Tractate Shabbat, Chapter One – Lesson 21
This transcript was generated automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- The framework of the discussion: global thinking versus spiritual solipsism
- Removing the bread from the oven and Birkat Avraham: a specific permission or a sweeping rule
- A penalty versus “sin so that your fellow may benefit,” and the distinction between saving oneself and saving another
- Sefer HaChinukh and Nachmanides: “they regularly uproot their own words” as a model of point-specific suspension
- Saving a life: a halakhic source as a specific permission and not a comparative rule
- Mishneh LaMelekh and terumah “not from the surrounded produce”: rabbinic versus Torah-level, and the implications for the topic
- Tosafot as the key: mixing rabbinic and Torah-level prohibitions and deriving a general approach
- A sweeping rule that is still solipsistic: Tosafot, first part, and dependence on blame and on "do not place a stumbling block"
- Tosafot, second part: a global starting point with the permission limited because of negligence
- “A commandment of the many” and “be fruitful and multiply”: expanding the permission when the benefit is public
- A positive commandment overrides a prohibition, “at the same time,” and rules of override versus rules of comparison
- The law of mutual responsibility, women, and Jewish sinners: rejecting the identification of mutual responsibility with a global consideration
- Tashbetz, Ran, and the question: “who is the one committing the transgression?”
- Side remarks: altruistic acts, Roi Klein, and reinforcing the words of the Sages
Summary
General overview
The lecture places the question of “sin so that your fellow may benefit” against the background of two foundational approaches: a consequentialist-global consideration that seeks to minimize transgressions in the world, versus “spiritual solipsism,” which centers a person’s spiritual responsibility for himself and therefore recoils from committing a transgression even in order to save someone else. The discussion enters the Talmudic topic of removing bread from the oven in order to save another person from the prohibition of baking, and asks whether the permission, when it exists, is a specific suspension enacted by the Sages or a sweeping rule that “a lighter prohibition is set aside in the face of a graver prohibition,” and what practical difference this makes between rabbinic and Torah-level prohibitions. Throughout the lecture, proofs are examined from Sefer HaChinukh, Nachmanides, Mishneh LaMelekh, and Tosafot, and the lecturer argues that in the Talmud and in Tosafot, the very comparisons between different passages indicate a principled, general discussion. Tosafot offers two different directions: a narrow permission dependent on the blame of the person who caused the problem and on "do not place a stumbling block," versus a broader permission that is limited in a case where the sinner acted negligently. At the end, the possibility of linking this permission to the law of mutual responsibility is discussed; the identification of mutual responsibility with a global consideration is rejected; and a connection is drawn to Tashbetz and to Ran’s dispute regarding slaughtering for a sick person versus feeding him non-kosher meat, and the question whether it matters who actually commits the transgression.
The framework of the discussion: global thinking versus spiritual solipsism
The lecturer presents three principal directions that were seen in the previous lecture, centering on the distinction between a consequentialist-global consideration and a focus on the question of a person’s negligence and his personal responsibility not to sin even for the sake of another. He defines a “global perspective” as asking whether, overall, there will be more transgressions in the world or fewer, and defines “spiritual solipsism” as a position in which a person serves based on his own considerations, with the emphasis being: “Why should I sin if the other person is to blame?” He suggests that one can see in Ateret Tzvi a combination of these two dimensions, and notes that among different halakhic decisors there may be different mixtures of the global and the solipsistic considerations.
Removing the bread from the oven and Birkat Avraham: a specific permission or a sweeping rule
The lecturer explains that in Birkat Avraham, the focus is not only the question of Torah-level versus rabbinic status, but whether the permission to remove the bread from the oven is an active step by the Sages, who permitted the removal in order to save the other person from the prohibition of baking, or whether the permission stems from a sweeping principle in which preventing a graver prohibition justifies violating a lighter one without any need for a special permission. He formulates two possibilities: either the Sages “permitted” the prohibition of removing the bread in this situation, or the Sages prohibited bread-removal across the board and the individual must resolve the dilemma by comparing a rabbinic prohibition to a Torah-level prohibition punishable by stoning. He links these two possibilities to the two basic conceptions: the global consideration tends to see here a sweeping rule of comparing outcomes, while the solipsistic approach requires a specific permission, because the mere fact that one prohibition is lighter than the more serious prohibition being prevented is not enough to permit it.
A penalty versus “sin so that your fellow may benefit,” and the distinction between saving oneself and saving another
The lecturer distinguishes between the question of imposing a penalty on someone who stuck bread onto the oven wall with regard to saving himself, and the broader principled discussion in which one person commits a transgression to save another person. He argues that the rule “we do not tell a person: sin so that your fellow may benefit” is not, in the simple sense, a matter of penalties, but of what is permitted and forbidden without any penal mechanism. He focuses the lecture on the case of another person removing the bread to save his fellow, and notes that from the standpoint of a global consideration there is no essential difference between “for himself” and “for another,” but from other standpoints this is a different issue.
Sefer HaChinukh and Nachmanides: “they regularly uproot their own words” as a model of point-specific suspension
The lecturer cites the wording of Sefer HaChinukh (commandment 243) and of Nachmanides in his glosses to the first root principle: “And they regularly uproot their own words because of a Torah-level prohibition… if one stuck bread into the oven, they permitted him to remove it before he comes to a prohibition punishable by stoning.” He argues that understanding “regularly” as “many times, though not always” teaches that according to Sefer HaChinukh we are dealing with point-specific suspensions and not a sweeping rule in which a lighter prohibition is always set aside in the face of a graver one. He concludes that according to this approach, a mandate from the Sages is needed in order to permit the rabbinic prohibition, and the individual does not decide on his own to violate a lighter prohibition in order to prevent a graver one. From this follows a practical consequence regarding a case of a lighter Torah-level prohibition in order to save from a graver Torah-level prohibition, where there is no one “to permit it” without an explicit source.
Saving a life: a halakhic source as a specific permission and not a comparative rule
The lecturer raises the difficulty from the principle that saving a life overrides the Sabbath, and answers that for this there is a source in the Talmud in Yoma, chapter eight, which searches for verses and arguments in order to establish that “saving a life overrides the Sabbath.” He emphasizes that the passage in Yoma actually strengthens the claim that a source is needed in order to permit overriding Torah-level prohibitions. He adds that this does not prove anything against the global consideration, because there the comparison is between life and a prohibition, not between a graver prohibition and a lighter one, and therefore sources are needed to determine what counts as “graver” and what counts as “lighter” in a comparison that is not along a single axis.
Mishneh LaMelekh and terumah “not from the surrounded produce”: rabbinic versus Torah-level, and the implications for the topic
The lecturer cites Mishneh LaMelekh, who discusses the prohibition against separating terumah not from produce that is adjacent to the produce being tithed, and proves that it is rabbinic, arguing that if it were Torah-level they would not tell a learned person to separate terumah in that way in order to save an ignoramus from transgression. He presents Birkat Avraham’s inference that this implies that we do not say one should violate a light Torah-level prohibition in order to save another from a graver Torah-level prohibition, and that Mishneh LaMelekh assumes the principle is relevant only to rabbinic law. Alongside this, he notes that Mishneh LaMelekh himself brings medieval authorities (Rishonim) who hold that the prohibition against separating terumah in that way is Torah-level, and according to them, the Talmudic passage permitting such separation teaches that even a Torah-level prohibition may be permitted in order to save from a Torah-level prohibition. The lecturer uses this to show that the question remains open and depends on one’s assumptions about the source of the permission.
Tosafot as the key: mixing rabbinic and Torah-level prohibitions and deriving a general approach
The lecturer presents Birkat Avraham’s inference from Tosafot: Tosafot raises objections from cases involving the nullification of a Torah-level positive commandment, such as freeing a slave and the case of one who is half-slave and half-free, and the case of completion in tractate Pesachim, against the topic of removing bread from the oven, which is rabbinic. From this he learns that Tosafot does not make a principled distinction here between Torah-level and rabbinic prohibitions. He argues that even apart from the very mixing of Torah-level cases, the mere fact that Tosafot compares and asks from one passage to another shows that Tosafot understood the topic as a sweeping rule and not as a point-specific permission limited to bread-removal. He adds that, in his view, the Talmud itself is not proceeding as a historical inquiry into “whether those very Sages who permitted or prohibited” did so, but as an analysis of the reasoning behind the rule “we do not tell a person: sin so that your fellow may benefit.”
A sweeping rule that is still solipsistic: Tosafot, first part, and dependence on blame and on "do not place a stumbling block"
The lecturer reads the beginning of Tosafot as establishing a starting point that it is forbidden for a person to sin so that his fellow may benefit, and only “there, so that the ignoramus not eat untithed produce because of him” do we permit it, because the prohibition came about “through him.” He explains this as spiritual solipsism, in which the permission is not for the sake of the fellow, but in order to save oneself from the prohibition of "do not place a stumbling block," because he is the one who caused the other’s stumbling. In his sharp formulation, the fellow “doesn’t interest my grandmother,” meant to dramatize the position. He discusses the question of “one side of the river” and the possibility that even without the formal parameters of "do not place a stumbling block," blame or negligence might still be enough to create responsibility to fix the situation. He suggests a nuance in which there is a combination of concern for the broader world together with a condition of personal responsibility for having caused the problem.
Tosafot, second part: a global starting point with the permission limited because of negligence
The lecturer presents the “and one can further say” in Tosafot as a fundamental reversal: the starting point is that one may sin in order to save his fellow, and only “specifically where he was negligent” do we not say this. He emphasizes that Tosafot also treats an unintentional act as negligence in the sense of carelessness that is not unavoidable, and therefore specifically here they do not permit saving him. He argues that complete globalism would ignore the sinner’s negligence, but the fact that Tosafot limits the permission because of negligence shows that even in a global approach one still needs a justification for why a person should damage his own spiritual state in order to save someone who acted negligently. Perhaps the difference may be between mere permission and actual obligation, depending on the level of blame.
“A commandment of the many” and “be fruitful and multiply”: expanding the permission when the benefit is public
The lecturer explains that Tosafot resolves cases of freeing a slave for the sake of a prayer quorum, or coercing the freeing of one who is half-slave and half-free, by means of the principle “a commandment of the many is different.” He offers two understandings: either we are dealing with a higher level of severity that justifies the permission, or there is an altruistic tilt toward the many, in which the number of beneficiaries changes the justification for violating a prohibition. He parallels this to the discussion of self-sacrifice to save many people, and notes that “being fruitful and multiplying is a great commandment” is also discussed as affecting many, and even “potential people,” raising the question whether the consideration is to increase the number of people so that there will be more commandments, or to care only for those already existing.
A positive commandment overrides a prohibition, “at the same time,” and rules of override versus rules of comparison
The lecturer presents Birkat Avraham’s distinction between a formal override, such as a positive commandment overriding a prohibition, which requires “at the same time,” and a situation of comparing prohibitions, where simultaneity is not required. He gives the example of eating matzah made from new grain to illustrate simultaneity, and emphasizes that severe prohibitions punishable by karet or death are not overridden. He explains that Birkat Avraham brings from Tosafot in Pesachim (59) a distinction according to which, when it is one prohibition against another, the graver one pushes aside the lighter one without any requirement of “at the same time.” The lecturer uses this to sharpen the point that the question in our topic is whether we are dealing with a comparative rule or with an override rule that carries formal conditions.
The law of mutual responsibility, women, and Jewish sinners: rejecting the identification of mutual responsibility with a global consideration
The lecturer describes Birkat Avraham’s suggestion to link the permission to sin with the law of mutual responsibility, and then the difficulty this raises regarding those not included in mutual responsibility according to Noda B'Yehuda, such as women or Jewish sinners, and the implausibility of distinguishing between a man and a woman regarding the question of removing bread from the oven. He argues that mutual responsibility is an obligation toward another person and can include considerations such as “your own life takes precedence” and personal cost, whereas a global consideration is an obligation toward the world of the Holy One, blessed be He, and does not depend on whether the other person stands within the “framework of mutual responsibility.” He explains this by means of a metaphorical distinction between “the Secretary-General of the UN,” who worries about members of the organization, and a broader point of view concerned with the world as a whole.
Tashbetz, Ran, and the question: “who is the one committing the transgression?”
The lecturer returns to Tashbetz, which he mentioned in the introductory lecture regarding the Raavad’s question whether one should slaughter for a sick person or feed him non-kosher meat, and presents Ran, who prefers slaughtering because it is one prohibition, whereas eating non-kosher meat involves a separate transgression with every olive’s bulk. He brings Tashbetz’s question that in slaughtering, the other person commits the transgression, whereas in eating the non-kosher meat the act is done by the sick person himself, and argues that this is a difficulty that arises from the logic of mutual responsibility, where it matters who pays the price. He suggests that Ran would answer from a global consideration of the balance and quality of transgressions, in which the identity of the transgressor does not matter, only the total number of transgressions in each option.
Side remarks: altruistic acts, Roi Klein, and reinforcing the words of the Sages
The lecturer refers to a philosophical question about the possibility of altruistic acts and points to column 120 on his website, where he consistently argues that altruistic acts do exist. He mentions Roi Klein and presents the view that according to Jewish law, self-sacrifice in order to save others is generally forbidden, unless it is required for victory in war, and he distinguishes between human appreciation of such an act and its halakhic evaluation. He suggests interpreting the phrase “they regularly uproot their own words” also against the background of the principle that the Sages “strengthened their words more than the words of the Torah,” so that sometimes the exception is actually a point-specific prohibition intended to prevent contempt for rabbinic law, while the comparative tendency could be more general.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the previous lecture we saw—we began the discussion, really, of “sin so that your fellow may benefit,” after that introduction about global considerations, and I said that this too would really be in the background of the discussion here. So last time we started dealing with this law of sinning in order that your fellow may benefit. We saw a bit in the halakhic decisors, and I pointed to three main conceptual directions. There are those who put the consequentialist consideration at the center—what I called the global perspective—that is, whether overall there will be more transgressions in the world or fewer. There are those who place at the center the question whether the person was negligent; that is, the perspective I called spiritual solipsism, right? Why should I sin if the other person is to blame for it? The basic conception is that I’m supposed to serve out of my own considerations—I’m at the center. And I said that perhaps in Ateret Tzvi one can see some combination of those two things—the Magen Avraham, the Maggid Mishneh, as against Tosafot, Shulchan Arukh, Mishnah Berurah, Magen Avraham, and so on—that Ateret Tzvi somehow combines them, basically saying that there is both a relevant dimension of negligence and a relevant consequentialist dimension. And afterward I said that really in each of them you can see some nuance: maybe in the Maggid Mishneh it’s only global, I’m not sure, but maybe. But in the others there’s probably some mixture of the solipsistic and global considerations. And now I want to enter a bit more deeply into the topic and see how this actually finds expression in our own Talmudic passage itself. In Birkat Avraham, which I gave you to read, he really begins—begins the discussion of how to understand this permission, where there is a permission, to remove the bread from the oven in order to save the other person from the prohibition of baking. What lies behind his discussion of Torah-level, rabbinic, and so on—what lies behind it is not the question whether it’s Torah-level or rabbinic, but whether, when we speak about permission to remove the bread, that means that the Sages performed some active step—they permitted removing the bread in order, or in a case where it is needed, to save the other person from the prohibition of baking—or whether we are dealing with some sweeping principle. The Sages didn’t need to permit the prohibition of bread-removal in this context; rather, by the very fact that the prohibition of removing it is rabbinic, while the prohibition of baking is punishable by stoning, a Torah-level prohibition of labor on the Sabbath—by virtue of that alone the permission emerges. Meaning, simply the comparative consideration. In other words, you already…
[Speaker B] Wait, wait—comparative? Comparative means that the Sages simply never prohibited it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, quite the opposite. It means the Sages don’t need to permit it. The prohibition of bread-removal remains in force, and the Sages didn’t address situations where one must remove it to save the other person from a prohibition. Rather, does it get overridden in a sweeping way?
[Speaker B] Yes, the prohibition remains sweeping, so I’m saying that’s the second possibility.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s the second possibility I raised. I’m saying these are the two possibilities. One possibility says: the Sages need to permit the prohibition of bread-removal so that there won’t be a prohibition of bread-removal, and then I’ll be able to remove it in order to save the other person from a prohibition. The second approach says: what are you talking about? The Sages don’t need to permit anything. The Sages made a prohibition of bread-removal and went home. Now I have—I’m in a dilemma, not the Sages—I’m in a dilemma whether to remove it and save the other person from the prohibition of baking, or whether there’s a prohibition of bread-removal, in which case I don’t remove it. And the claim is that without—there’s no need for the Sages’ permission. Rather, in such a situation I’m supposed to decide that I need to remove it, because the consideration is to prevent a graver prohibition; so there’s no need to permit the lighter prohibition—the lighter prohibition is overridden in the face of the graver one. That is really the question Birkat Avraham is dealing with: are we dealing here with some sweeping rule, a rule saying that where a graver prohibition clashes with a lighter prohibition, the graver one pushes aside the lighter one—in other words, preventing the graver prohibition justifies violating the lighter one—and then there’s no need to examine whether the Sages permitted it or didn’t permit it; rather, this is a rule throughout Jewish law. Or not—here there is a specific question regarding bread-removal. There is no such sweeping rule. In every place where there is a clash, it is not certain that I’m allowed to commit a lighter prohibition in order to prevent a graver one. In order to prevent a graver prohibition, here specifically there is a question whether the Sages permitted the prohibition of bread-removal in this situation. And each case has to be discussed on its own: did they permit it there, or didn’t they permit it? Okay? That is really what lies behind Birkat Avraham’s discussion. He says it, but it’s easy to miss; he hides it a bit.
[Speaker C] But in principle—the Talmud itself is conducting a discussion here, so if it were obvious, the Talmud wouldn’t have brought this discussion at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what do you mean, obvious? The Talmud discusses whether there is such a rule. After the Talmud reaches its conclusion, then we can decide whether such a rule exists or not. But the question is: what is the Talmud discussing? Is the Talmud discussing the existence of a sweeping rule that a graver prohibition overrides a lighter one, or is the Talmud discussing specifically with regard to bread-removal whether here the Sages permitted it? I didn’t say it was obvious before the passage begins. My question is what the passage is about. In other words, the passage is trying to clarify whether one may remove the bread. What is the subject being clarified? Is the subject a general subject in Jewish law, that a lighter prohibition may always be violated in order to be saved from a graver prohibition, or is the subject specifically bread-removal—whether, with regard to the prohibition of bread-removal, when they made it, those same Sages who made it also permitted it where necessary in order to save a person from a graver prohibition? Clear?
[Speaker C] But this whole passage goes on to deal with the matter of a penalty—once the person has already stuck the bread in the oven, do we penalize him by not letting him remove the bread in order to save himself? It’s really dealing with a penalty.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here it’s a bit different. Right now I’m talking about one person removing it to save another person. If the person removes it in order to save himself, that’s a slightly different chapter. Of course, from the standpoint of the global consideration it makes no difference, but it is already a somewhat different chapter, and there it’s not certain that we’re talking about a penalty the way you describe it. But even if we are talking about a penalty, it could be that they say to him: look, you already did the act, as Riva says; that’s it, it’s lost to you—why should we permit you to remove it in order to save an act that has already been done? Maybe here indeed the Sages say I penalize you, or something like that. But the general principle that we do not tell a person, “Sin so that your fellow may benefit,” in the simple sense isn’t speaking about penalties. It speaks about the question what is permitted and what is forbidden to do, without penalties.
[Speaker D] So here the discussion is about another person doing the transgression, committing a transgression for—we’re…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right now we’re dealing with the question of one person in order to save another person. The discussion of the person with respect to himself is another discussion, which of course arises in the passage and which we already dealt with in the past, but right now I’m talking about “do we tell a person: sin so that your fellow may benefit.” In other words, our topic is one person sinning in order to save another person. That is the topic we are dealing with in today’s lecture. Okay? So of course that too arises within the passage here, but right now I’m putting the focus there. Our discussion is here. Now, how do we clarify such a thing? Are we dealing with a sweeping rule—a rule of comparison, let’s call it—or a global rule saying that I need to minimize prohibitions in the world, and therefore if I violate a lighter prohibition in order to save someone from committing a graver prohibition, there is no problem and no special permission is needed, because the rule says you need to make sure there are as few prohibitions in the world as possible. Alternatively, the other conception says: what are you talking about? There’s a question here; there is a prohibition of bread-removal. You can’t just take it upon yourself to violate the prohibition of bread-removal, deciding on your own—the Sages prohibited it. As long as they haven’t permitted it, you cannot violate it, even if your goal is a good one, to save someone else from a prohibition. That requires permission. It’s not something that follows automatically from comparing the graver and lighter prohibitions. Okay? Those are really the two sides. What stands behind the two sides? Of course, the whole discussion we’ve had until now. Because under the global perspective, it’s pretty clear that if this is a global perspective, then basically it is a sweeping rule. You need to compare the two options: either I remove the bread, in which case I commit a lighter prohibition but I spare a very grave prohibition; or I don’t remove the bread, avoid the lighter prohibition, but the other person ends up with a grave prohibition. From the global perspective it’s obvious that I am permitted to remove it, right? Because under the global perspective that is the option that leads to a better state of affairs—fewer prohibitions. So in fact what lies behind the two possibilities I presented earlier in Birkat Avraham’s formulation is nothing other than the two possibilities we’ve been discussing until now. The question is whether this is a global consideration, or whether—not—the other perspective, the one that says a special permission is required with respect to the prohibition of bread-removal. That really means there are no global considerations. The fact that the prohibition of bread-removal is lighter than the prohibition of baking is not enough in itself to permit it. Therefore the global consideration plays no role here. The question is whether specifically here the Sages permitted you the prohibition of bread-removal. Otherwise, without their specifically permitting this prohibition, even though this prohibition is lighter and the prohibition you are preventing is graver, it would still be forbidden for you to do it. Why forbidden? Because it’s solipsism, basically. I am forbidden to commit a transgression even if the other person will gain—will avoid more serious prohibitions because of it. That is basically a solipsistic outlook. Again, spiritual solipsism, right? Not plain selfishness. It’s the question what you…
[Speaker B] Wait, sorry—I’m not… right? I didn’t understand why it’s necessary to show that the first distinction exactly parallels the second distinction. That is, the global consideration versus the solipsistic one—how does that line up with the two conceptions Birkat Avraham presents? It doesn’t seem necessary to me. Why? I mean, it’s true that under the global consideration there should consistently be a rule that a graver transgression overrides a lighter one. That makes sense, and then it fits—there will be fewer transgressions in the world. That’s the easiest part. But from a solipsistic standpoint, the fact that they permit specifically bread-removal and not other things—how does that fit with “why should I sin so that my fellow won’t get entangled in something more severe?”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s the very same point—why is permission needed? I didn’t understand. If there is permission, the starting point is that it’s forbidden. Why is it forbidden? After all, my prohibition is lighter and I’m preventing a graver prohibition. Because the outlook is solipsistic, and I’m not allowed to transgress. But the fact is, they permitted it! In a place where the Sages permitted it, there’s no problem, because I’m not violating a prohibition. But the starting point is that permission is required, meaning that without permission it would be forbidden for me to do this. Fine? So that’s obviously a solipsistic outlook and not a global one.
[Speaker E] Meaning, if the Sages permitted it, then the consideration is not that it’s good for a person to commit a lighter transgression in order to…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Otherwise that permission would apply everywhere, not only to bread-removal. Bread-removal. Meaning that really at this specific point—and because the gap between bread-removal and baking is so large, or because of various other specific reasons of theirs—they say: here, we do indeed permit it. But that’s not… But the starting point is that permission is required. Meaning, without that, the mere fact that this prohibition is light and that one is severe does not in itself permit the matter. So that is clearly a non-global perspective. That is why all the introductions I gave up to now illuminate all the discussions one can have here in the passage, among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), among the later authorities (Acharonim). I brought Birkat Avraham as a good example, but I think it will come up everywhere—you’ll see as the lecture goes on, it comes up everywhere. In other words, the question whether it’s this consideration or… that’s what lies behind the issue, even though I haven’t found anyone who points this out explicitly. And that is really the subtext of this whole topic. Okay? That’s why I gave those introductions. Okay, so let’s see—how do we clarify the matter of whether this is a specific permission for bread-removal or a general claim? So Birkat Avraham—I’ll share my file here for a moment… And we’ll also see in the Talmud, this is a citation from Sefer HaChinukh, commandment 243: “And we also see in the Talmud that they regularly uproot their own words because of a Torah-level prohibition, as they said in tractate Shabbat: if one stuck bread into the oven, they permitted him to remove it before he comes to a prohibition punishable by stoning.” This is a quotation from Nachmanides in his glosses to the first root principle. So what do we see here? Sefer HaChinukh takes this as a specific uprooting, right? And not only that—he also says, “they regularly uproot their own words.” What does “regularly” mean? Meaning, it’s not in every place; rather there are many places where the Sages uprooted their own words. So you can see that the permission depends on whether our case belongs to those places where the Sages uprooted their words, or not. If it doesn’t belong there, then it really will be forbidden. So in the simple reading of Sefer HaChinukh, you indeed see that we are not talking here about a sweeping rule, but about a specific permission. The discussion is basically whether they permitted the prohibition of bread-removal. There is no sweeping rule that whenever there is a light prohibition versus a grave one, the lighter one is set aside—because otherwise it wouldn’t be “regularly,” it would be always. The Sages wouldn’t need to uproot anything at all, because what does it mean to uproot? They wouldn’t need to uproot anything; the mere fact that it’s a lighter prohibition versus a graver one…
[Speaker F] Wait, doesn’t “regularly” mean always?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. “Regularly” means many times, but not always. On the contrary, he says we find it regularly—as though this is not a rare thing, that we find the Sages uprooting their words. But that implies yes—it’s not always; rather there are many times the Sages uprooted them, but there are also times they did not. Meaning, therefore you see this is not some sweeping rule. The question is in how many cases they uprooted it and in how many they didn’t. Fine, one can argue about that—whether it’s many times or few times—but in principle an uprooting of the rabbinic prohibition is required in order to permit me to do this. Meaning, without that uprooting, in principle it is forbidden for me to do it. This is not some calculation that I make; it’s a calculation the Sages have to make. If they permitted this prohibition, then they permitted it; but if they didn’t permit it, I cannot decide that I will violate a lighter prohibition in order to save from a graver prohibition. That’s not my mandate—it’s theirs… they need to do that. Okay? The implication, of course, is what happens when we are talking about a light Torah-level prohibition that I need to violate in order to save from a grave Torah-level prohibition. In such a case, apparently, the conclusion according to Sefer HaChinukh should be that it was not permitted. It is not allowed. Why? If you find a source in the Torah that says the lighter prohibition—even though it is Torah-level—does not exist where it comes to save from a graver prohibition, then fine. But from the mere fact that this prohibition is lighter and the other is graver, it does not follow that one may violate the lighter prohibition. Everything we found in bread-removal is simply because in bread-removal there is a specific permission from the Sages—those who prohibited bread-removal are the ones who permitted it here. So even with a Torah-level prohibition, in principle one needs a source in order to permit it. Meaning, the default is that a light Torah-level prohibition versus a grave Torah-level prohibition is not permitted.
[Speaker C] But here we’re talking about others—not a specific person standing before two Torah-level prohibitions, one lighter and one graver.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s another discussion, another discussion. Right now I’m talking about one person versus another.
[Speaker C] But with one person versus another it matters a lot, because here too, when he says “they regularly uproot,” he’s speaking about the person himself, not about one person versus others.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t follow. Fine, he says they regularly uproot their own words because of a Torah-level prohibition, as they said: if one stuck bread into the oven… But it’s not true that he’s speaking about himself. What you do see is that the discussion in our Talmudic passage is whether the prohibition was uprooted, not whether the prohibition is inherently permitted. So apparently with respect to others as well, the question whether it is permitted to remove the bread is the question whether they permitted it or not, but not the question whether it is just permitted to them. You’re right that he isn’t speaking directly about permission for another person, but when he explains our passage, in the passage it’s clear that he understood the discussion to be whether they permitted bread-removal, not whether bread-removal is simply permitted. So in the context of others too—when we tell them to sin—there too apparently the discussion is whether they permitted bread-removal. So the implication that Birkat Avraham himself brings regarding a light Torah-level prohibition versus a grave Torah-level prohibition is not because a Torah-level prohibition is grave and a rabbinic one is light, since even in Torah law we’re talking about a lighter prohibition for the sake of a graver one. That’s not the point. Rather, what he says is simply that a permitting source is needed, because without it, it isn’t allowed. Or in other words, this permission is not a global consideration. This really is a solipsistic perspective. Okay, that is really the meaning. And therefore in every case one has to check. With rabbinic prohibitions, you can check whether the rabbis who prohibited them really permitted them here. But with Torah-level prohibitions, as long as it’s silent—if the Torah writes that it is prohibited, then it is prohibited; there’s nothing for me to check. Meaning, it is forbidden. I can’t ask the Holy One, blessed be He, whether He permits it to me in this situation—it’s not in heaven. What is in the Torah is in the Torah, and what isn’t, isn’t.
[Speaker B] So therefore—do I always know what’s light and what’s grave?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not necessarily, but I can know, for example, by the punishment. If there is a transgression punishable by lashes and another punishable by death or something like that—although even about that one can discuss whether the severity of the punishment necessarily reflects the severity of the transgression. The common view is yes; in Sefer Hasidim there is a desire to argue no. There’s a very interesting discussion about that. I once wrote an article about it too—about that whole issue. One of the first articles I wrote many years ago. In any case, for our purposes, what emerges from Sefer HaChinukh is that we’re dealing here with a discussion about a specific permission. There is no such sweeping principle. And the implication is that with Torah-level prohibitions we do not make a distinction between a light prohibition and a grave one. There the perspective is: if there is a prohibition on it, I cannot do it. Now, in the example of, say, slaughtering on the Sabbath for a sick person, or in general saving a life by violating prohibitions—there would seem to be room to discuss it. After all, there we are dealing with Torah law, right? With Torah-level prohibitions. We are talking about desecrating the Sabbath through a Torah-level prohibition, or slaughtering on the Sabbath, or eating non-kosher meat, which is a Torah-level prohibition, or some other prohibition in order to save a life. So there, apparently, we do see that a Torah-level prohibition too is set aside in order to save another person. How does that fit with Birkat Avraham’s conclusion here? The answer is that with saving a life, the Talmud in tractate Yoma, chapter eight, says that saving a life overrides the Sabbath. Meaning, Jewish law itself says that in a case of saving a life, the prohibitions were not prohibited. Therefore there really is a specific permission there. It does not mean that there is also some sweeping rule in Torah-level law. In fact, the Talmud there searches for sources—it brings arguments, brings scriptural sources, all kinds. There are five or six sources that the Talmud proposes in order to explain why saving a life overrides the Sabbath. And on the contrary, the passage there actually supports Birkat Avraham’s conclusion, because there you see that a source is needed, and without it I don’t automatically say that saving a life overrides the Sabbath. A source is needed in order to permit it. In other words, you see that in Torah law there is no permission in principle, only if we happen to find a source. But note, on the other hand, that this is also not really proof in favor of Sefer HaChinukh and Birkat Avraham, because there in the Sabbath discussion the whole point of searching for a source is because what is at stake there is life versus a prohibition—not prohibition versus prohibition. It’s violating a prohibition in order to save life, not to save someone from committing a transgression. Therefore here, even if I wanted to make the consideration—say the global consideration is the determining one, and Birkat Avraham and Sefer HaChinukh and so on are wrong, and it really is a global consideration—there is no proof from the Talmud there against that. Because there, if I only had the global consideration and nobody found me a source, how would I know from a global perspective what is preferable in the eyes of the Holy One, blessed be He? That a person remain alive, or that the Sabbath not be desecrated? I don’t know. These are two things of different kinds. This is not a case of a grave prohibition versus a lighter one that I can compare. It’s comparing things measured in entirely different ways. There is no common scale, and therefore I truly cannot determine from a global consideration what is more important than what. And therefore it may be that the reason the Talmud there searches for sources is just to tell me what is more important than what. Once they tell me that life is more important than Sabbath observance, now the global consideration comes in. I just needed the sources in order to determine what the global consideration is, because I don’t know what is more important than what. With prohibitions, I might determine it, say, by the punishment. But when I compare life with the prohibition of labor on the Sabbath, how can I determine which is graver? So because of that, I need a source to tell me which is graver—not that the source is permitting the prohibition here, but rather the source tells me which is graver. Once I know which is graver, the global consideration comes and says: okay, the graver one overrides the lighter one. And therefore I think that from that Talmudic passage one cannot bring proofs in favor of Birkat Avraham and Sefer HaChinukh. It remains open. Birkat Avraham brings Mishneh LaMelekh; I’ll copy Mishneh LaMelekh here. Mishneh LaMelekh talks about the prohibition against separating terumah not from adjacent produce. Right, we already discussed this: when we separate terumot and ma'asrot from fruit that is here for fruit that is elsewhere, they are not adjacent together, not one unit. Am I allowed to separate from one place for produce that is in another place? It says that it is forbidden. The question is whether this is a Torah-level prohibition or a rabbinic one. Okay? So here the medieval authorities (Rishonim) disagreed. Mishneh LaMelekh discusses that question and brings a proof that the prohibition of separating terumah not from adjacent produce is rabbinic. What is his proof? That if it were Torah-level, they would not tell a learned person to separate terumah not from adjacent produce in order to save the other person from a prohibition. That is Mishneh LaMelekh’s proof; therefore it is clear that the prohibition of separating terumah not from adjacent produce is rabbinic. Birkat Avraham says: from the words of Mishneh LaMelekh, you can see what he assumes—that there is no such thing as telling a person to commit a Torah-level prohibition in order to save someone else from a graver Torah-level prohibition. With Torah law we don’t say such things, only with rabbinic law. Right? That’s the assumption Mishneh LaMelekh doesn’t even bother to mention—it’s as though it’s self-evident. Mishneh LaMelekh isn’t dealing with that; he’s dealing with the question whether the prohibition of separating terumah not from adjacent produce is Torah-level or rabbinic. But from the proof he brings, Birkat Avraham learns how he understands our passage: that the permission to violate a lighter prohibition in order to save—save someone else from a graver prohibition—speaks only about rabbinic prohibitions. Right, that’s what Mishneh LaMelekh assumes; otherwise he has no proof of anything. His proof assumes that this can only be talking about a rabbinic prohibition. So you see that Mishneh LaMelekh understood that when we say to a person, “sin so that your fellow may benefit,” we are talking only about rabbinic prohibitions and not Torah-level prohibitions. And in that sense he joins Sefer HaChinukh. Again, the outlook is solipsistic and not global, because he is basically saying that a special permission is needed in rabbinic cases, and therefore with Torah-level prohibitions we don’t say such a thing. If it were a global perspective, then even with Torah-level prohibitions one could say such a thing, because separating terumah not from adjacent produce is a lighter prohibition than eating produce that hasn’t been tithed or from which terumah hasn’t been taken. So from Mishneh LaMelekh’s words you see that he took it differently. But as Birkat Avraham rightly notes, Mishneh LaMelekh himself brings medieval authorities (Rishonim) who argue that the prohibition of separating terumah not from adjacent produce is Torah-level. And according to them, that same Talmudic passage permitting the learned person to separate terumah not from adjacent produce in order to save the ignoramus from eating untithed produce—clearly that applies even to a Torah-level prohibition, right? Because they hold that separating terumah not from adjacent produce is a Torah-level prohibition. Mishneh LaMelekh himself argues against them; he claims the prohibition must be rabbinic, otherwise they would not say to violate this prohibition in order to save from a Torah-level prohibition. But those medieval authorities (Rishonim) who disagree with him and hold that separating terumah not from adjacent produce is a Torah-level prohibition—then the Talmudic passage that permits separating terumah not from adjacent produce in order to prevent the Torah-level prohibition of the ignoramus is clearly permitting a Torah-level prohibition here according to their view. So you see that the principle of telling a person to sin so that his fellow may benefit applies even to Torah-level prohibitions according to those authorities. Therefore, on the one hand, Mishneh LaMelekh is proof in favor of Birkat Avraham and Sefer HaChinukh; on the other hand, the medieval authorities (Rishonim) that Mishneh LaMelekh himself brings are proof…
[Speaker C] And therefore I want to ask something about that. Does this specific case of the learned person teach us a rule that a light Torah-level prohibition is pushed aside in the face of a grave Torah-level prohibition? Why does it teach that? You could start finding a solution for why in this particular case of the learned person they nevertheless permitted it, even though the rule is specifically that a light Torah-level prohibition does not override a grave Torah-level prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? What do you mean, they permitted it? It’s a Torah-level prohibition; it’s not the Sages.
[Speaker C] No, but why is one’s fellow allowed to violate a lesser prohibition? That doesn’t mean there’s a general rule. You can’t infer from that that there’s such a rule.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So then tell me why.
[Speaker C] Because, for example, in the case of the fellow you can say that he is actually causing the other person’s prohibition, because he’s the one acting.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Leave aside Tosafot’s explanations for now, wait, we’ll get to that. At this stage I see a permission here. The moment I see a permission here, and this is not a rabbinic prohibition—and after all, the Talmud doesn’t bring a verse telling me that the prohibition on separating terumah not from the adjacent produce, the prohibition which is Torah-level, to separate not from the adjacent produce—according to those medieval authorities (Rishonim), that’s Torah-level, and the Talmud doesn’t bring a verse saying, but here that prohibition doesn’t apply. Right? A sign that this is apparently a sweeping permission. Afterward we’ll see in Tosafot that maybe it’s only because I caused it, fine, that’s a different discussion.
[Speaker C] But if there’s a sweeping permission—if there’s a sweeping permission, there should have to be proof for it. Do we have proof? Do we have some rule in the Torah?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no proof—on the contrary. The sweeping permission is exactly what he’s saying. You don’t need any proof and you don’t need any source. Rather, if the prohibition I’m saving is more severe, and the prohibition I violated is lighter, then I look from the point of view of the Holy One, blessed be He: what does He prefer? And Jewish law means carrying out the will of the Holy One, blessed be He. Therefore it’s obvious to me that one may violate the lighter prohibition. It’s a sweeping permission; you don’t need sources for it. And that’s exactly the point: a global consideration is a meta-halakhic perspective; it doesn’t need a source verse teaching me this. The very fact that I am lessening the total level of prohibitions—that itself yields the permission. You don’t need some source for the whole idea.
[Speaker C] By the same token I could say the opposite. What opposite? That a light prohibition does not override a severe prohibition, and that’s what the Torah wanted.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if there is a global consideration, then the global consideration says that a light prohibition is lighter than a severe prohibition.
[Speaker C] But we don’t know whether there is a global consideration or not. The Torah didn’t tell us that; we ourselves are deciding it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so that’s why I’m now looking at the commentators, the medieval authorities (Rishonim), and asking myself how they understood it. Right? Because there are two possibilities. One is the global one, and the other is the solipsistic one. Okay? Now I’m saying: according to those medieval authorities (Rishonim) whom the Mishneh LaMelekh cites, who say that the prohibition on separating terumah not from adjacent produce is Torah-level, according to them it’s clear that this is a global consideration and not a solipsistic one. That’s how they learned it. The Chinukh and the Mishneh LaMelekh really learned that it isn’t. Exactly.
[Speaker C] I could also say the opposite: that the consideration is always solipsistic, and in this specific case they made an exception. Meaning, the Torah’s starting point is solipsistic, but in the prohibition of not from adjacent produce there’s a global consideration here, and it’s specific and needs to be permitted.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, you can’t say that. Why not? If a global consideration exists, then it always exists. You want to say it exists only here? What’s your source? Bring me a source. How do you know that here there is such a consideration? After all, no source is brought. The Talmud brings no source for the permission to separate not from adjacent produce. That is exactly what the Mishneh LaMelekh says; that’s why it’s obvious to him it’s rabbinic. But according to those medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say it is a Torah-level prohibition—how can I decide to permit it if there’s no source saying that here the Torah permits it? Rather, we see that even without a source I permit it. What does that mean? That this permission stems from the very fact that it is a light prohibition against a severe prohibition—in other words, that there is a sweeping rule.
[Speaker C] I can’t understand why you can infer from a specific case to the general rule.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, from a specific case? We always infer from a specific case to the rule; that’s called induction.
[Speaker C] Right, but for induction you need conditions in order to justify the induction, and the question is whether all those conditions are met here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly the opposite. The whole point of induction is that there are no conditions and no proof.
[Speaker C] The fact is that they’re looking for explanations—why did they permit it here after all? What? Why did they permit it here?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because it’s a sweeping rule—what do you mean, why did they permit it here?
[Speaker C] It’s a sweeping rule of a light prohibition versus a Torah-level prohibition? Obviously.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore the fact is that they didn’t bring a source and yet it is permitted. How can you permit a Torah-level prohibition without a source? Because you have some sweeping principle saying that if this Torah-level prohibition is light, and by means of it you save a severe prohibition, then apparently it is permitted—so no source is needed. I’m saying: that’s the position of those medieval authorities (Rishonim). According to the Mishneh LaMelekh and the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say it’s a rabbinic prohibition, that is exactly the opposite, solipsistic view. And therefore they say it’s a rabbinic prohibition, because if it were Torah-level it couldn’t be that they would permit it—that is exactly their argument. If it’s a Torah-level prohibition, without a source you can’t permit it. So what will those medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say that it is in fact a Torah-level prohibition say? After all, they have no source, so on what basis was it permitted? They apparently understand that no source is needed, because it’s a sweeping rule. Okay, now in Tosafot in our topic / passage—the Tosafot around which our entire discussion revolves—what do we see? What do we see in Tosafot here? So the Birkat Avraham infers from Tosafot that they do not distinguish between rabbinic prohibitions and Torah-level prohibitions, right? Because after all, it also brings there the prohibition against freeing one’s slave. Here for example: a woman who is half-slave and half-free woman, and people treated her promiscuously, and they compelled her master to free her. Now freeing a slave is the negation of a Torah-level positive commandment. Okay? Or similarly here, in Gittin: one who is half-slave and half-free, we compel his master and make him fully free. And also here, regarding Passover, the positive commandment of completion. The positive commandment of completion means this: in the Temple there is the daily offering of the morning and the daily offering of the afternoon, which is brought later in the day. Now, all offerings are brought only during the day, between the two daily offerings. It is forbidden to bring an offering after the afternoon daily offering or before the morning daily offering. The daily offerings are the envelope that surrounds the entire Temple service. Okay? That is called the positive commandment of completion. Meaning: there is a positive commandment that the completion of the offerings should be with the afternoon daily offering. After that, someone who brings an offering after the afternoon daily offering has neglected the positive commandment of completion. It is the neglect of the positive commandment of completion. Okay? So once again, this is the neglect of a positive commandment, a Torah-level prohibition. So if Tosafot compares Torah-level prohibitions to rabbinic prohibitions—here in our case removing the bread from the oven is a rabbinic prohibition, and Tosafot raises difficulties from Torah-level prohibitions—the Birkat Avraham says we see in Tosafot that from their perspective it makes no difference whether it’s Torah-level or rabbinic. The question is only whether it’s a light prohibition versus a severe prohibition, and that’s all. Against the Chinukh, against the Mishneh LaMelekh, and like those medieval authorities (Rishonim) cited by the Mishneh LaMelekh, who hold that separating terumah not from adjacent produce is a Torah-level prohibition, right? Tosafot too apparently belongs to the globalist camp, the camp that says that here there is essentially some sweeping permission: the moment there is one prohibition that is lighter and another that is more severe, I don’t care whether it’s Torah-level or rabbinic; the main thing is that this one is lighter and that one is
[Speaker C] more severe, and therefore it’s permitted. He also doesn’t distinguish between for himself and for others, because he also brings the example of the slave, which is for himself, as opposed to the story of the completion-offering, which could also be for the priest.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’ve already illuminated that point long ago, right?
[Speaker C] He really is a total globalist.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and in the global consideration that is also very logical, because in a global consideration there is no reason to distinguish between for oneself and for others. After all, I’m looking from the point of view of the Holy One, blessed be He: let’s see how many transgressions there will be here in each of the possibilities. What difference does it make whether I commit the transgression or someone else does? In this global perspective there is no reason at all to distinguish between a transgression I do for my own sake and a transgression others do for my sake. Because I am only comparing the number and intensity of the transgressions in each of the options. I don’t care who does them. That’s the whole idea of a global perspective. Therefore indeed it makes no difference. Now, ostensibly Tosafot fully joins the globalist conception. Okay? And I said that the difference between these two approaches is basically between a global perspective and a specific perspective—or a solipsistic one, if you like. Now the Birkat Avraham himself brings a practical implication of this. He says, for example, in the rule that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition, there is a principle of override: if I have a positive commandment that in order to fulfill it I need to violate a prohibition, then a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. Fine? So in order to fulfill the positive commandment I may violate the negative commandment. But there are rules to this. For example, it has to be be'idna. What does be'idna mean? That at the very moment I violate, at the moment I fulfill the positive commandment, I am violating the prohibition. I’m not allowed to violate a prohibition now in order to fulfill a positive commandment later. That I’m not allowed to do. Fine? I am allowed to violate the prohibition only if the fulfillment of the positive commandment itself involves violating the prohibition, so that it happens simultaneously. Okay? The Birkat Avraham asks: what about in our case? Wait, can you go back over that example? If I do it simultaneously. Of course not, right? Because the permission for me to commit a light transgression so that the other person not commit a severe transgression—that doesn’t happen at the same moment. On the contrary, not only does it not happen at the same moment, it doesn’t happen at all, because if I commit the light transgression, then he does not commit the severe transgression. At all. I prevent his committing the severe transgression. Meaning, the requirement of be'idna is not fulfilled here—that it happen at the same moment. The Birkat Avraham says: that is a consequence of the same discussion he has conducted up until now. Why? Because if we are talking about a global, comparative consideration—a comparison between two options—what do I care whether it is simultaneous or not? The Holy One, blessed be He, looks at how many transgressions were committed in the world, and from His perspective the fewer the better. So if I commit a light prohibition and in that way prevent a severe prohibition, obviously I should commit the light prohibition even if it doesn’t happen simultaneously; it changes nothing. I want to know the overall balance. In contrast, with rules of override like a positive commandment overrides a prohibition, there it does not stem from the positive commandment being more important than the prohibition. Rather, there is some specific consideration that says the positive commandment should override the prohibition; I won’t get into that topic right now. So there, that consideration is said only when various conditions are met—for example, that it happens simultaneously. Okay? So one can talk about such conditions and other conditions. In a place where the discussion is comparative—what I called a global consideration—what do I care if it happens at the same time or not? I want to know the total number of transgressions there will be in each of the two possibilities, and that is what determines it. Right, so that is basically what he claims: there will be a practical implication for this discussion, or for the dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) that he presented earlier—there will be an implication as to whether I require formal conditions on these override rules, on telling someone to sin so that his fellow may benefit: whether I would need to require that it be only when it is simultaneous, or to make various other requirements. He says: if it is a global consideration, there is no room for such requirements. You make the comparison, and the comparison says that this is the better option, so that is what you choose. But if it is an override rule, and not a comparative rule but an override rule—if it is an override rule, then of course there may be certain requirements, that it happen simultaneously and the like. Okay? He brings the…
[Speaker C] Can you give us an example of a positive commandment overriding a prohibition where it’s simultaneous? A commandment, specific commandments, in a specific situation?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, if I eat matzah made from grain from the new crop. Then when I ate that, I violated the prohibition of eating from the new crop, but I fulfilled the commandment of eating matzah. In that very act of eating, it is simultaneous.
[Speaker C] And then I’m allowed to do that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes—positive commandment overrides prohibition. But if, for example, I steal matzah and afterward, in order to fulfill the positive commandment and eat matzah—then the prohibition happened before the eating, and that is forbidden. By the way, an interesting question is what happens if the theft happens simultaneously with the eating. Say I stole it through the eating, meaning the eating itself is the act of theft. As far as I think, according to all opinions, that too is forbidden. I’m only bringing it as an example to illustrate.
[Speaker B] Maybe that’s because theft is something special.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, because theft is an interpersonal matter, and you can’t perform commandments at someone else’s expense; about that there is a special verse: “I the Lord hate robbery in a burnt offering.” Meaning, I do not want My commandments to be done through theft. So here theft is only an example, but not really a correct one; here even if it’s be'idna it is forbidden.
[Speaker C] But I had innocently thought that a prohibition is something more severe than fulfilling a positive commandment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s an interesting question that people discuss a lot, and I also wrote about it, and it’s not so simple. But…
[Speaker C] So according to this, I see that here, in the case of eating matzah, it is more severe than…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not only eating matzah—all positive commandments. Every commandment?
[Speaker C] And even if the prohibition is one punishable by karet? What? Even if the prohibition is one punishable by karet?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, prohibitions punishable by karet or by death are not overridden. But an ordinary prohibition, one punishable by lashes—a positive commandment overrides a prohibition.
[Speaker C] Okay, so this rule that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition is only in the case of lashes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, only ordinary prohibitions.
[Speaker C] Okay, that’s it—because something didn’t fully make sense to me, and that’s why I wanted an example, to understand why it didn’t sit right with me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, and it’s not so simple, because if in fact this is not a matter of severity, as the Birkat Avraham himself says—that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition not because the positive commandment is more severe. Because if it were more severe, then why would it need to be be'idna? By virtue of being more severe, it would override the prohibition. So there it’s a rule of override built on a certain consideration, not on a comparative consideration, not on a question of which is more severe than which. And if so, there would have been room to say that even a prohibition involving karet or death should be overridden by the positive commandment, because we are not talking here about comparing severities. But yes, the Talmud says not, and again we won’t get into that here. Okay, so basically he really brings from Tosafot in Pesachim 59—the Birkat Avraham, we won’t get into the Tosafot now—but he brings in Tosafot’s name that when I make a comparison between a lighter prohibition and a more severe prohibition—regarding myself, leave aside others for the moment, okay? If I have a positive commandment that overrides a prohibition, then the positive commandment overrides. What happens if I have a light prohibition—say I refrain from eating leavened food, that’s a prohibition—but I violate the prohibition of the new crop, which is also a prohibition. Okay? I’m not talking about a positive commandment versus a prohibition, but a prohibition versus a prohibition. He says that where there is a lighter prohibition versus a more severe prohibition, Tosafot says that it overrides. But there you do not need be'idna. Who overrides what? The more severe one overrides the lighter one. It is forbidden to do the lighter prohibition if it involves the more severe prohibition. Okay? Now, there Tosafot says there is no requirement of be'idna. It’s not like a positive commandment overriding a prohibition. The Birkat Avraham explains why: because when you compare a prohibition with a prohibition, it really is a comparative matter, and you choose the less severe option. In comparisons there is no room for requirements like having it happen simultaneously and various formal requirements. But in a rule of override, it depends: it overrides when they stand opposite each other, but when one is done now and the other later, then there is no problem of override, and from the perspective of comparison there is no place to compare a positive commandment with a prohibition, and therefore when it is not be'idna, it does not override. Right.
[Speaker C] Is this about others or about the same person himself?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even about the same person himself. In positive commandment overriding prohibition, usually it’s about the same person.
[Speaker C] And in a lighter prohibition versus a more severe one, are they both Torah-level?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There too it’s about—
[Speaker C] the same person.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The same borrowed example again—the Birkat Avraham brings it, and it isn’t connected to our topic / passage. He’s only showing that in override rules there are formal requirements, such as that it be simultaneous, but in rules of comparison there is no such requirement. That’s why he brought the Tosafot in Pesachim, and from there he infers to our case. The question is whether ours is a rule of override or a rule of comparison. If it is a rule of comparison, then there is no room to require be'idna, and you simply make the comparison and see which option is better. Okay. Fine. Now, the truth is that this whole discussion of the Birkat Avraham seems to me completely implausible. Because first of all, let’s go to Tosafot for a moment. In Tosafot he brought the proof that Tosafot goes against his initial direction from the fact that Tosafot mixes Torah-level prohibitions with rabbinic prohibitions, right? But actually you don’t even need to get to that. There’s a much simpler proof from Tosafot. What’s the proof? That Tosafot asks questions at all. After all, according to the Chinukh and the Birkat Avraham, there is no place for any of Tosafot’s questions, regardless of whether they are from Torah-level or rabbinic law. Because if the whole discussion here is whether they specifically permitted the prohibition of removing the bread from the oven, then why are you asking me from elsewhere about terumah not from adjacent produce—even if it is rabbinic, I don’t care. There they didn’t permit it. What kind of question is that? The very comparison that Tosafot makes between different places says that Tosafot apparently understood that this is a sweeping rule, right? Because otherwise there’s no room to compare. Here, regarding removing the bread, they did permit or did not permit, and there they did permit—so what? Every prohibition is judged on its own terms, whether the Sages permitted it or didn’t permit it. There is no sweeping rule that always a rabbinic prohibition is permitted in order to save someone from a Torah-level prohibition, so there is no room for Tosafot’s questions and no need for answers. Do you understand what I’m saying? In other words, the proofs you’re bringing from Tosafot are getting hung up on details. It’s not because Tosafot also mentions Torah-level prohibitions. Even if Tosafot brought only rabbinic prohibitions, so what? I would still say that Tosafot learns this way. Why? Because from the very fact that Tosafot asks from one topic / passage to another, it’s clear that he understood that the discussion in our topic / passage is a principled, general discussion and not a specific discussion about removing bread from the oven. Suppose he asked only from rabbinic prohibitions. Suppose separating terumah not from adjacent produce is a rabbinic prohibition, as the Mishneh LaMelekh says, fine? And Tosafot says: wait, why there did they permit a rabbinic prohibition and here they forbade it? I say: from that question itself—even leave aside whether the prohibition there, even if it is rabbinic—from the very fact that Tosafot asks the question, we see that he understood this as a sweeping rule.
[Speaker G] I’m not so sure. Why? Sorry. Because a person can think that in every specific case there is a different reason for permitting it, so he can compare different cases as to whether that reason is there or not there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what is the question? Again. Tosafot raises a difficulty, and afterward finds answers. Fine—but why does he ask the question? What bothers him? Here they permitted and there they didn’t—what’s the problem?
[Speaker G] So maybe he assumes there is some one reason in both cases that should lead to permission beyond the basic conditions.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he doesn’t assume there is one reason in both cases, because we are dealing with six cases. And if he assumes that in all six cases it should be the same, then he apparently assumes it is a sweeping rule. That is exactly what I’m saying.
[Speaker D] And not—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and not that each thing needs its own reason—that is exactly the point. And therefore I think that his focus on Tosafot with the issue of Torah-level and rabbinic is irrelevant. The whole move of Tosafot says this is a global consideration. The fact that he compares different places and needs explanations for why here yes and there no—according to the Mishneh LaMelekh and the Chinukh no explanations are needed. Here they permitted and here they didn’t, so what’s the problem? On the contrary: every place where they permitted needs explanation; a place where they didn’t permit is obvious, because if they didn’t permit it, then it’s forbidden. What’s difficult? The very difficulty means that he expected there to be one uniform rule in all places. Afterward he has explanations why not. But his initial expectation is that the rule should be uniform. What does that mean? That it is a global rule. I’ll say more than that: in the Talmud itself—I’m saying not in Tosafot—in my view it’s in the Talmud itself. In the Talmud itself you don’t find even a hint that the Talmud is searching whether those same Sages who forbade removing the bread from the oven permitted it in a case where I am saving someone else. What—did anyone bring historical evidence here that the same panel that forbade removing the bread from the oven also permitted it when on the other side of the scale stood the prohibition of baking? Of course not. What was brought here were the reasonings of the Sages discussing our topic / passage, not of the Sages who originally forbade removing the bread. No one here is dealing with history—what they permitted and what they didn’t permit. We are dealing with the question itself: is it permitted or forbidden? And they also bring this rule: we do not tell a person, “sin so that your fellow may benefit.” They don’t say: we do not tell a person, “remove the bread so that your fellow may benefit.” It isn’t said about removing bread. It’s a rule. The rule says either it is permitted or it is forbidden to commit a transgression in order to save one’s fellow, but it is a sweeping rule. How can one say otherwise? In my view, this whole discussion of the Birkat Avraham is extremely puzzling. It has no basis whatsoever. It is completely clear that not only in Tosafot, as I’m saying, but in the Talmud itself, it is completely clear that we are talking about a sweeping principle, and no wonder Tosafot only asks questions and therefore has to look for explanations why the sweeping rule does not apply in one place or another. Because fundamentally we are speaking of a sweeping rule; it’s a sweeping policy: either it is permitted or it is forbidden. There are no specific permissions here. In a moment we’ll go more into Tosafot, but for now I’m only speaking generally.
[Speaker C] So the phrase “sin so that your fellow may benefit,” as it appears in the Talmud, is not said about inadvertent versus intentional; it is said generally. And in the specific case of removing the bread from the oven there is something more specific—if I’m looking at the plain meaning of the Talmud.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a specific prohibition, not a specific permission.
[Speaker C] A specific permission to remove the bread? No, there is a prohibition. Why, in the intentional case, is there a permission to remove the bread?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s something else—intentional for the person himself. We are talking about inadvertent for others. Because only in that context does this rule of “sin so that your fellow may benefit” arise in our topic / passage. We are dealing only with that.
[Speaker C] Okay. So that means it is always a sweeping rule regarding others, no matter what the prohibition is, no matter the amount of prohibition—that’s the rule in the Talmud.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m saying it can go either way. There may also be exceptions, and Tosafot says there are exceptions, but fundamentally it is a sweeping rule. If there are exceptions, then that requires explanation. Fine, but there is no discussion here about whether they permitted removing the bread from the oven itself. This is not a discussion about the prohibition of removing bread; it is a discussion about “sin so that your fellow may benefit.” That’s the discussion. Now, if I am indeed right that this is so simple both in the Talmud and in Tosafot, then that means that the discussion here really is a global one. And at least on the side that says it is permitted, the permission is global. And second, we now have to understand: so what about the Mishneh LaMelekh and the Chinukh? According to the Mishneh LaMelekh it’s also not a proof, and I think in the Chinukh too it’s not a proof. And therefore I claim that everyone stood where I’m saying, and not as the Birkat Avraham claims—that it is a dispute. The Mishneh LaMelekh, who says this applies only to rabbinic prohibitions—it may still be that this is a sweeping permission, but a sweeping permission only for rabbinic prohibitions and not for Torah-level prohibitions. Who said it speaks specifically about removing bread from the oven? On the contrary: the Mishneh LaMelekh too compares different rabbinic cases—between sticking bread in the oven and tasting not from adjacent produce. Therefore according to his view it is rabbinic, and therefore it seems that even according to him it is a sweeping rule. He just thinks that this sweeping rule applies only to rabbinic prohibitions, and with Torah-level prohibitions we do not make calculations about which prohibition is more severe and which is lighter. That’s one point. Regarding the Chinukh it’s harder.
[Speaker B] Wait, wait, before that: does the Mishneh LaMelekh say that only with rabbinic prohibitions I compare one against the other, or rabbinic against Torah-level?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, rabbinic versus Torah-level prohibitions. Only when there is a sharp line separating the prohibition I violate from the prohibition I am preventing—meaning, this one is rabbinic and that one is Torah-level—can it be permitted. But where both are Torah-level or both are rabbinic, we do not enter into such fine gradations of which is more severe and which is less severe. In such a case it is not permitted. And then it can certainly be, and it is even plausible, that the Mishneh LaMelekh also sees this as a sweeping rule. It’s just that the sweeping rule is not every time there is a light prohibition versus a severe prohibition—perhaps because he thinks there is no such thing as light and severe within Torah-level prohibitions, and punishment, as I said, is not necessarily an indication of the severity of the prohibition. I said that there is such a view in Sefer Chasidim, and then he says: when can you know that this is light and that is severe? Only if this one is rabbinic and that one is Torah-level. That’s it; otherwise you can’t get into finer gradations. From his perspective it is only rabbinic prohibitions, but still his conception is that it is a more sweeping rule. The wording of the Chinukh is harder, because there we saw that the Sages regularly uprooted. That implies there are cases where they uprooted and cases where they didn’t uproot. Meaning, there it’s quite clear that the discussion is about a certain specific uprooting and not about a sweeping principle, not even within the rabbinic sphere. But I think that even in the Chinukh that is not a proof. Why? There are several Talmudic passages in different places that say that the Sages strengthened their own enactments even more than Torah law. Right. Here, at times the Sages decided to fortify the rabbinic prohibition that they imposed so that people would not come to belittle rabbinic prohibitions and say they are light prohibitions, and they were stricter about it even more than they had to be about Torah-level prohibitions. There are several passages in Eruvin about this and in various other places; the Talmud says this in a number of places. Okay, so if that is so, it may be that the Chinukh too is arguing that this is a sweeping rule—the Chinukh and the Nachmanides he cites—that we are dealing with a sweeping rule. But what? There are certain places where the Sages forbid the rabbinic prohibition in order to be strict, so that people should not come to belittle it. So then, on the contrary, the specific rule is when they come to forbid, not when they come to permit. The permission is sweeping. If the rule is that one may violate a rabbinic prohibition in order to save a Torah-level prohibition, except for places where the Rabbis forbade it—they decided nevertheless to be strict so that people would not come to belittle it. Now, they can do that, and from time to time they did do that. But then my claim is that the specific discussion is on the forbidding side, not the permitting side. And the fact that they permitted you to remove it is not that they permitted the act of removing—the removing is permitted, period. The discussion is whether perhaps they forbade removing it because they wanted to be strict about the prohibition of removing, so that people should not come to belittle it. But the specific side is on the side of prohibition, not on the side of permission. The permission is a permission of global consideration.
[Speaker B] That’s the exception.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, and then it may be that even the Chinukh does not go against this. In short, I tend to think that there really is no approach in our topic / passage that sees our topic / passage as some specific discussion about removing bread. There’s no such thing; it is always a general discussion. A general discussion with the qualifications we talked about and will talk about in a moment. Meaning, according to Tosafot’s conclusion and the plain meaning of our Talmudic passage, we are really dealing with a general principle. Right—that’s what I think. In my opinion, since that’s the Talmud, that’s also all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim). We are dealing with a general permission. But precisely because it is a general permission, it becomes difficult: there are places where we see that they did not permit it, and places where we see that they did permit it. In our topic / passage they did not permit it, and in separating terumah not from adjacent produce they did permit it; freeing a slave they permitted it; all the examples the medieval and later authorities bring. So now, precisely because this is a sweeping rule and a global consideration, we need explanations for why in certain places they permitted it and in other places they did not. And that is Tosafot’s whole discussion. Okay? So precisely because the foundation is a global foundation, we now have to understand why it does not exist everywhere—why it exists only in certain places and not in others. And for that, the discussions now begin: maybe here he was negligent, there he had already done the act, all kinds of things of that sort, the distinctions Tosafot makes. But they are said only because the starting point is that this is a global consideration, a sweeping consideration, and then I need to explain in all the places where the rule does not apply why it does not apply there. If it were something specific, there would be no room for this whole discussion. Now, when we enter Tosafot itself, there are basically two principal directions in Tosafot. This is an important point. In Tosafot, after all, it begins—Tosafot begins, wait, look, I’ll pull up Tosafot for a second so you can see it quickly. Tosafot is made up of two parts. In the first part: “And do we say to a person, sin so that your fellow may benefit? But didn’t it say in Eruvin, Rabbi held that it is preferable for one’s fellow to commit a light prohibition,” and so on—right, he asks the question. So he says: there, it was in order that the am ha'aretz not eat untithed produce because of him, when he said to them, “Fill yourselves a basket of figs from his fig tree”; but here, where the prohibition was not done because of him, we do not say to him, sin—even a light sin—so that your fellow not come to a severe prohibition. What is Tosafot’s starting point at this stage? That there is a sweeping rule that in principle one does not permit a person to sin so that his fellow may benefit, right? Only because there the prohibition was caused by him did they permit him. Meaning, the starting point is that this is not permitted. If the Sages saw that the prohibition was caused by me, there they did permit, as in terumah not from adjacent produce, right? Notice then that even though we are dealing with a sweeping rule—as we said, in Tosafot he sees the topic / passage as a sweeping discussion—what is the sweeping rule? That they did not permit, not that they did permit. Or in other words, the sweeping rule is solipsistic. Meaning: if there is a prohibition on me, I am forbidden to do it in order to save the other person. Because there is a prohibition on me, I make my own calculations, not global calculations, and that is the sweeping rule. So notice: there is no identity between the question whether we are dealing with a sweeping rule and the question whether the global consideration is the determining one. Here there is a sweeping, solipsistic rule, a rule that says: if there is a prohibition on me, even if it is a light prohibition, in principle I may not violate it in order to save the other person from a severe prohibition. Meaning, the global consideration does not permit me to violate prohibitions—that is the sweeping rule. Where am I allowed? If the prohibition my fellow would do was caused by me. Why? Let’s try to think why, in the simplest sense. Because if it was caused by me, then I violate “do not place a stumbling block.” And if so, then my calculation says that I should remove it—not his calculation. I’m not doing it for him; I’m doing it in order to save myself from a prohibition. So it is worthwhile for me to commit the light prohibition of removing the bread in order to save myself from the severe prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block.” Do you see this pure solipsism? It is exactly like Rabbi Akiva with Turnus Rufus, yes? That I give charity to the poor in order to merit the World to Come—not for the poor but for myself. So here too, even when they permitted me to remove the bread in order to save the other person, even the permission is a solipsistic permission. Why did they permit me? Because otherwise I would violate “do not place a stumbling block,” not because he will violate the prohibition of baking—who cares. My permission to remove the bread is so that I should not violate “do not place a stumbling block,” because I caused him that prohibition. Meaning, this brings the solipsistic conception to an extreme. Meaning, true, Tosafot says that this is a sweeping rule—sorry, that the rule is a sweeping rule—but the sweeping rule is not a
[Speaker B] global one, not at all; it is solipsistic.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I stand at the center, and if you remember all the halakhic decisors I brought last time, you can place Tosafot among them. Tosafot sees this through a solipsistic lens, and we saw that there—I said that Tosafot is against the Maggid Mishneh there. It is a solipsistic consideration, because basically he says, in principle—first of all, in principle it is forbidden to violate a prohibition in order to save the other person. That itself already shows that it is not a global consideration. Second, even when it is already permitted, why is it permitted? In order to save me from the prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block.”
[Speaker F] Wait, I have a question here, I have a question here. “I”—am “I” the case where I removed the bread for the other person?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, we’re talking only about that case.
[Speaker F] No, I mean—sorry, wait, sorry—did I stick the bread in the oven for someone else?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. I remove the bread in order to save someone else who stuck it in.
[Speaker F] Yes, but—
[Speaker B] Think about the tithe not from adjacent produce.
[Speaker F] But the fact of “do not place a stumbling block”—if I don’t do it, does that mean I’m placing a stumbling block?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No.
[Speaker B] You mixed two examples together, Yael.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s why they didn’t permit it, Yael, because here I didn’t place the stumbling block, so they didn’t permit it. In the case of terumah not from adjacent produce, there I did create the stumbling block for the am ha'aretz, and therefore there they really did permit it.
[Speaker F] Ah, so I’m distinguishing between the two cases. Fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what Tosafot says.
[Speaker B] If you invite me to eat something and it isn’t tithed, then I’m causing you to stumble.
[Speaker F] Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So since I’m causing you to stumble, in order to save myself they permitted me to violate the lighter prohibition. There is no permission to violate a prohibition in order to save someone else. In short, according to Tosafot in the first direction, there are no permissions to commit prohibitions for someone else, only for oneself. There is a global consideration about myself—
[Speaker F] therefore—
[Speaker B] it’s forbidden for you to remove the bread in order to save someone else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now I myself need to bring myself to the optimal state—but only myself, not the world and not the other person. It’s just that there is also the prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block,” so if I caused someone else to sin, then what permits me to violate the prohibition is not that he won’t stumble in a severe prohibition, but that I would violate “do not place a stumbling block.” Okay?
[Speaker F] So now too, if that’s the case, then even in an intentional case I can’t do it by removing the bread?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean by intentional? I didn’t understand.
[Speaker B] The one who stuck it in did it intentionally? That he stuck it in intentionally?
[Speaker F] Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We are talking about someone who stuck it in intentionally—ah no, sorry, in our Talmudic passage it’s talking about someone who stuck it in inadvertently. No, sorry—if he stuck it in intentionally, then ostensibly it’s even worse. Right. If we are solipsists. Completely. If we are solipsists, then if he stuck it in intentionally, from my perspective there is less justification for damaging my own spiritual state, right? He is guilty, he got himself into this mess, his problem. That’s what I discussed in the previous class. Yes, yes—and I showed it in the halakhic decisors, and now I’m showing it to you in the topic / passage itself, in Tosafot and in the Talmud.
[Speaker C] I want to ask something about that. “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind”—ostensibly we’re saying this is solipsistic, but you could look at the rule itself and say that the rule of “do not place a stumbling block” that the Torah wrote is a rule that comes to teach us that we need to care about the transgressions of others, and therefore the rule itself is actually a global rule.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be. Why couldn’t it be? In Tosafot it can’t be—not in general.
[Speaker C] Not in Tosafot; I mean in general, when I look at it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—but I’m speaking specifically in Tosafot. Because in Tosafot, it cannot be that you are right.
[Speaker C] No, I understand Tosafot, but I’m speaking generally.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—“do not place a stumbling block.” “Do not place a stumbling block” can absolutely be what you’re saying—that it is a global perspective on “do not place a stumbling block.” I completely agree. But Tosafot certainly did not learn that way. Because if that were Tosafot’s perspective on “do not place a stumbling block,” then Tosafot would have had to permit me to do this even if I didn’t cause him to stumble. Because in the end I need to save him from the transgression, right? And Tosafot does not permit that.
[Speaker C] So basically I’m learning from this—Rachel and I had a discussion about this in class—whether on this whole issue, if a person does something in a pure way or whether he always has an interest, that basically in the end it’s always solipsistic, because a person will always want to do the right thing so that he gains points from it. The very discussion itself basically already puts us into a solipsistic state.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a philosophical question. I think I mentioned it at the beginning of the current series, and I said I have a column on the site dealing with it, and I disagree. I think it’s column 120 on my site, where I write why I think there is such a thing as altruistic acts.
[Speaker C] And could I ask that sometime you devote a few minutes to that and explain it to us? Because it’s really interesting.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Read the column. It’s a philosophical discussion; it’s not connected to our topic / passage specifically at all.
[Speaker C] Because I’m really interested in understanding the—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll talk about it sometime later. In fact there are more columns—if you send me an email I’ll look; there are other places where it appears. I very consistently believe in altruistic acts, in the existence of altruistic acts.
[Speaker C] Okay, so where do I find it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On my site, in column 120.
[Speaker B] In the email that’s always sent there’s a link—take a look.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I see.
[Speaker C] And under what topic does it appear?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the columns. There are columns on the site—look for column 120.
[Speaker C] One hundred twenty, okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, in any case, now there’s room to discuss, according to Tosafot’s solipsistic perspective, what happens when I’m not violating the prohibition of "do not place a stumbling block"—for example, if it’s on one side of the river. Birkat Avraham mentions this, if you see it there. Surely it’s still forbidden.
[Speaker B] Why? Because I’m not gaining or losing anything here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, apparently what comes out is that if the perspective really is a solipsistic one, then the only reason I remove the bread is to save myself from "do not place a stumbling block," or to separate tithes not from nearby produce—that too is only in order to save myself from the prohibition of "do not place a stumbling block," right? But in a place where I’m not violating "do not place a stumbling block," even though in a certain sense I caused his prohibition, but that doesn’t make me violate "do not place a stumbling block," then I wouldn’t have permission to remove the bread, right? The whole permission is meant to save myself from prohibition. But he writes there—Birkat Avraham brings this—he has a position to say here, in this marked passage, what did I do here? He says that perhaps—you see this?—"And perhaps even where the formal criteria of ‘do not place a stumbling block’ do not apply, nevertheless we find later on," and so on. He brings various examples. Why? Because he argues that it’s enough that I’m to blame in order to permit me to violate the prohibition so as to save the other person.
[Speaker B] What does "to blame" mean? That you don’t protest?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or even when I don’t protest—but even when I handed a cup of wine to a Nazirite, except it was all on one side of the river. Meaning, he could have taken it without me. So not only am I not protesting, but even when I’m at fault, though not in such a decisive way that without me it couldn’t have happened—that’s what’s called two sides of the river. Okay? In such situations I’m not violating "do not place a stumbling block." He argues that maybe—he’s uncertain about it—but maybe even in such a case Tosafot would permit me to violate the lesser prohibition. Now if he’s right about that, and I’m not sure he is, but if he is right, that really means the picture here is more complex. It’s not complete solipsism. Rather what? In the end I have to save the world, but on the other hand in order to do so I’m harming myself. And all in all, if everyone takes care of himself—remember what I said the class before last?—there’s a certain view that says I really need to be selfish in order to improve the condition of the whole world. Because if everyone takes care of himself and his family and the circles close to him, rather than the entire world all at once, the state of the whole world will be better. And then the claim is that I’m really looking at things from a global perspective, not a solipsistic one. But still, if I have no part or share in the sin that the other person committed, why should I harm myself to save him? There’s reason to save him, but on the other hand the prohibition rests on me—that’s the dilemma. In a place where I caused that damage, the responsibility to repair it rests on me. But the responsibility to repair it is a responsibility to repair the state of the world, not to keep myself from violating "do not place a stumbling block." Rather, where I caused damage, I bear the responsibility to prevent that damage. No—it’s not in order to spare me from "do not place a stumbling block." Do you understand the nuance? Meaning, when I read Tosafot, I said: this is pure solipsism. It basically means I’m allowed to sin only where it benefits me. Now I’m saying no—the formulation is much more moderate. It’s true that only when I’m at fault am I allowed to sin in order to save the world. But still, the sin is in order to save the world; it’s just that where I’m not at fault, I have no right to harm myself in order to save the world. Why should the responsibility be on me? Why should my spiritual state be harmed? But if I’m at fault, independently of "do not place a stumbling block," even if I didn’t violate "do not place a stumbling block," if I had a share in this problematic outcome happening in the world, then the responsibility to prevent it rests on me. And therefore that justifies my violating the lesser prohibition.
[Speaker B] So that already combines solipsism with the global view.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Meaning yes—in this formulation it’s not narrow solipsism like I described earlier. Because all in all I really am doing this based on a comparative consideration, in order to prevent evil in the world. But there has to be a justification that places the responsibility to save the world on me. Because otherwise, what permission do I have to commit prohibitions in order to save the world? Leave the world to the Holy One, blessed be He; you worry about your own little divine plot and don’t commit a prohibition. But where I harmed the world of the Holy One, blessed be He, the responsibility to prevent that rests on me. And therefore I need to violate the prohibition, even if I didn’t violate "do not place a stumbling block." The practical implication is when I caused the prohibition but did not violate "do not place a stumbling block." Now there’s another example: there’s a dispute among the halakhic authorities about what happens with indirect "do not place a stumbling block." I caused someone to violate the prohibition of causing someone else to sin. I caused one who causes another, who causes someone to commit a prohibition. Some argue that in that case I did not violate "do not place a stumbling block." But according to what Birkat Avraham says here, even if I didn’t violate "do not place a stumbling block," it is enough that I’m to blame for the result in order to permit me to violate a prohibition in order to prevent it. Okay? So that’s the line of thought.
[Speaker B] Does that permit me, or obligate me?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good question. I wrote here—you can see the different possibilities I wrote down—I really don’t have enough time now to go into the details. But the claim basically is that there may really be two possibilities here. In principle, the global consideration only says that I am certainly permitted to violate the prohibition in order to save someone from a more severe prohibition. But not that I am obligated to. After all, if I want to preserve my spiritual level, I have the right not to get myself into trouble because the other person cooked up a mess he can’t eat. So it may be that I’m permitted to violate a prohibition in order to save someone else, but I’m not obligated. In a place where I caused the other person’s prohibition, there perhaps I am even obligated to violate the prohibition. And then that really changes the picture a bit. The global consideration only leads to the conclusion that I’m permitted to remove the bread. But the question whether I’m obligated to remove the bread—that is only if I’m at fault.
[Speaker F] Wait, one question—another question. If he did it intentionally, then okay, I mean, there’s some kind of change here. If he did it unintentionally, then it’s like "do not place a stumbling block" and I’ll go remove it for him. But if he did it intentionally, then there’s no "do not place a stumbling block" here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is, there is. "Do not place a stumbling block" applies even if the other person commits the prohibition intentionally. As long as I cause the matter, or without me he could not have done it, then I have violated the Torah-level prohibition of "do not place a stumbling block." For example, handing a cup of wine to a Nazirite when the cup is on the other side of the river. The Nazirite can drink it—he drinks it intentionally—but without me he would not have been able to commit the prohibition. If I had not handed him the cup of wine, he would not have been able to commit the prohibition. So I violated "do not place a stumbling block" even though the Nazirite decided to drink. Okay? Good. Now there is also a discussion here about the Tosafot HaRosh that he brings there. Tosafot HaRosh says that if a person caused another person to sin, it is as though he himself committed the prohibition. And then again that sharpens the solipsism even more. It basically means that all they permitted me to do—commit the lesser sin—was so that I avoid the more severe prohibition, and that really puts the emphasis on "do not place a stumbling block" even more. Why—why does he say that? I’ll explain why. Look, let’s say I—let’s look for a moment at the pure solipsistic view. Then what am I really saying? That all they permitted me to do—to separate tithes not from nearby produce—was so that I wouldn’t violate the prohibition of "do not place a stumbling block." Okay? Now let’s say that separating tithes not from nearby produce is a Torah-level prohibition, not a rabbinic one. There’s a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), but for the sake of discussion let’s go with the view that it’s Torah-level. The prohibition of "do not place a stumbling block" is also Torah-level. Which is more severe? I don’t know—both are Torah-level prohibitions.
[Speaker B] Maybe because it’s a general prohibition?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The prohibition of eating something from which tithes were not separated is certainly more severe than the prohibition of separating tithes not from nearby produce. But the prohibition of "do not place a stumbling block"—not necessarily. There’s no flogging for it, for example. Okay? For eating produce from which terumah and tithes were not separated there is flogging. So what does that mean? That if we really take the solipsistic view, even if I caused the matter, it’s not clear that separating tithes not from nearby produce leaves me in a better state. Because who says that "do not place a stumbling block" is more severe than separating tithes not from nearby produce? The Rosh says: but if I caused him to eat untithed produce, it is as though I myself ate untithed produce. The prohibition of "do not place a stumbling block" is not the prohibition I am violating; rather, "do not place a stumbling block" is a principle that says his prohibition is considered as though I myself committed it. And now what stands before me is the consideration of the prohibition of eating untithed produce versus separating tithes not from nearby produce. And it is certainly true that separating tithes not from nearby produce is the lighter one.
[Speaker C] This matter—that someone bears responsibility for what someone else did, that the prohibition is attributed to him—is it attributed to him with all the halakhic consequences? Does he also get the punishment? Question—a good question. No, it’s just a general question, and maybe it comes to tell us exactly the opposite—to tell us that you have to make sure others also do not commit the prohibition, and if you took part in it, it’s as if the prohibition is on you, because you are not okay if you aren’t looking out for others.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You started with a question and ended with an exclamation point. The question I agree with; the exclamation point I do not agree with. In truth it’s a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). Rashi, at the beginning of Parashat Matot, writes that one who causes his fellow to sin enters under him with respect to punishment. With respect to punishment—meaning he receives the punishment. Maimonides, at the end of the laws of forbidden mixtures, writes—what I mentioned once—Maimonides writes at the end of the laws of forbidden mixtures that if someone dressed his fellow in forbidden mixtures, the one who dressed him gets flogged. Yes? For "do not place a stumbling block" one does not get flogged, so it’s clear that he is flogged because he is considered the one who violated the prohibition of forbidden mixtures. But the Rosh challenges Maimonides—where did he get this from, what is this, and it can’t be. The Rosh apparently understands it as a metaphorical expression, like what you said at the end. Okay?
[Speaker C] Yes, it’s just that the case Maimonides brings—putting someone in forbidden mixtures—is extreme, but the cases Tosafot brings here are much more mild, involving an am ha’aretz—no, but even the am ha’aretz has some part in the matter because he didn’t know the Jewish law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides also—
[Speaker C] —speaks only about when—here too it’s about negligence, okay, causing a prohibition through negligence, not intentionally.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides speaks only about a case where the transgressor was unintentional and the one causing it was intentional; only then do I get flogged. If he too was intentional, then Maimonides says I do not get flogged. I’m only showing the principle, that here too we’re talking about intentional versus unintentional, like there in our passage. And the am ha’aretz also doesn’t know that it wasn’t tithed, so it’s unintentional. And in a place like that I’m really considered as one who intentionally ate something from which terumah was not separated. And then the global consideration really says that separating tithes not from nearby produce is better. So when the Rosh notes that it is as if he himself is eating it—yes, Birkat Avraham brings this—as though he himself is eating it, again, as though he himself is eating it, I think the Rosh is sharpening the solipsistic consideration. It’s all for me—only if it’s for me. The comparison between "do not place a stumbling block" and separating tithes not from nearby produce is not unequivocal. How do you know which is more severe? But if "do not place a stumbling block" causes me to be regarded as though I’m eating untithed produce, then clearly separating tithes not from nearby produce is lighter. So that sharpens the solipsistic foundation. Now later Tosafot writes that he raises an objection from the case of one who is half slave and half free man, where they compel his master and make him free, even though there is a prohibition against freeing a slave. He brings a proof there from Rabbi Eliezer, who entered the study hall and did not find ten, so he freed his slave to complete the quorum of ten, and the Talmud says: a public commandment is different. What does that mean—different because it’s a public commandment, of the community. Okay? Now what does the fact that it is a public commandment help me with? That it’s more severe? All the cases we are talking about involve my violating a lighter prohibition in order to gain avoidance of a more severe one. So what did you answer me when you said it is a public commandment? On the simple understanding, it could mean that a public commandment is simply more severe—that is, it’s just a higher degree of severity, and at that level it is indeed permitted to make a global calculation. That is one way to understand it. But it may be—and here this connects to what we discussed earlier with the Rosh and with Birkat Avraham—it may be that another nuance has to be introduced into the global consideration. When I presented the global consideration, I said that the global consideration means looking from the perspective of the Holy One, blessed be He: how many prohibitions are committed in the world under each option, and choosing the option in which fewer prohibitions are committed. It may be that this is actually a commandment between one person and another, not between a person and the Holy One, blessed be He. I’m doing this in order to save my fellows from spiritual decline, not to save the world for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He. It’s a kind of commandment between one person and another. And then the question is how many fellows are being saved. If I save many fellows—remember I talked about the permission to give up one’s life to save others? On the face of it that is forbidden. But there are halakhic authorities who say that if it involves many others, the public, then it is permitted. Meaning that here we are not dealing with solipsism; we are dealing with looking at the world, but not necessarily from the perspective of the Holy One, blessed be He. Rather I am looking at the other person, not at the world—the other person. When many others will benefit, then I am permitted to commit a prohibition so that they benefit. I called this in the summary the perspective of the UN Secretary-General, not the perspective of the Holy One, blessed be He. The UN Secretary-General is supposed to care for all people; the Holy One, blessed be He, cares for the world. Okay? So really I am making the global calculation from the standpoint of altruism for the sake of other people, not for the sake of the world of the Holy One, blessed be He. And then it may be that a public commandment means caring for many other people. And the same applies to procreation, by the way. Tosafot also says that procreation is a great commandment, like a public commandment. Because what is procreation? Procreation means that more children will be born here, and of course those children will in turn have children, and so on. Meaning, we are talking here about very many people who will come into existence as a result of this, and all these people, after all, will keep many Sabbaths, right? I am really caring for the condition of many, many people—even though notice, in this case these are potential people, not existing people. And the question is whether I have some interest in increasing the number of people so that they will increase commandments, or whether I only need to care for existing people so that they do commandments and avoid prohibitions. So there is certainly room to discuss that. Good. So that is Tosafot’s first direction, which on the face of it looks solipsistic.
[Speaker F] Wait, I want to remind us of something for a moment. Once we heard, or raised, this point in one of the classes, and you talked about—we talked about some guy who saved other soldiers by throwing himself on a grenade. I don’t remember the exact story.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Roi Klein, yes.
[Speaker F] Yes, Roi Klein. And then you said—or it was said in class—that he was wrong to do that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. According to Jewish law, it is forbidden. Wow.
[Speaker F] Even if he saved others?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. You may not give up your life in order to save others. Again, if the battle required it, then it would be permitted—just as I am allowed to die in order to win a war. So certainly, if in order to win the war I need to save soldiers and I die in order to save them, then of course that is permitted and even a commandment. But there, as far as I understand—I’m not expert in the details—but as far as I understand, we’re talking about a deputy battalion commander who gave up his life to save two or three soldiers. In terms of contribution to victory in battle, it seems to me that usually the deputy battalion commander is much more important. But again, I’m really not judging him, and I also don’t know all the details. If he had been an ordinary soldier?
[Speaker B] What? If he had been an ordinary soldier?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, even if he had been an ordinary soldier it would still have been forbidden, but maybe he would say: but if I save five others, then victory in the battle requires it. And for the sake of victory in battle one is allowed to give up one’s life.
[Speaker B] And maybe also to create a fighting spirit of self-sacrifice.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, there may be situations here where it could indeed be permitted. On the face of it, it’s a forbidden act. Again, I’m not coming to judge him, and I think in any case it is worthy of tremendous admiration on the human plane, even if on the halakhic plane it was a forbidden act. But that’s just a side note. Good. Further on in Tosafot—I want to move on, because this thing is really not moving. Further on Tosafot says: "And one can also say…" I’m now reading the continuation. Up to here, this was the first direction, which was solipsistic. That direction basically assumes that as a basic rule a person is forbidden to sin, unless there are good reasons, and those good reasons are generally also about himself—saving himself from "do not place a stumbling block." Meaning, it’s all solipsistic. What happens in Tosafot’s second direction? "And one can also say: specifically where he was negligent do we say, ‘Do we tell a person: sin so that your fellow may benefit?’" Because the one who stuck the bread in the oven was negligent. And notice—we already discussed this, that we’re dealing with an unintentional act. From Tosafot’s perspective, even putting it in unintentionally is considered negligence, because it’s not coercion; he was careless. He should have paid attention and thought twice before doing it. So there is a certain dimension of negligence on his part, and therefore they do not permit it for him. So first of all, what is the starting point in this direction of Tosafot? The complete opposite of the previous one. Right? In this passage of Tosafot, in the last part of Tosafot, the starting point is that a person is permitted to sin in order to save his fellow. The opposite of before. Why is it forbidden here? Here it is forbidden because he was negligent. So you need a reason to forbid, not a reason to permit. There, a reason was brought to permit. What was the reason? That you contributed to the sin he committed, and therefore it is permitted to you—but the starting point was that one may not sin in order to save one’s fellow unless there is a reason, namely that you contributed. Here it’s the opposite. The starting point is that it is permitted to commit a prohibition in order to save your fellow. Meaning, the starting point is global and not solipsistic. That’s the difference between the two interpretations of Tosafot. But what about the negligence? Just one second. If the other person was negligent, then no. Why not? Look—absolute globalism, apparently, should disconnect from the question of whether the other person was negligent or not, because bottom line, let’s see how many prohibitions there will be under each option. If I remove it, there will be fewer prohibitions than if I do not remove it, so why should I care that he was negligent? You can see that there is still that same dimension I spoke about earlier: in the end, you are doing this for him. There is no justification for your sinning if he was negligent. So this is indeed a global consideration, but still, some justification is needed for me to commit a prohibition in order to improve the global condition of the other person, or the world, or whatever you want. And that is also what we saw in the previous class: this combination between the global consideration and the question of negligence—between the question of the result and the question of negligence, what I called in the previous class. The question of the result is the global consideration, but considerations of negligence also enter in here. And if he was negligent, then there is no justification for me to commit a prohibition even if that improves the state of the world. So once again this is a more moderate formulation—it’s global, but there still has to be a justification to permit me to sin. And it may be, as I said earlier, that perhaps if he was negligent then I’m allowed to make the global calculation, but I’m not obligated. If he was not negligent, maybe I’m even obligated to remove it. Okay? Maybe.
[Speaker B] So I think that pure solipsism can be found, but pure globalism can’t really be found.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, it can almost never be found. Maybe in the Maggid, I don’t know, but it can almost never be found. Right. After that, Birkat Avraham discusses here the question of the law of mutual responsibility. He says that apparently the permission to sin is based on the law of mutual responsibility. So what is the law of mutual responsibility? It means that if I can enable someone else to fulfill his obligation in a commandment or a blessing, then I also need to make sure he does not commit prohibitions. Both on the side of commandments and on the side of prohibitions. Basically, we are all one unit, all one human fabric, as the well-known song says, and therefore I need to make sure that others do not sin. So he says: if that is so, then he starts wondering—what about people who are not included in mutual responsibility at all? He brings the Noda B'Yehuda there, who says that women are not included in mutual responsibility—or sinners of Israel, to distinguish, yes?—they are not included in mutual responsibility. And then the question is whether with regard to such people too we say, "Sin so that your fellow may benefit." And he himself notes that it is unreasonable to say that if a woman was the one who put bread in the oven, it would be forbidden for me to remove it in order to save her, whereas if it was a man it would be permitted. No one makes such a distinction; it’s inconceivable. And so it seems, apparently, that this really is not stated on the basis of mutual responsibility. And I really think—what’s the difference? Mutual responsibility is an obligation to the other person. The global consideration is an obligation to the Holy One, blessed be He. Now it may be that I have no obligation to the other person as a person, but if that person sins, it lowers the condition of the world of the Holy One, blessed be He, and therefore it may be that I need to sin in order to save the world of the Holy One, blessed be He, even if I am not responsible for the spiritual condition of some particular other person. Again, in my opinion it’s absurd to say such a thing about women. I’m not saying this apologetically—it’s really outrageous, that statement of the Noda B'Yehuda. Many disagreed with him, and I think it’s really not—problematic. But let’s say even according to his view. So what he says is that I have no obligation to a woman as a woman to save her from prohibition, but still it’s obvious that I have an obligation to save the world from prohibitions. And therefore even if there is no law of mutual responsibility, that does not mean I would not have an obligation to remove it so that the woman not violate a prohibition. That is exactly the difference between the UN Secretary-General and the Holy One, blessed be He. From the standpoint of the UN Secretary-General, I’m not responsible for her; she’s not a member of the UN—the woman. Yes, we don’t belong to the same unit of mutual responsibility according to the Noda B'Yehuda. But she is still part of the world. If she starts a war, then the UN member states will suffer from it too. Meaning, because the world will suffer from it. So one has to prevent war even by those who are not members of the UN. Okay, that’s the analogy. Now further on he brings the discussion there and says that in the law of mutual responsibility, it really makes no difference whether he commits the prohibition or I commit the prohibition. He brings there the Ratzio—I referred you to this matter—yes, if it is because of mutual responsibility, then he basically identifies the law of mutual responsibility with looking from the perspective of the Holy One, blessed be He, so that it makes no difference whether you committed the prohibition or I committed the prohibition; bottom line, you have to see how many prohibitions were committed and whether it was worth it or not. And then he raises difficulties, because that’s not true—you can see it’s not true. And the answer is that I don’t think he’s right there; it’s the same mistake I found in him above. He identifies the law of mutual responsibility with the global consideration, and I do not identify them. The law of mutual responsibility is the UN Secretary-General; the global consideration is the Holy One, blessed be He. The law of mutual responsibility is obligation to the other; the global consideration is obligation to the world, to the Holy One, blessed be He. Therefore, in the global consideration it really does not matter whether I did it or he did it. But under the laws of mutual responsibility, there is my obligation to take care of you. So with all due respect to my obligation to take care of you—not at my expense. When we are talking about my obligation to take care of you, there is room for considerations that say: okay, I have to take care of you, but not at my expense—my life comes first. If I am talking about a global consideration in relation to the Holy One, blessed be He, there is no room for such considerations. Because here the question is: what total of prohibitions will the Holy One, blessed be He, see before His eyes? It doesn’t matter whose fault it is. It doesn’t matter to the Holy One, blessed be He, whether it was this pawn or that pawn. And again, I think the difficulties he raises there are the result of confusing the law of mutual responsibility with the global consideration. The law of mutual responsibility is the UN Secretary-General; the global consideration is the Holy One, blessed be He. So this keeps recurring, and I think what we have done up to this point is enough to show you that what lies behind all the discussions in this passage is the question of globality versus solipsism. No one formulates it this way, but that is the subtextual question. That is what underlies all the discussions. I think it sheds a completely different light on the disputes, the distinctions, the conceptions. Maybe one more small comment—you can look at it in the summary—but there’s one final point. The Tashbetz that I brought two classes ago, in the introductory class—remember that Tashbetz about the question asked of the Raavad whether one should slaughter for a sick person or feed him carrion? Which is preferable? So the Tashbetz there, among other things, connects it to our passage, and he asks there—if you remember the Ran that I brought—the Ran says it is preferable to slaughter, even though it is a more severe prohibition, because it is one prohibition, whereas feeding him carrion means that for every olive-sized amount he eats he violates a prohibition. So the Tashbetz does not accept that and raises several difficulties against him. The second difficulty brought here in the quotation is that yes, slaughtering is one severe prohibition—but I violate that prohibition, I slaughter for the sick person. But eating the carrion—that the sick person himself eats. So he asks the Ran: why are you just making a calculation of whether this is one severe prohibition or many lighter prohibitions? There is also the important question of who is committing the prohibition. All that would be relevant if this were a law of mutual responsibility. But if this is the consideration of the Holy One, blessed be He, then who cares who commits the prohibition? The opposite mistake from Birkat Avraham. I claim that for the law of mutual responsibility it matters who commits the prohibition, because if I save you—not at any price, not at my expense, my life comes before yours—then we have to ask whether your gain justifies the price I pay. But if the point of view is that of the Holy One, blessed be He, and "do we tell a person: sin so that your fellow may benefit" is from the perspective of the Holy One, blessed be He, then in such a situation what difference does it make? There are no justifications for this person or that person. Let’s make the general calculation: how many prohibitions will be committed? That’s all. And therefore the Ran says—and that is probably how he would answer the Tashbetz’s difficulty—the Ran would say: what do I care? For me, what matters is how many prohibitions and of what quality were committed under each option. And if slaughtering is preferable, even though it is a severe prohibition, because it is one, over carrion, which is a lighter prohibition but many times over, then I do not care that someone else does the slaughtering and the sick person himself eats the carrion. That may be relevant to mutual responsibility; it is not relevant to the global consideration. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. We’re not going to continue, even though there was room to—did you see it? Did you manage to look at the Kehillot Yaakov? Yes, yes. In my opinion it’s very interesting in the global context, really fascinating. Right. And indeed he also brings it there in Kovetz Shiurim—many later authorities discuss this. But it’s very, very interesting.
[Speaker B] That branch on its own is fascinating—human dignity.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. That’s why I’m saying I don’t want to get into human dignity, but really our issue comes up there too—the general consideration.
[Speaker F] But what also comes up there is the issue you mentioned earlier, when you said a lieutenant colonel can’t do something for the sake of a simple soldier. So the matter of a person’s dignity also comes up there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, although there maybe the question is not his dignity as a deputy battalion commander, but rather what his contribution to the rescue is.
[Speaker F] Right, right, right. We were talking about contribution to the rescue.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And there shouldn’t be more dignity for an officer than for a soldier; everyone is a human being and everyone deserves respect. That has nothing to do with military rules that you have to salute an officer or something.
[Speaker F] No, no, I’m talking about capacities in the world, yes. Okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Thank you very much. Thank you, see you.