Tractate Shabbat, Chapter One – Lesson 19

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, the truth is I had thought to begin today with the law of whether we tell a person to sin so that his fellow may benefit, which basically brings our discussion of this topic of someone sticking bread to the oven wall to a close. But I thought it would be worth devoting some sort of preliminary introduction to the conceptual, philosophical, meta-halakhic background of the discussion, because I don’t think it’s right to ignore it. It’s there in the background the whole time. I think it can really shed light on various statements that are made within the topic itself. Little by little it became clear to me that this would take up an entire lecture, so in the end I decided simply to devote a full lecture to this conceptual framework within which the whole business is taking place. It touches on quite a few very fundamental aspects of the conception of Jewish law, of a person’s halakhic commitment, and I’ll try, more or less, to sketch the map and touch on them. Afterward, when we study the topic itself — and that will still take us another lecture or two — we’ll see, I think, we’ll be able to see the expressions of the different possibilities we’ve been talking about here. Okay, there’s one more point: the differences and nuances between the different conceptions are sometimes very fine, and sometimes they switch places, and that makes things terribly confusing. So I’m going to try somehow to attack the issue from various angles through different examples, not all of which are the same. I mean, in the final analysis, try to get an impression of the overall picture, because no single example illustrates, I think, all the points in an unambiguous way. Each one points to something else. I struggled a bit with how to structure this lecture, because it really is something somewhat soft, vague — that is, something that’s hard to pin down, the point I want, or the points I want, to present here. All right, so I’ll begin. The question I actually intend to deal with in the coming lectures is whether a person may, or perhaps is even required, to sin in order to save his fellow, where we’ve already seen that saving one’s fellow can mean either saving him from a transgression or saving him from a punishment — that is, from death. Okay? If the transgression was intentional, then he could become liable to stoning, so there may be a case here of saving from punishment. And we talked about how, among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), you can see what they place the emphasis on — saving from the transgression or saving from the punishment. That also relates to accidental versus intentional sin, of course, but that’s the background. Basically what we have here is some kind of dilemma between a transgression I am supposed to commit and the consequences that transgression will produce. Those consequences, of course, are consequences that will arise for the other person, not for me. In other words, I am, as it were, investing spiritual currency in order to get a bonus — in order that the other person, sorry, will get a bonus — and the bonus can be either spiritual or physical. That is, either simply that he will live, yes? that he won’t be stoned, or that he’ll be spared the transgression. Okay? So the question is whether I am supposed to sacrifice something — at least something spiritual, yes, to commit a transgression from my perspective — so that the other person will gain, whether physically or spiritually. That is really the essence of the topic, and therefore I think we need to focus on it a bit before entering into the details and the various statements that arise within it. In the background of this discussion there is actually a more basic and broader question. The question is: when I approach making a halakhic decision — or halakhic decisions in general, or some halakhic decisions, we’ll still talk about that — from what point of view am I supposed to make it? Am I supposed to make it from my personal point of view, or from some sort of point of view, yes, of the U.N. Secretary-General? Meaning, I look at the world as though it weren’t about me. I want to know in what way the state of the world will be better. The overall state of the world from the standpoint of the Holy One, blessed be He, from the standpoint of the sum total of all people in the world, but not from my own personal point of view.

[Speaker B] Meaning subjective or objective? What? Subjective or objective?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not exactly, because both of those can be objective. The question is only whether these are objective outcomes for me, or objective outcomes for the world. So I wouldn’t define it as subjective versus objective. That’s exactly one of the points I mentioned earlier — that you can very quickly connect what I’m trying to say here to other dilemmas that perhaps overlap with it but are not identical, and therefore one of the most delicate goals here is to try to sharpen exactly what I’m talking about.

[Speaker C] You didn’t bring it up here, but it surprised me that you didn’t mention the statement, “Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may keep many Sabbaths.” That’s exactly this kind of worldview. There’s a world here, there’s a system of Sabbaths that need to be observed, and it doesn’t matter whether it’s me or you — what matters is that the whole thing should exist.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s definitely related, and I’m getting to that too, I’m getting to that too. You could have connected this question to the question of interests versus values: am I acting for my own interests or for values? But again, that misses it — but that’s not it, not exactly.

[Speaker B] I myself can also have values.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t hear.

[Speaker B] I myself can also have values. My values as opposed to values…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. No, it’s always my values that are involved, but the ethical bonus or the benefit that I gain even from my own personal point of view is not an interest in the crude sense, but a spiritual interest, spiritual improvement. So I don’t think it’s right to formulate this as interests versus values, but rather: what kind of ethical consideration am I supposed to use, or supposed to take into account, in order to make my decision? The ethical interest — and again, the word “interest” here is misleading, because I do not mean to gain something in some material sense, selfishness, money, power, and the like. I mean spiritual advancement. For now I’m calling that an “interest” only for purposes of terminology. Yes, so we need to understand that that’s what I’m talking about, and this will come up again and again, so it’s important for me to stress this point. There is a spiritual disagreement here. This is not a dispute between self-interested people and principled people. That’s a point that’s very important for me to sharpen. In other words, this is a dispute over how I understand the moral world. What, in other words, is the ethical consideration with which I am supposed to make my calculations, on the assumption that when a person gains spiritual gain, that is not an interest in the low sense, but a spiritual interest. That is, a person has a goal and a value in advancing spiritually, and that’s perfectly legitimate — he should do that.

[Speaker C] But the world also gains from it. Even when a person advances spiritually in a private way, the world also gains from it. So it’s not dichotomous to say it’s me or others. Once I improve my character traits, that will also affect others.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly to say what I’m saying. My claim is that the personal gain I’m talking about does not mean a non-ethical action. This is an ethical dispute. In other words, the question is what my ethical goal should be, and we’re talking here about righteous people versus righteous people. I’m not talking about righteous people versus wicked people. The question is what my ethical goal should be, and therefore it’s very easy to take this discussion to places of self-interested people versus people of values, or low versus high, or wicked versus righteous. I’m not talking about that. I’m talking about a real ethical dispute, and it has a certain self-regarding dimension that I’ll get to, but that’s not the root. Sometimes it’s hard to make that distinction. Fine, we’ll see it, we’ll see it later. Let me just remind you that when people speak in moral philosophy, in ethics, and we talk about utilitarianism — yes, one of the central approaches in ethics — the idea that a person should make his ethical decision according to a consideration of maximizing gains, maximizing utility. But that says nothing about the question of what your utility function is. What counts as utility for you? It can be utility in the sense of earning money, but it can also be utility in the sense of bringing as many people as possible to repentance. That too is a kind of utility. In other words, a person first has to define for himself what his utility function is, and then determine what course allows him to move most effectively in order to maximize that utility function. By the way, that’s true in game theory too, not only in moral theory. In game theory, for example, there are all kinds of criticisms of people who, I don’t know, buy a lottery ticket. Okay? I’m just giving an example here. This is philosophy, so I allow myself a few associations — I want to sharpen the points. You buy a lottery ticket. Let’s say it costs ten shekels, and your chance of winning a million shekels is, I don’t know, let’s say one in a million, okay, for purposes of discussion.

[Speaker C] Zero point and then four zeros after… What? Zero point and then four zeros after.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, let’s say one in a million, okay, six zeros. So the expected gain is one shekel, right? You have a one-in-a-million chance to win a million. Now you’re investing ten shekels in the ticket. So that means that, supposedly, you’re behaving irrationally, because you’re investing ten shekels in a lottery whose expected gain is one shekel. Now, very often you hear criticisms of this kind. Those are mistaken criticisms. They are mistaken because they ignore two facts. One fact is that the gain from the lottery is not the expected value; it never will be the expected value. It will be either zero or a million; it will never be one shekel. And the chance that I might win a million is worth investing ten shekels to me, even if the expected value is negative. It’s not that people confuse the expected value with the outcome. The expected value is not the outcome; it’s the average outcome. And the eventual result of a lottery can also be a million, and for the chance that I’ll win a million it’s worth it to me to invest ten shekels, because that’s not such a significant loss for me, and the gain would be very large. So even if the expected value is lower than the investment, that does not mean I’m irrational. There’s another formulation of the same point — there is a connection between them, but it’s not exactly the same — where people say that for the excitement itself and for the chance of winning a million, it’s worth ten shekels to the person. In other words, the gain from the lottery is not only the shekel he’ll get in the end, even if we treat the expected value as though that were the gain, yes, that I gain one shekel. But if the gain of that shekel also includes playing the game, and for me the very act of playing the game has value — the excitement, the anticipation of the results, all those things — I’m willing to pay for that too. So for that I’m paying an additional nine shekels. What does that mean, basically? That assuming my utility function is not only the money I stand to win, but also, for example, the value of participating in the game — the excitement of the game is also part of the utility for me. If that’s my utility function, no one can say that I’m irrational. Rationality is always determined by the question: what is my utility function? That is a given that must be accepted, and then one has to see whether I’m acting optimally in order to get the maximum from my utility function. There you can judge whether I’m rational or not. As for the utility function itself, there is no judgment of what is rational and irrational. Each person determines what he enjoys and what he is willing to pay for, and to each his own taste. Here there is no issue of rational or irrational. So in the analogue, in the ethical context as well, a person has to determine for himself what counts as utility. Is utility the spiritual gain of the whole world? The material gain of the whole world? His own spiritual gain? His own material gain? I don’t know, whatever utility function you can imagine. Therefore when I say that I hold a utilitarian ethical view, yes, that statement does not say very much. First, please tell me what your utility function is. You’re aiming to maximize utility, but you haven’t yet told me what counts as utility for you. If your utility is maximizing happiness or the spiritual elevation of the world, then utilitarianism — which on its face sounds terribly egoistic — suddenly becomes pure altruism under the same heading of utilitarianism. So here too we have to be very careful in our context: when I speak about viewing the dilemma from my own personal point of view or from the point of view of the world, that does not mean egoism versus non-egoism — or at least not necessarily. It may also express egoism versus non-egoism, but absolutely not necessarily. I can take as my own personal gain the fact that the world advances, or my own personal gain that I advance — but not so that I’ll profit in the World to Come or in this world, but because I think the Holy One, blessed be He, wants people to advance. In other words, it has a spiritual ethical purpose. So one has to be very careful; I’m stressing this a lot because later it may come up more than once. It’s very confusing. I moved here among poles when I prepared the lecture because things kept shifting for me and changing places, and the formulations here are very confusing. So it was important for me to sharpen this point. I’m speaking about two spiritual conceptions, not about interests versus values and not about low versus high necessarily. Now let’s take, for example, an initial case just so we can start playing the game. A person sees someone else in danger, and the Torah tells him: “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.” You must save him. There’s even a law in Israel today called “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” but the verse says, “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.” Okay, so you’re obligated to save him. So far, so good. What happens when it requires me to pay a price? For example, when I need to spend money on it. Here one could say: you need to spend money on it, because in principle, if you don’t save him, you violate the prohibition of “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.” In order not to violate a prohibition, a person must spend all his money. Okay, but still notice: the spending of the money is done for me, meaning, in order to save me from being a transgressor of that prohibition. I’m not spending the money in order to save the other person. In practice I’m doing it through saving the other person, but my motivation is so that I will not be a transgressor. And again, notice: I’m not talking about egoism. I don’t want to be a transgressor because the Holy One, blessed be He, doesn’t like transgressors, not because I’ll go to Gehenna. That has to be understood — that’s a different point. Okay? This is a person for whom only spirit exists. He is an elevated, moral, spiritual person, everything is fine. But for him, the spiritual goal is his own maximum spiritual ascent. Therefore, if he is required to spend money in saving another person, he does it. Why? Not because the other person is the focus and for his sake he spends the money, but because he has to make sure that he does not violate a Torah prohibition. And okay, once again, he is obligated spiritually — that is, not obligated because otherwise he’ll be punished, because that would make it a low kind of interest — but because of spiritual advancement. What happens now if the person is required not merely…

[Speaker F] What’s being said here is not simple. Why? Because no — I mean, a person can think he wants not to be a transgressor in the spiritual sense, and then sort of intend that all the time. And there’s — I mean, in some sense he’s frustrated by that; there’s some kind of transgressiveness in it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not necessarily. That’s his spiritual outlook.

[Speaker D] It could be that you simply disagree with such an approach. The way you want to be a good citizen and obey the law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s separate that for a moment.

[Speaker D] You would be — you don’t like it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can disagree with such an approach. I also don’t agree with it. But that doesn’t mean that someone who holds that approach is self-interested in the low sense. Okay. I don’t agree with his spiritual outlook. Fine, that’s a legitimate disagreement. I agree with you — in that sense I do not side with that approach. But I do not see someone who does side with it as self-interested in the egoistic sense; rather, he has a different spiritual outlook. He thinks that the task imposed on him is to soar as high as possible spiritually. The Holy One, blessed be He, expects each person to try to soar as high as he can spiritually. And therefore he acts that way, not because he is indifferent to others, not because he cares only about himself, but because that is how he understands his purpose in the spiritual-ethical sense. All right? So even if I don’t agree with this view, I think we shouldn’t belittle it, and we need to understand what…

[Speaker F] Yes, but it can also lead a person to a very low place at that level. Those are concerns.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not dealing with some sort of…

[Speaker D] Some kind of technocracy of commandment observance?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The outlook in itself is fine. You’re concerned that it may lead to, or give rise to, something further that is less — more problematic. Fine, so those are slippery-slope questions. I want to discuss the outlook itself, not the question of what it might lead to. How do I relate to this kind of outlook, assuming it won’t lead anywhere? The person will remain with this outlook and act on it. Okay? So now, what happens if the person has to pay with his life?

[Speaker D] Then your life takes precedence over your fellow’s life.

[Speaker F] That I know very well — I know right and left of people who go to save someone from drowning, die, and the people they went to save come out alive.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, there was that story at Nahal Ariyeh a year ago.

[Speaker F] Yes, and I even have a personal friend that happened to. Yes. Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. In this case, most halakhic decisors — there’s a Jerusalem Talmud that the Hagahot Maimoniyot brings in chapter 1 of the laws of murder; the Jerusalem Talmud says it is permitted — but most halakhic decisors maintain not only that it is not required, but that it is forbidden. Meaning, not only is there no obligation to do it such that it would at least be permitted — no, it’s not even permitted; it is forbidden to do it. Now why is it forbidden? Here there is a combination of two things. One is that from the perspective of the U.N. Secretary-General’s chair, yes? or of the Holy One, blessed be He, fine — one person is saved and another person is saved, while the other pays with his life; overall the two options are equivalent from the standpoint of the world as a whole. And once the two options are equivalent from the standpoint of the world as a whole, I need to prefer myself. In other words, a dilemma can arise where if I pay the price and the other benefits, the other benefits more — more than the price I pay. So if I care only about myself — again, spiritually, not selfishly — then I won’t pay that price, because my role is to maximize my own spiritual level. But if I think collectively, then overall the spiritual gain he gains is greater than the spiritual loss I lose, and from the U.N. Secretary-General’s chair I should indeed do that act. Okay? What happens when his gain equals my cost? In such a case, the collective consideration is indifferent. Right? Meaning, do it or don’t do it, the collective situation remains the same. In such a case there is certainly room for the view — and this is how most halakhic decisors, most medieval authorities, rule — that here you must prefer yourself. Meaning, the law that your life takes precedence was stated mainly where the two options are equal from the collective perspective. But where one option is preferable from the collective perspective, that’s where questions begin to arise. And we’ll discuss that later. There are questions where perhaps here I should pay the price for the greater benefit of the surroundings, even though certainly my task is first of all to take care of myself. But there is still room for a collective perspective.

[Speaker F] Sometimes from the collective perspective — the U.N. Secretary-General, okay? — says it’s better that ten die and not a hundred.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, there are…

[Speaker F] Many such cases where we know that that’s the argument, the collective perspective.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I save the lives of two people and give myself up, then seemingly from the collective perspective I ought to give myself up.

[Speaker F] Or two, yes. Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But from the personal perspective I say: one second, I still have — again, not selfishly — I still have tasks; I too will keep many Sabbaths, so I need to care that I advance spiritually, even at the cost of others being harmed spiritually or physically. And again, I’m not talking about interests; I keep stressing that. I’m talking about a spiritual outlook — what really ought to be my task. There is “Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may keep many Sabbaths,” and indeed Hani mentioned it earlier. That actually reflects this type of consideration.

[Speaker B] There’s also the case where they are besieging them and asking for one person…

[Speaker D] Better that they all die than that they hand over one Jewish life.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There, in that article, there are many issues. I won’t go into all the aspects here. On almost all of them I’ve written articles, because I like dealing with this subject. So on that I once wrote, and there I argued that it has nothing to do with our topic at all. Even though all the commentaries on Maimonides — this is chapter 5 of the laws of the foundations of the Torah — and in the Jerusalem Talmud in Terumot it says this, everyone there struggles with it and leaves it unresolved, because that law doesn’t fit the halakhic rules. And I argued that it has nothing to do with this at all. These are questions of sanctification and desecration of God’s name; it’s not a question of utilitarian profit and loss, but sanctification of God’s name. It is not a question from the laws of murder and preservation of life.

[Speaker D] But it’s some kind of profit and loss for the world, isn’t it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, from the standpoint of profit and loss for the world, I should indeed have done it. And therefore all the commentaries there wonder about this law: why not hand over that person and thereby save all of us? Otherwise all of us die, so what did we gain from that? Including him himself. What did we gain? On the utilitarian level there is no logic in it whatsoever. Utilitarianism again — not low utilitarianism, high utilitarianism — there is no logic in it whatsoever. And therefore I argued that it has nothing to do with utility considerations; it has to do with considerations of sanctification and desecration of God’s name, and that is a separate issue. But leave that aside, I don’t want to get into all those corners here. So “Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may keep many Sabbaths” appears as one of the reasons the Talmud in Yoma, chapter eight, gives when it comes to explain why we desecrate the Sabbath in order to save a life. One of the reasons the Talmud gives is: “Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may keep many Sabbaths.” What does that mean?

[Speaker C] The question is whether…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …they’ll let him keep Sabbaths afterward. Here we really see in a very sharp way the point at which I am actually desecrating the Sabbath, and the gain will be someone else’s gain, right? But since that other person’s gain is greater than the spiritual price I’m paying — because he will keep many Sabbaths and I will desecrate only one Sabbath — then from the perspective of the U.N. Secretary-General I need to do it. Even though in terms of my own personal task I have seemingly failed, because I myself desecrated the Sabbath. But I am supposed to look at it from the perspective of the Holy One, blessed be He, from the global collective perspective, and not from my own personal perspective.

[Speaker C] Isn’t it a bit presumptuous to put ourselves in the shoes of the U.N. Secretary-General, let’s call it that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because what will happen…

[Speaker C] …if that person goes on to desecrate Sabbaths afterward?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not presumptuous at all; you have to make that judgment. You’re not making decisions for others, you’re making decisions for yourself. If I were making decisions for others, you’d be right — I’m not playing God. But decisions for myself — who’s going to make them if not me? And I make those decisions for myself. From God’s point of view. I’m sort of trying to enter God’s point of view, and that’s how to make the halakhic decision.

[Speaker C] But that’s exactly my problem — that I’m not God. I’m not God, and that person I saved and desecrated the Sabbath for, he can also go on to desecrate many Sabbaths.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and that’s exactly what the halakhic decisors discuss: whether for such a person one gives up one’s life or not. All of these are hard questions. And again, I’m not getting into all those topics, because it’s impossible — we’ll never get out of it.

[Speaker B] But maybe that’s not the consideration? What? Maybe that’s not the consideration, but rather that the commandment says “and live by them,” not that one should die by them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no — “and live by them” is the second rationale. No, but…

[Speaker B] No, no, that’s not you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud, again, the Talmud in Yoma distinguishes between two different considerations. One argument is: desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he will keep many Sabbaths. And that argument is, ostensibly, a clear global argument. In an article I once wrote about organ donation, I brought this rationale, this Talmudic passage, as proof that Jewish law takes a global perspective and not a personal perspective. It’s true that the Talmud there also brings another rationale that seemingly disagrees with this one — namely, “and live by them,” not that one should die by them. And that is seemingly a rationale in the personal sense. It basically says that what matters is saving life. Forget all the costs and global calculations and everything else; we don’t make the calculation of desecrating one Sabbath so that he will keep many Sabbaths. It’s true that even in this personal rationale I am still desecrating the Sabbath so that he will be saved, so it’s not that I’m desecrating it for myself, but still the prism through which I look at it is a personal prism. I have to save his life, and all of Jewish law evaporates when it threatens a person’s life. So that means I am not making the quantitative calculation of where the gain is maximal; there simply is no cost. Desecrating the Sabbath in such a case is not a cost, because I have not violated a prohibition. Where human life is at stake, Sabbath desecration is not a cost. When you say such a thing, what are you really saying? That if it were a cost, then it would be forbidden to use it. Therefore you say: yes, but in a case of danger to life, it isn’t a cost. So you see this is the opposite perspective. It’s a perspective that basically says: I’m not supposed to pay prices so that the other person will be saved. All I’m supposed to do there is simply that I am not paying a price, that’s all. It is really the exact opposite perspective from the rationale of desecrate one Sabbath so that he will keep many Sabbaths.

[Speaker C] I want to ask one more question about that. There is, seemingly, a ruling that says a man is saved before a woman, right? That if both are drowning, one saves the man first?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s an example of a global consideration.

[Speaker C] Exactly, it’s like an example of a global consideration, because she has fewer commandments. Right. So now I ask myself: why did the Sages get themselves at all into God’s shoes? I really don’t understand that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’ll explain it to you — it’s not hard to understand. God Himself didn’t tell us what He was thinking. So what remains for us to do is to make our decisions. So what we can do — and God can always come afterward and claim that we made a mistake — but what can I do? I somehow have to make a decision. So I make the best decision as I understand it, and as I understand it, what God would want is the maximum number of commandments.

[Speaker B] Maybe, but the woman can bring more children into the world who will do even more commandments than the man.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly what I was about to say.

[Speaker C] First, we also see among the Sages considerations of suffering, not only commandments. And yes — what do you mean, if she’s a mother of children…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, I didn’t say otherwise — what does that have to do with it? We can now argue specifically that if she’s a mother of children and he’s alone, maybe indeed the law would change — who said not? I’m speaking on the principled level. On the principled level, the Talmud there gives a consideration of maximizing spiritual benefit, and that is a classic global consideration. And I think there’s no problem with that at all. It frightens people, as though you’re playing God. But you have to understand that here a decision has to be made. In any case, a decision has to be made here. And people are making decisions here. What can you do? Who will make the decision if not me? God didn’t tell me what I’m supposed to do in such a situation, so there’s no choice — we have to make the decision.

[Speaker E] I want to say something that I think. Okay. It’s true that God gave us the Torah; there it is written for us what He wanted, what He meant, what He thinks. His thought is deeper than ours. He gave us the sages to tell us what He meant and what He thinks, and it’s not given to a million people, each one saying what he thinks. Now in the Torah He also wrote to us that even if he tells you that left is right, do what he says, because I too bow to a Torah scholar. God gave them this power, a kind of power of attorney, to stand in His place and say what they think. Not every person can get up and say, I think this way and I think that way. There are Torah scholars who…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no — in the Torah it doesn’t say that left is right and right is left; that’s a midrash of the Sages. The Sages interpreted it that way, and I say that this interpretation is a reasonable one. If someone thinks that this interpretation isn’t reasonable, he’s allowed to criticize the rabbinic decision — there’s no problem with that. The Sages were human beings like us, and what they thought, they thought; and what I think, I think. I try to understand what they thought. Usually it seems to me that they thought well, but fine — criticism is allowed, there is nothing wrong with that.

[Speaker E] No, there’s nothing wrong with criticizing; one even should criticize afterward, because sometimes it sharpens things. But I’m saying they were given the power to say what God meant, even if they made a mistake.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The fact that they were given authority — that’s an explanation of authority. I’m asking about the logic. The question is why they made this decision, not whether they had the power to decide. What’s the logic behind it.

[Speaker E] Okay, that’s something else — that’s so it will be easier for us to understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rashi, in his very first comment on the Torah, after all brings: Rabbi Yitzhak said, why didn’t the Torah begin with “This month shall be for you the first of the months”? Why was the book of Genesis written, and the beginning of Exodus? So Rashi says: because “He declared to His people the power of His works, in order to give them the inheritance of nations.” So that we would see that God created the land and the world, and therefore He can, He has the power to give it to whomever He decides, because He created it. Now the question is — and the question is maybe…

[Speaker F] Not yours, okay,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why was the whole book of Genesis written except for the first chapter of creation? So fine, the first chapter of creation I understand — it comes to tell me that God created the world. But Rashi asked about a whole Torah portion and a quarter, not about one chapter, and he answered only one chapter. And the answer, in my opinion, is that Rashi says there: “and gave it to whomever was upright in His eyes.” The book of Genesis is called the Book of the Upright by the Sages. And therefore I think that what Rashi means to say here is that the book of Genesis was stated here, written here, in order to teach us why the Jewish people were the ones it was upright in God’s eyes to give the land to. And now I come to your question, Yiska: after they told us that He has the power to give it to whomever He wants, why do we need that extra point? To tell me that the fact that He has the power is wonderful, but there still has to be a substantive explanation of why He did specifically this. He has the power, He can do whatever He wants, but that doesn’t exempt Him from explaining the logic of the decision He made.

[Speaker E] Yes, but in truth the whole Talmud is full of explanations. All the disputes and all the discussions there are really explanations.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So we deal with explanations. So what’s the claim? We too deal with explanations just as the Talmud does, and therefore when the Sages tell us that a man should be saved before a woman, a good question certainly arises here — what is the rationale for that? And that’s a legitimate and good question. I see no problem with it at all.

[Speaker E] Yes, every question is legitimate, and every question is even worthwhile; one needs to ask. I’m only saying that in the final analysis we need to know that in the end we are subject to that ruling.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not speaking right now about submission to the ruling; I’m speaking about the logic in the ruling. I want to understand why the Sages said this.

[Speaker D] Not talking about obligation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whether it obligates or not — each person will decide what his obligation to Jewish law is. I also think that Jewish law is binding, but that’s not what I’m dealing with right now. I’m dealing with the question of what the rationale is, what the logic of the law is. Wait, there’s someone here named Moshe. Someone came in here who…

[Speaker F] I think it’s Noa, maybe — maybe it’s Noa Kortzweil?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Noa? No, she’s here in the light.

[Speaker F] Okay, then no. Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We have a stowaway here. There are more participants here than the participants listed. An intruder.

[Speaker F] Someone wanted to listen.

[Speaker D] No, sometimes these aren’t nice things. Better to remove him. Let’s see who it is. Come on, maybe it’s just one of us?

[Speaker H] No, better to remove him, unless whoever it is identifies himself.

[Speaker C] I think it’s better to remove him.

[Speaker H] Yes, for now…

[Speaker B] No, I think not.

[Speaker D] Better,

[Speaker C] because here there’s…

[Speaker B] the…

[Speaker D] this link and all of us together.

[Speaker B] Ruti,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You…

[Speaker D] don’t know what they’ll do with it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It left.

[Speaker B] Maybe that was Noa.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No.

[Speaker C] That was someone who connected

[Speaker B] from the iPhone.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This Zoom link is the link where I give all my Zoom classes; I have various classes throughout the day, so people come in.

[Speaker B] Maybe one of those from the college? Looking for free stuff. Okay, let’s get back. Yes.

[Speaker C] I just wanted to say that I think what Yiska meant was that when I said, why do the Sages allow themselves to get into God’s shoes, then maybe Yiska meant that God gave them permission to get into the shoes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, yes. But the question, of course, was what the logic is in that. I don’t think the question was a psychological one — why they allowed themselves — or a question of authority, but rather what the logic is, why they made such a decision, what the idea is behind that decision. That is the plane on which we are dealing here. Now, in a place where, for example, in order to save the other person I myself am supposed to be harmed in some way, to become sick… or something like that — that is already a dilemma, right? There is a cost to me, there is a benefit to him, his benefit is greater than my cost, and here there is already room for hesitation. From the global perspective, ostensibly it would be appropriate to do it, but there is still some priority to myself, and therefore all sorts of dilemmas and different positions arise here, and I’m not getting into that issue here. But there is another distinction I want to make here. When I speak about saving a life, one could look at it as saving a material interest. A person wants to live; just as he wants money, he wants to live and not die. When I speak about spiritual gain, such as saving a person from a transgression, in such a case there is even more logic in looking from God’s point of view. Why? Because after all, the whole point of my spiritual advancement is supposed to be to do God’s will. But if I am already doing things in order to fulfill God’s will, then let’s look at what He really wants. And surely, from His perspective, what difference does it make whether the spiritual gain comes from this person or that person? If overall the world will be in a better spiritual state, clearly that is, ostensibly clearly that is more in line with God’s will. Therefore, when I am talking about saving a life, here there is room to hesitate — it is interest versus spirituality, or interest versus interest. But when I am talking about spirituality versus spirituality, as in our topic, yes? To commit a minor transgression in order to save one’s fellow from a major transgression. In such a situation, ostensibly there is room for a global consideration. Because in the global consideration, after all, everything I do by performing commandments and refraining from transgressions is in order to advance the spiritual state of the world, to do God’s will. Fine — but from God’s point of view, it is clear that He would prefer that I commit a minor transgression so that the other person not commit a major one. The condition of the world globally will be better if that happens. So there is even more logic in taking a global perspective when the dilemma is spirit versus spirit.

[Speaker B] And that of course brings us back to — and what is the responsibility? The question is what responsibility God placed upon a person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But responsibility — responsibility is another question. Right now I want to know what God wants.

[Speaker B] But if you are not responsible for your fellow’s spiritual world the way you are supposed to be responsible for your own spiritual world, Ruti, that’s another question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all I’m asking the question: what does God want? Okay? After I ask the question of what He wants, one can then ask, okay, is the task of achieving the result He wants placed on you or not? That too can be discussed. But first let’s see what the preferable result is from His point of view. This argument, this consideration, is an independent consideration. Afterward one can come and say, fine, but that’s not your business. So since you raised it already, I’ll add one more remark. In the summary you’ll see that I refer to various columns on my website, in each of which I expanded on these aspects. There is, for example, a dilemma between universalism and individualism — well, not individualism but let’s call it chauvinism. What does that mean? Does a person care for himself, his family, his society, his people, his community, or is he supposed to care for the whole world? What is actually the preferable ethical approach? Okay? Now ostensibly I would say that clearly you are supposed to care for everyone you can, at least as long as it does not come at your expense.

[Speaker F] But the poor of your city come first, the poor of your city — exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To increase the good in the world overall. So logic says to be a universalist. I’m not talking right now about when it comes at my expense, but in the general sense: I should care for maximum benefit in the world at large, a global perspective. The universalism I’m presenting here is nothing but the global consideration I spoke about. Okay? By contrast, there are people who say: forget it, advance yourself and those close to you, and let everyone focus on that, and overall the spiritual condition of the world will come out better, even though that seems less logical. Because if everyone cares for the whole world, in the end it will turn out that no one cares for anyone. Therefore, even from a consequentialist perspective — spiritual consequentialism, I mean — it is preferable that everyone focus on the circles closest to him: first of all himself, then his family, his community, his city, his people, and then the whole world, and that there be a hierarchy among the circles of belonging with regard to my obligation. And I think the argument in this matter is not a non-value argument; excuse me, it is a value argument. It is not an argument between urges or interests and values, but rather the question is how to maximize the good of the world. There are approaches that say that if each person focuses on his own and those close to him, then the good of the world in the broader sense too will look better. If every nation cares first of all for its own people, even when that comes a little at the expense of the rest of the world, but each does it in the best way it can — again, within limits of course, and all that. But if everyone does that, then in the end the condition of all of us, of the whole world, will be better. And that is much better than all of us caring for the whole world. Yes, universalism, like communism for example, championed total universality. That is, they denied obligation to your own nation. Yes, communism in essence was universal. Afterwards this paradox arose of communism caring for the Russian people, or for the Soviet Union, and people have spoken about that quite a bit. But on the principled level it was universal, and there is a very significant value statement here. It is something worthy of appreciation. Opposition to that requires a rationale. And that rationale basically says that if everyone cares for the whole world, the world will not look like much. If everyone cares for himself and those close to him in a more directed way, in a way that prefers the closer circles, then overall even the more distant circles will also benefit. Because then each person really will care for what he can care for, within his own span of wings, and overall the situation will be better — though it is clear that some people will suffer. Those who have no people near them who can care for them really will suffer if the distant ones remain indifferent. But overall, when I look at the whole picture, the whole picture may come out better. And again, these are all slogans, and everything has limits, of course, and proportionality and so on. I’m not getting into all those stories; I just want to sketch the principal lines of thought. Okay, so now let’s try to focus this even more from a moral standpoint. Can I ask something? Let’s be quick. I want to sharpen the question a bit and formulate it as follows. When I discuss relations between a person and his fellow, in Jewish law and in general, one can look at it in two ways. I have a duty toward my fellow, and if I don’t do it, then I am basically committing a transgression. So the spiritual interest — again, spiritual interest — in the end is mine. I care very deeply about my fellow, but at the end of the day the interest is mine. Or alternatively, no — the interest is my fellow’s interest. I see myself as some kind of limb in an organism that is all of humanity, let’s call it that, or the community — it doesn’t matter, depending on where I draw the circle — and that is the reason I act. For example, I’ll give a more concrete example. When I speak about the prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block” before the blind, okay? There is a prohibition on causing another person to sin, or giving him bad advice, causing him harm. Let’s talk right now about causing another person to sin, and leave aside for now the causing him harm. So the prohibition on causing another person to sin — there is one person, Reuven, who avoids doing that because he is righteous and he doesn’t want to be a sinner. If he causes the other to sin, he will violate the prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block,” and therefore he is very careful not to trip up anyone else. But basically what stands before his eyes is himself, so that he won’t be a sinner. Okay? Again, not his World to Come. I’m talking about his own spiritual state itself. This is a completely values-driven person, not interests and not profits. It is a spiritual outlook. Shimon — that was Reuven. Shimon does it differently, because he sees his fellow and he understands that one must care for the other person too. Yes? That’s the example, the saying I brought there on the page — that “my fellow’s this-worldly welfare is my World to Come.” Meaning, the claim is that Shimon is really caring for the other, not for himself. Okay? And one can formulate both a halakhic obligation and a moral obligation in a way that is egoistic. But again, egoism not necessarily — there can be self-interested egoism here, but I am only claiming that it is not necessary to see this as self-interested egoism but as spiritual egoism. I want to advance the spiritual matter as much as possible. And therefore I formulate this question as — I call this spiritual solipsism. Solipsism? Solipsism is a philosophical view that basically says only I exist, and everything I see around me are phenomena of consciousness. There is no world. Yes, sometimes it is called idealism, but the more precise expression is solipsism. Solipsism basically means that the whole world is simply a collection of my impressions and perceptions. You do not exist, the world does not exist, nothing exists. I have perceptions within me. The only thing that exists is me alone. Okay? That is solipsism in its philosophical sense. When I speak about spiritual solipsism, I do not mean the view that others do not exist, but the view that my considerations do not take others into account, only myself. Even when I care for others, I am basically doing it in order to advance spiritually myself. And again, one can treat it as an interest — I want to merit the maximum World to Come, or I want to get bonuses of one sort or another — and then that is a lower interest. But one can also see it as a spiritual outlook that says everyone should care for himself, as I said before, spiritual individualism. Which says that if everyone cares for his own maximal spiritual advancement, then in the end the whole world too will look better. And therefore this is a value-based outlook, not necessarily a self-interested one.

[Speaker D] But we also know the view that really comes out against that, like we saw in Maimonides — to do things only because God commanded. “One who says, ‘Your mercy reaches even to a bird’s nest’” — meaning, one should not say, I fulfill the commandment because I have mercy on some creature God created, but because He commanded me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what does that mean?

[Speaker D] That I’m not supposed to relate at all — not to take myself into account, not my character traits and not my World to Come, but simply because I need to do what He said.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So is that in favor of solipsism or against solipsism?

[Speaker D] Against — I can’t quite define it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think not. Because one could define it as something that is actually in favor of solipsism.

[Speaker D] It basically means that I want to do what ought to be done.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I am supposed to fulfill the commandments I was commanded. Everyone else is just supporting cast. The others are there so I can gain a commandment. They’re ends — they’re means.

[Speaker F] No, that’s the World to Come.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe not — why exactly? The commandment is to go outside yourself and see the world. Therefore those statements too are not necessarily statements that go in this direction or that direction. That’s the point. Therefore I say the distinctions are very, very subtle. It’s a little hard to put your finger on them, and they are cousins of other distinctions, but they are not the same thing. That is an important point to understand.

[Speaker C] I can’t understand how a person refrains from placing a stumbling block before the blind if he thinks he’s doing it only for his own spiritual advancement — how is he really advancing spiritually? The question is what we even call spiritual advancement. Maybe spiritual advancement is specifically caring for the other, that I care about the other — then I advance spiritually more than if I care only about my own sins?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe this and maybe that. You’re posing a dilemma; you’re not answering it. Right, but someone could come and say: spiritual advancement means fulfilling the commandments and refraining from the transgressions I was commanded about. That is spiritual advancement. And again, not interest — spiritual advancement. That is the task God placed before me. You’re simply saying that you hold the second view, and that’s perfectly fine, but that doesn’t mean the first view is baseless. I too hold the second view.

[Speaker C] It’s just that according to the first view, ostensibly God could also have set us arbitrary commandments. It wouldn’t matter what commandments — you would do them and achieve the benefit you need. But when God chose specific commandments for us, then clearly there is something here far beyond a private consideration.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not necessarily toward the other person; it could be repairing the upper worlds, I don’t know what.

[Speaker C] I’m not getting into the upper worlds; I’m referring to the lower worlds.

[Speaker D] So if you withhold, none of your friends is harmed by it or benefits from it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The lower worlds? Then you can infer nothing. It’s true that the commandments did not come to achieve that. Most commandments do not seem to me like something that improves our lives in this world.

[Speaker D] All the decrees, what Maimonides wrote. On the contrary — the statutes, what do they contribute to the world?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think that is what is written in Maimonides, Idit, but we’ll get to that in just a moment. The opposite.

[Speaker D] There are—

[Speaker I] But there’s another point I want to raise.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I want to show you just how subtle these points are, and how easy it is to identify them with one another when they are not identical. I’ll get to that in a moment. Look.

[Speaker I] But can I raise one more point for a second? Yes. You say it can be this interest or that interest, but there can be another possibility — that it’s without any interest at all, that interest doesn’t matter at all. The person did an action, that action benefited another, and by that also contributed to society or to God’s will, so what difference does his interest make? I don’t understand. That his interest is irrelevant. You’re hanging everything on interest. Is his interest to care for his own spirituality, his own this-worldly welfare, his own World to Come, or his fellow’s World to Come, or his fellow’s this-worldly welfare?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Interest” is just a word, Iris. I’m asking you: when you do not cause another person to sin, why don’t you cause him to sin?

[Speaker I] Why does it matter why? That’s what I’m trying to say.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It matters to me why. It matters to me — it interests me. I’m asking you why.

[Speaker I] Fine, but who said it matters to God? That the person did not cause his fellow to sin, or saved his fellow, or helped his fellow — what difference does it make for what reason he did it? In the end he did it, he saved the world, he saved a friend, he did kindness with a friend, and also earned reward. So what difference does it make why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t say it interests God, and I didn’t say why it interests me. I’m saying it interests me. I don’t know why — maybe it interests me.

[Speaker B] Now I’m asking why you do it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is an answer to the question of why you do it. You don’t do it for no reason. Either you do it because of this or you do it because of that, that’s all. You can’t ignore the fact that there are two possibilities here.

[Speaker I] And I’m saying that God’s will is that it be done first of all on the practical plane. But to say what my motives are, what my motives are — that may be between me and Him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And I’m asking you what your motives are — it’s between you and Him, therefore I’m asking you. Maybe you can’t define the motive? There are two possibilities here, and a person can do it out of possibility A. Or because of possibility B.

[Speaker B] But maybe she—

[Speaker E] doesn’t know the motive!

[Speaker B] But motive is something… why present it in such a dichotomous way? Maybe it can be — can’t an action be done from two motives?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It can be both, exactly.

[Speaker B] That’s what I’m asking — why is it dichotomous?

[Speaker I] Why is it dichotomous?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no — what you asked is something else; that is not your question. You asked why it’s interesting, and Ruti says that maybe it can be both. That’s not the same thing. Because when you say it can be both, that means there are two different rationales; it just doesn’t necessarily mean they have to appear separately — they can appear together. You’re saying: why should I care which rationale? That’s a different statement.

[Speaker I] Because it can be, because it can be both things, it can be both things together, it can be in one proportion or another, it can be something different each time, but it still can be something — but it still can be that it advances the world, and also society, and also the self in relation to itself, regardless of his motive. No, but you are always yourself regardless of his motive. You say you’re trying to get into God’s shoes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not getting into the world’s shoes; I’m asking what the person’s motive is. That interests me.

[Speaker F] Can such a thing

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] be

[Speaker F] intuitive?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker F] I mean, I don’t know — I see someone fall, so it’s obvious to me that I’ll go and… or like we said earlier, I saw a pit in the street, naturally I’ll cover it, I won’t start making calculations about…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if you do it naturally — well, that already brings me into moral philosophy. If you do it naturally, it’s doubtful to what extent that is a moral value. A moral value is in an act that you do out of awareness. Naturally a cat saves its kitten, or a donkey saves its foal. Okay, so what does that mean — that the donkey is moral? A moral action by a person is an action that he takes through decision. That doesn’t mean we always have to operate mechanically; that’s another issue.

[Speaker F] No, but that intuition has a framework, that intuition has a whole framework of values and morals you grew up with.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There, you’ve retracted. You’re basically saying that even when you act intuitively, that only means that the calculation you’re making is perhaps not conscious, but there is some sort of calculation there. And I’m asking what that calculation is that you have behind it — that’s what I’m asking. Even if we don’t always put it at the forefront of our consciousness and awareness, there is still some motivation that causes us to do it, and I’m asking what that motivation is. So let’s take the example of charity. Again — this has already taken me a lot of time, so allow me to do this briefly — you saw this already. In Maimonides, commandment 193, he speaks about the commandment to give charity to strengthen the weak and so on. In prohibition 232 he says this is a warning not to withhold charity from the poor and from our brothers, and then he says: and this is a warning against acquiring the trait of stinginess and cruelty that would prevent one from doing what is proper. And he says that only in the prohibition and not in the positive commandment. The question is why? Because there it says “do not…”

[Speaker C] Harden your heart.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are two different conceptions of the commandment of charity. And those conceptions are expressed in the Talmud in Bava Batra, to which I referred you. Right? On the one hand, the Talmud says there: if God wants what is good for the poor, why doesn’t He support them? Why does He rely on us? So Rabbi Akiva answers Turnus Rufus — Rabbi Akiva answers him that the commandments were given to us so that we may merit by them the life of the World to Come. Meaning that giving charity is done so that I may merit the World to Come — and again I’m not talking necessarily about self-interest in the lower sense, but so that I may advance spiritually. The World to Come is only an expression.

[Speaker H] Wasn’t it written about Gehenna, to be saved from Gehenna? Maybe that’s more, like, more precise — like, it’s something negative.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but I—

[Speaker F] Actually I didn’t like — I didn’t like the idea… What? I’m saying I didn’t like the idea that the layer of poor people is kept around so that in the end I can merit a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s exactly the point. What the Talmud is saying there, Rabbi Akiva basically, is that we were given commandments — why do we perform them? In order to be saved from the judgment of Gehenna. And again, being saved from the judgment of Gehenna does not necessarily mean that it’s an interest because I don’t want it to hurt because it burns there, but because Gehenna is an expression of the fact that I do not want to decline spiritually. Let’s take it to the higher place; let’s not make life easy for ourselves. So Rabbi Akiva is presenting here a spiritual outlook that says: giving charity is in order that I not decline spiritually. On the other hand, there is a statement there that the prophet Jeremiah asks God regarding the people of Anatot that He should cause them to stumble with poor people who are unworthy. Yes. What does that mean? That in fact I performed a commandment in the most exemplary way — I gave charity, and this poor person was here, and I invested myself — only what? I didn’t know that this poor person was a fraud, and really wasn’t poor and didn’t need the charity. And ostensibly it seems from the Talmud that I lost the reward. The matter of charity is really for the poor person, not for me, and once there was no poor person here who benefited, no commandment was fulfilled. That is the exact opposite conception, right? Rabbi Akiva’s conception is that the commandment is intended to improve my spiritual state, or at least not let my spiritual state decline. And the second conception says, what do you mean? When I gave charity and thought there was a poor person standing before me, I didn’t know he was a fraud. So surely I worked on my character traits and improved them; I worked on the trait of stinginess, of miserliness. What difference does it make that in the end he wasn’t poor? You see that the matter is consequentialist. The issue is what happens in the world, not what happens to me. Ostensibly that’s contradictory, right? A real contradiction in the Talmud.

[Speaker B] But Rabbi, if it doesn’t matter what happens to me, then why should God provide him with worthy poor people?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly what Tosafot asks. That’s why I’m saying the Talmud speaks in two voices.

[Speaker B] But in the first answer you brought,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the first case.

[Speaker B] The first case — it says that Rav Nachman bar Yitzhak says He provides him with worthy poor people, and that’s for the benefit of the giver, so that he won’t give for nothing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously. But I’m saying: why should it depend on whether this poor person is worthy or not? It would be for my good either way. Even if this poor person is unworthy, I did my work on my side. What difference does it make that there was no worthy outcome? So you see that the outcome in the world is what determines whether there was a commandment of charity here or not. That is a different conception. Now I claim that this is the source of what Maimonides writes. The distinction between these two passages in the Talmud is because the second passage deals with the prohibition involved in charity. And therefore it was not for nothing that I was corrected earlier and they said it doesn’t say so that I merit the World to Come; it says so that I be saved from the judgment of Gehenna. What do you get Gehenna for? For transgressions. Basically this passage is talking about the prohibition. By contrast, with unworthy poor people it is about giving reward. Reward is received for positive commandments, not for prohibitions. That means Maimonides understands that the first passage is talking about the positive commandment, and there indeed the focus is the poor person — to improve the standing of the poor person. Therefore if that poor person is a fraud, the standing of the poor person was not improved, and the commandment was not fulfilled. But the second passage is talking about the prohibition, and the prohibition deals with the giver and not the recipient.

[Speaker C] But you can also see that from the verses. Because in the verse about the prohibition it also says, “Do not harden your hand,” and afterward, “do not harden your heart and do not harden your hand.” Meaning, “your heart” is for the sake of advancing my own character traits, hardening of heart. And afterward in “you shall surely open” it says only “you shall surely open your hand”; it doesn’t say “you shall surely open your heart.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I wrote it for you on the page; look at the verses and you’ll see this already in the verses themselves — that’s exactly what I meant. Meaning, this distinction basically shows that the commandment of charity has two faces. One face is to improve the state of the world, of the other, of the poor person. The second face is to improve my own spiritual state — and again, not in a low sense, not reward and punishment, but spiritual state. Okay? These are two spiritual conceptions, and why does the Torah need to write both the positive commandment and the prohibition? To tell me that at least in the context of charity, both faces exist. That means that in other contexts, where the Torah does not state both a prohibition and a positive commandment but only one or the other, it may be that there truly will be only one face there. “You shall not curse the deaf.”

[Speaker D] “You shall not curse”

[Speaker C] “the deaf” — an excellent example.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, all sorts of things. So there are many things for which there is a prohibition without a positive commandment, or a positive commandment without a prohibition, and there indeed there may be only one side. Therefore when I ask the question what is supposed to stand before my eyes, there is not necessarily one sweeping answer. Sometimes there may be certain prohibitions or positive commandments that are focused on the doer or the giver and not on the world, and there are prohibitions or positive commandments that are focused on the world and not on the doer. The dilemma is of course what happens when there is a clash. But here I am only trying to show that these two sides exist; one cannot ignore that. Okay?

[Speaker H] Can I ask two questions about that? Yes. First, why can’t it also be a matter of reward and punishment? I didn’t understand. Besides spiritual gain, maybe there really is also an interest of reward and punishment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, of course. I’m only saying that we shouldn’t make life easy for ourselves when we think about it. Because once we speak about reward and punishment on one side, and opposite that some sort of altruism of improving the spiritual state of the world or of the other person or something like that, then ostensibly it’s easy to decide. And I specifically want to make it harder. I want to say: wait, the decision isn’t so simple, because we are speaking here about a spiritual outlook versus a spiritual outlook, not interest versus values. But certainly there may also be a self-interested dimension — that’s another discussion. But not necessarily. Second thing.

[Speaker H] There are psychological views that say that basically everything is self-interested.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I don’t agree with that. Okay. I wrote two columns on my site about this issue; one of them is called “Is There an Altruistic Act?”—which is exactly this question. I don’t think I referred you to them, because there really are lots of columns there connected to the things I’m talking about here. And I argue that yes, there is, and I try to explain the flaw in the views that say there isn’t.

[Speaker H] No, there are also people who kind of recognize altruism, but still think there’s something selfish here too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. I want to argue that an altruistic act is altruistic in the essential sense. Meaning, I want to say that there can be—there may be an act, not that it always happens, but there may be an act that was not done out of self-interest. That’s my claim. Okay? I didn’t say all acts are like that, obviously, but such a thing is possible, such a thing exists.

[Speaker H] And what you’re saying—

[Speaker D] Is that what you also call silencing my conscience?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s an interest.

[Speaker H] No, because maybe there’s something here where I still wanted what was good for the poor person, but there’s also some selfishness behind it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But then the philosophy behind that is weak. Because then why assume there always also has to be an interest? If you recognize that there can be a motive that is only the poor person’s good, with no interest, then why assume there’s always also an interest added in? That’s an assumption with no basis. If you assume there’s no such thing as an act without interest, I understand. And you’re basically saying there’s no such thing—when you do something, there has to be some interest motivating you. That’s what I argue with, but I understand the position. But if someone says philosophically, I agree, there can also be an act with no interest, whose motive is a pure motive, with no interest at all—then why assume an interest is always added too? That’s an assumption I don’t see any basis for. Okay. Fine, okay, in any case, for our purposes, let’s move on. This is taking me much longer than I thought, but all right, no matter. I’ll bring an example I like, from a friend of mine once in the yeshiva in Bnei Brak. He was a Torah scholar; he wasn’t mistaken about this, but he wanted to illustrate a point for us. So we were sitting at a table, and he saw someone there reading a book he had been looking for for a long time. So he said to him: Look, I have two options. Either to take the book from you and violate “you shall not steal,” or leave the book with you and violate “you shall not covet.” And since either way I’m violating a prohibition, then at least let the book be with me. Now, that isn’t correct in the halakhic definitions, and he of course knew that, but let’s say even if that were a correct consideration on the level of Jewish law. What is flawed in that reasoning? In my opinion, that reasoning is flawed even if all its assumptions were correct—and they’re not correct. He doesn’t understand, he isn’t applying the correct definition of “you shall not covet,” but let’s leave that aside for the moment. Suppose he were right about everything. Still, his conclusion would not be the right conclusion. And why?

[Speaker D] On both sides, he’s not giving up the prohibition, but on one side he’s also harming the other person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One thing at a time, say it again.

[Speaker D] Here, of course, he’s looking only at himself. Meaning, what transgression am I committing—“you shall not steal” or—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or “you shall not covet.” But the damage to the other person isn’t part of the calculation here. The fundamental point in this reasoning is that this halakhic reasoning is completely logical. It’s perfect on the logical and halakhic level, let’s say, yes? But the fact that you made a perfect halakhic calculation doesn’t mean you’re allowed to harm another person. This reasoning assumes that the whole reason I don’t harm another person is because I violate the prohibition of stealing. Therefore I don’t harm another person. So he says, fine, but in my calculation it comes out that either way I violate a prohibition, so what do I care? I claim that first of all you need to see the other person, not just the prohibitions and your own calculations. And if you’re harming another person, you’re not allowed to do it. You’ll violate “you shall not covet”? Fine, violate “you shall not covet”—you’re violating it anyway, so at least don’t harm the other person. Do you understand? Here this is a wonderful practical implication of the conceptual distinction I’m talking about. Because now I’m saying: look at it in a completely opposite way. After all, you’re violating it anyway. So if either way you violate it, then what justification is there for harming another person? That’s actually a reason not to harm him, not a reason to harm him. What’s the difference between us? From his perspective, there is no other person—he doesn’t see the other person; from his perspective the other person is an extra. From his perspective, he’s making only the calculation of commandments and transgressions that he performs. From his perspective, he is a spiritual solipsist. He exists facing the Holy One, blessed be He, that’s all. I, by contrast, say: what do you mean? I also see the other person. True, I need to take into account the transgressions and commandments that apply to me, but if either way I’m violating a prohibition, then that’s actually a reason not to harm another person. Because I’m violating it anyway. And that is exactly the difference.

[Speaker E] He made such a narrow calculation that because of that he also arrived at—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A distortion.

[Speaker D] And that’s the solipsism the Rabbi is talking about.

[Speaker E] Exactly. He just made a narrow and distorted calculation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re judging him too favorably. Notice that in the halakhic interpretation, this absolutely stands. Meaning, from the standpoint of halakhic interpretation, I violate a prohibition either way—on that we both agree. Now the question is what to do. So the spiritual solipsist says: no problem, from the standpoint of my spiritual interpretation, either way it’s the same. So why shouldn’t I keep the object in my hand? The fact that the other person is harmed—that’s not a consideration. My consideration is only not to harm him because then I’d violate a prohibition. But if the consideration of the prohibition doesn’t decide the issue here, then why shouldn’t I keep the object? Therefore this is a wonderful example because it sharpens the meaning of solipsism. Because in an ordinary case of “do not place a stumbling block,” for example, I can’t sharpen it this way. Because in an ordinary case of “do not place a stumbling block,” what difference does it make whether I refrain in order not to harm you or in order to gain the fact that I won’t violate a prohibition? Practically speaking, we’ll do the same thing. The practical conclusion will be the same conclusion whether you’re a solipsist or not. Only the motive will be different. In this example, solipsism has a practical consequence. It’s not just a difference in motive regarding the same action; the action itself will be different. The solipsist will take the object, and the person with the global consideration will not take the object. Okay? So here comes in— I thought the Torah

[Speaker C] said not to steal and not to covet—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In order not to harm another person too.

[Speaker C] You hear? I thought the Torah said not to steal and not to covet in order also not to harm another person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly! And he claims no—I don’t avoid harming another person in order to fulfill what the Torah said, in order not to violate what the Torah said. By the way, later in the chapter we’ll see—I’ll already say it here—later in the chapter on page 60b there’s a passage we’ll still deal with, I hope, if we manage to get there: whether a person may save himself with another person’s money. Rashi’s position is that a person may not save himself with another person’s money. That one may not steal. Yes, one may not steal, even if he is going to die because of it.

[Speaker D] Die because of it. Okay?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And there it may be an even more extreme expression of this position, which says that with all due respect to my halakhic calculations, because of my halakhic calculations I cannot allow myself to harm another person—even if the harm is not just to money, and I myself will pay for it with my life. I cannot harm another person. And that is of course a more extreme view than what I described here; most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) do not agree with it, but we’ll talk about that later. Fine, moving on. One of the implications of this issue is really how much the talk about the World to Come plays a role. Meaning, many times—yes—when I formulated earlier the principle that “my fellow’s this world is my World to Come,” that formulation is one that sounds like an interested, self-serving formulation. I’m basically not harming my fellow, or helping my fellow, in order to gain or not lose something in my own World to Come. Okay? And then in fact that is exactly the solipsistic outlook. But that’s a low-level solipsistic outlook. Because it’s a solipsistic outlook that says: I basically want to gain or not lose in terms of the World to Come—Heaven, Hell, and all those things. But there can be a situation where it’s solipsism in a non-self-interested sense. Rather, I do it in order to reach a high spiritual level, or not fall to a low spiritual level—and the World to Come and the talk about the World to Come are only indicators. They are not my goal. Okay? So here there are two possible ways to interpret these statements. Look, in the summary I won’t go into it now— Irit sent me by email some source for this expression from Rabbi Yisrael Salanter. And in the source there, the World to Come really isn’t mentioned. The World to Come isn’t mentioned, and apparently he’s only saying that you need to make the calculation for your fellow not the way you make the calculation for yourself. You need to care about your fellow’s honor, even though you’re not supposed to take your own honor into account. And all kinds of things that from your own standpoint aren’t supposed to matter, from your fellow’s standpoint are supposed to matter. But are they supposed to matter because maybe that is your spiritual value, that it will lead to your spiritual advancement—or are they supposed to matter because they matter, period, because your fellow matters? Two ways to interpret it, and I’m not going into which is the correct interpretation in Rabbi Yisrael Salanter. But he says it without mentioning the World to Come. Therefore, from my point of view, that’s even a better source for sharpening the dilemma I’m trying to formulate here. Now let’s continue a bit further. We’ll now move to these Maimonides sources about identification versus obligation. Right? So Maimonides, in chapter eight of the Laws of Kings, writes there that… maybe here I’ll share the sources. When I share the sources I can’t see you, so I share them only when I need to. Maimonides in chapter eight of the Laws of Kings says: “Anyone who accepts the seven commandments and is careful to observe them is among the pious of the nations of the world and has a share in the World to Come. And this is provided that he accepts them and performs them because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them in the Torah and informed us through Moses our teacher that the descendants of Noah had previously been commanded concerning them. But if he performs them because reason compels it, he is not a resident alien and is not among the pious of the nations of the world, but among their wise.”

[Speaker C] In any case, the more correct version is “but among their wise.”

[Speaker B] What is Maimonides actually saying? That I’m supposed to perform commandments—by the way this is not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not the resident alien, this is every—

[Speaker C] Jew,

[Speaker B] but we won’t get into that now.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m supposed to perform commandments because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them—not because reason inclines that this is what should be done, but because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them. If I didn’t do it because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded it, then it’s not a commandment. It may be a good deed; I’m among the wise of the nations of the world, but not among their pious. It’s not a commandment; it’s a good deed. Also in his Commentary on the Mishnah in Hullin, Maimonides writes the same… I won’t read it now; Maimonides writes that we need to do the act because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded at Sinai, and not because of earlier things and not because of all kinds of other reasons. There is a difference between these two sources in Maimonides; I note it in a comment here, see in the summary, I won’t go into it here. Also in Maimonides, Laws of Idolatry, Maimonides writes that someone who worships idols out of love or out of… this is a dispute in the Talmudic text, yes? Abaye and Rava disagree. Abaye holds that one who worships idols out of love or fear is liable, and Rava holds that one who worships idols out of love or fear is exempt. Maimonides rules like Rava, of course, because generally the Jewish law follows Rava except in the cases of YAL KGM. So Maimonides rules like Rava. But what? Most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) explain that when we speak about idolatry out of love or fear, the meaning is love and fear of a person, as the Raavad writes here in his glosses, and that is how all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) explain it—the Rivash and Rashi and the Kesef Mishneh, everyone—that this is love and… Why do they explain it that way? Because they don’t understand how it could be that if I worship idols out of love or fear of the idol, that wouldn’t be idolatry. After all, just as in relation to the Holy One, blessed be He, when I serve Him out of love and fear, that is the very best service of God there is, so if I worship the idol out of love and fear of the idol, then certainly that is excellent idolatry. Why would one be exempt in such a case? Therefore the medieval authorities (Rishonim) say that if I worship idols out of love or fear, this probably means love and fear of a person, not love and… But if it is out of love and fear of the idol, that is certainly full-fledged idolatry. But in Maimonides it isn’t written that way. Maimonides gives no hint that this is love and fear of a person—on the contrary, it’s the idol.

[Speaker D] It’s even misleading—“out of fear of it, lest it harm him.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He writes that it is love and fear of the idol. If one is exempt for worship out of love and fear, then what is idolatry in the highest form? If such idolatry isn’t idolatry, then what is? When is it idolatry?

[Speaker B] If he accepts it as a god over himself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So Maimonides writes: when he accepts it upon himself as a god. That’s the alternative. In that case it is idolatry. And I claim the same thing in relation to the service of God. Serving God out of love or fear is not superior service of God. The service of God needs to be done because He commanded it. I accepted Him upon myself as a god. Accepting as a god—what is a god? A god is someone who has authority, in the Talmudic text, right? “Elohim” in the Talmudic text and in the Torah refers to judges. Judges. A judge is someone who, when he says something, it has to be done—not because he’s right, but because he has authority. That is the meaning of a god. “God” means that what he says, I do because he is a god—not because of some calculation, because I’ll gain, because I’ll lose, because he’s right. It has nothing to do with any of those things, but simply because he is a god. I accepted him upon myself as a god. That is the meaning of a god. Therefore this Maimonides joins the previous two sources in Maimonides that say that basically I am supposed to fulfill commandments out of the command itself, not out of identification and not out of anything like that. Against this there is Maimonides in chapter six of Eight Chapters. I hope you had time to see it. There Maimonides basically says that at least with respect to the rational commandments, one should do them out of identification. And regarding the non-rational commandments, about that it says: “Do not say, ‘I do not want to eat pork,’ but rather, ‘I do want to, but what can I do, since my Father in Heaven decreed it upon me.’” That applies to the non-rational commandments. But the rational commandments, the moral commandments, the commandments that have a logic we understand—there one should do it out of identification. The question is whether that contradicts the sources we saw earlier in Maimonides.

[Speaker B] No, it doesn’t contradict. Why? Because it doesn’t say that if I act because I’m commanded, then I have no feeling or attitude toward the thing I’m commanded about.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. I really think it doesn’t contradict, and I gave you the Avnei Nezer’s Aglei Tal so you could see that way of thinking there. And what the claim basically is, that the reason why I am supposed to do the commandment is because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded it, but that doesn’t mean I’m not also supposed to try to develop identification—at least with the rational commandments—to develop some identification with why it is also correct and fitting to do this commandment, and perhaps also develop a natural inclination that will help me fulfill it. These are two different things. Meaning, the question is why I do it in the principal sense. And the question of whether I have identification inside me is a different question. I can do it because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded it, and at the same time develop identification. The practical implication will be: what happens on a day when I woke up on the wrong side of the bed. Today I have no identification; I woke up on the wrong side of the bed, I have no energy for all these things. Will I still do it? If yes, that means I performed a commandment. Now, in a place where I do have identification—if on the day when I have no identification I would still do it, that means that even on the day when I do have identification, I am not doing it only because of the identification, but because of the obligation to the command. And if so, that is an excellent commandment. And the best commandment is when I do it out of obligation and I also have identification. Is that what you meant?

[Speaker I] Is that what you meant when I said it doesn’t matter what feelings or what… I can’t hear. Is that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is that what you meant… never mind anyway. Fine, in any case, the point—if that’s what you meant earlier, Irit, then yes indeed. So as I said earlier, I say now too: there is no contradiction. You do it out of obligation, but you also develop within yourself identification. When I give charity to a poor person, there is no idea of suppressing the feeling of compassion and the moral motivations so that this should count as the commandment of charity. I do it because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded it, and together with that I also develop within myself the moral feeling and the moral obligation. Two different things. Even though it still is not a commandment if I don’t do it because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded it. That is true; it’s unrelated—I’m not retracting what I said before. I’m only claiming that it doesn’t contradict. And the example of this is the Aglei Tal’s words in the introduction—I referred you to that introduction—and there he says that those who think one must not derive pleasure from the commandment of Torah study are mistaken. Those who study Torah and enjoy it—there is no better Torah study than that. On the contrary, the ideas enter more deeply, you understand them better, you rejoice in them. Clearly that only improves the commandment you are doing. But many people know the Aglei Tal and don’t notice his concluding sentence. He says: “But one who studies for the sake of the commandment and delights in his learning—this is Torah study for its own sake… whereas one who studies not for the sake of the commandment of study, but only because he has pleasure in his learning, this is called study not for its own sake.” After the whole introduction he gave, that seems like a contradiction. Now he says that if you study because of the pleasure, it is study not for its own sake. So what does that mean? He says no: you need to study because of the commandment, and besides that develop within yourself identification and delight in the study. But if you study because of the pleasure, that isn’t a commandment. The same thing here: if you give charity to the poor person because of morality, you have not fulfilled a commandment. If you give charity to the poor person because of the command, but you are also committed to morality and you also developed emotional identification with it, that is the finest commandment there is. As long as your fundamental motivation is the motivation of the command, and the indicator is what happens on the day when you don’t feel like giving charity. The command still stands. If you do it out of the command, days like that are the ones that will testify whether what you’re doing is a commandment or not. Okay?

[Speaker C] And does morality in general have significance? Meaning, I ask myself—it’s a little hard to detach the idea that a person performs a moral commandment that the Holy One, blessed be He, did not command him, because one could say that’s not such a logical way to behave. After all, if we take an atheist, for example, who says he wants to give charity—why does he give? What value does morality have if the Holy One, blessed be He, is not there?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? The fact that it isn’t a commandment doesn’t mean it has no value. It isn’t a commandment, but it is an act of value. As Maimonides says, one who performs the commandments because reason compels it—he says he is not among the pious of the nations of the world but among their wise. And among their wise he certainly is. And it is indeed an act of value, just not a commandment. Two different things.

[Speaker B] If we did things only because we’re commanded and didn’t develop any relationship, then we’d be like robots.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not a matter of robots. I don’t think that’s robotic; it’s a decision to do what the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded. But it’s not complete action. Complete action is when you perform the commandment out of the command, and at the same time you also identify with the moral aspect and have compassion and do all kinds of things like that. But if you do it only because of the moral issue and compassion, then you do not have a commandment. It simply is not a commandment. It is a good deed, but it is not a commandment. Because a commandment is a response to a command—that is the root meaning of the term. Okay? Now, the point is that this whole move—I just want to say—this whole move does not necessarily mean a contradiction to what I presented, because above I presented the two approaches of spiritual solipsism versus considerations. The claim is that even if, when you perform the commandment, you do it because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded it, still it could be that what the Holy One, blessed be He, commands is to make the global calculation. Therefore this does not necessarily enter into the question that interests me, because I’m asking the halakhic question and not the question of morality versus Jewish law. And that needs to be sharpened very, very carefully, because when we speak about whether we say to a person, “sin so that your fellow may benefit,” the question here is not a moral question; it is a halakhic question. The question is what Jewish law demands of me. Therefore, even if I want to do only what the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded, and out of the motivation of obligation to the command, there is still room for the question: what does the command say? Does the command tell me to place before my eyes the global consideration, or does the command tell me to place before my eyes my own spiritual advancement? What does the Holy One, blessed be He, command me? And that is the point I very much want to sharpen, because now I’m reaching this complication with slaughtering for a sick person. Again, of course, we won’t manage to read it inside and deal with the details, but slaughtering for a sick person is a very interesting test case. When I wrote about it in one of the columns on the site, I said it was litmus paper for the ignorant. You ask an ignoramus, you ask an unlearned person: tell me what’s preferable? I have a sick person, the doctors say he needs to eat meat or he’ll die, it’s the Sabbath. I don’t have prepared kosher meat. What should I do—give him pork or slaughter a kosher animal for him? What will the ignoramus say?

[Speaker F] Give him pork. What do you mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? Pork? God forbid. An ignoramus, my dear—pork, God forbid. What will the Torah scholar say? Slaughtering is a capital prohibition on the Sabbath; eating pork is an ordinary prohibition, lashes—with all the connotations attached to it throughout history, pork is of course the ultimate impurity—but pork is a prohibition punishable by lashes. Slaughtering on the Sabbath is a capital prohibition. One who desecrates the Sabbath is like one who rejects the whole Torah. Okay? So the Torah scholar’s first instinct should be to say: give pork. The ignoramus’s first instinct should be to say: slaughter the animal. Okay? But the medieval authorities (Rishonim), when they discuss this question, raise all kinds of very, very complex considerations. The best-known among them is the Ran’s consideration—a fascinating consideration. He says it is better to slaughter and not give him pork. And why?

[Speaker B] Because if you slaughter, then for all the eating—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s one severe prohibition, but one prohibition. But if you give him carrion or pork or something like that, then for every olive-sized amount he eats—and even half an olive-sized amount, we’ve already passed into the issue of less than the minimum measure, yes—then he violates a separate prohibition in its own right. And quantity outweighs quality. Better to violate one severe prohibition once than to violate several lighter prohibitions. You can argue about that a lot; that’s not the issue right now, but that is what the Ran says. Okay? So the Ran basically claims that it is better to slaughter. By the way, the Shulchan Arukh rules that it is preferable to give carrion. But the Ran says it is better to slaughter.

[Speaker F] It seems terrible to me, it seems terrible to issue a ruling that yes, it’s preferable to slaughter, because there are so many processes involved in slaughtering, and the—

[Speaker B] And the carrion has to be cooked.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What processes? Take the knife and slaughter, that’s all.

[Speaker F] No, that’s it—it’s slaughtering, cutting, taking things out from inside, dividing it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Leave it—let’s say there’s only the one slaughtering, after that he eats the animal, so what.

[Speaker F] But also—

[Speaker B] The carrion also has to be cooked.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Does he eat the animal with the skin and bones? It doesn’t matter right now, it’s just a hypothetical question, okay?

[Speaker F] No, it seems to me like a very major act, with so much involved in it, compared with just giving him prepared carrion and that’s it—you’ve closed the issue.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Assuming the second option is only slaughtering, fine, it doesn’t matter, it’s a hypothetical option. In slaughtering I arrive at the same state. Is it preferable—fine, this is a hypothetical question, not a real one. Now the interesting point is that also when the Raavad was asked this question, look how it is formulated in the Rosh—not everyone brings it in the same way. But in the Rosh it is formulated, and this is the only place where this consideration appears: “If he has carrion before him, and there is no slaughtered meat unless one slaughters on the Sabbath, for some say”—that’s how they asked the Raavad—“it is preferable that he himself violate the prohibition of carrion rather than others violate a capital prohibition for him.” Right? Better that he violate the prohibition of carrion than that we, slaughtering for him, violate a capital prohibition. Now notice, there are two parameters here. One could have said: better that he violate the prohibition than that I violate it, because after all this is being done for his sake, so let him pay the price. Why should I violate a prohibition for his benefit? Okay? Assuming both options exist, of course. Okay? So that’s one point. The second point: we have a lighter prohibition and a more severe prohibition here. Exactly. Carrion is a lighter prohibition and slaughtering is a capital prohibition, a severe prohibition. But in this discussion they combined both reasons. So look: simply speaking, it seems they do not accept the distinction between his violating a prohibition and my violating a prohibition as such. If there were not also a gap in severity here, that by itself would not have been a consideration. And indeed, when you check all the positions of the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—

[Speaker D] and there are quite a number of positions among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) here—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] each with his own reason; I gave you a taste of some of them, that’s still not all of them, but—

[Speaker D] there are quite a number of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] positions here—none of them, except the Tashbetz in some initial thought, raises this consideration: why shouldn’t he violate the prohibition if he is the one who profits from it? Why should I violate the prohibition for his gain? This consideration doesn’t come up at all. And that is very fascinating. It’s fascinating because it shows that for the medieval authorities (Rishonim), this is not a relevant consideration. The outlook is a global outlook, focused on the question whether a prohibition will be violated here or not. I don’t care whether you violate the prohibition or I do. In the end, a prohibition must be violated here in order to save a person—that’s clear. The question of who will violate the prohibition is not interesting. What matters is what level of prohibition it is. All the time that’s the interest.

[Speaker I] But why—if it’s because they relate to the sick person as someone who is really very ill, bedridden?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A sick person who is about to die, of course—it’s a life-threatening situation.

[Speaker I] But he can’t do such a thing, and that’s the assumption.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, “a sick person in danger” means a sick person in mortal danger, otherwise it’s forbidden to desecrate the Sabbath. So here I’m saying only that for our purposes, what’s important is that when one goes through all the reasons of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), this reason—who should do the transgression—does not come up. It’s not relevant. The question is which transgression is done.

[Speaker B] And also, the very fact that they say “we desecrate [the Sabbath] for him”; they don’t say “he desecrates.” We desecrate the Sabbath for him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Others desecrate it for him because he can’t.

[Speaker B] Right, that’s what I’m saying, the wording is like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not relevant, because that’s in a place where he can’t. In a place where he can’t, obviously I violate a prohibition in order to save him. That’s not the discussion. I’m speaking where there is an option for him to do the prohibited act, and there’s no problem, and he’ll also be saved. Why not? Maybe he should do it? In such a case I would expect that to be the first consideration.

[Speaker B] Maybe in that case, when he needs to eat, he won’t do it out of command but out of feeling a need—as if it’s his own self-directed consideration that brings him to eat.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m asking why the medieval authorities (Rishonim) do not bring the reason that it is preferable that he violate the prohibition rather than I violate it. That’s all. Why don’t they bring that reason? Why is that reason the last one to arise? There’s something here saying: I’m looking with a global outlook. For me, what matters is, from the Holy One, blessed be He’s, point of view, how many prohibitions will be violated here, and what level of severity they have—I don’t care who does it. Similarly, I once wrote an article about separating Siamese twins. In a situation where there are two—you know what Siamese twins are—say two babies are born joined together, and for the sake of the discussion they have a shared heart, one heart. And here there are two bodies dependent on that heart, okay? And let us assume for the sake of discussion that the situation is symmetrical; the heart cannot naturally be assigned to one of them, because every such situation changes the discussion. But right now: a symmetrical situation. All the decisors forbid doing anything. One must leave both of them to die. The claim is that in certain known cases, doctors know that within nine months both will die. It can’t continue like this. There are cases where not, by the way. But in certain cases the doctors know that within nine months both are going to die. Now I have the option of performing a separation surgery. What does that mean? I do surgery, I leave the heart with one of them, and I send the other to die because he remains without a heart. But the one who remains alone with the heart will continue to live a normal life. That’s the separation surgery. All the decisors prohibit it. Prohibit? Yes. In the symmetrical case. They prohibit it entirely, and they say: leave both to die. Why? Because when you perform the separation surgery, you are basically murdering one in order to save the other, and one may not murder one in order to save the other. Now I wrote an article in Tehumin in which I wrote very sharply that in my opinion there is an obligation to perform such an operation; I cannot understand the argument that forbids it. And once again the root of the matter is that I’m not looking at the question of what prohibition I am violating. I’m violating murder, let’s say for the sake of discussion, but in the end, from the Holy One, blessed be He’s, point of view—after all, if I do not perform the operation, two will die. If I do perform the operation, one—who in any case would have died—will die, but the other will be saved. So from the point of view of the global consideration, clearly one should do the operation. And consequently I also claim that this is not murder. But the decisors who forbid it are looking as spiritual solipsists. They say: I am looking at whether I am committing murder. No—it is not justified to commit the murder of one in order to save the other, therefore don’t touch it. Ah, both will die? They will die on their own; I didn’t do it. So this is an outlook that basically places the person himself at the center—and again, I’m not talking about self-interest. This is a spiritual conception. The conception that says a person must not—on the contrary, it is spiritual caution that says: you must not be stricken by the prohibition of murder. That is a terribly severe prohibition; this is not self-interest. But still, the spiritual outlook is a solipsistic outlook. It is an outlook that says that as far as I’m concerned, all the people around me are extras. What matters is how many transgressions and commandments I myself will have. And the other people are only like target dummies on a shooting range. I am supposed to train on them or get through safely, to see the whole world as a very narrow bridge that in the end I am supposed to cross in the most perfect way possible, like some computer game that I’m supposed to get through as perfectly as possible. I do not see the other people before my eyes, and not even the Holy One, blessed be He’s, point of view. I see only the perspective on me—how I come out with the maximum commandments and minimum transgressions. And that is the solipsistic outlook in this context. And I argue in favor of the global outlook, which says: what do you mean? From a global outlook, clearly the Holy One, blessed be He, expects me to leave one alive and not leave two to die. Therefore, clearly I am expected to perform the separation surgery, even though in that surgery I perform an act in which I kill one of them. By the way, there’s a question whether to hand this over to a non-Jewish doctor or let a Jewish doctor do it. So there later authorities write—Igrot Moshe, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, and the Achiezer—that there is no such thing. The whole question is whether it is permitted or forbidden. If permitted, then a Jewish doctor does it; and if forbidden, then even a non-Jewish doctor may not do it. Again, the calculation is not who will do it; the calculation is what needs to be done.

[Speaker B] What did they answer you? What? What did they answer you in LMM?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They didn’t answer, they only protested. I had a long argument with Mordechai Halperin, the doctor, the rabbi-doctor from Jerusalem; he is an expert in medical ethics. He went through all the decisors and wrote that all the decisors forbid it. He tells me: there’s no such thing, this cannot be said. But he gave me no answer at all to my questions. I had excellent interviews with him; everything appears in the article in Tehumin, you can also find it on my site. Everything appears in the summary; there are also links there to the articles. Whoever wants can read; there are lots of links there to columns.

[Speaker B] But I think regarding the person himself who is in mortal danger—if he himself violates the prohibition, he’s not doing it out of considerations of command or not command; he’s simply acting instinctively because he’s going to die.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He has no considerations at all, he just eats like an animal.

[Speaker B] But that doesn’t interest me. That’s a psychological question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t interest me. I’m not a psychologist; I’m a man of Jewish law. I’m not interested in why he does it; I ask what he should do. That’s all. Why he actually does it—that’s for the psychologist, why would that interest me? I’m asking: a person comes to ask me, I say what should be done. The question of why the person acts, or what will happen in practice, is a question for psychologists—why would that interest me? Okay, we’ll stop here. We didn’t manage to finish. I very much recommend reading, because in the summary there are more sharpenings and more points, and anyone who wants to invest a bit more time also has links to read. I think this is a very important background to the passage we’ll deal with next time.

[Speaker D] Rabbi, regarding Aglei Tal, what about what we are doing now, studying the Oral Torah? Well? We’re studying for the enjoyment—clearly I’m not deriving from this any commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re studying—I don’t know—maybe you’re studying for enjoyment. I said I’m not interested in what you do in practice. You asked me what should be done? One should study for the sake of the wisdom.

[Speaker B] There’s also the category of one who is not commanded and yet performs.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, women are commanded—fully commanded.

[Speaker D] They are commanded, but not to study, say, the laws of the apostate city or the stubborn and rebellious son.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The laws of the apostate city, the stubborn son—everything, women are commanded. Why not?

[Speaker B] Why—

[Speaker F] not study?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who said? You can read—I have an article and I also have a recorded lecture about this on the site, and I also have an article on the site. An article that was published in one of the recent issues of Tzohar, and there I explained why women are fully obligated in the commandment of Torah study. Again, in that very commandment of Torah study in which men are obligated. It’s a commandment that is not counted. The counted commandment is to learn and receive reward; reciting Shema morning and evening is only for men. Yes. But beyond that, to study the apostate city, to study the whole Torah—women are obligated just like men, exactly the same.

[Speaker C] I wanted to ask about Siamese twins: if someone is told, kill one person and by means of that we will leave two others alive, and if you don’t murder him then we will kill all three of them—does the consideration of overall benefit also enter here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the Talmudic text; that’s what they asked me—what… Look in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, and look at my article in Tehumin on separating Siamese twins; I explain and answer that question there too.

[Speaker C] Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you very much.

[Speaker G] I wanted to ask, excuse me, Rabbi. Yes, yes. Since this is what I deal with, because I work with Noahides, I thought maybe the same logic regarding women’s Torah study could also be applied to them—that they too basically need Torah study.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One would have to think about that, maybe. One would have to think about it. It could certainly be. Why think otherwise?

[Speaker F] I don’t understand why think otherwise.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t—

[Speaker G] know, it’s a question of commandment or not commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “The Torah that Moses commanded us is the heritage of the congregation of Jacob”—so it is forbidden for a Noahide to study Torah.

[Speaker G] Yes, no, that issue is discussed—whether it is permitted or forbidden—and according to Maimonides, as we understand him, a Noahide who made the declaration before a religious court is in a different relation to the people of Israel, and therefore he is also permitted to take on commandments and study Torah. Huh?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You mean a resident alien?

[Speaker G] Yes. Maimonides really does define it more or less that way in terms of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the relation—that for a resident alien there isn’t the prohibition of studying Torah? I’m not familiar with that. I don’t know; it needs checking.

[Speaker G] No, but you need to look there in the Laws of Kings, chapter ten, because Maimonides says he can take commandments upon himself and also study Torah. We do not prevent him. But regarding commandment—if we’re already saying it’s permitted—maybe there is also an obligation. It’s possible to think about that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Look, throughout history there were quite a number of great Torah scholars who studied with non-Jews—who taught Torah to non-Jews. The question is how to justify that and how to explain it; fine, that’s a different discussion. Factually, it was certainly done. The Ramchal did it, and there were others who did it. Thank you. Okay.

[Speaker F] Thank you very much. Have a good day. Thank you.