Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 15
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- The dispute between Rashi and Tosafot about sticking bread to the oven wall
- Rav Bibi’s question and the reason for permitting removal
- The possibility that there is no dispute between Rashi and the Riv”a
- Tosafot Yeshanim: an objection to the Riv”a and an underlying assumption about the permission
- Sefat Emet: reading Tosafot Yeshanim and understanding the practical difference
- Tosafot Yeshanim: two answers for understanding the question
- The question: is the permission meant to save from sin or from punishment?
- Liability at the time of sticking it on or at the completion of baking, and the Jerusalem Talmud
- The question of destructive action and leaving the bread to burn
- A suspensive condition and an uprooting condition, and “coercion is not considered as though one acted”
- The apparent contradiction in the Riv”a and its resolution through the two sides of the question
- Maimonides: coercion, illness, and punishment
- A conceptual proposal: external coercion versus the circumstances of reality, and the implication for rabbinic decrees
Summary
General overview
The text centers on the dispute between Rashi and the Riv”a in Tosafot regarding liability to stoning for someone who stuck bread to the oven wall on the Sabbath and did not remove it because of the rabbinic prohibition on removing it, and it suggests that instead of a fundamental dispute, it may be that each explains a different side of Rav Bibi bar Abaye’s question. According to this proposal, the permission to remove the bread can be understood either as a way to save the person from the punishment of stoning or as a way to save him from the prohibition itself, and the discussion is clarified through Tosafot Yeshanim, Sefat Emet, and the question of how to define coercion when the Sages forbid an action that would save one from sin. The discussion then connects this to the tension between understanding the labor of baking as dependent on the completion of the baking or as determined at the moment the bread is stuck on, and to the topics of a suspensive condition and an uprooting condition, and the principle that coercion is not considered as though one acted. Finally, a distinction is brought from Maimonides in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah between coercion by an external threat and illness, in order to propose an additional framework for understanding whether a rabbinic decree counts as coercion that exempts one from punishment.
The dispute between Rashi and Tosafot about sticking bread to the oven wall
Rashi is presented at first as the view that one is liable to stoning for sticking the bread on in a way that led to baking, even when there is a problem of removing it because of a rabbinic prohibition. The Riv”a in Tosafot is initially presented as the view that exempts from stoning when the failure to remove it is due to coercion created by the rabbinic prohibition against removal. An analysis of Rashi’s approach is presented according to which even if he actually removed the bread, he might still be liable to stoning, so that the removal is not necessarily a mechanism for saving him from punishment.
Rav Bibi’s question and the reason for permitting removal
According to Tosafot, an assumption is presented that Rav Bibi’s question is not about saving someone from stoning, because according to the understanding attributed to the Riv”a there is no punishment of stoning in a case of coercion, and therefore the permission to remove the bread is intended to save him from the prohibition and not from the punishment. According to Rashi, it is argued that if removal does not save one from stoning, it is hard to understand why there would be any question at all about permitting removal, and so a reading is proposed according to which Rashi’s statement about liability to stoning even when he did not remove it under coercion belongs only to the side of the question in which he was not permitted to remove it. A conclusion is suggested according to which, for Rashi, the very doubt is whether removal saves one from the punishment of stoning, and if it does not, there is no reason to permit it.
The possibility that there is no dispute between Rashi and the Riv”a
A possibility is suggested that the dispute between Rashi and the Riv”a is not necessary, because each can be interpreted as explaining a different side of the question. The Riv”a is interpreted as explaining the side on which they forbade removal, and therefore the failure to remove counts as coercion that exempts from stoning, while Rashi is interpreted as explaining the side on which they permitted removal, and therefore the failure to remove is not coercion and incurs stoning. It is argued that if the Riv”a too would agree that on the side where removal was permitted, one who did not remove it is liable to stoning, then it turns out that they agree on the main law and each one simply described the relevant side of the question.
Tosafot Yeshanim: an objection to the Riv”a and an underlying assumption about the permission
Tosafot Yeshanim brings an objection in the name of “Our teacher Shmuel of Bourbourg is puzzled”: if so, what is the question at all? Since whether they permitted it or did not permit it, he is not liable, it is obvious that they should not permit it. It is argued that the objection assumes that the permission to remove the bread was meant to prevent punishment and not to prevent the prohibition itself, because if the permission were meant to save him from the prohibition, there would still be room to permit it even without stoning. A note is presented that Sefat Emet emphasizes that one can answer that there is no objection to the Riv”a if the permission is meant to save from the prohibition itself, in line with “the view of Tosafot above, that even from the standpoint of completing the prohibition itself, they permit him.”
Sefat Emet: reading Tosafot Yeshanim and understanding the practical difference
Sefat Emet objects to the Riv”a’s interpretation according to which there is no stoning even without permission, because then there would be no initial thought to permit it, and he brings Tosafot Yeshanim’s answer that the practical difference is that if they permitted it and he still did not remove it, he is liable. Sefat Emet argues that this seems odd, because “it is obvious that there is a practical difference whether he removed it or not,” and he explains that Tosafot Yeshanim means that the permission itself creates a situation in which, if he does not remove it, he becomes liable, so that there will not be a situation in which “all sinners will bake on the Sabbath and be exempt” by saying that “they permitted me to remove it.” It is explained that the permission functions as an incentive mechanism to get him to remove it, because from the moment they permitted it, there is no longer coercion, and therefore someone who does not remove it risks liability to stoning.
Tosafot Yeshanim: two answers for understanding the question
In the first answer of Tosafot Yeshanim, “It seems to me that the practical difference is if they permitted it, that he is liable if he did not remove it,” an understanding is presented according to which the side favoring permission is rooted in the idea that the permission changes the status of coercion and restores the possibility of liability to stoning if he does not remove it. Sefat Emet explains that the purpose of the permission is to cause the person actually to remove it by creating a strong incentive, and thereby to avoid completing the prohibition of baking. In the second answer, “Alternatively, that itself is what he was asking: did they permit it, because if they do not permit it he will be liable,” a possibility is presented that the doubt is whether the rabbinic prohibition creates coercion that exempts from stoning, and if it does not exempt, then there is reason to permit it in order to prevent liability.
The question: is the permission meant to save from sin or from punishment?
A framing dispute is presented over what motivates the permission to remove the bread, where one side ties it to saving the person from punishment and the other ties it to saving him from the prohibition. It is argued that Sefat Emet allows one to explain that there is no necessity that the permission be connected specifically to stoning; rather, it can be “also from the standpoint of the completion of the prohibition itself,” and it is noted that Sefat Emet says that even if, in the conclusion, “they permit him to remove it,” the Riv”a may still say that if he did not remove it because of coercion he would be exempt from stoning. An interpretation is presented according to which the loop in which permission to remove the bread restores liability to stoning serves in practice to prevent the prohibition, because it increases the motivation to remove it.
Liability at the time of sticking it on or at the completion of baking, and the Jerusalem Talmud
An addition in Sefat Emet is brought, in square brackets: “for one can say that the liability is not at the moment he stuck it on, but at the moment the baking is completed,” and it is explained that according to this, the exemption makes sense when he cannot remove it because of coercion. Against this, a proof is brought from later authorities based on the Jerusalem Talmud in our chapter, “that if one stuck bread to the oven on the Sabbath near nightfall and it was baked after the Sabbath, he is liable,” attributed to the Rashash, from which it apparently follows that the liability “is immediate, at the time he stuck it on,” and then it is difficult to understand why later coercion would exempt him. It is presented that the Riv”a could learn like the Minchat Chinukh and not like the Rashash, and then the Jerusalem Talmud would have to be explained accordingly.
The question of destructive action and leaving the bread to burn
A scenario is raised in which someone who did not remove the bread does not take it out at all but leaves it until it burns, and the possibility is considered of seeing this as a destructive act. It is argued that since at the stage when the bread was baked before it burned there was already a moment of proper baking, the later destruction does not undo the liability that arose when the bread was fit for use. A comparison is presented to carrying from one domain to another, where liability does not depend on actual use after the act of labor.
A suspensive condition and an uprooting condition, and “coercion is not considered as though one acted”
A connection is presented between understanding baking as a condition and the question of coercion, using the distinction of the Ketzot between a suspensive condition and an uprooting condition. It is explained that an uprooting condition describes a situation in which the act takes effect and can later be uprooted retroactively if the condition fails, while a suspensive condition describes a situation in which the legal effect depends on fulfillment of the condition, and only then takes effect retroactively. The example of a bill of divorce “on condition that she not drink wine for two months” is brought to illustrate implications such as the possibility of remarriage during the period or the death of the woman before fulfillment of the condition. Applying the distinction to removing bread from the oven is presented as follows: if failure to remove it is a suspensive condition required in order to turn the sticking-on into an act of baking, then failure to remove it under coercion is not considered fulfillment of the condition, because “coercion is not considered as though one acted”; whereas if removal is an uprooting condition that saves one from an act already completed at the moment of sticking it on, then coercion in failing to save oneself does not undo the act of sticking it on, which was done willingly.
The apparent contradiction in the Riv”a and its resolution through the two sides of the question
A tension is presented between the Riv”a in one place, who says that the completion of the prohibition is at the time of sticking it on and therefore “here you are not saving him anything; he already committed the prohibition,” and the Riv”a here, from whom it seems that coercion with regard to failure to remove it can exempt from stoning. It is suggested that on one level there is no contradiction if, according to Tosafot Yeshanim’s second answer, the Riv”a is not ruling that coercion exempts at all, but is only explaining one side that was not accepted as Jewish law, while in conclusion they permitted removing it because without permission there would have been liability. On another level it is suggested that even if the Riv”a is speaking for the actual law, he can be reconciled within the Rashash’s framework by understanding the condition as a suspensive condition rather than an uprooting condition, so that coercion in not fulfilling the condition prevents the legal effect of liability for baking.
Maimonides: coercion, illness, and punishment
Maimonides is brought from the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, chapter 5, law 4: someone concerning whom it was said “transgress and do not be killed,” but who allowed himself to be killed, “is liable for his own life”; and someone concerning whom it was said “be killed and do not transgress,” but who transgressed, “has profaned the Name,” but “since he transgressed under coercion, he is not lashed… and needless to say he is not put to death by a religious court.” Law 6 is also brought, which compares illnesses to coercion but adds that if he transgressed and was healed through idolatry, sexual immorality, or bloodshed, “the court punishes him with the punishment appropriate for him,” and it is said that some later authorities explain this as extra-legal punishment, while others understand it as actual punishment, which creates a contradiction with law 4.
A conceptual proposal: external coercion versus the circumstances of reality, and the implication for rabbinic decrees
A framework is proposed that distinguishes between coercion created by an external factor, such as being threatened with a gun, and a case in which a person acts within the circumstances of reality, such as the laws of nature or a bodily condition, which are not considered coercion exempting from punishment in the same way. An example is given of throwing a person off a roof and rejecting the claim that “gravity killed him,” because the laws of nature are the framework in which the act operates and do not exempt. On that basis it is suggested that the rabbinic prohibition on removing the bread can be seen as part of the preexisting “laws of halakhah,” and therefore should not be seen as full coercion that exempts, whereas sudden external coercion would be different. The passage ends with the note that whether one who places himself into coercion counts as coerced is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), and depending on that, the question of the relationship between prior knowledge of the law and the definition of coercion becomes sharper.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the previous lecture we began presenting the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot on the question of whether there is liability to stoning for someone who stuck bread to the oven wall on the Sabbath and did not remove it because there is a rabbinic prohibition on removing the bread. According to the Riv”a in Tosafot, we saw that there is no liability to stoning, and according to Rashi there is. Now, we explained Rashi’s position in several ways, and the last way was — and I just want to focus on it now — that even if he actually removed the bread, he would still be liable to stoning even though the condition was not fulfilled and the bread was not baked. Meaning, there emerges here some possibility that if it is forbidden to remove it, then even if he nevertheless did remove it — by force of the halakhic prohibition against removing it, sorry, the other way around — meaning, if we take the side that says it is forbidden to remove it, and he nevertheless violated that and removed it, he is still liable to stoning; he has not saved himself from liability to stoning. Removing it does not save him from that. So then it comes out like this: according to Tosafot, Rav Bibi’s doubt assumes that the permission to remove it is because of the prohibition, right? Not because of the punishment, because according to Rav Bibi there is no punishment. So therefore, even if he does not remove it because of the prohibition, he does not incur punishment anyway, so why permit him to remove it? Apparently the permission to remove it is because of the prohibition and not because of the punishment. Therefore there is a possibility that they permitted him to remove it even though in fact there is no punishment of stoning here. And Rav Bibi’s doubt is the question whether they permitted him to remove it in order to spare him the transgression or not, but punishment does not exist here. According to Rashi, the assumption is that he is in fact liable to stoning. I said more than that — it seems that Rashi is also not bothered by the possibility that he will fail to comply with our instructions or something like that — and I explained in the third way that he would be liable to stoning even if he removed it. So removing it does not help him avoid liability to stoning. So according to Rashi it is not at all clear what the discussion here is — so what is the rationale to permit him to remove it? Why is there any doubt here on the part of Rav Bibi bar Abaye at all? It seems to me that according to Rashi there is no choice but to say that the doubt is precisely about that very question. Meaning, if they permitted him to remove it, then the assumption is that the permission to remove it will save him from the punishment, and everything Rashi said — that he is liable to punishment even though he did not remove it under coercion — applies only to the side where they did not permit him to remove it. Otherwise you simply cannot understand Rav Bibi’s question. Meaning, my claim is that what Rashi said, that he is liable to the punishment of stoning even though he was coerced in not removing it, goes only on one side of Rav Bibi’s question. Because if that were an agreed-upon determination, and Rav Bibi’s whole question, on both of its sides, were said under that assumption, then it is not clear what the question is. Why permit him to remove it if he is saved neither from the prohibition nor from the punishment? He violates the prohibition and incurs the punishment either way, so why permit him to remove it? Therefore there is no choice but to say that on the side where they permitted him to remove it, he presumably really would be saved from the punishment. Everything Rashi said, that removal would not save him, applies only to the side where they forbade him to remove it.
[Speaker C] So you’re saying that the question is whether the permission saves him or doesn’t save him. What? The question is whether the permission saves him or doesn’t save him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rav Bibi’s doubt according to Rashi — that’s what it seems to me one has to say — Rav Bibi’s doubt according to Rashi is precisely that. Meaning, the question is whether the removal will save him from the punishment of stoning, and if so then they permitted him to remove it, or whether it won’t help him — the removal will not save him from the punishment of stoning, and therefore there is no point in permitting it. No point in the prohibition? No point in permitting it.
[Speaker C] If we forbid it, then it certainly won’t save him, right? According to Rashi. According to Rashi, if there is a prohibition then it certainly won’t save him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. And Rav Bibi’s question is precisely about that, whether in fact, even though he did not remove it, he would be liable — meaning, if he removed it, would he be exempt from stoning or not? That is basically the question. Okay? Because otherwise it is very hard to understand the question according to Rashi. According to Rashi. And at this point I’ll already say in advance: it could be that this whole story of a dispute between Rashi and the Riv”a — it is not at all certain that there is a dispute here. Because maybe the Riv”a would say the same thing too. And everything the Riv”a said, that he is exempt from the prohibition of stoning because he did not remove it under coercion, that is only on the side where they forbade him to remove it. The Riv”a explains the side where they forbade him to remove it. But on the side where they permitted him to remove it, he too would agree that there is punishment if he did not remove it, and that removing it would save him from the punishment, just as Rashi says. And then it comes out that there is no dispute here between Rashi and the Riv”a; rather, each one is simply explaining a different side of the question. And it is clear that they are explaining different sides of the question. That’s the answer — meaning, it is clear that Rashi is talking about the side where removal is forbidden. And it is clear that the Riv”a is talking about the side where removal is permitted. That is clear. But what I want to say is that they are speaking only about those sides. Meaning, each one is speaking only about one side of the question, and not saying that he disagrees.
[Speaker F] But the Riv”a does not say that they forbade him to remove it, and then he is coerced, and he does not say that they permitted him. He is not talking about the side where they permitted him. He says that he is coerced because he didn’t do it, and in order for the baking to be attributed to him, they forbade him to remove it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore he will not incur the punishment of stoning. What? If he did not remove it, he will not incur the punishment of stoning.
[Speaker F] Right, because then he is considered — called — coerced. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But why is that on the side where they forbade him?
[Speaker F] That is on the
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] side where they forbade him.
[Speaker F] And still that saves him from stoning?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the side where they forbade him, according to the Riv”a.
[Speaker F] If they forbade him to remove it, then—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Riv”a says: the fact that he did not remove it will not make him liable to punishment. Right — coerced. Meaning, the Riv”a is speaking about the side where they forbade him to remove it.
[Speaker F] That’s what I’m saying.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m not sure the Riv”a would say the same thing also on Rav Bibi’s side where they permitted him to remove it. It could be that on the side where they permitted him to remove it, the Riv”a would say that if he did not remove it, then he — not only could be, it’s even likely — then of course he would be liable to stoning, because he was not coerced; after all, they permitted him to remove it. Why, why should he be exempt from stoning, right? So that is fairly clear in the Riv”a’s view. But if so, and you connect that to what I just said in Rashi’s view, it turns out that there is no dispute between the Riv”a and Rashi.
[Speaker E] They’re simply talking about different sides. But that comes out that for the Riv”a now we’re talking again about punishment and not about the transgression.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Say that again?
[Speaker E] It means that now the Riv”a is speaking about saving from punishment and not saving from the transgression.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but the Riv”a does not talk that way — as I said earlier — because the Riv”a says there is no punishment. So what is the side on which they permitted him? The side on which they permitted him is presumably to save him from the prohibition, not to save him from the punishment. That’s what I said earlier. Right. But on the side where they did permit him, there is punishment as well. Meaning, what the Riv”a said — that there is no punishment — is only on the side where they did not permit him. But on the side where they did permit him, the Riv”a — and then we really return to what I said about Rashi, and what I’m saying now — there is no dispute between the Riv”a and Rashi according to this.
[Speaker C] Fine. You already mentioned in Rashi’s view — wait—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I didn’t understand.
[Speaker C] On the other side that they’re not talking about, yes, maybe they do have a dispute.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They’re talking about different sides.
[Speaker C] Right, but each one has a view regarding the second side as well. So where is the dispute? No — say the Riv”a is talking about the side of permission, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rashi is speaking about the side of permission, where they permitted him. And on that Rashi says that if he did not remove it, he is liable to stoning. Obviously, because he is not coerced — they permitted him. He could have removed it, so he is not coerced. And the Riv”a — the Riv”a is speaking about the side where they did not permit him, and then indeed if he did not remove it, he was coerced. About that the Riv”a says that he is not liable to stoning. But according to Rashi — but—
[Speaker C] According to Rashi, though, if they did not permit him, he would still be liable to stoning — he would not be considered coerced. Is that right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If they did not permit him — if they do not permit him—
[Speaker C] According to Rashi he is liable to stoning. No, according to Rashi always, in every case, there is no question. According to the Riv”a there is a question.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no — what I said is the opposite. According to Rashi, on the side where they did not permit him, Rashi too agrees that there is no liability to stoning. What Rashi says — that there is liability to stoning — applies only on the side where they permitted him. If he did not remove it, he would be liable to stoning.
[Speaker C] Oh, like that? Yes. Before, the Rabbi said that… even if they didn’t permit him, he still would not be coerced.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. At first I presented, at first I presented the positions of Rashi and the Riv”a as though there were a dispute here. And what Rashi says is that he is liable to stoning in any case.
[Speaker C] Oh no, then no.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So now Rav Bibi’s question has to be understood — then what is the doubt?
[Speaker C] Oh, I understand, I understand. So we rejected that assumption. I understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We didn’t reject it, but it is no longer necessary, and I even think it is less likely. Yes. Internally, it is really the case that Rashi is speaking about the side where they permitted him, and the Riv”a is speaking about the side where they did not permit him. It is clear that they are talking about different sides.
[Speaker C] But on the other side they agree? I understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s regarding Rashi and the Riv”a. Now, Tosafot Yeshanim asks an objection against the Riv”a. I’ll share the file. “Our teacher Shmuel of Bourbourg is puzzled: if so, what is the question at all? Since whether they permitted it or did not permit it, he is not liable, it is obvious that they should not permit it.” Right, so Tosafot Yeshanim asks about the Riv”a: you say there is no punishment, basically because he is coerced, so why should they permit him?
[Speaker F] But now you answered that by saying that if they permitted him, then the Riv”a thinks that he would be liable to stoning if he did not remove it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot Yeshanim himself says that — I just said it in advance. But Tosafot Yeshanim asks the question I asked earlier when I first presented Rashi and the Riv”a as disagreeing views. And then he says: the assumption in the Riv”a’s view was that he is really not liable to stoning at all, whether they permitted it or not — he is not liable to stoning in such a case. But if he is not liable to stoning in such a case, then what is the reason to permit him? That is Tosafot Yeshanim’s question. What does Tosafot Yeshanim assume in his question?
[Speaker D] That there is a prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That the permission is meant to prevent the punishment and not to prevent the prohibition, right? If the permission were meant to prevent the prohibition, what is the question? They permitted him to remove it so that he would avoid the prohibition. He is not liable to stoning even if he violated the prohibition because he was coerced. But still, there is room to say that they permitted him in order to spare him the prohibition, not the punishment. Yes — what does Tosafot Yeshanim assume? That it is obvious that the permission is a permission in order to prevent the punishment, not in order to prevent the prohibition, right? Yes. So this is also what I said at the very beginning, when I presented Rashi and the Riv”a as disagreeing views. I said that in them too you really see the same thing. In the Riv”a’s view, who says there is no punishment of stoning at all, then the whole question of Rav Bibi — I asked then what Rav Bibi’s question is — presumably Rav Bibi’s question is whether they permitted him in order to spare him the prohibition, right? That was the calculation I made at the beginning. And according to Rashi, where there is punishment of stoning, then presumably what they permitted him is in order to save him from the punishment of stoning, not in order to save him from the prohibition. And that is the dispute between Rashi and the Riv”a. But against that Tosafot Yeshanim asks, according to the Riv”a — where there is punishment of stoning in every case, and at the moment he assumes that on both sides there is no punishment of stoning — then he says: so what is the reason to permit? He apparently assumes that the permission has to be because of the punishment. And it is quite clear that this is not correct; the permission is to spare him the prohibition. But Tosafot Yeshanim does not even raise that possibility. In the Riv”a’s view, that is the simple explanation, that the uncertainty is whether they permitted him to remove it in order to spare him the prohibition and not the punishment; the punishment does not exist in any case. Okay, and that is how Tosafot Yeshanim asks. And in fact Sefat Emet here comments on this point from a slightly different angle, but it is the same point. He says: “Indeed, without this there is no difficulty against the Riv”a, for one can say that he follows the view of Tosafot above, that even from the standpoint of completing the prohibition itself they permit him, and therefore the permission is not specifically because of stoning.” What is he saying? He is saying that the objection against the Riv”a is not difficult, because it could be that what they permitted him to remove it for was not because of stoning, but in order to spare him the prohibition. And therefore, what do I care if there is no stoning here? I am still sparing him the prohibition. And according to this, even in the conclusion, where we hold that they permit him to remove it — after all, the conclusion of this sugya is that he is allowed to remove it — even so, the Riv”a can still hold that if he did not remove it because of coercion, he would be exempt from stoning. Yes, no need to — understand what he is saying. He is saying: after all, in the conclusion they permitted him to remove it. So if they permitted him to remove it, that means there was apparently a need for this removal; otherwise why permit it? What need is there? Apparently without the removal he would be liable to stoning. So you see that according to the Riv”a, in the conclusion there really is liability to stoning, and that is why they permitted him to remove it. So he says no, not true: in the conclusion of the sugya they permitted him to remove it, but not because he is liable to stoning. He is not liable to stoning. They permitted him to remove it in order to spare him the prohibition and not the punishment. It is simply the other side of the coin of what he said above. Okay? And then he adds in square brackets: “For one can say that the liability is not at the moment he stuck it on, but at the moment the baking is completed, and that is why he is exempt if he cannot remove it because of coercion.” That is how he explains the Riv”a. If you remember, I connected this to the Rashash and to the Minchat Chinukh: according to the Riv”a, if he really says that the moment he was coerced there is no punishment — no liability to punishment by stoning — then it seems that he holds like the Minchat Chinukh, that the baking itself is part of the prohibition, and therefore if you were coerced you are exempt. If the baking is only a condition, but the prohibition is the sticking-on, then I did the sticking-on, and so what if the condition was fulfilled under coercion? Okay? You have already seen the sources on a condition fulfilled under coercion, so all of that has to be brought in here, but let’s leave it for now. So he says: apparently according to the Riv”a, the liability is only at the moment the baking is completed and not at the moment he stuck it on. And therefore the Riv”a says that if he cannot remove it because of coercion, then—
[Speaker D] He is exempt from punishment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. “But according to what later authorities proved from the Jerusalem Talmud in our chapter, that if one stuck bread to the oven on the Sabbath close to nightfall and it baked after the Sabbath, he is liable.” The Rashash, yes. The Rashash. “Therefore it is proven that the liability is immediate, at the moment he stuck it on, and then it is again difficult why he should be exempt because of coercion.” Right — so if the liability is at the time he stuck it on, then the Riv”a’s reasoning is not clear. What do I care that you were coerced during the baking process? Of course, the Riv”a can learn like the Minchat Chinukh and not like the Rashash. We said that. And what will we do with the Jerusalem Talmud? He’ll do what the Minchat Chinukh does with the Jerusalem Talmud. They’ll have to explain it somehow. But in any case there is such a view among the halakhic decisors, and the Riv”a presumably learns that way. So that comment should not trouble us too much. In any event, Tosafot Yeshanim then says — he brings two answers. “And it seems to me that the practical difference is if they permitted it, that he is liable if he did not remove it.” So what is the practical difference if they permitted it? That he is liable if he did not remove it.
[Speaker F] Meaning this permission obligates — it’s not just… what? This permission obligates; it’s not just that it’s permitted, but that he is obligated — if they permitted him, then he is obligated.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but what is written there, “he is liable,” means liable to punishment — punishment of stoning — not obligated to remove it.
[Speaker F] Right, but I’m saying that once they permitted him, that means they obligated him to remove it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s how I spoke in the previous lecture. I’m not sure I agree.
[Speaker F] Why did you say that in previous lectures? What? I didn’t say there was an obligation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who said there is an obligation to save a permitted act from turning into a prohibition? I don’t know. One can discuss that. But here what is written — “he is liable” — means liable to stoning if he did not remove it.
[Speaker E] It’s obvious that if he did not remove it, then he has become liable with his life.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, he is basically saying that the practical difference between whether they permitted it or not is the question whether he becomes liable to stoning. Okay? What? So Sefat Emet asks on this: “However, the Riv”a’s interpretation is itself difficult, because if so, what was the initial thought that they would permit him, since even if we do not permit him he will still be exempt? And this was also asked in Tosafot Yeshanim. And they answered,” says Sefat Emet, “that the practical difference is if they permitted it and he did not remove it, he is liable.” That is the answer we just read. “And apparently their words are puzzling, for it is obvious that there is a practical difference whether he removed it or not.” Right — you don’t need to tell me that there is a practical difference. The whole practical difference is that if he did not remove it, then he is liable to stoning, and if he did remove it, then he is exempt. The objection was not what the practical difference is. The objection was what the reason is to permit him, if in any case he is not saved from liability to stoning. What does this answer answer? Tosafot Yeshanim gives a practical difference here. A practical difference in what sense? That if he did not remove it, then he is liable to stoning, and if he removed it, then he is exempt. Fine — that is the practical difference for Rav Avin’s question. I’m not asking what the practical difference is; I’m asking what the reason is to permit him.
[Speaker D] I have a question: are we talking here about not removing it and then completing the baking? Yes. Meaning, in the completion of the baking he really will take the bread out of the oven. Yes. Okay. No, “he did not remove it” could also be—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You know what, what happens if he leaves the bread there to burn? Exactly.
[Speaker D] Then that’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Interesting question. I’m not sure what the answer would be. You could say that it is destructive action. And when you act destructively, then a labor whose product is ruined does not incur liability on the Sabbath. But on the other hand, at the moment the bread was baked, before it burned, you had already become liable. It was baked — so that is damage that came afterward, but you already did the baking.
[Speaker D] But it’s not only destructive action, it’s even non-use — meaning, I’m not going to want it anyway.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not relevant. What does that have to do with anything? If I carried something from a private domain to a public domain and then I didn’t use it in the public domain, so what? I carried it — that’s what I’m liable for. Even if the labor of carrying is significant so that the object can stand for my use, that still does not mean that I have to use it in practice in order to be liable for carrying.
[Speaker D] Yes, but yes, but if I left it in the oven — okay, not destructive action — but really the main problem would be only in sticking it on, not in the completion of the baking or in the process. I’m no longer interested in that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t understand. Who?
[Speaker D] If in the case of not removing it, okay? If I stuck bread to the oven wall and really didn’t do any labor afterward, okay? Then that turns the fact that the sticking-on itself is the problem. Because no, no — we’ll solve it in a second — but the sticking-on itself, because what I do afterward no longer matters.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You want to link the question of what happens if in the end I burned the bread to the dispute between Rashi and the Minchat Chinukh? Whether the prohibition is the sticking-on itself, and then even if I burned it afterward I’m liable. But if the whole baking — if I burned it at the end, then I’m exempt? Is that the claim?
[Speaker D] Yes, because if the sticking-on has no significance for me, then I have no — I am exempt from everything. Apparently.
[Speaker E] But there is a multi-stage process here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. I don’t see why that is really considered anything. Even according to the Minchat Chinukh, one can say that the moment the baking was completed before the burning, I had already become liable. So what if afterward it burned? Right. Afterward it’s like, say, if I had removed the bread from the oven and then not used it but thrown it into the sea, or put it back into the oven to burn. Would I then be exempt? About that there is no doubt that I would not. Right? So what difference does it make whether I removed it or didn’t remove it? The bread was fit for my use inside the oven at some stage; I just left it there to continue burning. So I already committed the prohibition — why should that save me? Okay.
[Speaker D] Okay, so now I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] return to Sefat Emet. So Sefat Emet says: Tosafot Yeshanim, you brought me a practical difference — that he will be liable if he did not remove it. Okay? But I was not asking what the practical difference is; I was asking what the reason is. What is the reason to remove it?
[Speaker G] I didn’t understand this whole point. Tosafot Yeshanim first says that if he is not liable, then the question is pointless altogether. And then he answers that by saying that he is liable if he does not remove it. And because he is liable if he does not remove it, now there is a question whether to permit it or not. Okay, so what does Sefat Emet want from him? What is the problem with what he says?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sefat Emet understood — that is what he said here — that Sefat Emet understood that Tosafot Yeshanim brought a practical difference here. He says: you weren’t asking what the practical difference is if they permitted him or did not permit him to remove it. You were asking why permit it. Right? You’re right that you are continuing the line of thought the way we did above, and really you have to continue Tosafot Yeshanim and say it like this: what do you mean practical difference? Let’s see what lies behind this Tosafot Yeshanim. What is written here, that the practical difference is—
[Speaker C] A practical difference can be a reason, because if in the end something changes, that can create a reason.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s more than that. The practical difference is the result of the change; it does not cause the change. What is Tosafot Yeshanim saying? He says that Rav Bibi’s question is about the side where they permitted him, yes? So if he did not remove it, he is liable. On the side where they did not permit him, even if he did not remove it, he is exempt. Right? That is basically what is written in Tosafot Yeshanim. Yes. And therefore there is a practical difference to the question: what happens if he did not remove it? Is he liable or is he not liable? But if that is so, then clearly Tosafot Yeshanim has already hidden in here what I said above, that when the Riv”am said he is exempt from stoning because he was coerced, that is only on the side where they did not permit him to remove it. But on the side where they did permit him to remove it, the Riv”am too agrees that there would be punishment by stoning, and that is also obvious logically, because he is not coerced. They permitted him to remove it, so what is the problem? He is not coerced.
[Speaker G] I have to understand — I have to say I just haven’t been able to keep my head straight in all this. I didn’t manage to understand. Tosafot Yeshanim starts from the assumption that the sugya is not discussing whether he incurs punishment, but starts from the assumption that he incurs punishment if he did not remove it, and the sugya’s question is whether to permit him or not. Why does he call that a practical difference? I mean, from what I understood, Tosafot Yeshanim takes into account that the sugya takes into account that if he did not remove it, he is liable to punishment, and now the question is whether to permit him or not. Where does that come from?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, he is challenging the Riv”am. The Riv”am… what does he say? That even if he did not remove it, he is exempt from the punishment of stoning. And on that Tosafot Yeshanim asks: so what is the reason to permit him? After all, either way he will not become liable to stoning, so why permit him to remove it? Tosafot Yeshanim is discussing the Riv”a. Are you with me, Chani?
[Speaker G] Tosafot Yeshanim is on the Riv”a, and then basically he claims that he really is liable to punishment if he did not remove it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. That’s it — I thought that’s what you were pointing out earlier, and quite rightly. Basically, when you look at Tosafot Yeshanim, Sefat Emet apparently did not understand him. Because when Tosafot Yeshanim says, “the practical difference if they permitted it is that he is liable if he did not remove it,” what does he really mean to say? That even according to the Riv”a, even according to the Riv”a, if he did not remove it and they permitted him to remove it, then there would be liability to stoning. Everything the Riv”a says, that there would be no liability to stoning, is on the side of Rav Bibi’s question where they did not permit him to remove it, and then he is coerced. But if they permitted him to remove it and he did not remove it, then he’s just being foolish. Of course he is liable to stoning; he was not coerced — they permitted him to remove it. So the Riv”a was not talking about that. So what do you mean, what is the reason to permit him to remove it? The whole objection of Tosafot Yeshanim is a strange objection; from the outset it is a strange objection. Now I’m going back even further: already in Tosafot Yeshanim’s objection, it is not clear what he wants. Because when the Riv”a says that he is not liable to stoning because he was coerced, would it even enter our minds that on the side of Rav Bibi’s doubt where they permitted him to remove it — yes, if they permitted him to remove it and he did not remove it — according to the Riv”a he would not be liable to stoning? Of course he would be liable to stoning. On the side where they permitted him to remove it, he is not coerced. Everything the Riv”a says, that he is exempt from stoning, is because he was coerced. When is he coerced? He is coerced when they forbade him to remove it. But if they permitted him to remove it, then obviously if he did not remove it, he is liable to stoning, and the Riv”a clearly was not talking about that. That is the calculation I made at the beginning of the lecture, when I said that therefore I am not at all sure there is any dispute between the Riv”a and Rashi. Everything the Riv”a says — that there is no punishment of stoning — is only on the side where they did not permit him to remove it, because then he really is coerced, and you cannot punish him for not removing it. But the Riv”a never intended to say that on the side where they did permit him to remove it, there is no punishment of stoning, right? The point, though — the important point that she asks — right, but the question is why permit him to remove it? What Tosafot Yeshanim asked — you are right that on the side where they permitted him to remove it, he also incurs punishment by stoning, but why permit him? Why permit him? Leave it forbidden. Why? Because what do you lose? Even if you leave it forbidden, there will be no stoning here. That’s not what I’m saying. I—
[Speaker G] think I didn’t understand this sentence, that if they permitted him to remove it, he incurs punishment. When does he incur it? When he did not remove it? He did not remove it despite the permission.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll explain again. Look, the point is this.
[Speaker G] Why would a person, if they permit him to remove it, not remove it? I can’t understand the situation.
[Speaker F] And if he didn’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] remove it, right, and if he didn’t remove it despite the permission. Why would a person violate a prohibition when he knows he is liable to stoning? You can ask that about all Torah prohibitions.
[Speaker G] Okay, fine, but it’s obvious — a person who intentionally from the outset stuck bread on and did not remove it, leaving it inside, obviously he—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He would be liable to stoning. I can’t understand the initial assumption that if they permitted him, then he’s liable. What does that mean? He’s liable to stoning. Now the question is whether, if we permit him, he’ll be saved from stoning. If they didn’t permit him, then he isn’t liable to stoning because he’s under compulsion, according to the Rivah. Only on the side where they did permit him—so that he’s not under compulsion—then of course he would be liable to stoning, because he’s not under compulsion. That’s obvious. So what are the old Tosafot asking? Everything the Rivah said, obviously he said only on the side where they did not permit him—sorry—where he is under compulsion. Not on the side where they did permit him. So what difficulty are the old Tosafot raising against the Rivah? Are they asking the Rivah: what’s the point of permitting him, since either way he won’t become liable to stoning? That’s not true. On the side where they permitted him, he would become liable to stoning if he didn’t take it down.
[Speaker F] If he didn’t take it down.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is the question of the old Tosafot? Just, what is the question? The question is as follows.
[Speaker G] I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand that on the side where they permitted him, he would be liable to stoning. But the question is: why permit him? The prohibition on taking bread out exists in general, independently of this case, not just here in order to save him from a stoning prohibition. In general there is a rabbinic prohibition on taking bread out. The question is: why, in a situation like this, is there even a possibility that they permitted him this prohibition? What’s the reason? After all, even if they don’t permit him, liability to stoning won’t apply to him. So why permit him? That’s what the old Tosafot ask. Obviously, according to the old Tosafot, on the side where they permitted him to take out the bread and nevertheless he didn’t do it, then obviously he is liable to stoning—there’s no doubt about that, and the Rivah agrees to that too. The old Tosafot are only asking: according to the Rivah, right, on that side he would be liable to stoning. But why is there any such side at all? Why would anyone even think that the Sages would permit taking out the bread? What are you gaining here? Why permit prohibitions? After all, either way he wouldn’t become liable to stoning, and the prohibition is not the reason, right? That’s what the old Tosafot assume. So what did the old Tosafot ask? And it’s an excellent question. But then the Sefat Emet asks: the answer of the old Tosafot is terrible. What kind of answer is that? A practical difference—that if they permitted him, then obviously if he didn’t take it down he isn’t under compulsion and he becomes liable to stoning. Thank you very much. I didn’t ask what the practical difference is; I asked why permit him. Answer me that.
[Speaker B] To save him from the prohibition, like you said.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but the old Tosafot assume not. If you want to suggest that answer, no problem, but that’s not what the old Tosafot suggest. The old Tosafot raise a difficulty. Later he himself notes that one could have resolved it. Not later—actually we already read that in the Sefat Emet—that one could have resolved it by saying that it comes to save him from the prohibition. But the old Tosafot, who raised the difficulty, certainly did not learn that way, right? The old Tosafot understood that this is meant to save him from punishment. So the old Tosafot ask: according to the Rivah, what is Rav Bibi’s basis for saying they permitted him here to take out the bread? What are you gaining? Why permit prohibitions? After all, in any case he wouldn’t incur stoning, and the prohibition isn’t the reason, yes? That’s the assumption of the old Tosafot. So what the old Tosafot ask is an excellent question. The Sefat Emet only asks: in the answer of the old Tosafot, what did you actually answer? If the prohibition isn’t a parameter, and as for the punishment—you gain nothing through this permission, because there wouldn’t have been punishment even if you hadn’t permitted it—then why permit it? So what is the basis of Rav Bibi’s doubt whether they permitted him to take it out? Why would they permit him? And the fact that there is a practical difference—if they did in fact permit him and he didn’t take it down, then he would incur stoning—certainly that is a practical difference. But you still haven’t explained to me: yes, but why permit it? On the side where they permitted him, you’re right. But why permit it? That’s what the Sefat Emet asks. A very good question. It indeed seems right to explain their words, says the Sefat Emet, that for that very reason itself, from that very reason, they permitted it so that he would become liable if he did not take it down; because otherwise all sinners would bake on the Sabbath and be exempt—they would come to the religious court and say: permit me to take it down. Therefore they really did permit it so that anyone who wants to bake will incur stoning. That’s what seems right to me. What is he saying?
[Speaker D] It’s forced. It’s forced. Here they’re really checking the—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says they permitted a person to take it down in order to cause him actually to take it down. Why? On the side where they permitted him to take it down, yes, then if he didn’t take it down he would incur stoning. If they had not permitted him to take it down, then the person wouldn’t take it down, right? Because it’s forbidden to take it down, and he also doesn’t incur stoning, so he has no reason to take it down. Okay, so he wouldn’t take it down. Okay? We want him to take it down. And therefore, what do we say to him? We permit the prohibition to you—it is allowed for you to take it down. What did that permission cause?
[Speaker F] That permission caused that if he really takes it down—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the practical difference the old Tosafot mention. The practical difference of this permission is that he becomes liable to stoning if he does not take it down. And that itself will cause him actually to take it down, because a person doesn’t want to place himself under liability to stoning. So in fact the whole purpose of this permission was to make sure he takes it down. And therefore the old Tosafot brought the practical difference as an answer to why they permitted it—that’s exactly what the Sefat Emet asked. You asked why they permitted it, and you brought a practical difference. Why do I care about the practical difference? I asked why they permitted it, not what the practical difference is. He says no—the practical difference is itself the reason they permitted it. Because the moment they permitted it, they returned the punishment of stoning to you. Right? Because if they had not permitted it, you’d be exempt because you were under compulsion. Once they permitted it, the punishment of stoning comes back onto you; now you are no longer under compulsion. Ah, so if that’s the case, that’s a strong motivation to take it down. Here for sure you’ll take it down; according to Tosafot, you would take it down even if that involved a prohibition. If it would save you from stoning, you’d take it down even if it involved a prohibition. And all the more so if they permitted you to take it down—you’ll definitely take it down. Right? So therefore the practical difference is actually the explanation for why they permitted him to take it down. That’s what the Sefat Emet claims.
[Speaker F] And this is a situation of a prohibition, where they prohibited him from taking it down, so you can’t distinguish between someone who really wants to carry the act through to the end and someone who— and that saves him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think even more than that. You’re right, but I think even more than that. Why should I care whether we distinguish or not? The point is stronger. Through the back door, what enters in the first answer of the old Tosafot is what the Sefat Emet said, and what we also said above: that in essence the purpose of the permission to take it down is to prevent the prohibition, not the punishment. To prevent the prohibition. That’s really what the old Tosafot are answering, even though it’s not written here. But in the calculation the Sefat Emet makes, it’s clear that that’s how it works. Because why do I have an interest in making sure he actually takes it down? After all, he won’t incur stoning anyway, right? I could simply not permit it, and he could fail to take it down, and he still wouldn’t incur stoning. Why do I care to make sure he actually takes it down? Because that prevents the prohibition. Right? Because then the prohibition won’t occur—the bread won’t get baked. Not the stoning; there wouldn’t have been stoning anyway. But the prohibition—I do prevent that. And to make sure that the person does not violate the prohibition, or spares himself the prohibition, we permit him to take it down in a way that does two things: first, you don’t violate the prohibition of taking out bread, so you have motivation to take it down. Second, if you take it down you also save yourself from stoning. Double motivation to take it down. If you don’t take it down, you’ll be punished with stoning. That’s the way to make sure the person takes it down and does not come to the prohibition of baking. Or in other words, through the back door, even in the old Tosafot, the simplest understanding of the Rivah enters here: that basically the permission to take it down is for the sake of the prohibition, not for the sake of the punishment. Do you understand what I’m saying?
[Speaker E] It comes out like some kind of loop—that in order to obligate him to take it down, the Sages both prohibit and permit.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. The Sages prohibit taking it down independently of this. They prohibit taking it down as a general prohibition; it’s not only for this situation. In the situation where you stuck bread to the oven, the Sages are in doubt whether to leave in place the general prohibition they established, even in this situation, or to make this situation an exception and permit it here. So he says the reason to permit it in this situation—and by the way, this is the side that is ruled as Jewish law, yes? In Jewish law we rule that it is permitted to take it down. And that side, the old Tosafot say, is to make sure that you don’t violate the prohibition of baking; it is not in order to spare the liability to stoning. The liability to stoning would have been canceled even if you violated by taking it out. But specifically here they restored the liability to stoning by permitting you to take it down, and then you are no longer under compulsion. Once you are no longer under compulsion, if you do not take it down you are liable to stoning. So there’s no greater incentive than that to take it down. What did we gain by this? We gained that the person will not violate the prohibition of baking on the Sabbath. Okay? So that means that in fact the first answer of the old Tosafot brings us back to the ordinary explanation of the Rivah. After the whole big loop and all these lengthy pilpulim, in the end we arrived at the simple explanation of the Rivah: that the permission to take it down is in order to prevent the prohibition, not in order to prevent the punishment. But it prevents the prohibition in a way that is explained better by the old Tosafot. Since what prevents the prohibition here is not only that now there is no prohibition in taking it down, so you have motivation to take it down because you won’t violate a prohibition by doing so, and consequently you also won’t bake on the Sabbath. The old Tosafot say—and the Sefat Emet explains them—no, it’s much stronger than that. Because after they permitted you to take it down, the punishment of stoning also returns if you don’t take it down. Then your motivation to take it down is not only that there’s no prohibition involved, so why not take it down? There’s no prohibition of taking out bread—they permitted it to you. More than that: you have a positive motivation to take it down in order to escape the punishment of stoning. Through the back door they reintroduced the punishment of stoning to make sure you take it down.
[Speaker F] But why make sure he takes it down? In order to spare the prohibition. In the final analysis. To say that the old Tosafot are like the Minchat Chinukh, not like the Mishnah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I’ll get to that in a moment. Now, the second answer in the old Tosafot: alternatively, this itself is what was in doubt for him—did they permit it, because if they would not permit it he would become liable? What does that mean?
[Speaker F] As if he thinks he’s not called under compulsion when they didn’t permit him? He says, “if they do not permit it, he is liable,” which implies that if they do not permit him, he does not become under compulsion because of that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And isn’t that what the Rivah said?
[Speaker G] No, the Rivah said—
[Speaker F] That if they prohibited taking it down—if the Sages prohibited taking it down—and still he remains obligated, he incurs liability, that implies he isn’t called under compulsion.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, he isn’t called under compulsion? But the Rivah said he is under compulsion.
[Speaker H] Here’s the second answer: alternatively, if they don’t permit him, why would he still remain under liability to stoning? What he writes here is that really, if they don’t permit him, he would still be liable to stoning.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so he wants to explain the Rivah here, the old Tosafot, but the Rivah didn’t say that. The Rivah said that if they don’t permit him, then he is under compulsion, and therefore there is no punishment of stoning.
[Speaker F] He says that according to what follows, the Rivah compared it to the passage in tractate Pesachim, and he says it’s not similar to Pesachim.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, let’s leave aside for a moment why it’s not similar to Pesachim; I intentionally stopped here. First ask how he explains the dilemma according to the Rivah. He says that this itself was the doubt of the Gemara—within the very foundation of the Rivah. That’s the second explanation of the old Tosafot. The Rivah said that if the Sages do not permit you, then you are exempt from stoning. In essence, this itself is what Rav Bibi was uncertain about. Rav Bibi did not know: suppose the Sages do not permit it—does the fact that they do not permit it also exempt me from the punishment of stoning, in which case there is no reason to permit it, right? Because the permission is meant to exempt me from the punishment of stoning, and in any case I am not liable to it. Or the second side of Rav Bibi: really, the fact that there is a rabbinic prohibition does not mean that I am exempt from the punishment of stoning. That is the second side in the doubt. And then indeed they permitted him. And that is Rav Bibi’s doubt: did they permit it or not permit it?
[Speaker G] Can you repeat that once more? Again.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says that the words of—what did the Rivah say? The Rivah said that on the side where they didn’t permit him, the fact that he didn’t take it down means he was under compulsion, and he’s not liable to stoning. Then according to that we asked: so what is Rav Bibi’s doubt? Why permit him? In any event he avoids the punishment of stoning because he isn’t liable to it. The old Tosafot say: no, that itself was Rav Bibi’s doubt—whether the Rivah is right or not right. The Rivah himself read Rav Bibi that way. Rav Bibi is uncertain about the Rivah’s own basic principle, and he says as follows. This is how the Rivah read Rav Bibi, according to the second answer of the old Tosafot. Rav Bibi is uncertain about the question whether compulsion brought about by a decree of the Sages exempts me from stoning or not. Where will the practical difference be? First of all, of course, whether it exempts me from stoning. But for our purposes: if compulsion exempts me from stoning, then there is no reason to permit me to take it down, because anyway I’m exempt from stoning, right? But if compulsion does not exempt me from stoning, then of course there is reason to permit it so that I won’t fall into stoning. Because otherwise, if they did not permit me, then I would be liable to stoning. Right? And that is Rav Bibi’s doubt. And when the Rivah said that on the side where he is under compulsion he is not liable to stoning, he was explaining the side where they did not permit him to take it down—not the side where they did permit him to take it down. The side where they did permit him to take it down really holds not like the Rivah. It holds that if they had not permitted him, he would have been liable to stoning, and therefore they permitted him.
[Speaker G] Wait, I want to repeat this for a second; it went too fast for me. So basically the Gemara’s question is really the question whether the Rivah is right. Okay, meaning: if there is compulsion due to a decree of the Sages, then now the question is whether the compulsion exempts. If the compulsion exempts me from stoning, then there’s no reason to permit taking it down. And if it doesn’t exempt me from stoning—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then of course there is reason to permit it so that I don’t fall into stoning. Okay?
[Speaker E] So the fact that they permitted it basically teaches us that the prohibition of the Sages would not have exempted him from stoning—that this is not called compulsion.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. It comes out that everything the Rivah said was not the final Jewish law, because the Rivah only explained the side where they did not permit it. What is the side where they did not permit it? Would he fall under liability to stoning? That’s what the Rivah asked, right? What is the side where they did not permit it? After all, the person won’t listen to us—is he crazy, to let himself be stoned? So how could Rav Bibi even raise such a possibility, that they did not permit it? The Rivah answers: the possibility Rav Bibi raised, that they did not permit it, really assumes that even if they did not permit it there still would be no liability to stoning. But the Rivah is not saying this as the final Jewish law; he’s only explaining what Rav Bibi’s side was when he said they did not permit it. But as a matter of Jewish law, we rule like Rav Bibi’s second side, that they did permit it. And Rav Bibi’s second side, that they did permit it, holds that if they had not permitted it, the person would have been stoned. That is not called compulsion. Therefore they permitted it. Okay? Then, according to the second answer, it really comes out that there is no dispute between Rashi and the Rivah, just as I said above, right? According to the second answer of the old Tosafot.
[Speaker F] Rashi says that even if they permitted it he would still be liable to stoning.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rashi says they permitted him to take it down so that he would not come under coerced liability to stoning. Right, and the Rivah also agrees with that. That is the side where they permitted it. But the Rivah is talking about the side where they did not permit it. Rashi explains the position as final Jewish law. As final Jewish law, the Rivah agrees too. Here the Rivah only explained the side raised in Rav Bibi’s dilemma, the side that was not ruled as Jewish law. So this second answer of the old Tosafot is exactly what I said above—that there is no disagreement between Rashi and the Rivah; each explains one side. So that is the second explanation of the old Tosafot. Now here I come to the comments you raised earlier. At first glance it seems that the words of the Rivah contradict his own words that we saw in previous classes. Because what does the Rivah say here? That once he stuck bread to the oven, if afterward he was under compulsion, then he is exempt. Right? Exempt from stoning. Apparently, with what does that fit—with the Minchat Chinukh or with the Rashash?
[Speaker D] With the Minchat Chinukh, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because according to the Rashash, the moment he stuck it on, he became liable; there is only a condition that it actually bake. So why should I care that the condition was fulfilled because they didn’t allow him to take it down? The action for which he is liable—he did that action not under compulsion. He did that willingly: he stuck it on. Right? So here in the Rivah’s words it looks as though he answered like the Minchat Chinukh. And what did the Rivah say there? There he said: the labor is completed at the time of sticking it on; therefore we do not permit others to take it down in order to save him from transgression. Do you remember the previous Rivah? The previous Rivah asked why, if he remembered in the middle, we do not permit others to take down the bread in order to save him from transgression. Because after all we saw that we say to a friend: commit a minor sin so that your fellow may be spared a more serious sin—save your fellow from a more serious sin. The Rivah answered there: here you are not sparing him anything; he already did the prohibition, he already stuck the bread in the oven, the prohibition was already completed at the moment of sticking it on. In contrast to the am ha’aretz, where the prohibition is when he eats untithed produce, but here the prohibition was already completed at the moment of sticking it on. And there we explained that the Rivah goes with the Rashash—that sticking it on is itself the prohibition, and the baking is only a condition, but the body of the prohibition is the sticking on. Are you with me? So maybe from the beginning—wait, wait, one second, first I want to make sure you’re with me.
[Speaker F] Whoever isn’t should say I’m not okay?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So in the earlier Rivah we saw—what did the Rivah there say? Tosafot there asked: why don’t we permit others to take it down for me in order to save me from the prohibition carrying stoning, or from the punishment, or whatever—there it was unwitting, actually, so from a sin-offering. And the Rivah answered: because here we do not say to a person, commit a minor prohibition in order to be saved from a major prohibition. Why? Because he already committed the major prohibition; at the time he stuck it on he already committed the prohibition. All that is missing is only the condition. That is exactly the Rashash. Now the Rivah here is really like the Minchat Chinukh, the opposite of the Rashash. The Rivah here says that if he was under compulsion regarding the baking, even though he stuck it on initially, he is exempt from stoning. Why? If the baking was only a condition, then what difference does it make to me that the condition was fulfilled under compulsion?
[Speaker F] Still, the condition has to be fulfilled in order to punish.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The condition was fulfilled.
[Speaker F] But after all, he didn’t fail to take it down because he wanted it to bake.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no condition that he not take it down. The condition is that the bread be baked. And that is not dependent on him. You’re already re-presenting it as a labor that consists of sticking it on plus not taking it down. But the simple understanding of the Rashash is not like that. Sticking it on is the labor; it just has to end up being baked. Why? Because if in the end the bread was not baked, then it turns out that the sticking-on was not significant—it didn’t create anything significant here. But now here, in practice, it was baked. I don’t care that he was under compulsion; in practice it was baked. That reveals that the sticking-on was a significant act, because thanks to it we have bread here. Therefore he is liable.
[Speaker F] But taking it down before the baking could have saved him from a significant act. I didn’t understand. I’m saying that taking it down before the baking, before it got baked, could have saved him from a significant act.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could have saved him, and it didn’t manage to save him—so what? And again, he wasn’t saved; he—
[Speaker F] He didn’t take it down, he didn’t manage to because—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But bottom line, he was not saved. He performed a significant sticking-on; in the end there was bread. Why should I care that it became bread against his will? That he was under compulsion with respect to that doesn’t interest me. I don’t need him to make the bread; I need the result of the sticking-on to be significant, meaning that bread should be baked here. There is bread here. What difference does it make that he was under compulsion? If you relate to this as compulsion, that means that the baking itself is part of the action of baking—which is really the Minchat Chinukh—not merely a condition. Okay? So seemingly there is a contradiction between these two statements of the Rivah. What do you say?
[Speaker G] Isn’t there some distinction here between—we talked about this in the previous class—from the perspective of liability to stoning versus when he actually violates the prohibition itself? Meaning, true, he violates a stoning prohibition, but practically speaking, when does a person become liable to stoning? When he does the whole thing not under compulsion but all willingly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he didn’t do anything. The only action required of him in order to become liable is the sticking-on, and that he did. What happened from there onward is not his action. Do you see how all these things connect to compulsion on the last day and all the other passages? The question is whether failure to take it down is an exempting condition—failure to take it down is an exempting condition—or whether failure to take it down is an obligating condition. Do you see the difference? Meaning, the Sages prohibited me from taking it down. Now the question is what happened. Does that mean that I performed not-taking-it-down, right? But my not-taking-it-down was done under compulsion. If what is required of me is not-taking-it-down, then you’re right, the Rivah is right, because the not-taking-it-down here was under compulsion. Here not-taking-it-down means leaving the bread in the oven. I left it there under compulsion, okay? But if what is required of me is not not-taking-it-down, but rather that taking it down would have exempted me—then in that case, so what if I didn’t take it down under compulsion? “Compulsion is not as if one acted.” Do you see the connection to all the passages I referred you to? The Gemara says that compulsion is not as if one acted. What does that mean? Suppose a person was compelled and did not put on tefillin, and the compulsion ended an hour later. Does he have to put on tefillin? At first glance, what’s the problem? The fact that he didn’t put on tefillin earlier—he was under compulsion, so everything is fine, right? “The Merciful One exempts one under compulsion,” and it is as though he put on tefillin. The answer is: of course not. True, he won’t be punished for not putting on tefillin, but that does not mean he put on tefillin. Compulsion is not as if one acted. The fact that a person was under compulsion does not turn him into someone who acted. When a positive act is required and you were compelled and did not do it, you cannot say that in practice it counts as though you did it. You’re not to blame for not doing it, that’s true, but you can’t say you did it. So if the compulsion is removed at some stage, put on the tefillin now. That is not the same as with prohibitions. If, say, I ate pork under compulsion—sorry—then in that case I did not commit a transgression, because compulsion is like one who did not act. If I did an act, and the act was done under compulsion, it is as though I did not do it. That is what we understand from compulsion, but not the reverse. So if he performed a commandment under compulsion, it is not an act; but non-performance under compulsion does not count as performance. At the end of the day, you didn’t do it.
[Speaker F] Wait, if he performed a commandment under compulsion, does he have to do it again? Again? If he performed a commandment under compulsion, does he have to do it again?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Big question, big question. There are opinions that say yes. It starts in the Gemara in tractate Ketubot regarding modest women and promiscuous women. In fact, there is even a question: what happens if someone is coerced to do something that in any case he wanted to do? Not only did they coerce him to do a commandment and he did it—he also wanted to do the commandment even without the coercion. In any case he had planned to do the commandment. And now they put a gun to his temple and say: take the lulav. And in any event he was on his way to take the lulav. The question is whether such a thing is a commandment fulfillment or not. And the fact that he did it—
[Speaker F] With intention—compulsion or not?
[Speaker D] Huh? Either it’s compulsion or it isn’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the question is: is this compulsion? If so, then it isn’t a commandment fulfillment.
[Speaker C] It seems to me there’s a difference in the Sefat Emet there, and in Kovetz Shiurim at the end, because one says the will determines it and the other says to whom the act is attributed.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re talking about the material in Ketubot?
[Speaker F] No—
[Speaker C] At the end of the page there—
[Speaker F] For me, in Beit HaYerucham.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, I’m saying all these things are certainly connected to walled cities and to Mincha and to all the passages I referred you to at the end. And what Rabbi Chaim and the Ketzot say there—that the Ketzot at least distinguishes, Rabbi Chaim not exactly, but the Ketzot distinguishes there between a condition that applies or suspends, and a condition that uproots. A condition that uproots means that if the condition is not fulfilled, the act will be uprooted. The act was done, but if the condition is not fulfilled, then the act that was done will be uprooted. As opposed to a suspending condition, where the act has not yet taken effect; if the condition is fulfilled, the act will take effect. Is it positive or negative? Right, that’s the distinction the Ketzot makes there. I referred you to the Ketzot, didn’t I?
[Speaker F] Yes, you referred us, but we didn’t understand it enough.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, that’s basically what he writes; I’m telling you that now. That’s basically what he says. The question is whether—let’s come back here to taking out the bread—whether taking out the bread, what is required, say according to the Rashash, say the Ritva goes with the Rashash, and the sticking-on is the prohibited action, but there is a condition that it be baked. How do I understand that condition? Is it a suspending condition or an uprooting condition? That’s what jurists call it. A suspending condition means that the act of taking out the bread—the act of sticking it on—will not count as baking unless I leave the bread inside the oven. Only then will the act of sticking it on count as an act. That is called a suspending condition. Meaning, if I left the bread in the oven, only then does the sticking-on count as sticking-on.
[Speaker F] Meaning, it turns out retroactively? According to the Ketzot, exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But according to—on both sides it’s a condition, that’s why I’m saying both are Rashash, not Minchat Chinukh. Both are formulations within the Rashash: that sticking it on is the prohibited act, but there is a condition of the baking. The question is what the condition does. Does the condition reveal retroactively that the sticking-on was significant, or on the contrary, if the condition was not fulfilled, does that reveal retroactively that the sticking-on was not significant? Is it a suspending condition or an uprooting condition? Yes? Was the sticking-on significant—that’s the assumption—but if the bread is not baked, then it is uprooted; then the prohibition I committed by sticking it on is uprooted and canceled. Or on the contrary: the sticking-on, in and of itself, is still waiting. If in the end it turns out that the bread was baked, then it turns out that the sticking-on was significant. The starting point is that for now, in the meantime, not yet.
[Speaker F] Ah, according to the suspending condition, then there was no sticking-on, and according to the second, there was sticking-on but not significant.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Again?
[Speaker F] According to the suspending condition, I don’t know, I didn’t hear exactly, then it is uprooted and there was no sticking-on at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And according to—
[Speaker F] The second thing you said, then there was sticking-on but it wasn’t significant.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if it gets baked, then it becomes significant.
[Speaker F] Meaning that if it doesn’t get baked, then there was sticking-on, but it wasn’t significant. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But again, both of them—it’s neither of them from the outset. I want you to understand that. Yes, these are two possible ways of understanding the Rashash. The Rashash says: the sticking-on is the prohibited action; everything that happens afterward is a condition and not part of the action itself, except that the condition reveals the significance of the sticking-on that was there at the beginning. Only now the question is how it reveals it. Does taking it down reveal that the sticking-on was not significant, or does not taking it down reveal that the sticking-on was significant? What is the point of departure? What is the default? Is the default that the sticking-on is significant, unless you took it down and thereby uprooted it? Or no, sticking it on—I still don’t know how important it is until I see that the bread was baked, as long as I didn’t take it down. Okay? And the big difference is here: say I didn’t take it down under compulsion. Okay? If I didn’t take it down under compulsion, then like this: if what is required is not-taking-it-down in order to turn the sticking-on into a significant sticking-on, then the not-taking-it-down is an active act in this regard, right? And here, the act of not-taking-it-down, as an act of leaving the bread in the oven, I did under compulsion. So it doesn’t count as though I did it. Therefore it is not considered that the condition was fulfilled. I am exempt. But if the sticking-on is a significant sticking-on, period, and if you take it down then you uproot the prohibition of the sticking-on—now I didn’t take it down because of compulsion. So what? The sticking-on was a significant sticking-on; you violated a prohibition. The fact that I didn’t take it down because of compulsion—taking it down could have saved me, so I didn’t save myself because of compulsion, but the prohibition I committed deliberately. Only the rescue was under compulsion, so I am liable. That is exactly the distinction of the Ketzot.
[Speaker C] Can I ask a question, I didn’t ask there, I didn’t understand regarding tefillin what the Rabbi said. My first understanding came out that if the person was under compulsion for part of the day, then afterward he no longer has—he didn’t violate a prohibition by not putting on tefillin?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s the last day. That’s a different passage.
[Speaker C] If in the last part of the day he was under compulsion.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a somewhat different compulsion passage. It’s the passage of compulsion on the last day. What happens when I postponed something that I could have done?
[Speaker C] Yes, so that wouldn’t apply if it was in the morning and he was under compulsion, and afterward he didn’t put them on. He still would be liable for both, right? For not putting them on, for not doing a commandment and also for violating a prohibition? Yes.
[Speaker G] I’m having a little trouble moving forward because I’m still stuck here with— I didn’t manage to understand, first of all I’m not managing to understand the inferences in the Rashash. I didn’t manage to understand what a suspending condition and an uprooting condition are.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Suppose I perform an act and I make it conditional. Conditional, yes? So I say: I divorce the woman on condition that she not drink wine for two months. Fine? Now the question is how to understand this act. Is the woman divorced, only that if she drinks wine the divorce will be retroactively canceled? It will be uprooted retroactively from the very time of the divorce, not from the moment of drinking the wine. Therefore a condition always operates backward. But the question is whether the condition—if she drinks wine—uproots a divorce that already existed, or no, the divorce did not exist at all; if she doesn’t drink wine for two months, that will reveal that there was a divorce. The first formulation is an uprooting condition. The second formulation is a suspending condition.
[Speaker G] I don’t understand the difference between them. In any case we check the outcome.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. The question is whether the first act was an act that already contained the legal effect, and I have the possibility of uprooting it retroactively. Or no—the first act did not contain the legal effect at all until the condition is fulfilled; only then will the legal effect take hold. For example, I’ll give you an example: suppose the woman wants to marry during those two months. If the condition is an uprooting condition, then there’s no problem, right? Because she is divorced. And as long as she doesn’t drink wine there’s no problem; she can marry, everything is fine, she is already divorced. By virtue of the giving of the bill of divorce, she is divorced. According to the second formulation, it’s more problematic. There is room there too to hesitate, and it’s certainly more problematic. Because according to the second formulation the woman is not divorced at all. First let two months pass in which she does not drink wine, and only then will it become clear, true, retroactively, but only then will it become clear that she was divorced. But until the stage when that becomes clear, she was not divorced. For example, one of the implications brought by the medieval authorities and later authorities: what happens if the woman dies during those two months? She cannot fulfill the condition of not drinking wine for two months, right? Because she died.
[Speaker C] But then she also won’t be divorced because then—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but the divorce already happened a month earlier; she died after one month.
[Speaker C] Now the question is the practical difference for inheritance, for example?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, whatever it is. The practical difference is whether she is divorced or not. Why?
[Speaker F] Because it’s similar to someone who said that she—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] She was divorced, only if she had drunk wine it would have uprooted the divorce. No problem at all—she is divorced, she was already divorced. And it’s clear to us that next month she won’t drink wine anymore; she died. So it will never be uprooted, and everything is fine. But if I understand that not drinking wine is a positive condition, then I am basically saying that as long as the non-drinking of wine for two months has not been fulfilled, the woman is not divorced. But in the last month, the fact that she doesn’t drink wine is under compulsion, because she can’t drink wine. So it is not considered that she fulfilled the condition. Because here active fulfillment is required, and that active fulfillment happened under compulsion. That is not considered that the condition was fulfilled. So the woman died not divorced; she died as a married woman. Do you understand the difference?
[Speaker G] So let me try to explain this here regarding taking out the bread. Meaning, the moment a person—sorry—the moment a person sticks the bread in the oven, seemingly he already committed the transgression, and time will pass, and it could be that we won’t know whether the bread baked or not. Suppose we left and we don’t know whether the bread baked; we didn’t look at the oven. From his perspective he committed the transgression.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that depends, depends on which of the two formulations.
[Speaker G] According to the first formulation, according to the formulation of a suspending condition, he committed the transgression.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, according to the formulation of an uprooting condition. According to the formulation of an uprooting condition, it means that he already committed the transgression through the sticking-on. If he takes down the bread, that will uproot the transgression. But the transgression has already been committed.
[Speaker G] So how can you uproot a transgression if it has already been committed?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is the novelty of the laws of conditions. And in this case it’s not a condition that the person made—it doesn’t matter—the Torah made the condition. But that’s the meaning of a condition: that a condition can operate backward and change a reality that has already been decided, a reality that has already occurred. It’s like what we said—an entire page on logic, temporal logic of conditions, retroactive conditions.
[Speaker D] We read that in Rabbi Chaim, right? Something like that. What? In the page you sent there was something like that, with this distinction.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ketzot and Rabbi Chaim, everyone discusses it, yes.
[Speaker F] Fine, so will you explain this in the summary? What? Will you explain this topic in the summary? We need a summary.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, I’ll explain it.
[Speaker G] Wait, so now I understood that stage, I understood the stage between—I think I understood—what a suspending condition and an uprooting condition are. Now how does that connect to the Rivah?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying as follows. There was a contradiction in the Rivah’s words. The earlier Rivah that we saw says that at the moment of sticking it on, the prohibition is already done, and therefore we do not permit others to take the bread down in order to save me from the condition being fulfilled. Right? Meaning, he learned like the Rashash, that sticking it on is the prohibition. The Rivah here, though, seemingly learns like the Minchat Chinukh, because the Rivah here claims that if I was under compulsion regarding the baking, then I am exempt from stoning. If the baking were only a condition, then why should I care that the condition was fulfilled under compulsion? At the end of the day, I did the sticking-on deliberately. The condition was fulfilled under compulsion. That was the question.
[Speaker G] Wait, again, again, I didn’t understand that. If he is under compulsion, when he’s under compulsion he’s exempt, meaning that— I didn’t manage to understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the act of baking is itself part of the definition of the labor of baking, because otherwise, if I am under compulsion regarding it, that should not have changed anything at all. Because at the end of the day, I already performed the act. Right? Think according to the Rashash.
[Speaker G] And therefore it’s like the Minchat Chinukh.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I have—true, I could perhaps have saved it if the bread had not gotten baked, but it was baked. And the act I performed, I performed deliberately. So why should I care that I was under compulsion not to take it down?
[Speaker G] But why specifically—okay, fine, okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] About that I said that it depends, since even the Rashash himself can be explained either as a condition that uproots the removal, or as a suspensive condition. If I understand the removal in the Rashash as an uprooting condition, yes, then that basically means this is the Riva, this is the approach that says that the act of sticking it on already completed the prohibition; only if I remove it will I uproot the prohibition, I’ll cancel it out of existence. If I say that this is a suspensive condition, then I’m saying that the removal actually created a situation such that if the baking is completed, it will turn out retroactively that the act of sticking it on was an act of baking.
[Speaker G] Maybe you can explain the Riva like the Rashash, as a suspensive condition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. And my claim is that what the Riva says fits with the Rashash, but as a suspensive condition and not an uprooting condition. So there is no contradiction in the Riva. Because if it’s a suspensive condition, then on the one hand you’re telling me, נכון, the action is already complete. There’s no point in someone else saving me from it. If I did it, then I did it. But on the other hand, the Riva here does not contradict that. Because the Riva here says yes, but if I did not remove it—and not removing it is a suspensive condition, it’s an external condition needed in order to turn the sticking-on into a prohibited act—and if that failure to remove it happened under coercion, then it’s not considered that I performed the non-removal.
[Speaker G] Now I understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All right? The truth is, as I said earlier, the question doesn’t even get off the ground. This whole pilpul that I just went through is correct, by the way, but it isn’t necessary. This is a lesson in very fine distinctions, so you have to pay close attention. Why isn’t it necessary? Because we already saw that at least according to the second answer of the old Tosafot, we already saw that the Riva didn’t say what he said as a halakhic ruling at all. He said it only to explain the side in Rav Bibi that did not permit removing the bread. But as a practical halakhic ruling, we decide that they did permit removing it. So what’s the problem? There is no contradiction in the Riva. The Riva agrees in practice that coercion of this sort does not exempt. He would be liable to stoning, and that is why they permitted him to remove it, in order to save him from the prohibition carrying stoning. That fits very well with the earlier Riva. Everything the Riva says here that seems to contradict the earlier Riva appears only on the other side of Rav Bibi’s doubt, which was not accepted as practical Jewish law. The earlier Riva said what he said as a practical ruling. And the Riva here, in practice, does not contradict what he said there. So the question doesn’t even begin. And the Sefat Emet, who actually discusses this—I’m not going into it now—the Sefat Emet really says this. According to the second answer of the old Tosafot, there is no contradiction in the view of the Riva. The only interesting question is: what happens according to the first answer of the old Tosafot? There things get a bit tangled. According to the first answer of the old Tosafot, apparently the Riva said his words as a practical ruling too.
[Speaker D] You have to hear this lecture one more time. What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You have to listen to this lecture—
[Speaker D] —again. You’re absolutely invited. According to the first answer—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —of the old Tosafot, the Sefat Emet really explains the Riva according to the second answer of the old Tosafot, but we have to remember that the old Tosafot explained the Riva in both of its answers. In its first answer too, it is explaining the Riva. So I’m asking: according to the first answer of the old Tosafot, how do we explain the contradiction in the Riva? As I just said: suspensive condition and not uprooting condition. Again, if the Riva is read according to the first answer of the old Tosafot, then the Riva said his words as a practical ruling as well. If there had been a prohibition against removing the bread and I did not remove it because of that prohibition, I would be exempt from stoning. That is what the Riva says as a practical ruling too. It’s just that in practice there is no prohibition. But if there had been a prohibition, then I would be exempt from stoning. And that contradicts what the Riva said in the earlier passage, right? Because according to what the Riva said in the earlier passage, why should I care that I was coerced later on with respect to the continuation? I did the sticking-on willingly, so why should that coercion exempt me? The second answer of the old Tosafot resolves that. It says: not true; the Riva does not say as a practical ruling that the prohibition exempts from stoning. That itself was Rav Bibi’s doubt, and in practice we rule that the prohibition does not exempt from stoning, and the Riva agrees with that too. And exactly because of that they permitted him to remove it, so that he would not incur stoning. So there is no contradiction with the earlier Riva. But according to the first answer of the old Tosafot, there is a contradiction with the earlier Riva. Because the first answer of the old Tosafot reads the Riva straightforwardly. The Riva says even in practice: hypothetically, if there had been a prohibition against removing the bread and the fellow did not remove it because of that prohibition, he would be exempt from stoning. And therefore there really is no prohibition; that is why they permitted removal, because if they had not permitted it there would have been a prohibition carrying stoning. That is how the old Tosafot understood it in its first answer. But that cannot be understood; it does not fit with the first Riva. Because the first Riva says that the sticking-on itself is the prohibition, so why should I care that there was coercion later on concerning the continuation?
[Speaker D] That the prohibition is on the sticking-on.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Are you with me? That the sticking-on is the prohibition. Are you with me or am I… all right? Or should I go over it again?
[Speaker G] I only understand that according to the old Tosafot there is basically a contradiction.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: of course there is. I suggested an explanation both according to the first answer of the old Tosafot and according to the second answer of the old Tosafot. According to the second answer of the old Tosafot, that’s what the Sefat Emet says—what? That there is no contradiction in the Riva at all. Because everything the Riva said about there being no liability to stoning, he said according to a position that was not accepted in practice, the other side of Rav Bibi. The side of Rav Bibi accepted in practice is that they permitted removal. Why did they permit it? Because if they had not permitted it, there would have been liability to stoning.
[Speaker G] Okay, and according to the first answer of the old Tosafot?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s what I said earlier, right? It isn’t contradictory, because in truth coercion regarding the reversal really does not exempt him from stoning. Why? Because the sticking-on is the prohibition, as the earlier Riva said. But the big problem is according to the first answer of the old Tosafot.
[Speaker G] And there we said that it’s suspensive, that it’s like the Rashash, that it suspends.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, and that was the difficulty. But according to the first answer of the old Tosafot, he explains the Riva as holding that if there had been a prohibition, it would exempt me from the punishment of stoning—even in practice. In practice we permit it, so there is no prohibition; but hypothetically, if there had been a prohibition, I would be exempt from stoning if I did not remove the bread. Right? And that does not fit with the earlier Riva, because the earlier Riva says that basically why should I care that I was coerced with respect to the reversal? As long as I did the sticking-on, I transgressed the prohibition. So to that I said: not so. If it is a suspensive condition and not an uprooting condition, then this Riva can be understood. It is a suspensive condition, and since I fulfilled it under coercion, it is not considered that I fulfilled it. All right? It’s completely complicated. I fully understand that. But I strongly suggest that you do invest time in going over this again, because I think it’s excellent training in the way a conceptual Talmudic analysis thinks. Here you’re encountering a calculation that is a bit more complex than usual, so it’s worth not giving up on yourselves here. Try to go over it again and understand it better. Also from the summary and the recording if you want, or whatever—use whatever helps you. All right, one more point I do want to get to, and that is the issue of illness and coercion. According to the second answer of the old Tosafot, the Riva’s doubt was actually about this very point. Right? Meaning, even if the Riva does not disagree with Rashi and really each one is talking about a different side of the doubt, still according to the second answer of the old Tosafot this itself was the doubt in the Talmudic text: does coercion regarding the continuation exempt me from the punishment of stoning or not? And what does that depend on? So of course you can say first, as I said earlier, that it depends on whether this is a suspensive condition or an uprooting condition. That itself was the doubt: whether it is a suspensive condition or an uprooting condition. Okay? But perhaps it can be understood differently as well. And for that reason I brought you this Maimonides about illness and coercion. So look here. Maimonides writes in law 4 in Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah, chapter 5, law 4: “Whoever is told: transgress and do not be killed, and instead is killed and does not transgress—such a person is liable for his own life.” Right? This is a very well-known statement of Maimonides: someone who allows himself to be killed is liable for his own life. “And whoever is told: be killed and do not transgress, and is killed rather than transgressing—such a person has sanctified the Name. And if this took place in the presence of ten Jews, then he sanctified the Name publicly,” and so on. Now I’m moving here—look here. This is the part important for our purposes: “And whoever is told: be killed and do not transgress, but transgresses and is not killed—such a person has desecrated the Name. And if this took place in the presence of ten Jews, then he desecrated the Name publicly and nullified the positive commandment of sanctifying the Name and transgressed the prohibition of desecrating the Name. Even so, because he transgressed under coercion, he is not flogged, and needless to say he is not executed by a religious court, even if he killed under coercion. For flogging and execution are administered only to one who transgresses willingly, with witnesses and prior warning, as it says regarding one who gives of his seed to Molekh, ‘And I will set My face against that man’; by oral tradition they learned: ‘that man’—not one under coercion, not one acting inadvertently, and not one acting in error,” and so on. He continues. What is he basically saying? This is also a dispute, a major dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim). What happens if the rule imposed on me is “be killed and do not transgress,” say in a case of murder? Someone threatens me with a gun: kill so-and-so, and if not I’ll kill you. In principle I am supposed to die and not kill so-and-so. Right? Your blood is no redder than his blood. Therefore I am forbidden to kill so-and-so. I didn’t withstand the test; I killed so-and-so in order to save myself. Maimonides says: I did transgress a prohibition, but I am not liable to death; I am not considered a murderer. Why? Because I transgressed the prohibition under coercion. Ah—but it’s coercion that I was actually supposed not to yield to, because here the rule is “be killed and do not transgress.” Correct, says Maimonides: you are a wrongdoer, but still, as far as punishment goes, you are not punished because you were coerced. That is Maimonides’ claim. Tosafot disagrees with him on this, by the way, and Tosafot maintains that a person is liable to punishment—death, flogging, everything according to the transgression he committed—if he was supposed not to transgress and he did transgress, then he is liable to punishment. But Maimonides says not.
[Speaker D] So that’s a condition, right? What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Why is that important? Why does that matter? There’s no condition here.
[Speaker D] No, I’ll tell you what’s getting mixed up here. He had a condition; he did do it under coercion.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But no, this has nothing to do with the whole issue of conditions. It’s a completely different topic. We are not dealing with that topic. Now Maimonides in law 6 says as follows: “In the same way that they spoke about coercion, so too they spoke about illnesses. How so? Someone who became sick and inclined toward death, and the doctors said that his cure depends on some matter forbidden by the Torah—we do it and he is healed through any of the Torah’s prohibitions in a case of danger, except for idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed, in which even in a case of danger one may not be healed through them. And if he transgressed and was healed, the religious court punishes him with the punishment fitting for him.” At first Maimonides opens by saying that coercion is like illness. Coercion meaning someone points a gun at my head. But there is also a situation of coercion where I am sick, terminally ill, and I cannot be saved unless I kill so-and-so and, I don’t know, take his lungs so they can transplant them into me, all right? So basically I am under coercion; I am supposed to die. And of course this is “be killed and do not transgress”; I am forbidden to kill so-and-so in order to save myself. Maimonides says: that is the same as coercion. Someone pointing a gun at my head or my having a disease—that is the same thing. That is what he means by “in the same way that they spoke about coercion, so too they spoke about illnesses.” The big problem is the concluding sentence of Maimonides: “And if he transgressed and was healed, the religious court punishes him with the punishment fitting for him.” What does that mean? The later authorities (Acharonim) disagreed about this. Some later authorities wanted to say that the court punishes him extra-legally. Because really, “the religious court punishes him with the punishment fitting for him”—what, the religious court executes him? Gives him lashes? What is “the punishment fitting for him”? It means that the court chooses some punishment for him. The point is that this is not something required by the strict letter of the law, okay? Rather, it is extra-legal punishment. And if so, then nothing is difficult. Nothing is difficult, but according to that there is no contradiction in Maimonides. There is a slight difficulty, though: why above does Maimonides not write that someone who transgressed under coercion is punished by the court with the punishment fitting for him? Above he writes that he is exempt because he was coerced. He does not add that the court punishes him extra-legally. And here he does add that. So it still looks a bit strange. And therefore indeed some later authorities read Maimonides here differently. They claim that when Maimonides writes here that the court punishes him with the punishment fitting for him, he means for each transgression according to its own law: in idolatry, stoning; in murder, execution by the sword; in another transgression, lashes; it doesn’t matter—“the punishment fitting for him” means according to the transgression. But he is talking about actual court-imposed punishments. And if that is really how one reads Maimonides, then there is a contradiction between law 4 and law 6. Because in law 4 Maimonides says that one who transgressed under coercion is exempt; he is not punished because he was coerced, even though he is a wrongdoer because there is a rule of “be killed and do not transgress,” but he was coerced, what can you do, so he is not punished. Here Maimonides says that the court punishes him with the fitting punishment even though he was coerced and was ill. And illness and coercion are the same thing, says Maimonides, so why is he punished here and not there? So I’ll do this briefly, because our time is running short. There are different formulations among the later authorities—the Or Sameach and Kovetz Shiurim—and there is a difference between them. I’ll give one formulation, and it is probably more Kovetz Shiurim than Or Sameach. What do I mean? I want to argue as follows: suppose a person jumped off a roof and fell down and died—or you know what, no, he threw someone off a roof, and the person he threw fell and died. Can the person say, “Look, I was coerced—what can I do? I only threw him off the roof; gravity killed him.” Me? The laws of nature killed him. So maybe it’s “it began in negligence and ended in coercion,” but it’s not that I killed him. I only put him in the air; gravity killed him. Can one say such a thing?
[Speaker D] No, because it’s known in advance.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Exactly. Not only is it known in advance; more than known in advance—it’s the laws of nature. Even when I hit him on the head with a hammer, he dies not because I hit him, but because there are laws of nature that when a hammer strikes a head, it cracks it open. That won’t work. If we treat the laws of nature as a kind of coercion, there are no transgressions in the world. Everything I do makes use of the laws of nature, right? It’s not relevant. Meaning, the laws of nature are part of the reality in which I act, the framework within which I act. And if I act within the framework of the laws of nature, then in the end that is not called an act under coercion; it is called a voluntary act. I adjusted the laws of nature to serve the act that I wanted to do. Now, if that is so, then these later authorities say as follows. Maimonides says: if someone threatens me with a gun and says to me, kill so-and-so, and if not I’ll kill you. All right? When I look at the one threatening me, I basically see him as an external factor. He forced me to perform an action; I was coerced into doing it. Therefore I am exempt from punishment. Again, I am forbidden to do it, because it is “be killed and do not transgress,” but I am exempt from punishment. Why? Because the coercion came through an external factor. But if there is illness, then I take the—when I eat pork, I eat pork because I like pork, I enjoy it. There are laws of nature that cause my physiology to enjoy the taste of pork. Does that exempt me? Of course not. Everyone who eats pork does so for some reason, because it gives him some benefit. In the case where he is about to die, he has a terminal illness, and he eats pork in order to survive—Maimonides says that this is not called coercion. Why? You ate the pork in order to save yourself from the natural circumstances in which you find yourself. That is not coercion by an external factor. Therefore, says Maimonides according to these later authorities, there is a difference between illness and coercion. In the final analysis, true, you are ostensibly being forced by something to do it, but the question is: what is that something? If that something is part of the circumstances within which you are acting, that is not called being forced. You are not being forced—that is nature; we are all subject to the laws of nature. You eat this pork in order to be cured, you take medicine in order to be cured, you take the pork in order to be cured. That is your considered decision in service of your own interest. There is no coercion here at all.
[Speaker I] But why is illness not—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —an external thing?
[Speaker I] Why is illness not considered an external force, while another person standing there with a gun is?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a good question. The Talmudic text at least sees it—again, in a simplistic view, let’s call it that—it is right that from a philosophical perspective illness too is some kind of thing, I don’t know, a virus or bacteria attacking me or something else. But they treated illness as some kind of bug in my body. It’s just something, something in me, not something external. My body is damaged, and now I need pork in order to be healed. If you understand it that way…
[Speaker I] Maybe in my way of looking at it there’s some element of passing time here, because when a person is sick it seems as though he has time to decide and think whether I’ll take medicine or not, whereas when a person is standing before—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We are talking here too about something that will happen immediately; nobody is making distinctions of time here. The question is whether it is external or not external.
[Speaker G] I thought maybe the externality can be checked by asking who is at fault. Meaning, if someone points a gun at me, he is at fault, so he also has a share in the transgression; but when a person is sick, nobody has a share in the transgression.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are several ways to explain this Maimonides; that is one of the possibilities. I only went into the one that interests me for our purposes, because I don’t have time to get into this whole issue. You’re right, that is one possible explanation. Here you can blame someone else, and in illness you cannot blame someone else. But according to this explanation—that natural circumstances are not called coercion—there may be room to say that if the Sages decreed a prohibition against removing the bread, that is part of the world. Right now there is a halakhic prohibition; open the Shulchan Arukh and see: when you stuck the bread in the oven, that clause in the Shulchan Arukh was already written. You could have known that it would be forbidden for you to remove the bread. It is part of—of course these are not laws of nature, these are laws of Jewish law, but it doesn’t matter. These are laws of the reality within which you act, and they are known laws that already exist at the moment when you performed the act. You cannot say, “What do you want from me? I was coerced by the decree of the Sages.” That is like saying you were coerced because he fell by the force of gravity. You put him there and you knew that gravity exists. You stuck the bread in the oven and you knew that there was a rabbinic prohibition against removing it. Therefore in such a case there is a basis—I’m saying—to understand why the prohibition of the Sages is not considered coercion. The prohibition of the Sages is not considered coercion because it is part of the natural circumstances, like laws of nature; there are also laws of Jewish law. If someone suddenly came and threatened me, or if the Sages had suddenly decreed the prohibition after I had already stuck it on—suddenly now a Sanhedrin convenes and decrees a prohibition—then maybe that would be something else. But if it is part of the world within which I act, it cannot be called coercion.
[Speaker I] But how would you define, for example, various forces of nature—say, I don’t know, an earthquake—and a person had to act within that in order to save himself. An earthquake is a higher force, an external force, an internal force—it’s not a person.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Those are the circumstances within which you act; it’s not an external force. Those are natural circumstances. You do things in order to heal yourself; you do things in order to save yourself from an earthquake.
[Speaker D] Wait, an external force to the act, more so.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Strictly speaking, according to the formulation—I’m saying there are different formulations here and I’m not going into those fine resolutions. All the formulations you’re suggesting here also come up regarding Maimonides, in resolving the contradiction between law 4 and law 6. I adopted one formulation in order to explain the principle I am trying to suggest here: that the doubt according to the second answer of the old Tosafot, on the question whether the coercion—whether the decree of the Sages is considered coercion or not considered coercion—may be connected to this question. You acted there, you acted within circumstances that were known to you and pre-set. Those circumstances are like laws of nature; they are also laws of Jewish law. And once those circumstances were known, you cannot say that you were coerced. That is not called coercion.
[Speaker I] But if now there’s some kingdom, the Roman kingdom for example, and it is known that it issues decrees against people, that anyone it catches it forces to be killed or to bow down or something like that—then that too is a known law. Right. So according to that, a person who transgresses in such a case—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —would be liable?
[Speaker I] Apparently he would be liable, right. So there really is this element of time here, the time that allows you to know that law and take it into account.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But time is not what is essential here. Rather, the point is that it operates like circumstances already existing at the time the act is done. You should have taken them into account as part of the natural circumstances, or the laws of the kingdom, or the laws of the Sages, or the laws of nature—but they are part of the circumstances within which you act.
[Speaker D] So that means I would almost never be under coercion.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—
[Speaker I] Right, the opposite, very often under coercion.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If right now someone threatens me with a gun to worship idols, then I am under coercion.
[Speaker D] But if I know it’s Rome, if I know it’s Rome, if—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I go to a place where I know in advance that everyone who arrives there has a gun put to him and is threatened that he must worship idols, then really would he not be considered coerced? It is not simple that he is considered coerced, according to Maimonides. So—this itself is a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim). Putting oneself into a situation of coercion is a dispute among medieval authorities. There’s a long responsum of the Rivash on this and more. All right, I didn’t really get to the nuances, but I hope I managed to convey the general lines. Okay, we’ll stop here.
[Speaker D] Thank you very much.