Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 14

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, something exactly like that. Because that is exactly the question we ended the previous segment with. Whoever asked it—you asked it, right? Whether in stoning too you need the warning to apply from beginning to end? That is exactly the question here. And the question that comes up here—and until now we were talking about an unwitting act—whether you need the lack of awareness from beginning to end; now let’s talk about an intentional act. In the intentional case, he stuck the bread on at the beginning; the Talmud’s conclusion is that we are dealing with an intentional act. And Rav Bibi bar Abaye’s question was whether it is permitted or forbidden to remove the bread in order to save oneself from the prohibition of stoning or from liability to stoning—we’ll talk about that in a moment. Now the question is: there is some assumption here that if I do not remove the bread, then I will become liable to stoning, right? And therefore the question is whether one may remove the bread in order to spare himself the stoning, or whether I did it and I’ll have to be stoned. And the question is why. Why really—even if they do not permit me to remove the bread—does that make me liable to stoning? Why? After all, I entered that situation under duress. So you’ll say fine, that’s duress only at the end, but at the beginning I acted intentionally, because I stuck the bread in the oven intentionally. Later on I was compelled. That’s a question similar to what we saw with an unwitting act: do you need to be intentional from beginning to end in order to incur stoning? Okay, that’s why I said I still thought I should complete what I put until now from the previous session, because in fact this session is a continuation of what I said there regarding the unwitting case, but this time with respect to the intentional case. So let’s see it. We’ll start with Tosafot, who asks the following question. “Before he comes to the prohibition of stoning.” And if you say: what kind of question is this? If they permitted him to remove it—obviously he won’t listen to us if we forbid him. What kind of question is this? Now that we’re speaking about the prohibition of stoning in the intentional case. Yes, we reached the conclusion that this is talking about an intentional act, and regarding intentional placing of the bread, that was Rav Bibi’s problem. And we resolved that he may do it. According to Tosafot it isn’t clear that we resolved it, but according to Rashi we did resolve it. According to Tosafot it isn’t clear. Now I’m saying: but what was the question before we resolved it? How can there be a possibility that they would not permit him to remove the bread and would obligate him to die? Who would listen to us in such a case? Now here there are all sorts of assumptions that Tosafot is making, and I’ll try to lay them out step by step later on. But already here I’ll say that Tosafot assumes, first, that the fact that he won’t listen to us is a reason not to forbid it. He won’t listen to us—fine, so he’ll get punished also for removing the bread, I don’t know exactly what. Second, Tosafot assumes that if they forbade him to remove it and he removed it, then he is saved. Right? And then he says: after all, he won’t listen to us, he wants to save himself. Who says he is saved? Maybe if they forbade him to remove it, then even if he removed it he would not be saved. That’s the second point. Third point: the question really is about the very liability to stoning. Tosafot here assumes that there is liability to stoning, right? Because otherwise what does it mean, “obviously he won’t listen to us”? Why won’t he listen to us? Because he doesn’t want to die. It’s not because the baking prohibition frightens him; the stoning frightens him. Meaning, Tosafot right now assumes there is a prohibition of stoning. Right? Meaning, if he does not remove it because they forbid him from doing so, that is not considered duress. Meaning, in the end he will be stoned. The question is why. After all, he was under compulsion. That is really the question I want to get to. But I need to clarify several things before we get there. So the Sefat Emet here, on the Tosafot, says like this: “I am astonished by their astonishment.” Yes, I am astonished by Tosafot’s astonishment. “Either way: if he holds that one is allowed to depart from the teacher’s words”—that is, the authority issuing the ruling who tells him: you may not remove it. Suppose we had ruled that one may not remove the bread, okay? And now, says the Sefat Emet, what does Tosafot think? When the teacher tells me—I stuck bread in the oven, then a halakhic authority comes and tells me: you are forbidden to remove it.

[Speaker C] Now—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now the question is: am I allowed to go against the teacher’s words in order to save my life? Because nothing stands in the way of saving a life.

[Speaker C] Maybe you’re actually commanded to disobey him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly! After all, even Torah-level prohibitions are set aside for saving a life. So the rabbinic prohibition of removing bread, or of listening to this decisor who instructs me that way, certainly gets set aside for saving a life. So seemingly, it’s not just the question that he won’t listen to me—he also does not need to listen to me. On the contrary, it’s a life-saving case, so he can violate my words. And then Tosafot is indeed right to ask: so what sense is there in forbidding such a thing? After all, he won’t have to listen to the prohibition. But then the Sefat Emet says: if so, Tosafot should have asked an even stronger question regarding this dilemma here—why is there any doubt that we should permit a rabbinic “resting” prohibition in order to save his life? And that is an even greater difficulty. Right? So if that were true, Tosafot should have asked a harder question: how can you even determine that this is forbidden? It’s not just that he won’t listen to me—he doesn’t need to listen to me; there is no prohibition here at all. Tosafot should have asked a better question. Therefore it is clear that Tosafot does not assume that. Right? Tosafot assumes that if we had forbidden it to him, that would not make it permitted despite the fact that there is a life-saving issue here. Tosafot’s question was only: yes, but he won’t listen to us. So what’s the point of forbidding it? But it’s not that this prohibition has no validity. Right? That is what Tosafot is really assuming. Tosafot is not asking whether a decree not to remove the bread would be valid; rather Tosafot is asking whether it is effective to issue such a decree, right? The Sefat Emet asks: why? Ask how such a decree can have any validity at all. After all, in the face of saving life, every prohibition is set aside, and certainly a rabbinic prohibition. Actually questions like this arise in several halakhic contexts—just a side comment—for example when a fire breaks out, in the chapter “All Sacred Writings,” chapter 16 of tractate Sabbath. So when a fire breaks out in a house, one is forbidden to save—I think I already mentioned this—one is forbidden to save from the house anything except food for three meals, the clothing needed for that Sabbath, and sacred writings. That’s it. Now notice: my house is on fire. All my earthly wealth, all my earthly property, is going up in flames. And there is a prohibition—what kind of prohibition? It is a rabbinic prohibition. Right? What is the prohibition against saving? What’s the problem with saving? Take the thing, move it from here to there. We’re not talking about set-aside objects, not talking about anything like that. Move something from place to place. Rather, the Talmud says: since a person is frantic about his property, if he begins—if you allow him to save, yes, in his stress, wanting to save everything, instead of just saving he may come to extinguish the fire. And extinguishing is forbidden. Therefore they forbade him to save. In principle, certainly he is allowed to save, but because he may come to extinguish the fire, they forbade him to save. Now notice: if he were actually to extinguish the fire, that would be labor not needed for its own purpose. Because extinguishing is only the kind of extinguishing where I need the charcoal created by the extinguishing. But if I extinguish so there won’t be a fire here, not because I need charcoal, that is labor not needed for its own purpose, and in practical Jewish law, according to almost all decisors except Maimonides, that is a rabbinic prohibition, because we rule like Rabbi Shimon. Now notice here: the prohibition on me to save is not the prohibition of extinguishing, but a rabbinic prohibition on saving lest I come to extinguish. So right now, when I save, what prohibition am I violating? A rabbinic prohibition of saving, whose entire purpose is to prevent another prohibition that is also rabbinic—labor not needed for its own purpose. Two rabbinic layers. And because of that tiny prohibition I have to leave all my earthly property to go up in smoke to heaven. My house, my possessions, everything. Everything I accumulated on earth has to go up in smoke to heaven because there is a rabbinic prohibition that is merely a concern lest you come to another rabbinic prohibition. A concern—even that you may not even actually come to it. Okay? And because of this I’m supposed to give up all my property. Now I ask: will people listen to us regarding such a prohibition?

[Speaker C] For hundreds of generations they did listen.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who says? No, I don’t know of an example where they did. The prohibition existed, this prohibition is ruled in all the halakhic codes. But I don’t remember, I don’t know examples where it was tested in practice whether people really obeyed. I’m not asking whether they ruled the prohibition; I’m asking whether people actually complied with it. All right? Now here indeed you can ask both questions. Both Tosafot’s and the Sefat Emet’s. A, what is the point of forbidding something if people won’t listen to us? B, do they really have to listen to us? It’s not an issue of effectiveness; it’s an issue of validity. After all, this is a rabbinic prohibition. A rabbinic prohibition is not set aside when I’m losing all my earthly property? It’s not saving a life, but all my earthly property—there’s no greater financial loss than that. And here it is two rabbinic layers: a rabbinic concern lest you come to another rabbinic prohibition.

[Speaker B] A concern—even that you may not even come to it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Both questions can be raised there. And the claim is that once the sages establish a prohibition, and they tell you that this prohibition applies even where a life is at stake, then this prohibition will no longer be set aside. A regular prohibition, established for an ordinary situation—once you are in a life-threatening situation, it is set aside. But if the sages come and say: look, here we are forbidding you a rabbinic prohibition, and we are forbidding it even in a case of saving life—if so, then in principle halakhically you must listen to them and not violate the rabbinic prohibition. It joins the three severe sins. Why? Because being set aside in the face of saving life usually means that from the outset the prohibition was not said with a life-threatening situation in mind. On the contrary, it was said regarding a normal situation. So when they said, for example, Sabbath desecration—“do not desecrate the Sabbath”—that is in an ordinary situation, not related to saving life. Now it turns out that a situation has arisen where in order to save lives I need to desecrate the Sabbath. About such a situation, the prohibition was not said from the outset. Meaning, it is not that the prohibition gets overridden because of saving life; rather, in a life-threatening situation, those who established the prohibition are telling you: here there is no problem; we did not forbid this to you. But if those same people who made the prohibition were to say: no, no—this prohibition we forbid to you even in a case of saving life—

[Speaker D] Why would they do that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Never mind. Suppose. Let’s say they have their reasons; leave aside why for the moment. But if they did such a thing, it would be valid. It would not be set aside for saving life. That is what you see from Tosafot.

[Speaker D] But I—I would say to myself, excuse me, if I heard of such a prohibition, I would say: it cannot be that the sages forbade such a thing; it contradicts the law of saving life.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So, with the sages, you can’t just say “it can’t be.” You can say “it can’t be,” but the sages tell you—we forbade this even in a life-threatening case. So you can say it till tomorrow, you can say “I won’t listen to you.” That is what Tosafot asks, but I am asking the Sefat Emet’s question. The Sefat Emet asks: Tosafot asks what is the point of decreeing if we know he won’t obey us? The Sefat Emet asks: what validity does the decree have at all? After all, he doesn’t have to listen to us. So right now I’m speaking about the Sefat Emet’s second question. The Sefat Emet’s question says: after all, he doesn’t have to listen to us. Not true—he does have to. In a place where the sages determined that even in a life-threatening case this prohibition exists—and on the contrary, they stated this prohibition regarding a life-threatening situation—

[Speaker C] There’s an example in the Talmud about that person who was sick and wanted them to provide him a remedy through forbidden sexual relations.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but “let him converse with her from behind a fence”—that’s something else. “Let him converse with her from behind a fence” is something else. Why? Because there it is accessory acts of forbidden sexual relations. They said: let him die and not converse with her. Accessory acts of forbidden sexual relations fall under one of the three severe sins for which one must be killed rather than transgress, regardless.

[Speaker D] That’s why I’m asking: where do the sages do such a thing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I said: here, for example.

[Speaker D] But here we are still in the question whether they do it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, we are not in the question. They do it; the Sefat Emet only asks how that can be. On the contrary, here the Talmud says it.

[Speaker D] According to what is ruled in the passage, they permitted him to remove it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the Sefat Emet asks about the dilemma. The dilemma raises a question—according to your approach, what is there to ask? Obviously the sages do not forbid such things. No. From Rav Bibi’s dilemma you see that in principle the sages indeed can do such a thing. The question is whether they did. That is, the question is whether the sages decided that the prohibition of removing bread was stated even in a life-threatening situation, and if so then it would be valid.

[Speaker D] But I can answer that. What? I can answer it by saying that he is not liable to stoning here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand, wait.

[Speaker D] We’ll answer it by saying that he never became liable to stoning.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, no. You’re talking about Tosafot’s answer; I’m talking about his question. In Tosafot’s question the assumption is that he is liable to stoning. In the answer he will tell us that he is not liable to stoning. By the way, Rashi says that even in the conclusion he is liable to stoning. So in Tosafot’s question he assumes there is liability to stoning here. And still Rav Bibi asks—that is the Sefat Emet’s difficulty on Tosafot—still Rav Bibi asks why, whether the sages forbade it or did not forbid it. Meaning, from Rav Bibi’s words you see that if the sages had decided to forbid it, it would have been valid even in a life-threatening situation. That is unequivocal. The only question is whether they forbade it or not. That’s all. So there—the Talmud says it explicitly; there is no room to argue at this stage of Tosafot, where we understand that there really is stoning here, and according to Rashi that indeed is also the tendency in the conclusion, that there is stoning here. So now regarding the question whether he will listen to us—that is a different question. Will he listen to us? So I say, look—after all, even I, when I make my own calculation, I say: you know what? I’ll violate this rabbinic prohibition. Right, I am forbidden to violate it. And they will come with a claim against me in heaven—why did you violate a rabbinic prohibition and remove the bread? But practically speaking, I gained another thirty years in which I can do many things, and even many commandment if you like. So I can even make my own calculation and know: this prohibition is forbidden, and still I will violate it. Meaning, the fact that he won’t listen to us is not only small-scale delinquency in the simple sense; there can also be some sort of reasoning here: okay, this is a transgression, I understand, but it’s a kind of transgression for a higher purpose. I think that here it is more correct to violate the prohibition even though it was not permitted. It is a transgression. Meaning, there is room to see that person who “won’t listen to us” not simply as some sort of criminal, or someone whose life is precious to him and who doesn’t care that much about Jewish law—or certainly not when life itself is at stake. Rather, maybe even for substantive reasons he is making a spiritual calculation. He says: what help is it to the Holy One, blessed be He, if right now I go out to execution by stoning? Instead, now I’ll live thirty years, do commandment, save the world. So I’ll now violate a rabbinic prohibition.

[Speaker D] But then you could say the same thing even about the three severe sins, also about idolatry. Fine, what does God care—so I’ll bow to an idol for a second, I’ll say the shahada, I’ll do whatever, and after that I have plenty of years to live. Right. So he could say that about any prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. Now you have to see what the calculation is. What is the weight of the transgression here? It’s only a light rabbinic prohibition—if there even is a prohibition; the Ritva was uncertain whether there is any prohibition at all in removing bread. But it is a light rabbinic prohibition, and against that, what do I gain? In every case you have to judge on its own terms, right? For example, in a fire. I am not ruling out at all the possibility that someone will come and say: a fire broke out in my house, okay? Now I have a dilemma whether I may even extinguish it, not just save things from the house—actually extinguish it. Labor not needed for its own purpose—a rabbinic prohibition. Right, I violated the prohibition of labor not needed for its own purpose, but I saved my whole house. I can give from it to charity, I can do many things; my whole life looks different. So I will bear the consequences—I violated a rabbinic prohibition. Can’t you imagine a person making that calculation? A God-fearing person making that calculation even though it is forbidden.

[Speaker D] Obviously—but the sages also made that calculation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. I didn’t say he was in the right. But I said there is certainly room for a person to make such a calculation. It can happen. It isn’t something far-fetched, and it also isn’t such blatant criminality. Even though, when the sages said it is forbidden, then of course Jewish law expects the person not to do it. Okay, later on I’ll also get to the possibility that perhaps this is only a declarative law—but one moment. The last point in this context: in the Shulchan Arukh, the Rema brings that regarding a house fire, nowadays the custom is to be lenient and to extinguish it, because this is a life-threatening case—people can burn, it can spread to other places, and so on. Now I know, at least from what I hear, that this permission of the Rema is used wholesale. Meaning, they always extinguish it. Who knows whether it will burn—practically speaking, this is some sort of legal fiction that we use.

[Speaker C] I can testify—they do it. As a synagogue administrator I can say—this is my second year as administrator—and they even do it to save gentile property.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, well, that again, I’d say, maybe because of the ways of peace?

[Speaker C] The ways of peace—you can’t do without it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but I’m saying, in principle it’s clear that this is the custom today. And everyone jumps on this permission of the Rema as if finding great spoil, and uses it even where it is clear that there is absolutely no danger to life for anyone.

[Speaker H] Wait, so regarding saving property there is no permission on the Sabbath?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In principle, no. But as I said earlier, they use this legal fiction. And what lies behind it? What lies behind it is the consideration I mentioned earlier, in my opinion. Because otherwise it would really be just a legal fiction, and that would be forbidden. I think what lies behind it is that there is nevertheless a relevant halakhic consideration to do it. True, the law forbids it—I’m not saying it doesn’t. But there is some sort of halakhic-spiritual calculation that does justify it. So if I have some opening, even if it is strained and not exactly relevant and so on, I use it, because in the end the act in itself is indeed a proper act. I think that is what lies behind this approach.

[Speaker D] Maybe it’s “do not place a stumbling block before the blind.” If people won’t be able to stand up to it, then why forbid it from the outset? It only causes people to stumble.

[Speaker H] Then why give Torah and commandment at all? I mean, that’s Tosafot’s question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot’s question is why forbid something in a case where people won’t listen to you. That is exactly what he asks.

[Speaker H] But there is also a place to say that if you don’t save property in that situation, the person becomes a life-risk case—he ends up with no money, no house, no—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’ll be supported by charity. Again, one of the legal fictions used in this context is the consideration Yael just raised. True, but a person who lives on charity all his life—in the end that shortens his life. So that becomes a life-threatening issue. By the way, that is not far-fetched. A person who has to live his whole life like that—a person who has to live his whole life like that—you certainly can see that as a life-threatening issue. “A poor person is considered like dead,” as the sages themselves say. So there is certainly room here for legal fictions, even better ones than the Rema’s legal fiction. So I’m saying—therefore it’s good, I’ll say it already here—there is a possibility of treating this kind of law as declarative law. That basically means this: we want to tell you, look how severe Sabbath prohibitions are in our eyes. We do not permit you even a rabbinic prohibition, and even in a situation where we know you will become liable to stoning because of it, because even a light rabbinic prohibition of Sabbath is worth a person’s life. But we ourselves say this with half a wink. We know you won’t listen to us. This statement is only an educational statement whose purpose is really to tell you: don’t stick the bread in the oven in the first place. Understand how grave the situation is that you are entering. But true, if you already stuck it in and so on, we will look away with a wink if you remove the bread so that we won’t have to stone you. That is also a possibility. I’m only raising a possibility. I haven’t found anyone who says it, but it is certainly possible. I suspect that this is also what exists in the prohibition on saving from a fire on the Sabbath. These are basically declarative prohibitions whose purpose is to educate a person about the importance of the Sabbath. But I do not think there is an expectation that an ordinary person will also withstand these prohibitions. That is how it seems to me. And I think that is what Tosafot is asking here. Tosafot asks here: listen, true, if the sages had forbidden it, it would be valid—even though this is a life-threatening case, as I said earlier. That is the Sefat Emet’s question. But still, there is no sense in forbidding it. After all, people won’t listen to you. There is no sense in forbidding it. In the end, people won’t listen to you; you’ll make a mockery of it. Don’t decree and don’t insist. If it were a Torah prohibition, fine—the Torah already forbade it. But with a rabbinic prohibition, where they themselves are decreeing the prohibition, then don’t decree it. You know people won’t listen to you.

[Speaker H] I have a question. Today they put rescue teams on standby, including firefighters, even on the Sabbath and on Yom Kippur. So? That’s fine, it’s permitted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning—there is danger to life there. What does that have to do with this?

[Speaker H] In terms of danger to life, okay.

[Speaker D] Usually fires are life-threatening.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I’m talking about a specific case where it turns out there is no danger to life—it’s only property. But obviously we make the standby arrangements for all situations. Now, the Sefat Emet’s question really is this: I explained why Tosafot basically asks only the question of effectiveness and not the question of validity. And Tosafot asks what sense there is in decreeing, and does not ask whether the decree is valid. Because to Tosafot it is clearly valid. He says: there is no point in decreeing such a decree if people won’t listen to you. The question is why such a decree is really valid. Why don’t we say that here there is a rabbinic prohibition—they told me not to remove the bread—and this prohibition gets set aside because of saving life? After all, severe Torah prohibitions get set aside; Torah-level Sabbath desecration gets set aside. So why doesn’t this rabbinic prohibition? So here, as I said before, in a place where the sages—I’ll give you an example. I referred you to the Mishneh LaMelekh, I think, right? Yes. The Mishneh LaMelekh there discusses a very interesting case. The Talmud there, in tractate Sanhedrin, speaks about Zimri. The story of Zimri, yes, with Kozbi bat Tzur, who did what he did, and Pinchas came and pierced both of them to death. The Talmud says that if Zimri had turned around and killed Pinchas, he would not be executed for it. In short, Pinchas had the status of a pursuer, and if Zimri had turned and killed Pinchas in self-defense, he would be exempt; he would have been allowed to do it. So on that, the Mishneh LaMelekh asks: if so, what happens, for example, if someone is liable to death and the emissary of the religious court comes to bring him to the gallows or to stoning or to the place of stoning, okay? And the person essentially runs away or beats up that man—or shoots the emissary of the court who came to take him—on the law of a pursuer. After all, from his standpoint he is going to die and the other is coming to kill him, so he is a pursuer. What is the difference between that and Pinchas? Or the blood avenger?

[Speaker F] The murderer is liable to death.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. If the blood avenger comes to kill the inadvertent murderer and the Torah gave him permission—there is even a tannaitic view that it is a commandment to kill him—can the inadvertent murderer defend himself against the blood avenger and kill him on the law of a pursuer? Even though the Torah gave the blood avenger permission, and maybe even said it is a commandment to kill the inadvertent murderer. One second. So the Mishneh LaMelekh really asks these questions. Again, I won’t read it inside; it took me a long time to get here. He asks all these questions and basically argues as follows. Regarding Zimri, there truly is the law of a pursuer. Why? Because what Pinchas did was not a commandment; it was permission. It was permission. Permitted—zealots may strike him. It is even an act for which he receives reward, but there is no commandment in it. You take the risk. More than that—it may even be, well, this whole extension about the law of Zimri and Pinchas—that the permission for Zimri to kill Pinchas is intended to ensure that Pinchas is a true zealot. If you are not a true zealot and are just exploiting opportunities, know that you are putting yourself in danger: he can turn around and kill you. So this comes a bit to screen out all the fake zealots who would exploit the opportunity to kill people they don’t like. Fine. But in any case, there there is the law of a pursuer. What about an inadvertent murderer? Regarding an inadvertent murderer, the Mishneh LaMelekh says that he was uncertain whether an inadvertent murderer is in the category of pursuer or not, and why.

[Speaker F] Because it isn’t certain that if he reaches a city of refuge they kill him. What? Because it isn’t certain he is liable to death, because the fact is that if he reaches a city of refuge then it is forbidden to kill him, a sign that he isn’t liable to death.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But outside the city of refuge it is permitted—what do you mean?

[Speaker F] Right, but in the end he isn’t liable to death, so that’s not a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But yes he is—what do you mean? Outside the city he is liable to death, so we are talking about outside the city, not inside the city.

[Speaker D] But the blood avenger is not obligated to kill him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. There is a tannaitic dispute whether it is a commandment or a permission, and there is a tannaitic view that it is a commandment. But the Mishneh LaMelekh really does compare the inadvertent murderer and the blood avenger to Zimri and Pinchas. He apparently sees both these cases as a kind of permission—perhaps permission that even has some positive aspect, but not really a commandment. In contrast, when someone pursues another to kill him, or pursues a forbidden sexual target—where of course it is a commandment upon everyone to kill the pursuer in order to save the pursued—what happens there if the pursuer turns around and kills the one who came to save? He is executed for that, certainly.

[Speaker B] There is the pursued, there is the pursuer, and there is the rescuer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay? Now the pursuer is pursuing, and the rescuer is obligated to kill the pursuer. The pursuer sees that the rescuer is coming to kill him, turns around and shoots him in the head. Is that permitted or forbidden? Forbidden. Obviously forbidden. He would be executed for that; it is murder. Why? Because there there is a commandment on the rescuer to kill the pursuer. This implies that according to the view that the blood avenger has a commandment to kill the inadvertent murderer—which, as I said, is a tannaitic dispute—it may be that according to the Mishneh LaMelekh he would say that there too it would be the same, and there would be no permission under the law of pursuer for the inadvertent murderer to kill the blood avenger. What he says here is only according to practical Jewish law, where it is not a commandment but only permission, and then it resembles Pinchas. But in the case of a pursuer, there there is a commandment to save the pursued. So if I have a commandment to kill you, you cannot turn around and kill me. And if you want, I can continue now, for example, to the emissary of the religious court—same thing, of course. There too it would certainly be forbidden for him to kill him. To kill that emissary. Okay? Now what exactly is the difference? Why really isn’t this saving life? So one could say some kind of scriptural decree or something like that. I think you can formulate this in two ways. One could understand that in a place where there is a halakhic prohibition—after all, where do we know that one may violate prohibitions in order to save life? There is a verse: “and live by them, and not die by them.” Okay? Now “and live by them” means that if you are required to violate a prohibition in order to save yourself, you may violate the prohibition. Okay? But in a place where there is a halakhic prohibition to do so, then the verse of “and live by them” was not said. Because the law itself is telling you that here it requires you not to live by them. So once there is no permission of “and live by them,” you cannot violate prohibitions in order to save yourself. Now, in Pinchas and Zimri, or the blood avenger assuming it is not a commandment, then you are not violating a prohibition. Meaning, there is no commandment upon him to kill you. So there there is room to discuss whether even so you may turn around and kill him. But in a place where there is a commandment to kill you, you cannot turn around and kill the one who is killing you, because the law says that here there is no “and live by them.” Another formulation—and one could sharpen the distinction between the two formulations, but that would take us to another discussion. I noted it in the summary; see there. Another formulation says this: think for a moment about someone to whom the emissary of the court comes in order to execute him. He desecrated the Sabbath in front of witnesses after warning, and now the court’s emissary comes to execute him. Now he is wondering whether he may kill the court emissary on the law of pursuer. So the Mishneh LaMelekh says: you may not. You would be liable to death—though, by the way, being liable to death isn’t all that frightening to you, because you’re headed for death anyway. Exactly. But in principle there is a prohibition here. Why? I think the point is this. The emissary of the religious court—on whom does the commandment rest to kill this Sabbath desecrator? On the religious court. I would say even more than that—on the public. The court is the public institution that carries it out, but this is a commandment upon the public. The court emissary is the public’s agent to carry out the obligation incumbent on the public, right? Now the offender himself is also part of the public. Meaning the obligation to kill him rests on him himself as well. Right? Now clearly I am not claiming—but he—

[Speaker H] He’s wicked; he removed himself from the public.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not claiming that a person who desecrated the Sabbath in front of witnesses after warning should kill himself, jump off a roof and commit suicide. Because since that law is imposed on the court, only the court must kill him. But again, that is procedure. In essence the obligation is on the public as a whole; the proper way to carry it out is through the authorized agents. But those upon whom the obligation rests are the public as a whole. Now I too am part of the public. So it cannot be that I kill the one who comes to kill me, when I myself was, in essence, supposed to kill myself. He is carrying out my own agency. So clearly I have no obligation to save myself, nor even permission to save myself; I have an obligation to die. So how, in the name of a permission to save myself, can I kill the one who comes and carries out the obligation that is also incumbent on me? I have no obligation to save myself; I have an obligation to die.

[Speaker F] Maybe if he actually has an obligation to die, then “and live by them” no longer applies to him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker F] Right. We would have to go by the fact that it is his obligation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I said—what’s the difference? I said there is a difference between the two formulations. You are pointing out that maybe there is no difference. I’m saying no, there may be a difference. The formulation of “and live by them” says: here there is no permission. The second formulation says: this is not a life-threatening situation at all. A life-threatening situation is a situation where a living person is in mortal danger. He is not a living person; he is a dead person. He must be killed. There is no reason to permit—not merely no permission, but no reason to permit. It is not a life-saving case at all. Okay? But again, I don’t want to get into that, because it really takes us a bit into definitions of saving life. Let’s continue. So now I go back to Tosafot. But this led to—

[Speaker C] So does it come out that if a person carried out on himself the court-imposed death penalty, he acted properly? In that he didn’t leave it to the court?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, I didn’t understand.

[Speaker C] A person who killed himself with the court-imposed death appropriate to him—is that halakhically permitted?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. He cannot put himself to the court-imposed death appropriate to him, because a court-imposed death is carried out by a court. It’s like the controversy I mentioned over renewing ordination, where they wanted to create a court in order to flog the coerced converts and exempt them from the punishment of karet. According to your approach, there would have been no need to create a court—let him just flog himself thirty-nine lashes and be exempt from karet. No. If the lashes are not given by a court, he is not exempt; it does not atone for him. Court punishments have to be carried out by a court, after a court ruling, with the whole procedure. Okay, so now—Tosafot’s difficulty was: why decree this at all, since he won’t listen to us? On that the Rivah answers: “And the Rivah answered that if they did not permit it, he is not liable to stoning, since he refrains from removing it because we forbid him to.” Meaning, what the Rivah answers is that he brings back the question the Sefat Emet asked, which we answered earlier, and adopts it not as a difficulty but as an answer. After all, what did the Sefat Emet ask? Why does Tosafot ask: why are you forbidding him something that he won’t listen to you about? You should have asked better:

[Speaker G] Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why does he need to listen to you at all? What validity does the prohibition you are imposing here even have? Okay? After all, he can avoid it because he is under compulsion—this is a life-saving case. The Rivah says: let’s go one step further. If he is indeed under compulsion, then it follows that he also does not deserve liability to stoning. And if he does not deserve liability to stoning, then when we tell him not to remove the bread, we are only telling him: don’t remove the bread, and absorb the fact that you will violate the Torah-level prohibition of baking, but there will be no stoning here. You are exempt from stoning, and therefore indeed the language of the Talmud is “so that he not come to the prohibition of stoning,” not “to liability to stoning,” because there is no liability to stoning here—only the prohibition of stoning. All right? Again, regarding the Rashash and the Minchat Chinukh, we already spoke about that—how according to the Rashash, why is it called “that he not come to the prohibition of stoning”? He already committed the prohibition of stoning, and he is not liable to stoning because a condition is missing, and the prohibition he already did—that I already answered earlier. But for our purposes here, I think the wording in the Talmud is indeed precise: “that he not come to the prohibition of stoning” means the prohibition and not the stoning itself, because the stoning itself, says Tosafot, does not exist in such a situation. “And likewise in tractate Passover, at the end of the chapter ‘The Woman’—an uncircumcised person, sprinkling, and a scalpel—they upheld their words in the face of karet.” That is, if I need to do some prohibited act in order to perform the act of circumcision, in order to perform circumcision for someone on the Sabbath—yes?—then I need to violate Sabbath prohibitions, so the sages forbade rabbinic prohibitions even though karet applies to one who does not bring the Passover offering. So you see that it is not because the rabbis forbade him from doing Passover that therefore—sorry, the karet is for Passover, not circumcision. Since the rabbis forbade him from doing the Passover, therefore he does not become liable to karet. The Rivah says the same is true here. Again, I’m not getting into that passage there, because there one can discuss a lot. But Tosafot, or the Rivah, says that according to this, the same is true here: once the rabbis are the ones who forbade you to remove it, then clearly even if you did not remove it because you listened to them, you would not come to liability for stoning. Now, that is Tosafot’s view. But Rashi on page 3b—I referred you to that Rashi—look only at the line underlined: “But here, if we penalize him from removing it, then perforce there is liability to death by the court.” Meaning, Rashi disagrees with the Rivah. Rashi claims that although we penalize him, forbid him to remove it, and because of that he does not remove it, he does become liable to death by the court; he does become liable to stoning, against what the Rivah says. And then of course the Rivah’s question returns, right? So why decree something upon him that for sure he won’t listen to? That is what forced the Rivah to say that apparently there is no liability to stoning here—and then he will listen to me—but according to Rashi, where there is liability to stoning, Tosafot’s question returns in full force: why decree on him a prohibition that you know he won’t listen to? Okay? Are you with me again? I think so. Suddenly—

[Speaker G] There was a crash.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second—so Zoom stopped, everyone left the meeting, now they need to come back.

[Speaker G] Wait, give me a second.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is this? Am I outside? Or what? I heard some voice in the closet?

[Speaker G] How are you too?

[Speaker E] That’s me. I’m not dealing with it now, but back in the day I was a computer programmer, and afterward—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —I worked at it here בארץ.

[Speaker E] As—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As you dug into me, there was a drop—a brief power outage אצלנו and we came back. But the modem—the modem now also takes time to come back up; now it’s coming up. Is everyone here?

[Speaker H] We didn’t leave.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good. So according to Rashi, who says there is liability to stoning even in such a case, then—

[Speaker F] He won’t listen to you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot’s question returns: what is the point of forbidding people things that they certainly will not observe? And here there are several possible ways to settle it. Yes, there are several possible ways to explain it. One possibility is what I said earlier: maybe this is a declarative prohibition.

[Speaker C] Are you answering Rashi now?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. First possibility: what I said before—that maybe we are dealing here with a declarative prohibition. Rashi basically is not troubled by the fact that they won’t listen to us; he understands they won’t listen to us, and still there is value in establishing a prohibition in a way that educates people how severe Sabbath violation is, that even for a light prohibition like removing bread we are willing that you come to liability to stoning. True, in practice people won’t listen to us, and perhaps we ourselves will even wink and forgive them for it, but this declaration has educational importance for us. That is one possibility. Another possibility is that this is simply not a legitimate consideration. The fact that they won’t listen to us—that’s their problem. We have to say what the truth is, and the truth is that in such a situation removing the bread is forbidden; there is no permission to remove the bread from the oven. If you decide to violate that, then decide to violate it, and you will receive punishment in heaven also for the rabbinic prohibition that you committed. It is not our job, in making our calculations, to decide whether to surrender to lawlessness. We are not supposed to take that into account.

[Speaker C] “Let the law pierce the mountain, and let the wicked die.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s a second possibility. Yes, it’s in a somewhat inverted form: “feed it to the wicked man and let him die.” The third possibility—and this is a novel one, but afterward maybe we can even bring some support for it—is that according to Rashi, on the side that it is forbidden to remove it, and on that side he is also liable to stoning, right? If he didn’t remove it because of the prohibition, that doesn’t exempt him; he would still be liable to stoning. What would happen if he did remove it? It could be that he would still be liable to stoning. That wouldn’t save him. And why? Think about it: why really—why really would I be liable to stoning in such a case? Maybe, for example, because of the approach of the Rashash. Whether he removes it or whether he doesn’t remove it?

[Speaker H] If he removes it in an unusual manner, if—

[Speaker C] If he removes it, and also if he doesn’t, he’s still liable to death.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It wouldn’t save him. In short, the claim of Rashi—the third possibility I’m suggesting—is that Rashi’s claim is that even if he removes it, that won’t save him, and therefore he won’t remove it.

[Speaker E] Wait, but Rashi doesn’t think like the Rashash, does he?

[Speaker C] That the moment he stuck the bread on, he already performed the act?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, Nechama is getting ahead of me. One second, first let me say it.

[Speaker C] Why would anyone remove it? So why would the Sages decree something that in any case he won’t do?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So wait a second. The question on Rashi was: why issue a decree when you know people won’t listen to you? I said there are three possibilities. Okay? Possibility one: this is a declarative Jewish law. Possibility two: such a consideration is irrelevant—I decree what it is correct to decree, and people will decide what they decide. Possibility three: Rashi may hold that even if you remove the bread, you still won’t be saved from stoning; we’ll stone you despite the fact that you removed the bread. And then what happens is—one second, I’ll explain it—but according to… what happens is that there’s no point; why wouldn’t you listen to us? Whether you remove it or don’t remove it, you are stoned. So at least don’t commit this rabbinic prohibition.

[Speaker C] So here he actually will listen to us.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but then I’ll tell him, listen, we command you to breathe. What? I don’t understand. Listen to us.

[Speaker C] What’s the point of commanding… they forbid removing it if in any case the person doesn’t care and won’t remove it? Why do they need to command that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But he will listen, I don’t understand.

[Speaker C] No—

[Speaker F] If he gives up because of the decree—

[Speaker C] of the Sages, he won’t remove it because he knows he’ll die anyway. So why would he remove it? So he won’t remove it. That’s exactly the point—I don’t understand. So he won’t remove it? Right, so why do the Sages need to decree such a thing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If they hadn’t decreed it, he would remove it. He regretted it in the middle; he acted intentionally and then regretted it. They say—

[Speaker C] They don’t want a person to remove it, so they prohibit it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s like asking why we prohibit something to someone—after all, if it’s forbidden he won’t do it? Of course—that’s why we make it forbidden, so that he won’t do it. If in any event he won’t be saved, whether he removes it or doesn’t remove it, then yes—why would he have motivation to remove it? Right, exactly, that’s what we wanted to do. We wanted to say: you shouldn’t have motivation to remove it because it’s forbidden. We don’t want you to remove it. And he’ll be liable to death as if by rabbinic law? No—by Torah law. Why… I didn’t understand why he’s liable.

[Speaker D] Wait, even according to the Rashash he isn’t—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] liable, because once he removes it, the action isn’t completed. One second, one second, I haven’t explained yet. I haven’t explained yet. First I only said that Rashi may hold that he is liable to death. Now I’ll try to explain. Why is he liable to death? Look at the logic. First, you could say it according to the Rashash, but I’m saying even without the Rashash. The question is whether Rashi goes with the Rashash or not. But I’m saying: you don’t need the Rashash here; it just sharpens the point. The claim is this—look: if he had not removed it, then he would have become liable to stoning, right? If he had not removed it. Now they tell me, look, now not only did he do all the criminal actions, but he added one more rabbinic transgression on top of that. And that will exempt him from stoning? Does that make sense? He basically did everything he needed in order to murder—to, sorry, desecrate the Sabbath. He is a complete offender. We talked about attempted murder as complete criminality, right? So essentially this man is a complete offender. More than that: he is an offender also in the sense that the condition for the baking was supposed to be fulfilled. He attached it in such a way that the condition was supposed to be fulfilled. Right? Had he not committed the prohibition. So now because he committed the prohibition, we will exempt him? Why in the world? He only became more wicked, not less wicked, by also removing it. So this formalism—that the condition was not fulfilled—doesn’t interest me, because in the end, from my perspective, the condition was fulfilled. Meaning, it’s like the Rashash: since you prevented the condition from being fulfilled by means of a prohibition, that is not called preventing the condition from being fulfilled; the condition is considered fulfilled. Think of Hanukkah candles as a matter of the day’s obligation. With Hanukkah candles, I put in enough oil for half an hour. Then after five minutes the wind comes and extinguishes the candle. I have fulfilled my obligation. Why? But it needs to burn for half an hour. No—the requirement is that you do your part in a way that would allow it to burn for half an hour. Now, the person who stuck the bread in the oven stuck it there in a way that allows it to bake. And in that sense he performed the forbidden act; he is a complete offender. If the whole oven had burned up, or fire had come down from heaven, and then not—well, even in such a situation it could be that he would still be liable. In the end, the act he performed was an act that should have resulted in baked bread. So what now? Now no fire came down from heaven; something worse happened. He committed another prohibition. Now besides the ordinary prohibition he committed, in which he is a complete offender against the laws of the Sabbath, he also committed another rabbinic prohibition of removing it. And that will exempt him from stoning? Because he is an even bigger wicked person?

[Speaker B] But if in order to incur stoning he needs, from beginning to end, to complete the labor of baking, and it has to end in baking, then yes, he saved himself—he didn’t commit the transgression.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s why I said that according to the Rashash it’s easier to say this.

[Speaker D] Why? But the Rashash says he doesn’t incur the punishment. He may violate the prohibition, but for the punishment to occur, it has to bake.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m claiming that if the condition—according to the Rashash it’s much easier to understand that if the condition was not fulfilled because you committed a transgression, that counts as if it was fulfilled. Because it’s only a condition. According to the Minchat Chinukh, fine—you need actual baking. In practice I didn’t bake, right? It happened through a transgression, but I still didn’t bake. But here, after all, I already committed my transgression. That’s done. It just requires some condition to be fulfilled. Now if you prevented that condition from being fulfilled by means of a prohibition, as far as I’m concerned it’s as if the condition was fulfilled. So according to the Rashash it’s easier. I think you can say it even according to the Minchat Chinukh. Because in the end it’s obvious that even the Minchat Chinukh would agree that physically my act is only the attaching. Right? That’s obvious. The difference is only in the definition of the prohibited labor, but my act—meaning, even the Minchat Chinukh says that I am a complete offender after I stuck the bread in the oven. Nothing is missing, from my perspective, for me to become a complete offender. It is still a technical condition; it’s just a technical condition for the transgression and not for the punishment, but it is still a technical condition. And therefore even according to the Minchat Chinukh, in my opinion, you can say this—not only according to the Rashash. And according to this, it really comes out that if, I don’t know, I put bread in the oven and the bread was about to bake—had nothing unusual happened, the bread was about to bake—and now fire came down from heaven or hail came down from heaven and extinguished the oven and destroyed everything, I claim he would incur stoning even though the condition was not fulfilled. Because it’s like Hanukkah candles. If for a Hanukkah candle I put in enough oil for half an hour, then even if in the end the candle goes out, I did everything on my end; I prepared the matter so that it could burn for half an hour. So from my perspective the condition was fulfilled.

[Speaker C] And can you compare a positive commandment and a prohibition? Meaning a positive commandment versus a prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m offering this only as a suggestion, only as a suggestion, even aside from the comparison. I’m just saying that this suggestion is possible if one accepts that line of reasoning.

[Speaker F] Then why does the Rashash require the condition to actually be fulfilled?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker F] If he did everything necessary for it to happen, then why does the Rashash require that the side condition be fulfilled?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does it mean to say he requires the condition to be fulfilled? There was a condition for liability. If he stuck bread in an oven in a way that it was not going to bake, then he did not commit a prohibition.

[Speaker C] In a cold oven.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. The attaching has significance only if in the end it leads to baked bread—or if it is an attaching that could lead to baked bread, according to the adjustment I’m making now. Once this is an attaching that can lead to baked bread if nothing unusual happens, that is the prohibition. And according to this reading of the Rashash, I don’t care if that baked bread emerges after the Sabbath; that doesn’t matter to me, because in the final analysis the attaching turns out to have been a meaningful act, because as a result of that attaching, the bread was produced.

[Speaker F] So then he doesn’t really remain with the Rashash at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Rashash still sees it as a side condition, but it is a condition that basically sheds a different light on the action. Now when I ask whether this was a meaningful action when he attached it—the answer is certainly yes, because if he had done nothing else, it would have been an action that produced bread. So you can’t say that this action was not a meaningful action. That’s all. The fact that now he did some maneuver so that in the end the bread didn’t come out—that doesn’t matter, because the action was meaningful. It was an action that had the potential to produce bread. If you understand it this way, then I think you can explain in Rashi that he would be liable to death even if he removed it. That really is a novelty, but in my opinion it is not such a far-reaching novelty.

[Speaker C] I think it’s very far-reaching, because we generally accept that in Jewish law there is no such thing—it’s written that the Holy One, blessed be He, joins a good thought to an action, but not a thought—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, it has nothing to do with good thoughts. I’m talking about the question of how the prohibition is defined. Notice, I changed—

[Speaker C] But—

[Speaker D] Rashi says that they permit him to remove it so that he won’t reach a situation of stoning liability. Meaning, they permitted him. Again.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll explain again. There is a doubt about the opinion of Rav Bibi bar Abaye, and that is exactly what the Tosafot Yeshanim—our next topic—deals with. There is a doubt about the opinion of Rav Bibi bar Abaye. According to one side of the doubt, they forbade him to remove it even though he would thereby come to liability for stoning, right? According to that side, even if he removes it he still violates a stoning prohibition—he incurs stoning. Fine? But what is the second side? The second side says that they permitted him to remove it so that he would not come to liability for stoning, and according to that side, if he removes it he certainly will not come to liability for stoning—that’s obvious. We are explaining only the first side of Rav Bibi’s dilemma, not the second side. Always remember: this is not a fixed law; these are two possibilities. Each one proposes what the law would be. We are uncertain which of the two is correct, so each of the two sides requires explanation.

[Speaker D] No, I understand. I’m just saying that according to how I read Rashi, if he leaves the bread in the oven he is forcibly liable to stoning, but if he removes it he will not be liable to stoning.

[Speaker B] Right—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That—

[Speaker D] is what Rashi says.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but right now Rashi isn’t saying that. Rashi says that if they forbade him to remove the bread, then the view is that he is essentially liable to stoning even though he was under compulsion, and according to that side, even if he removes it, it won’t help him—even if he removes it, it won’t help him. The second side of the doubt, no—it may indeed be that this is not true. It may be that the view is like Tosafot: that if he removes the bread, then he is saved from liability to stoning, and therefore they permitted him to remove it. That’s all.

[Speaker F] So, that’s the end of the class. What? The electricity started working again.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so now let’s look at the Tosafot Yeshanim. The Tosafot Yeshanim basically says similar things. I’ll share it for a second—where was I? I don’t know what happened here this time; the electricity didn’t even go out. Suddenly my internet disconnected, I don’t really understand what happened. Fine, I’ll just finish with the Tosafot Yeshanim because it actually takes us right into the point where we stopped. The Tosafot Yeshanim basically asks: “Our teacher Shmuel of Marburg raises a difficulty: if so, what is the dilemma? Since whether they permitted it or did not permit it, he is not liable, it is obvious that they would not permit it.” He is basically asking on the Riva. The Riva says that he is not liable to stoning because he is under compulsion, since the Sages forbade him to remove it. If so, then what practical difference does it make whether they permitted him or didn’t permit him? In either case he does not come to liability for death, so obviously there is no reason—

[Speaker F] That’s because of the side prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait a second. So what is the hesitation about whether they permitted him or not? After all, he will not come to a stoning prohibition either way, so why permit him? Then obviously they did not permit him—what would be the point of permitting him? Okay? What is he assuming?

[Speaker E] You could say that… right, and then when he raises it like that, yes, I thought the answer should be that the question could be whether to permit him in order to save him from a transgression or not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. That is the same question. Meaning, the Tosafot Yeshanim assumes that the permission to remove the bread is permission in order to prevent the death prohibition—the liability for death—not the prohibition itself. Because if it were to prevent him from the prohibition, then what’s the question? There would still be room to hesitate whether they permitted him or not in order to prevent the prohibition. The fact that he is not liable to stoning is irrelevant. He assumes like the Ritva that we saw earlier—that’s why I said we’d come back to this here—that the permission to remove it, at least in a case of intentional action, is to prevent the punishment, not the prohibition. And this joins with the Ritva we saw regarding an unintentional case, where the Ritva says that in an unintentional case the permission to remove the bread is in order to spare the money of the sin-offering, not because of the prohibition. And that is how the Tosafot Yeshanim asks. So he answers with two answers. And it seems to me—and the Sefat Emet comments on this incidentally, though I’m not bringing him here—that the Sefat Emet basically comments that in any event one could have explained the Tosafot Yeshanim as referring to permitting the prohibition. “And it seems to me that the practical difference is whether, if they permitted it, he is liable if he did not remove it.” What is that? What is this answer?

[Speaker H] “If they permitted it, he is liable if he did not remove it”? That’s the Tosafot Yeshanim.

[Speaker F] Meaning, if he is obligated to remove it—not only if this permission obligates him, not just that… what—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] is the answer? He asked a question: after all, obviously they don’t permit him because either way he won’t be saved from liability to stoning. So what is the doubt whether they permitted him or not? What does he answer?

[Speaker C] That maybe he is saved? No, he is saved.

[Speaker B] If they permit removing it—

[Speaker C] that teaches us that when he does not remove it, then he really does become liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. According to the side that they permitted it—according to the side that they permitted it—if he did not remove it, he is liable to stoning, and therefore they permitted him to remove it in order to exempt him from stoning. What the Riva explained was the side that they did not permit it. On the side that they did not permit it, he says there is no liability to stoning. There is no liability to stoning there. That is the side that they did not permit it. Of course the question still remains: fine, so if there is no liability to stoning here, then what is the novelty in the fact that they did not permit it? There is no reason to permit it. The novelty is precisely that there is no liability to stoning. That is the doubt. The doubt is whether there is liability to stoning if he did not remove it, or whether there is no liability to stoning if he did not remove it. And that depends on the question whether they permitted him or did not permit him. And now we have to ask ourselves what the difference is between this answer and the second answer: “Alternatively, this itself is what he was asking: did they permit it, because if they did not permit it he would become liable?” I already see that I’ve gone over time. What I suggest is: next time, start from this Tosafot Yeshanim. We’ll continue the class—there are several important principles here. I may add a bit for you.

[Speaker F] Rabbi, I think you also didn’t send this time—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the summary.

[Speaker F] the summary of the previous two classes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I remember that I sent it. Did I send it? That’s how I remember it, but maybe I’m mistaken.

[Speaker B] You sent it, you sent it, yes.

[Speaker F] You even sent an updated version.

[Speaker B] Yes, an updated one, and it’s six pages.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I sent the correction to the preparation sheet, not to the summary. Right. Fine, I’ll send it again if you want. In any case, look from the Tosafot Yeshanim onward briefly, and we’ll start from there next time. Okay? But remember well what we’ve done until now, because there’s a connection. What I suggested in Rashi at the end—I’m already giving you a hint—what I suggested in Rashi at the end, the third possibility, that he incurred death even if he removed it—he incurred death—may be connected to the Tosafot Yeshanim here. Okay, thank you very much,

[Speaker H] Shabbat shalom. Shabbat shalom, shabbat shalom.