by four is not required. So with Maimonides, in any case, we’re stuck. Okay? So therefore that means the suggestion we just made—that the Talmudic text linked it to Rabbi Akiva, but that does not necessarily mean the sages disagree—apparently won’t work in Maimonides. But we’ll still have to examine this topic. Okay, now the Talmudic text continues. “Does this mean that it was obvious to Rava that with regard to ‘it is considered as if it had come to rest,’ and that they disagree within ten?” Yes, meaning the Talmudic text assumes that the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis is within ten, and they disagree on the question whether it is considered as if it had come to rest, and this is obvious to Rava. The Talmudic text asks: but Rava himself raised it as a question. But for Rabbah it was not obvious; Rabbah was uncertain about this question. How do I know? Because Rabbah raised the following dilemma. “Do they disagree below ten?” That’s the first possibility. He was torn between two possibilities. First possibility: they disagree below ten, and this is their dispute—Rabbi Akiva holds that it is considered as if it had come to rest, and the rabbis hold that we do not say it is considered as if it had come to rest; but above ten, everyone agrees one is exempt, and everyone agrees we do not derive throwing from handing over. I’ll comment on that in a moment. That’s the first possibility. Or, second possibility: perhaps they disagree above ten. The dispute is above ten, and this is their dispute—Rabbi Akiva holds that we derive throwing from handing over, and the rabbis hold that we do not derive throwing from handing over. But below ten, everyone agrees one is liable. What is the reason? We say that it is considered as if it had come to rest. Meaning, Rabbah is unsure whether Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis disagree about the law of “it is considered as if it had come to rest,” or whether they disagree on the question whether we derive throwing from handing over—but regarding “it is considered as if it had come to rest,” both agree that we do say that. So how, in our passage, does he treat it as obvious that their dispute is below ten in the law of “it is considered as if it had come to rest”? That is what the Talmudic text is asking. A few background comments. The Talmudic text says there was an act of handing over in the Tabernacle, between the wagons. They passed beams from wagon to wagon, and between the wagons there was a public domain, and the wagons were higher than ten handbreadths. So when they handed the item from wagon to wagon, that was at a high level, above ten handbreadths. And if this was in the Tabernacle, then such an act is a labor for which one is liable in our context too, because that is the criterion for the labors of the Sabbath. Okay? But that was handing over. Handing over means: I take the beam, extend it to the other person, and the other person takes the beam from me. But now I ask: what happens if I throw the beam rather than hand it over? Do we derive that if handing over is liable, then throwing is liable as well, or do we not derive throwing from handing over? Handing over is indeed liable, but throwing is not. That is the Talmudic text’s discussion here. Okay? Now the Talmudic text says that I basically have two ways to understand the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis. The first possibility is that they disagree below ten, and the dispute is whether it is considered as if it had come to rest. What happens above ten? Above ten, everyone exempts. How do I know? Because we do not derive throwing from handing over. That’s the first possibility. And that is apparently what Rabbah assumes in our passage. But in the other passage he is unsure; that is only one of the possibilities. The second possibility is that the dispute is above ten, and what do they disagree about? Whether we derive throwing from handing over or not. Then even in throwing above ten, Rabbi Akiva would say one is liable because we derive throwing from handing over; according to the rabbis one is exempt because we do not derive throwing from handing over. What happens below ten? Below ten, according to both, it is considered as if it had come to rest and both say one is liable. And the assumption is that there is no law of handing over below, okay, so you need “it is considered as if it had come to rest” in order to impose liability. So these are the two possibilities. The difference between the two possibilities is the question whether the law of “it is considered as if it had come to rest” is itself disputed between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis, or whether it is an agreed law. Right? According to the second possibility, it is really an agreed law; the dispute is over a different question altogether—whether we derive throwing from handing over—but the law of “it is considered as if it had come to rest” is agreed according to the second possibility. So the difference between Rabbah’s two options is the question whether “it is considered as if it had come to rest” is an agreed law or whether that is the point of dispute. Therefore the Talmudic text rightly asks: so how, in our passage—yes—how does Rabbah here say as something obvious that there is a dispute over “it is considered as if it had come to rest”? That chooses the first option, but Rabbah himself was unsure between the two options, so why here did he simply choose the first option? So the Talmudic text answers: “That is not difficult; after he asked, it later became resolved for him that Rabbi Akiva held that it is considered as if it had come to rest.” Right—he was unsure, but in the end he resolved it and reached the conclusion that the first option is correct, and therefore in our passage he used the first option. The fact that a person is unsure at one point and elsewhere later expresses a position—that is not a contradiction. It may be that the position was formed at a later stage than the uncertainty. That’s all. So there is no contradiction here. Okay? Now there is something interesting here. What is the difference between the two options? There is a very troubling linguistic point here. I spend a lot of time here on the plain meaning of the Talmudic text, because here the plain meaning of the Talmudic text contains many of the substantive questions. What exactly is the difference between the two options? What is the difference between Rabbah’s two interpretive options for the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis? According to the first option, Rabbi Akiva holds that it is considered as if it had come to rest, and the rabbis do not. Right? According to the second option, they both agree that it is considered as if it had come to rest. The difference between the options is the question what the rabbis think about “it is considered as if it had come to rest,” not what Rabbi Akiva thinks. Agreed?
[Speaker D] Yes. Right? Yes, yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I don’t understand the highlighted section I left here in the Talmudic text. “It was resolved”—not difficult. “After he asked, it later became resolved for him.” Meaning, he basically resolved his doubt and chose the first option. And what does the first option say? “That Rabbi Akiva held that it is considered as if it had come to rest.” What does that mean? Because
[Speaker B] after all, even according to
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the second option, Rabbi Akiva also holds that it is considered as if it had come to rest, not only according to the first option. Right. It should have said: it was resolved for him that the sages do not hold that it is considered as if it had come to rest. That is his conclusion. That is what distinguishes the first option from the second. The fact that Rabbi Akiva holds that it is considered as if it had come to rest is true in both the first option and the second option. So the Talmudic text’s wording is unclear. The Talmudic text wants to say that he chose the first option, but when it describes what he chose, it describes something shared by both options. If it wants to sharpen for me that he chose the first option, it should have said: after he asked, it later became resolved for him that the sages hold that it is not considered as if it had come to rest. That’s what it should have said. But the Talmudic text’s wording—that Rabbi Akiva holds that it is considered as if it had come to rest—still tells me nothing, because that is true for both the first option and the second.
[Speaker B] But here they’re relating to the sages’ point of view, not Rabbi Akiva’s point of view. Rabbi Akiva is consistent in his position.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But here the Talmudic text brings Rabbi Akiva. Read the highlighted passage now.
[Speaker B] Do you see the highlighted passage here? The Talmudic text wants to tell me which of the options Rabbah chose.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The first option. How does it describe it? “That Rabbi Akiva held that it is considered as if it had come to rest.” That is also true of the second option. It should have said: that only Rabbi Akiva held that it is considered as if it had come to rest—that I understand. Or it should have said: that the sages held that it is not considered as if it had come to rest—that I also understand. But it chooses exactly the wrong wording. It has two other possible formulations that would have been correct in the Talmudic text, and it specifically chooses the wrong one. That’s very strange. I remind you—did you see the Tosafot? The long Tosafot. Did you get to it, or…? Yes. Yes. The Tosafot there—did you notice that Tosafot claims that according to Rabbi Akiva, in the second opinion, it is not considered as if it had come to rest. And what it says, that below ten everyone is liable because it is considered as if it had come to rest—that is only according to the rabbis, not according to Rabbi Akiva. Do you remember? Let’s go to Tosafot for a moment. Just one line so we’re synchronized. Do you see it? Look. “And Rabbi Isaac further says”—I’m reading from the middle of the Tosafot—“that when the Talmudic text says, ‘but below ten everyone agrees one is liable,’” exactly the line we just read, “‘because we say it is considered as if it had come to rest’—that applies to the rabbis. But according to Rabbi Akiva, it is not considered as if it had come to rest, and he imposes liability because we derive throwing from handing over.” After all, Rabbi Akiva derives throwing from handing over, so the reason he imposes liability below is because he derives throwing from handing over, not because it is considered as if it had come to rest. Therefore Tosafot’s understanding is that the Talmudic text’s wording, “below ten everyone is liable,” the “everyone” refers only to the fact of liability, but not to the reason. Why is one liable? That differs. According to the rabbis, it is because it is considered as if it had come to rest, and according to Rabbi Akiva, it is because we derive throwing from handing over.
[Speaker B] Ah, where is that Tosafot? I’m not…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The long Tosafot, the Tosafot beginning with “because we say,” the one that runs between the columns.
[Speaker B] Ah yes, okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay? Now, without getting into Tosafot just yet—we’ll get there—but notice that this fits beautifully with the language of the Talmudic text. On the face of it what Tosafot says here seems very surprising, but when you read the Talmudic text—because according to Tosafot, what comes out? According to Tosafot, what basically comes out is that Rabbah’s first option is that Rabbi Akiva holds—holds that it is considered as if it had come to rest, and the rabbis also hold that it is considered as if it had come to rest, and the dispute is whether we derive throwing from handing over; and according to the second option, specifically the rabbis hold that it is considered as if it had come to rest, while Rabbi Akiva does not. So now when the Talmudic text says the line we read—“that is not difficult; after he asked, it later became resolved for him”—Rabbah resolved it and chose the first interpretive option, “that Rabbi Akiva held that it is considered as if it had come to rest,” because in the second option Rabbi Akiva really holds that it is not considered as if it had come to rest. The Talmudic text’s wording is excellent according to Tosafot.
[Speaker C] But deriving throwing from handing over applies only above ten handbreadths, not below?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, that’s not correct. Tosafot itself is unsure about that—there is another Tosafot. Another Tosafot in this passage—I don’t know if you saw it—raises the question whether deriving throwing from handing over also applies below ten or only above ten.
[Speaker C] Because in the Tabernacle it was above ten, so
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The point is whether there is a difference—what difference does it make? So Tosafot is unsure about that; the medieval authorities (Rishonim) also disagree about it. It’s really not simple at all. But the Tosafot here follows the position that we derive throwing from handing over even below.
[Speaker D] According to Tosafot he chooses the first view?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to everyone he chooses the first view; it’s just that according to Tosafot, the reason the Talmudic text gives—or not the reason, but the description the Talmudic text gives of that choice—is an accurate description. Because according to Tosafot, the difference between the options really is whether Rabbi Akiva holds that it is considered as if it had come to rest or not. In the first option, Rabbi Akiva holds that it is considered as if it had come to rest. In the second option, he holds that it is not considered as if it had come to rest, and the reason there is liability is because we derive throwing from handing over, while it is not considered as if it had come to rest. So when the Talmudic text wants to show that Rabbah chose the first option, it describes it correctly: it says, “and Rabbi Akiva held that it is considered as if it had come to rest,” and that is true only according to the first option. I haven’t seen anyone bring this, but this passage in the Talmudic text is a conclusive proof for Tosafot. Otherwise it is very hard to read the Talmudic text here. One would have had to read it as: that only Rabbi Akiva held that it is considered as if it had come to rest. That is probably how medieval authorities (Rishonim) who read the Talmudic text differently will have to read it, but it is very difficult. In the plain meaning of the Talmudic text, Tosafot is right. Okay? Now the Talmudic text asks: “Perhaps it is only placement that does not require it, but lifting does require it.” After all, what we see from Rabbi Akiva is that indeed regarding placement, you don’t need an area of four by four—because it is considered as if it had come to rest—because there there was only placement. But perhaps lifting does require it? Meaning, perhaps for lifting you do need an area of four by four, and therefore they go and bring another tanna—“Who is this? Rabbi”—and that is already the continuation of the topic, which we won’t discuss now. That’s the end of the section we’re focusing on. Okay? Why is there a difference here between placement and lifting? First of all, seemingly, what room is there for this objection? After all—maybe he only says it about placement and not about lifting. Maybe yes, maybe no—but how can you raise a difficulty from a mere maybe? After all, you’re raising a difficulty on the Mishnah. The Mishnah assumes that an area of four by four is not required, right? Because it imposes liability even on the poor person if he lifts from or places onto the hand of the homeowner. So you don’t need an area of four by four. We found a tanna who says that with regard to placement. The simple conclusion is that he presumably says it about lifting as well. That’s all. What’s the problem? Just as he says it about placement, he says it… The fact that here you found proof only regarding placement does not mean that Rabbi Akiva says it only about placement and not about lifting. Your proof is only from placement. But why distinguish? If this is so for placement, then it is so for lifting. Especially since you already have a Mishnah that says it, and you are looking for a tanna to support the Mishnah. So why not assume that Rabbi Akiva is that tanna, and just as for placement he does not require an area of four by four, so too for lifting he does not require it. That’s all. What kind of objection is that? In Rashi—I’ll read you the Tosafot, which also brings Rashi. Not the previous Tosafot; this is the Tosafot on “perhaps,” Tosafot on amud aleph—sorry, Tosafot on amud bet, the one after the long Tosafot. Rashi explains: “And he inferred this from the fact that he does not impose two liabilities, one for carrying out and one for carrying in.” Where is he inferring that from? After all, Rabbi Akiva says “liable.” Yes—the one who threw from one domain to another through the public domain is liable. According to the view that in both lifting and placement he would not require an area of four by four, Rabbi Akiva should have said “liable for two” if it was from private domain to public domain, because that is carrying out, and afterward there is also lifting. Rashi says—that is the source for the Talmudic text. The Talmudic text is really saying that Rabbi Akiva states his law only with regard to placement and not lifting—not maybe, but certainly. If it were only maybe, then it wouldn’t be an objection; you don’t raise an objection from a maybe. Maybe Rabbi Akiva said it only about placement and not about lifting? Maybe yes, maybe no—do you raise objections from that? So don’t raise objections and don’t posit maybes. But Rashi says: it’s not maybe, it must be so, because if Rabbi Akiva waived the requirement of an area of four by four for lifting as well, not only for placement, then he should have said here that he is liable for two, not simply that he is liable. If he says liable, it means liable for one. Okay? Makes sense? Yes, yes. Okay, so Tosafot asks—I continue in Tosafot—and challenges Rashi: “Perhaps the reason he does not impose two is because one is not liable for a derivative labor in the place of a primary labor.” After all, what two do you want him to impose?
[Speaker B] Carrying out and carrying in, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But carrying out and carrying in are a primary labor and its derivative. And one who performs a primary labor and its derivative in a single lapse of awareness—we already saw this—is not liable to bring two sin-offerings, but only one sin-offering. Therefore Rabbi Akiva says “liable” and does not say “liable for two.” So there is no proof that Rabbi Akiva did not see lifting here. There was lifting here, but since there was both carrying out and carrying in, one is not liable for two sin-offerings but only one.
[Speaker C] For that really just one? I mean, because it’s in one action?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not as though there are two
[Speaker C] actions one after the other?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—after all, I threw it and it passed through the public domain. What do you mean?
[Speaker C] I mean, there is—so it did carrying out from private domain to public domain, and afterward transfer,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is one action done within one lapse of awareness. I finished when I threw it, that’s it; after that the object flies. It is certainly one lapse of awareness. Now of course “liable for two” is always said in the case of unintentional violation. There is no “liable for two” in intentional violation, because you don’t kill a person twice; only cowards die twice. Okay, so when we say “liable for two,” that always refers to unintentional violation—liable to bring two sin-offerings. On that Tosafot says: that is not correct, he is not liable for two sin-offerings because it is a primary labor and a derivative done in one lapse of awareness, for which one brings one sin-offering. Therefore Tosafot rejects Rashi’s inference. And further.
[Speaker C] “One lapse of awareness” means one action?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it means one action and one error. Meaning, he didn’t know—after all he violated unintentionally—he didn’t know that it was Sabbath now, for example. So it’s not that in the middle he remembered it was Sabbath and then forgot again and then carried out and then carried in. In the same lapse of awareness, both things happened. Say, for example, if someone selects on the Sabbath because he forgot that today is Sabbath, and afterward he selects again, and he didn’t remember in between that today is Sabbath—in that same lapse of awareness, he is liable for only one sin-offering, because the sin-offering is determined by the number of lapses of awareness. You bring a sin-offering for the lapse of awareness, and if the number of lapses is one, then you bring one sin-offering.
[Speaker D] Why is that a primary labor and a derivative? Aren’t carrying out and carrying in both primary labors?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, it’s a primary labor and a derivative; they are counted among the thirty-nine primary labors only
[Speaker D] as one.
[Speaker B] There are
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] those who want to claim that carrying out and carrying in are a primary labor and something akin to a primary labor. We talked about the fact that there are labors similar to a primary labor, and they too are basically considered primary—not an additional primary labor, because there are only thirty-nine—but they also have the status of a primary labor, while other labors are derivatives. That isn’t important for our purposes. In any event, if it is within the category of the same primary labor, and these are two labors done in one lapse of awareness, then you bring one sin-offering. Okay?
[Speaker D] I wanted to ask about handing over—what exactly happened there in the Tabernacle with handing over? I mean, what action was done there? Someone took from one wagon and passed to the second wagon through the public domain? Yes. But he didn’t pass it into someone’s hand—he placed it on the wagon?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s set that aside for the sake of the discussion.
[Speaker D] No, because if they are passing from hand to hand, then again we are in the same story as here, where it isn’t placed on four cubits.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That depends on the question whether you need an area of four cubits or not. But after all, we know that our Mishnah was also ruled as Jewish law in practice, meaning that in practice it doesn’t bother us that this happened into a hand. So there too it could be that it happened into a hand. But for the sake of our discussion, let’s leave it—right now, it wasn’t into a hand there. Okay?
[Speaker D] No, because then it also changes for me the whole story with lifting and placement. He took it from one wagon, and there it was resting on four cubits, and passed it to the second wagon. Then he basically lifted it from his hand and not from a place of four cubits, so again we have the issue of lifting and placement.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He lifts it from that wagon, raises it, passes it. So let’s continue with Tosafot. “And furthermore, nearby Rav Yehuda says that Rabbi would impose two, even though it teaches simply: Rabbi imposes liability,” and so on. He has another difficulty from later in the topic that we haven’t yet seen—it doesn’t matter. “And it seems correct to explain”—therefore Tosafot explains differently from Rashi—“that he asks, perhaps lifting does require it, because we derive from the Tabernacle that they used to take from their chests, which had four by four, and place into the hand of the laborer.” Meaning, he says that really the inference is not from the fact that there isn’t liability for two, because that is no inference. The inference is simply from the fact that in the Tabernacle, the requirement for an area of four by four existed only for lifting and not for placement. Because they would take from a chest that had four by four and place into the hand of the worker. Therefore for placement Rabbi Akiva says you do not need four by four, but for lifting you do. Meaning, this is really learned from the Tabernacle. Okay? So it doesn’t matter—this is a different explanation from Rashi. But for our purposes, in the end there really is here: “perhaps it is only placement that does not require it.” In the Talmudic text it says: maybe this is only said about placement and not about lifting? Both Tosafot and Rashi say this is not a “maybe”; it is clear, because you do not raise objections from a maybe. You don’t raise objections from “maybe.”
[Speaker F] So why is the rule “it is considered as if it had come to rest” and not “it is considered as if it had been lifted”? I didn’t understand. If in the Tabernacle this was really only about lifting having to be from four by four, then why is the phrase “it is considered as if it had come to rest” and not “it is considered as if it had been lifted”? So that the lifting is what counts, not the placement. The very fact that it arrived in the domain, passed through the public domain—that’s what makes him liable, because he lifted; it’s considered as though he lifted.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but he needs placement. Not on an area of four by four, but there still has to be placement. How is it at rest if not because it is considered as if it had come to rest? “It is considered as if it had come to rest” comes to show me that it is at rest, not that there is a place of four by four.
[Speaker F] But in the Tabernacle the liability was for the fact that they lifted, not for the fact that they placed.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they also placed. They just lifted from a place that had four by four and placed into a hand.
[Speaker F] And the liability was because they lifted?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the liability was for both. You need both lifting and placement—nobody disputes that. In order to impose liability you need both lifting and placement. The question we’re discussing here is: in which of those two parts of the action do you need a place of four by four? That’s the discussion.
[Speaker F] Ah, okay. So for lifting you need four by four, and for placement you don’t, I understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Okay, so that is basically the flow of the topic. Now I want to—that is basically the flow of the Talmudic text.
[Speaker D] Wait, so according to what Tosafot brings from the example in the Tabernacle, I’m not interested at all in whether “caught is as if placed.” The dispute is whether you need a place of four by four or not, and from the Tabernacle we see that for lifting you need a place of four by four and for placement you don’t. I’m not interested in “it is considered as if it had come to rest.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At least according to Rabbi Akiva. That’s how Rabbi Akiva learned what happened in the Tabernacle. Because with Rabbi Akiva we see that regarding placement he does not require an area of four by four, right? That we see in Rabbi Akiva. Now we go to the Tabernacle and ask where he learned that from. Apparently from the fact that they placed it into someone’s hand. But notice that in that same action they lifted it from a place of four by four, not from a hand. Therefore even Rabbi Akiva will agree that for lifting, you do need a place of four by four.
[Speaker D] But still, couldn’t we just remove this whole discussion? If we learned from the Tabernacle that when they place in a hand that’s a problem…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean “we learned”? Rabbi Akiva learned that. That’s the proof from Rabbi Akiva. That’s how he learned what happened in the Tabernacle.
[Speaker D] If Rabbi Akiva learns it from the Tabernacle, then really there is no discussion at all about what “caught” means—whether there is such a thing as “it is considered as if it had come to rest.” That’s not interesting at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He did not learn the law of “it is considered as if it had come to rest” from the Tabernacle. He learned the law that for placement you do not need an area of four by four. Yes. “It is considered as if it had come to rest” cannot work unless you add to it the premise that for placement you do not need four by four. Because otherwise it doesn’t help to say “it is considered as if it had come to rest”—it is as if it had come to rest, but not on an area of four by four.
[Speaker E] Okay, fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now let’s start working. Up to this point we only read the Talmudic text. In principle there are two ways to understand this whole matter of “it is considered as if it had come to rest” a priori. One possibility—and often it’s like this—is that the object is essentially considered as resting on the ground. Even though in fact it’s just flying through the air, halakhically we view it as though it were resting on the ground. According to that, it is very unclear how they proved that according to Rabbi Akiva an area of four by four is not needed, of course. Why? Because if it is considered as resting on
[Speaker F] the ground, that’s four by four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The ground has four by four. So how does the Talmudic text learn from Rabbi Akiva’s words that according to his view, for placement you do not need an area of four by four? Therefore, seemingly, the more natural interpretation of “it is considered as if it had come to rest” is different. Not that it is considered as though it were resting on the ground, but that you do not need to place it on the ground. Do you understand what I’m saying? Yes. “It is considered as if it had come to rest” means: do you think placement has to be on the ground? No—if it is caught, that is as if it had come to rest. Meaning, it does not need to be resting on the ground.
[Speaker B] Wait, if from here the homeowner puts it in the poor person’s hand, does that mean it is resting in his hand and not resting on four by four, or does that mean that there is actually no placement here?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmudic text assumes that resting in a hand is not a place of four by four.
[Speaker B] It is not a place of four by four. And that’s a domain, okay, that’s a domain, not a place.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, the place is not four by four.
[Speaker E] Fine, maybe this is the extreme case of moving—say, if he moved something small and not on four by four,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So—
[Speaker E] Lower the protrusion to zero; it’s just hanging there in the air. Or a pin, exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay? So apparently the obvious conclusion is that if the Talmud proves from Rabbi Akiva’s words that Rabbi Akiva says that something caught is considered as if it has come to rest, then the Talmud proves from here that you don’t need placement on an area of four by four. Apparently the Talmud understands not that it’s like it’s resting on the ground, because otherwise you couldn’t have proved this from Rabbi Akiva, but rather that the Talmud understands that you don’t need to place it on the ground. Whenever we waive some law, the question is whether we find a substitute for it, or whether we’re basically saying that this law just isn’t needed. You can always see in many places that there are two possible understandings. They say here: in context X, you don’t need Y. The question is why. Is it because in context X there’s an alternative that does the job instead, or because you really don’t need Y at all? Okay.
[Speaker B] And is it enough that this object occupies space in the air? For example, if I throw it into the water, into the sea? So then same thing—is the sea a place of rest?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or not, or it’s like the air—it doesn’t matter. But let’s say, whatever you’d say about the air.
[Speaker B] No, but like—it occupies space in the air.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That it occupies space in the air is obvious; there’s no requirement about that. Every object occupies space in the air.
[Speaker B] No, but is that called coming to rest? My question is whether occupying space is called coming to rest according to Rabbi Akiva’s view.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that means that really—
[Speaker B] you don’t need—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] placement, because there’s always airspace.
[Speaker B] I—
[Speaker D] want—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait—
[Speaker D] to understand the second view. According to the second view, if for example in my hand I have some large box that is four cubits by four cubits, and someone places an object inside it, then even if that box isn’t resting on the ground, he’s liable? I mean, I didn’t really understand the precise point of what it means that it doesn’t have to be resting on the ground.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because I haven’t finished it yet; I’m going to explain now. The first possibility, that an object is considered as though it is resting on the ground—that’s a difficult possibility. Because according to that, if you say that something caught is considered as if it has come to rest, meaning that the object is considered to be resting on the ground, then it’s not clear how they inferred from Rabbi Akiva that you don’t need an area of four by four. Here there is an area of four by four: the ground. The second possibility, which apparently is more called for, is that “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” means that you don’t need placement on the ground. You don’t need placement on the ground, and therefore even though it’s not resting on the ground, it’s still fine. And about that we ask: wait a second, but it’s not resting on an area of four by four. So we see that according to Rabbi Akiva you don’t need placement on an area of four by four. Of course, when I say you don’t need placement on the ground, that doesn’t mean you don’t need placement at all. You need lifting up and you need putting down according to all opinions. It’s just that the putting down can also be in the air and not only on the ground. Because otherwise, for example, if one person lifts it up and another one puts it down, then the one who lifted it would be liable, right? Because you wouldn’t need placement—you’d only need lifting up. Obviously you need placement; it’s just that the placement can also be in the air and not only on the ground. So really the second understanding says not that you don’t need placement, but that you don’t need placement on the ground—or in other words, the object is considered as resting in the air. But now the opposite question arises: why, when the object is resting in the poor person’s hand, can’t we say that it is considered as if it has come to rest?
[Speaker B] That’s what I thought, really. So it—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] is standing in the air, and that’s perfectly fine—what’s the problem?
[Speaker B] As far as I’m concerned there’s no problem, that’s what I’m saying.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so let’s see that further on, but let’s see.
[Speaker C] Yes, but then that uproots the whole issue of the size of the place. So basically anything in its own airspace—if you say that anything located in a given domain, no matter what its size is, is considered four by four in that domain—then basically it uproots the whole requirement of location and not domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right, that itself is exactly what I’m noting. Apparently the whole distinction between place and domain disappears. Okay, but we’ll see that in a moment. It may really be that this is one of the possible ways to explain the conclusion of the passage. We’ll see that later. Look at Tosafot, on the words beginning “but.” “But below ten, all agree that he is liable, because something caught is considered as if it has come to rest.” Tosafot says: when the object is in the hand of the poor person or of the homeowner, the rule of “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” does not apply, because when the homeowner places it into his hand and he carries it out, he is not liable. What is Tosafot asking here? Tosafot is basically asking what I just asked: when the object is in the hand of the poor person or the homeowner, there it doesn’t make sense to say “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest.” And he has a proof for that, because if it were applicable to say “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest,” then when the homeowner places it into the poor person’s hand and the poor person carries it out, he should really be liable, because after all it had come to rest in his hand, and now he moved his hand and carried it out to himself. Apparently he should be liable. So we see that “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” does not apply when the object is in the hand of the poor person or the homeowner. Okay, so that is not a case of “caught.” What exactly is Tosafot trying to challenge?
[Speaker C] No, I didn’t understand what—
[Speaker G] He’s challenging—
[Speaker B] this possibility that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot is ruling something out here. In a moment I’ll want to clarify what exactly he is ruling out, but first of all, what does he write? What he writes is—placement.
[Speaker B] He’s ruling out the air.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says—
[Speaker B] that placement in the air isn’t considered placement.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, before the air—we haven’t gotten to the air yet. When the object is in the poor person’s hand, okay? Tosafot says that in such a case, the rule “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” does not apply. Even if, say, it’s at a height of three handbreadths from the ground or six handbreadths from the ground, less than ten.
[Speaker B] What, is he claiming that it’s simply placement? What? He’s claiming that it’s simply placement.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Either it’s good placement or it isn’t, but “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” won’t help you here.
[Speaker C] Does the law depend on whether the poor person’s hand is in the private domain or whether he is in the public domain, or does it not matter?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter. He says whether in the hand of the poor person or in the hand of the homeowner, yes. So he says the claim is basically that whenever the object—this whole rule of “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” is said about an object standing in the air, but for an object that is in a person’s hand, we do not apply the rule of “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest.” And then he proves it, because according to that, if the homeowner placed it into his hand and he carried it out, then he should have been liable, and it says that he is not liable. And that is only the proof, but it’s less important for our purposes. What is Tosafot’s interest in saying this? If I were to say “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” when the object is in the poor person’s hand, would that create some difficulty? It seems from Tosafot that yes. What difficulty would that create?
[Speaker G] It would be like Rabbi Akiva—that there’s no need for four by four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. Meaning, what is the Talmud actually claiming? After all, what did the Talmud ask at the beginning of the passage? The Talmud asked: how can you hold the poor person liable when he lifts it up or places it into a hand? After all, that’s not an area of four by four. What’s the problem? I can answer that easily. Right, it’s not an area of four by four, and you need an area of four by four—but what makes him liable is the rule of “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest,” and therefore he is liable. What’s the problem? Therefore Tosafot says: we see in the Talmud that when an object is in the hand, the Talmud assumes that “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” does not apply to that, and the whole discussion is only the question whether the hand itself is an area of four by four or not. If there were a discussion here of “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest,” then there would have been no need to resort to the question whether the hand has four by four or not; this would have been considered liability because “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest.”
[Speaker B] Oh wait, wait, wait—so the hand is—now we’re going back to what Noa said at the beginning of the lesson, that is, his hand is drawn after his body.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no—
[Speaker C] No, leave aside this “his hand is drawn after his body”—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] we’ll leave that complication for later.
[Speaker B] Okay, but wait—so that means the hand is in four by four—what? It means that the hand will always be within four by four, no matter where it is.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. Meaning, Tosafot is really saying this. In the Talmud itself we see that if we were to say the rule “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest”—that is, the Talmud says it cannot be that we say the rule “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” when the object is in the hand. There is no rule of “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” there. How does Tosafot see that in the Talmud? How does Tosafot see that in the Talmud? Because he says: if there had been a rule there of “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest,” then the Talmud wouldn’t have had to be troubled by the fact that the hand does not have four by four, since there was lifting up and putting down here because “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest,” like in the air. Yes. Meaning Tosafot assumes that the discussion of “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” and the discussion of an area of four by four are not the same discussion. Or in other words, Tosafot is really saying this: if the rule “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” means that “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” is like it is resting on the ground—the first of the two possibilities I mentioned above—then there would really be no room to ask the question what happens in the poor person’s hand, after all there isn’t four by four here. What do you mean? “Something caught is considered as if it has come to rest,” so it is on the ground, and there is four by four here. Right? Therefore Tosafot is basically saying that if I were to say “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” also in a situation where the object is in the poor person’s hand, then I shouldn’t have cared about an area of four by four, because that would have been on the ground. Therefore it is clear, says Tosafot, that when the object is in the poor person’s hand we do not say “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest.” So what is Tosafot’s problem? Therefore Tosafot really—the difference between these two conceptions is basically the question whether “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” means that it is considered to be on the ground—the two possibilities I mentioned earlier—or whether it is considered to be resting in the air. If it is considered to be resting on the ground, then if you say “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest,” then this too is an area of four by four. So what is troubling the Talmud? Therefore it is clear to the Talmud that in the hand we do not say “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest,” right? And therefore now we have to discuss the hand itself—after all, it is not an area of four by four, so that is our difficulty, and they answer from Rabbi Akiva that you do not need an area of four by four. Okay? But if we were to understand that “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” means that the object stands in the air—
[Speaker G] then they wouldn’t ask about four by four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. If we were to say that the object is resting in the air, then it is obvious in the Talmud that that is why the Talmud asks: after all, there is no area of four by four here, because the object is standing in the air. If my conception of “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” were that the object is resting on the ground, then the Talmud wouldn’t have needed to be troubled at all by the question whether there is an area of four by four here or not. Obviously there is an area of four by four, because “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest.” Okay? But if the conception is that “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” means that it stands in the air, then if I were to say “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” also in the hand, then that would solve the problem. Are you with me, or—?
[Speaker C] Yes. Yes. I’m not. Again.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s a Tosafot, and it’s important to him to explain why, when the object is in a person’s hand, we do not say the rule “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest.” Because it is obvious to Tosafot that if they did say there the rule “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest,” something would be off in the Talmud. What would be off in the Talmud? The Talmud wouldn’t have needed to be troubled by the fact that the hand does not have an area of four by four, because “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” would do the job. It is like it is resting on the ground, so there is four by four here—why do you care? How can you claim that in the Mishnah we see that an area of four by four is not needed? That’s not true; we don’t see that. The reason one is liable in the homeowner’s hand is because there is an area of four by four here. What is that area? The ground. Because “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest”—it is in the homeowner’s hand—“something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” means it is as though it is resting on the ground, so if that is the case, there is an area of four by four here. So what is troubling the Talmud about the poor person being liable? Obviously he is liable; there is an area of four by four here—what’s the problem? Therefore Tosafot says that apparently the Talmud understands that we do not say “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” when an object is in the hand. Okay?
[Speaker C] But that doesn’t—but that doesn’t explain what distinguishes the hand from the air.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m not—
[Speaker C] I understand the explanation of the move in the Talmud, but what in principle explains it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not explaining explanations at all right now; I’m only drawing out exactly what Tosafot says. No explanations—so far I haven’t explained anything. What I’m saying is that you can see in Tosafot a certain conception regarding “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest.” What is his conception? That “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” means it is like resting on the ground.
[Speaker B] Since it’s obvious that if the hand is in some place—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] on the ground—
[Speaker C] Doesn’t Tosafot say that “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” is in the air? Isn’t it not on the ground?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Did Tosafot say? And I—so this Tosafot says, let’s be precise: this Tosafot says, we do not say “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” when the object is in the hand. It follows from Tosafot that if we did say “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” and the object were in the hand, then something in the Talmud would not work. What would not work in the Talmud? That if we did say “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” also in the hand, then it would come out that when an object is in the hand there is an area of four by four here. So what is troubling the Talmud? Right? That is what Tosafot means. But that is correct only according to the conception that “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” means as though it is on the ground. After all, if “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” means in the air, then let’s say I say also in the hand: “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest.” Does that solve the problem of an area of four by four? No. Of course not. It is still in the hand, and that is not an area of four by four. How does “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” help me? Then you would still have to get to the point that you don’t need placement on an area of four by four. Clear?
[Speaker C] So because of that they actually do think it means in the air?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. From this Tosafot it comes out that “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” means that it is resting on the ground. Why? Because if Tosafot thought that “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” means in the air, then Tosafot wouldn’t have minded saying that we apply “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” also when the object is resting in the hand. Because what is bothering him about the possibility that we say “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” also when the object is in the hand? What bothers him is that if we say “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest,” then that solves the problem of an area of four by four. So what is troubling the Talmud about the fact that when an object is resting in the hand there is liability? Obviously, because it is an area of four by four. But the Talmud is troubled. So we see that the Talmud does not view the hand as an area of four by four. Tosafot says: apparently the Talmud understands that in the hand we do not say “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest.” But if Tosafot had thought that “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” means that the object is resting in the air and not on the ground, there would have been no problem at all assuming in the Talmud that we say “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” also about an object resting in the hand. It wouldn’t have thrown anything off. Because if we were to say “something caught is considered as if it has come to rest” when the object is in the hand, that would make it as though it were resting in the hand, not resting on the ground. And when it is resting in the hand, the question still remains: where is the area of four by four here? And that is exactly what troubles the Talmud. So the Talmud works out perfectly well in being troubled by that. Fine, this took me much longer than I thought it would. You’ll see it in the summary—go over it—so I hope that will make it a bit clearer. Just tell me where you’re up to on the page so I can see what we do next.
[Speaker B] We finished.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Including Kehillot Yaakov? For a change. What about the others?
[Speaker D] We did everything except Kehillot Yaakov.
[Speaker F] Me too, thank you very much.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s it? Is there anyone else? Iska, what about you?
[Speaker F] Exactly like Kama—just the Talmud without Kehillot Yaakov. We didn’t manage Kehillot Yaakov.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, good. So we’ll—I’ll think before next time how to structure this. But we need to continue at least one more time. Okay, what’s all this shouting?
[Speaker B] Thank you.